CourtListener 10861330•In re A.G. CA2/6
Texto completo
Filed 5/19/26 In re A.G. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re A.G., A Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B349620
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. J073534)
(Ventura County)
VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,
Respondent,
v.
L.S.C.,
Appellant.
L.S.C. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating parental rights as to A.G. (Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 366.26.)1 Mother contends: (1) the court prejudicially erred in
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
denying her parental bond exception; and (2) Ventura County
Human Services Agency (Agency) and the juvenile court failed to
adequately comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and its state counterpart. We will
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 13, 2024, the Agency filed a section 300 petition
regarding A.G., born in August 2024. The petition alleged
mother tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl at
birth. Both mother and father had substance abuse issues that
periodically interfered with their ability to provide adequate care
and supervision. A.G. entered the care of resource parents within
days of birth.
At an uncontested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the
juvenile court sustained the petition. It offered reunification
services to mother but bypassed services for father.
After minor’s counsel requested a contested six-month
review hearing, the parties ultimately came to an agreement.
Reunification services were terminated and a section 366.26
hearing was set. If mother entered a program and did well, her
counsel would file a JV-180 request. During the dependency
period, mother had struggled with sobriety as she entered and
exited drug treatment programs and failed or refused drug tests.
At the section 366.26 hearing, mother testified she
currently visited A.G. three times per week for 90 minutes. Her
visitation schedule had varied throughout the case, but she had
missed just one visit. At the visits, they played and shared
meals, and mother bathed him. A.G. cried when mother put him
in the car. Mother usually tried to comfort him by giving him a
toy or bottle, or by hugging and kissing him. Mother believed
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A.G. had a strong bond with her because of how happy he was to
see her and she “could just feel it as a mom.”
According to the section 366.26 report, there was “no
evidence to support that [A.G.] and the parents have such a
significant relationship that it would be detrimental to [A.G.] if
this relationship was severed.” The report noted that although
mother’s visitation had been liberalized, it “was returned back to
monitored six months ago due to the mother’s lack of progress in
services and failure to demonstrate that she is sober and engaged
in treatment.”
Regarding the parental-benefit exception, the court
acknowledged mother satisfied the first prong of visitation. As to
the second prong, the court could not find a positive emotional
attachment. The court noted it needed to consider factors like
the child’s age and the amount of time spent in mother’s care.
At one point, the court addressed mother as follows: “And I
think you would acknowledge that there’s still quite a bit of
things that you need to work on. And so here’s an important
question, which I don’t—I’m not expecting you to answer, but I
think you would acknowledge there’s some substance abuse
issues that you still have to deal with, as well as some other
things. And, you know, how long should [A.G.] have to wait?
How long should he have to wait for you to try and get on track?
That’s not fair to him. You know, children—all children need
stability; they need permanency.”
The court then stated the second prong “essentially asks is
the parent ready and has engaged in the parental role, the role of
a parent, and I don’t see how I can find in this particular case
based on visitations that you have, which I’m sure are pleasant;
I’m sure you feel that love with [A.G.] But based on those visits
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alone and the amount of time he has either been in your care or
out of your care, I don’t know how I can find that there’s a
positive emotional attachment. But I consider all of the factors.”
The court indicated it did not need to reach the third prong
given its finding on the second. The court stated that even if it
did consider the third prong, it could not find that terminating
parental rights would be detrimental to A.G. for the reasons the
second prong was not met. The court terminated parental rights
and freed A.G. for adoption.
ICWA
On August 8, 2024, a social worker reviewed the ICWA-010
form with both parents, who gave no reason to believe the child is
or may be a member of an Indian tribe. Both parents later
completed ICWA-020 forms answering no to all queries regarding
Indian ancestry. Subsequently, another social worker spoke with
both parents, who denied enrollment in a federally recognized
tribe.
During the case, the Agency documented ICWA inquiries
with relatives and other individuals. Maternal grandfather
stated his half-brother was registered with the Tejon tribe. This
half-brother, who shared a mother with the maternal
grandfather, denied registration with a federally recognized tribe.
The maternal great grandmother reported she was registered
with the Diegueno tribe in Southern California. However, she
did not register her children. She was not in possession of her
documents at the time due to a recent move but provided contact
information for a relative on the Indian Council.
A social worker sent inquiries to the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA), the California Department of Social Services, and
seven Diegueno tribes. The tribes provided no response
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indicating A.G. was either a member of or eligible for
membership with the tribes. A social worker spoke with the
relative that maternal great grandmother had referenced. He did
not know if she was registered with a tribe and noted several
Diegueno tribes existed.
At the detention hearing, the court stated “there’s no
indication” A.G. was an Indian child and ICWA did not appear to
apply. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court
stated ICWA continued not to apply. At a pretrial and ICWA
review hearing, the court found the Agency had made reasonable
efforts based on maternal great grandmother’s information.
ICWA did not apply. The court did not address ICWA at the
section 366.26 hearing.
DISCUSSION
Parental-Benefit Exception
Appellant argues the juvenile court infused its findings
regarding the parental-benefit exception’s second prong with
considerations specifically disapproved in In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). Appellant also maintains the court
prejudicially erred in failing to balance the competing variables
for the third prong. We conclude no error occurred.
