CourtListener 10862463•People v. Deetch CA2/6
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Filed 5/20/26 P. v. Deetch CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Civ. Nos. B343608,
B343609
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles Super. Ct.
Nos. NA121676-01, BA488179-
v. 02)
BENJAMIN SHANE DEETCH,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted Benjamin Shane Deetch of vehicular
manslaughter with gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 192, subd.
(c)(1)) after his sleeping passenger was killed when he drove his
car into the back of a semitruck. Based on the same conduct, the
trial court also found him to be in violation of his probation in a
separate human trafficking case. Deetch appeals the judgment
in the vehicular manslaughter case and the probation revocation
order in the human trafficking case, now consolidated on appeal.
He contends there is no substantial evidence to support the
verdict or the probation violation. We disagree and affirm the
judgments.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of June 1, 2022, Deetch and Lesly Janet
Cabrera attended a gathering in Compton. Cabrera left the
gathering around 11:40 p.m. and fell asleep in Deetch’s parked
Infiniti without fastening her seatbelt. An hour later, Deetch
entered the car, saw that Cabrera was asleep and unbuckled, and
began driving east toward a hotel in Anaheim without waking
her or securing her seatbelt.
At around 1:00 a.m., Deetch was driving eastbound on
Highway 91 near the interchange with Highway 710 in Long
Beach. Cabrera was still asleep and unbuckled. Another
motorist, Cardella Burtch, was driving 50 to 60 miles per hour
when she noticed Deetch approaching rapidly from behind. She
estimated he was traveling at least 70 miles per hour (in a 65
mph zone) and she changed lanes for fear of being struck. Deetch
passed on her left and quickly outdistanced her.
Ahead of Deetch, Hugo Herrera was driving an 18-wheel
semitruck at approximately 35 miles per hour after merging onto
Highway 91 two to three minutes earlier. Deetch’s Infiniti struck
the rear of Herrera’s trailer, blowing out two of Herrera’s tires
before spinning out and coming to rest near the center divider.
The cause of the collision was disputed at trial. Herrera
testified that Deetch suddenly swerved from his lane into
Herrera’s and struck the rear left side of the trailer. The defense
presented CHP measurements and expert testimony showing
Herrera’s truck was straddling the lane line at the point of
impact, with the left rear tire about one foot over the line.
Photographs also depicted several rear lights on Herrera’s trailer
as dim or unilluminated after the collision. Herrera said he had
checked all lights when his shift started in the afternoon, and all
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were working. The responding officer was unable to determine
whether the unlit lights were in that condition before or as a
result of the crash.
Cabrera, unrestrained and asleep at the time of the
collision, was thrown forward and struck her head on the
windshield, sustaining fatal injuries. Deetch pulled Cabrera
from the car and held her near the center divider. Minutes later,
another car struck the abandoned Infiniti. Deetch and Cabrera
were clear of this second impact. Cabrera died as a result of the
collision.
The People charged Deetch with vehicular manslaughter
with gross negligence (count 1) and driving on a suspended
license (count 2). At the time of the accident, Deetch was on
probation in a human trafficking case. His probation terms and
conditions required him to obey all laws.
The trial court held a combined preliminary hearing and
probation violation hearing. The court held Deetch to answer on
the new charges and found him to be in violation of his probation
for failure to obey all laws.
Jury trial commenced. Before evidence was presented,
Deetch pleaded no contest to count 2, driving on a suspended
license. After trial, the jury found Deetch guilty of vehicular
manslaughter with gross negligence.
The trial court sentenced Deetch to 16 months on the
manslaughter conviction to be served consecutive to an 18-year
sentence Deetch was serving in an unrelated attempted murder
case. In the probation case, the court imposed four-year-eight-
month sentences for each of the two human trafficking counts,
consecutive to each other and the principal term.
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Deetch timely filed notices of appeal in both cases and the
appeals were consolidated.
DISCUSSION
I. Vehicular Manslaughter
Standard of review
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) It is the
exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of
witnesses and to resolve factual conflicts. We do not reweigh the
evidence or substitute our own credibility determinations for
those of the trier of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199,
1206. (Ochoa).)
Gross negligence
Deetch contends the evidence was insufficient to support
gross negligence. We disagree.