“‘“At a permanency plan hearing, the [juvenile] court may
order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-
term foster care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable,
there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative
permanency plans.” [Citation.]’” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 303, 316, quoting In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1218, 1224.) If the juvenile court finds the child adoptable, it
must terminate parental rights unless one of several statutory
exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
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A parent invoking the parental-benefit exception has the
burden of proof and must establish three prongs by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) “regular visitation and
contact” between the parent and child; (2) “a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship”; and (3) “terminating that attachment would be
detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The
inquiry’s focus is the child’s best interests. (Caden C., at p. 632.)
We review the first two prongs for substantial evidence.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) We likewise review
for substantial evidence any factual determinations underpinning
the third prong. (Id. at p. 640.) The third prong’s “ultimate
decision—whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with his
parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” (Ibid.)
The juvenile court’s analysis of the parental-benefit
exception complied with Caden C. The court focused on whether
a “positive emotional attachment” existed. The court highlighted
relevant factors like the child’s age and the amount of time spent
in mother’s care. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The
court noted the “pleasant” visits with A.G. but ultimately could
not find the requisite attachment. Given A.G. was just 14
months old at the time of the hearing and had spent virtually his
entire life outside of mother’s custody, substantial evidence
supports the court’s ruling.
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Mother finds fault with the court’s comments related to her
substance abuse issues. Read in context, these comments do not
indicate the court based its ruling as to the second Caden C.
prong on mother’s ongoing issues. Rather, the comments were an
aside to mother designed to underscore the necessity of focusing
on A.G.’s needs, specifically stability and permanency. An
overarching focus on the child’s best interests comports with
Caden C. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
Seizing on the court’s remarks regarding the parental role,
mother argues she did not have to demonstrate a readiness to
assume full-time care of A.G. for the exception to apply. The
juvenile court in this case did not impose any such requirement.
The term “‘parental role’” is ambiguous. (See, e.g., In re
Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 319.) Here, however,
the totality of the court’s ruling clarifies that underlying factors
relied upon included A.G.’s age, time in mother’s care, and the
quality of visitation—all appropriate considerations. (See In re
A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1149 [affirming even where
juvenile court used “‘parental role’” language].)
Given the court’s ruling on the second Caden C. prong,
analysis of the third prong was unnecessary. “[A] parent must
prove all three components of the beneficial relationship
exception. A failure of proof on any one of them is fatal.” (In re
Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 322, fn. 10.)
ICWA
Mother argues the Agency and court failed to adequately
comply with the inquiry requirements of ICWA and CAL-ICWA.
The Agency concedes “the ICWA inquiry into maternal great-
grandmother . . . fell short of being adequate.” We reject the
concession and conclude reversal is unwarranted.
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ICWA defines an “‘Indian child’” as “any unmarried person
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an
Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25
U.S.C. § 1903(4); see also § 224.1, subd. (b).)
“Agencies and juvenile courts have ‘an affirmative and
continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding to determine
whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child is or may be
an Indian child.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1131-
1132 (Dezi C.); § 224.2, subd. (a).) “‘This continuing duty can be
divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of
further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.’”
(In re C.R. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 793, 799.)
“We generally review the juvenile court’s factual finding
that ICWA does not apply for substantial evidence.” (In re C.R.,
supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 800; see also § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
“[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry
is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially
discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard
of review.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) “If, upon
review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry was adequate
and proper and ICWA does not apply are found to be supported
by sufficient evidence and record documentation as required by
California law [citation], there is no error . . . .” (Ibid.)
Applying a deferential standard of review, the inquiry
regarding maternal great grandmother was adequate. The
Agency spoke with a relative who she indicated could provide
additional information. That individual did not know if maternal
great grandmother was registered with a tribe. The Agency also
sent an ICWA inquiry letter to the BIA and seven Diegueno
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tribes. (See § 224.2, subd. (e)(2).) The Agency was not required
to recontact these entities to fulfill its continuing duty. (See In re
H.M. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1183 [disagreeing with claim
that department obligated “to again contact” tribe after providing
requested information].)
In addition to the efforts regarding maternal great
grandmother, the Agency documented ICWA inquiries with both
parents, the resource parents, father’s friend, mother’s prior
partner, maternal grandfather and his half-brother, a paternal
uncle, paternal grandmother, and paternal great grandmother.
The Agency thoroughly addressed the only reasons to believe
A.G. was an Indian child. Sufficient evidence supports the
conclusions that the inquiry was adequate and that ICWA was
inapplicable. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
Mother argues the juvenile court failed in its independent
duty of inquiry regarding both parents, maternal grandfather,
and maternal step-grandmother. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); 25
C.F.R. § 23.107(a); § 224.2, subd. (c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.481(a)(2)(A).) As to mother and father, their negative responses
to any ICWA inquiry are abundantly clear based on the ICWA-
010 form, ICWA-020 form, and subsequent conversation with the
Agency. Likewise, any court inquiry of maternal grandfather
would have served only to duplicate the Agency’s effort. And
maternal step-grandmother, who did not qualify as an extended
family member statutorily, could not be reasonably expected to
contribute any unique information. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1,
subd. (c)(1).) Any issue concerning the court’s inquiry does not
undermine the evidence’s sufficiency.
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DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Gilbert A. Romero, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Aida Aslanian under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Appellant L.S.C. (mother).
Tiffany N. North, County Counsel, and Joseph J. Randazzo,
Principal Assistant County Counsel, for Respondent Ventura
County Human Services Agency.
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