Gross negligence is “the exercise of so slight a degree of
care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the
consequences.” (People v. Bennett (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036
(Bennett).) The test is objective: whether a reasonable person in
the defendant’s position would have been aware of the risk
involved. (Ibid.) Gross negligence may be shown from all the
relevant circumstances, including the manner in which the
defendant operated his vehicle and any other relevant aspects of
his conduct. (People v. Ho (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 408, 415 (Ho).)
Although Deetch contested the cause of the collision at
trial, pointing to evidence that the truck driver was negligent, we
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cannot simply substitute a version of the facts the jury did not
find true. At least one reasonable interpretation of the disputed
evidence is that Deetch was grossly negligent.
Three acts, considered cumulatively, support the jury’s
finding here. First, the uncontested evidence is that Deetch
decided to drive on the freeway after midnight knowing Cabrera
was asleep and unrestrained in the front passenger seat. This
was a knowing violation of Vehicle Code section 27315,
subdivision (d). That decision created a substantial risk of
serious injury or death in the event of any sudden maneuver or
collision.
Second, he traveled at an unsafe speed. Burtch estimated
Deetch was traveling at least 70 miles per hour. She felt
compelled to change lanes to avoid him and watched him quickly
outdistance her. Her lane change confirms that his speed was
not merely above the posted maximum but unsafe for a nighttime
freeway merge with a sleeping, unbelted passenger. (Veh. Code,
§ 22350.)
Finally, the jury could have found that Deetch made a
sudden lane change, driving his car into the rear of a large
commercial truck without slowing, braking, or taking any evasive
action before impact. A reasonable person aware of Cabrera’s
vulnerability would have recognized that this course of conduct
created a high probability of serious injury or death.
Deetch argues the evidence of gross negligence is
undermined by the dim or inoperable lights on Herrera’s trailer,
which he contends rendered the truck difficult to see in the dark.
But this was contested, and we must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the judgment. The responding officer was
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unable to determine whether the malfunctioning lights were
broken before or as a result of the crash.
Deetch also contends that because the facts here are less
egregious than those in cases like Bennett, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1032
(drunk driving), Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1199 (extreme
intoxication), and People v. Nicolas, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th 1165
(17 minutes of texting at 80 miles per hour), the evidence cannot
support gross negligence. Gross negligence, however, does not
require any particular combination of aggravating factors. It
may be shown from “all the relevant circumstances” of the
defendant’s driving and conduct. (Ho, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p.
415.) The absence of intoxication or distracted driving does not
preclude a finding of gross negligence where, as here, the
defendant knowingly began a freeway drive with a sleeping,
unbelted passenger and then drove at excessive speed into an
adjacent lane without any attempt to avoid the truck in front of
him.
Deetch also argues that his immediate rescue of Cabrera
after the collision shows he was not consciously indifferent to
human life. But the question is whether a reasonable person in
Deetch’s position would have been aware of the risk created by
his pre-crash conduct, not what Deetch’s post-crash behavior
reveals about his subjective feelings toward Cabrera. (Bennett,
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1036.)
Ordinary negligence and causation
Deetch separately contends that the evidence does not
support even a finding of simple negligence. He argues that
Herrera’s lane encroachment was the true cause of the accident.
Since we hold the evidence supported a finding of gross
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negligence, it necessarily supported a finding of simple
negligence.
Again, we do not reweigh the evidence. Herrera and the
defense expert gave conflicting testimony about lane positioning,
and the jury resolved that conflict against Deetch. We may not
revisit credibility determinations on appeal. (Ochoa, supra, 6
Cal.4th at p. 1206.) Even if Herrera’s truck was partially over
the lane line, as the defense contended, the jury could reasonably
conclude that Deetch’s speed and lane change were a substantial
factor in causing the collision. When multiple concurrent causes
contribute to a death, each defendant whose conduct was a
substantial factor in bringing about that result bears criminal
liability. (People v. Brady (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1325
(Brady).)
Deetch also contends that because no expert testified a
seatbelt would have saved Cabrera, and because Deetch himself
was unbuckled and survived, the seatbelt violation cannot be the
proximate cause of her death. But the prosecution was not
required to prove that the seatbelt violation, standing alone,
caused Cabrera’s death. It needed only to prove that Deetch’s
conduct as a whole was a substantial factor contributing to her
death. (Brady, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1325.) There is no
dispute that Cabrera died from the collision. A jury could find,
based on the evidence, that the collision resulted from Deetch’s
negligent driving and that Cabrera’s injuries were fatal because
her seatbelt was not buckled.
Superseding cause
Deetch argues that even if his driving was negligent,
Herrera’s conduct was a superseding intervening cause that
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severed the causal connection between the seatbelt failure and
Cabrera’s death.
An independent intervening cause only breaks the causal
chain if it is “unforeseeable . . . an extraordinary and abnormal
occurrence, which rises to the level of an exonerating,
superseding cause.” (People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860,
871.) A dependent intervening cause, which is a normal and
reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s original act, does
not relieve the defendant of liability. (Brady, supra, 129
Cal.App.4th at p. 1325.) The jury could have found that a large
commercial truck traveling at 35 miles per hour on a freeway at
1:00 a.m. is not an extraordinary or abnormal occurrence.
Whatever role Herrera’s position may have played in the
collision, the jury did not have to find that it rose to the level of a
superseding cause.
II. Probation Violation
Standard of review
The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence
that Deetch had violated his probation. We review that decision
to determine if it was supported by substantial evidence. (People
v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443-447.)
Sufficiency
Because we affirm the manslaughter conviction, the
probation violation finding (for failure to obey all laws) based on
the same conduct must be affirmed as well. The manslaughter
conviction establishes that Deetch violated the condition of his
probation that required him to obey all laws. (People v. Arreola
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1162; People v. Armas (2011) 191
Cal.App.4th 1173, 1187.)
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Even considering the independent probation violation
hearing record, the evidence was more than sufficient. Herrera
testified that Deetch’s vehicle was “coming really fast” and
“getting real close” before it suddenly swerved into his lane. The
CHP officer who responded to the scene testified that Deetch told
him Cabrera was asleep and unbuckled when he began driving,
that he did not attempt to wake her or fasten her seatbelt, and
that he was traveling approximately 70 miles per hour when the
collision occurred. That evidence supports the violation finding.
Deetch’s reliance on People v. Quarterman (2012) 202
Cal.App.4th 1280 is misplaced. In Quarterman, the court refused
to find a probation violation because the prosecution presented no
evidence that the property (in a receiving stolen property case)
was stolen. Without proof of that essential element, there was no
proof the defendant had failed to obey all laws. (Id. at pp. 1287,
1291.) Here, the People proved all elements of gross vehicular
manslaughter – at the probation violation hearing, and again at
trial.
Willfulness
Deetch contends his conduct was not willful because the
collision was an accident beyond his control which he did not
intend. Any probation violation, therefore, was also not willful.
The test, however, is whether his conduct was deliberate, not
whether the consequences were intended. (People v. Galvan
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 978, 983.) Again, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding Deetch’s decision to drive on the
freeway at night, with an unbuckled, sleeping passenger, and
then change lanes unsafely, was deliberate conduct. The fact
that there was some evidence that Herrera may have contributed
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to the collision does not render Deetch’s own course of conduct
involuntary.
Probation violation sentencing
Deetch contends the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating his probation and sentencing him to prison instead
of reinstating probation. He correctly notes the standard in
deciding whether to revoke or reinstate probation is “whether the
probationer’s conduct demonstrates that they are no longer a
suitable candidate for community supervision and that the goals
of probation have been frustrated.”
We review the decision for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1421.) “The decision
whether to reinstate probation or terminate probation . . . rests
within the broad discretion of the trial court.” (Ibid.)
Here, Deetch was on probation for human trafficking when
he committed gross vehicular manslaughter. At the time the
trial court sentenced him to prison on the probation violation,
Deetch was already serving an 18-year sentence for attempted
murder. On these facts, we cannot find the court abused its
discretion by not reinstating Deetch’s probation. Deetch was no
longer a suitable candidate for community supervision.
Deetch relies on People v. Sturgeon (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d
711, 714, for the proposition that a trial court must weigh
mitigating circumstances before revoking probation. But
Sturgeon cuts the other way. It holds that where revocation rests
on a criminal conviction, a probationer may not, as a matter of
right, relitigate the underlying facts even for purposes of
mitigation. (Ibid.)
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgments in both cases, NA121676-01 and
BA488179-02.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
VAN ROOYEN, J.*
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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Laura L. Laesecke and Kerry L. White, Judges
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Omer A. Khan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nima Razfar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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