People v. Simmons CA2/6

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Filed 5/19/26 P. v. Simmons CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE 2d Crim. No. B341135
(Super. Ct. No. 24PT-00594)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

CHARLES VINCENT
SIMMONS III,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant Charles Vincent Simmons III challenges the trial
court’s order granting revocation of his Post Release Community
Supervision (PRCS) on the basis that because he had previously
admitted a prior serious felony, he should have been placed on
parole instead of PRCS. He asks us to remand to the trial court
for further proceedings so he may demonstrate he did not receive
adequate notice either of the reason he was placed on PRCS as
opposed to parole, or that he only had 60 days to challenge that
designation. We conclude his claim is meritless and we will
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant pled no contest to Possession of Contraband in
the Jail in violation of Penal Code § 4573.6, subdivision (a)1.
Prior to sentencing he filed a Romero2 motion to strike and
dismiss his admitted prior strike for violating section 136.1,
subdivision (a)(2) (attempting to dissuade a witness). The court
granted his motion and sentenced him to three years in prison.
Appellant was then released on PRCS. Over the next year,
he violated PRCS five times after failing to report to probation.
At his most recent revocation hearing, appellant argued the court
should transfer him to parole, not PRCS, because he suffered a
prior strike. The trial court found appellant remained subject to
PRCS pursuant to section 3451, subdivision (d)3 because he had
been on PRCS for a year. It further found appellant violated his
PRCS conditions and sentenced him to 180 days in jail.
DISCUSSION
Respondent moved to dismiss this appeal alleging
appellant’s claim is untimely because he challenges only his

1 Further undesignated code references are to the Penal

Code.

2 People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero)

3 Section 3451, subdivision (d) provides:
“A person released
to postrelease community supervision pursuant to subdivision (a)
shall, regardless of any subsequent determination that the
person should have been released to parole pursuant to Section
3000.08, remain subject to subdivision (a) after having served 60
days under supervision pursuant to subdivision (a).”

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initial placement on PRCS, not the current PRCS revocation
order. Appellant filed an opposition and we deferred resolution of
the motion pending completion of the briefing. Deferring to the
policy favoring review on the merits, we deny the Attorney
General’s motion. (People v. Robinson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 143, 145;
California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(a)(4).)
Appellant argues that because he suffered a prior serious
felony conviction, his placement on PRCS violates section
3000.08. We review statutory interpretation de novo (People v.
Arroyo (2016) 62 Cal.4th 589, 593), concluding appellant’s claim
is meritless because his prior strike was struck and dismissed by
the trial court when it granted his Romero motion during
sentencing.
Placing an inmate on PRCS is not a discretionary decision.
The statute unambiguously provides that unless the
requirements for parole are met, “all other offenders released
from prison shall be placed on postrelease supervision pursuant
to [section 3450 et seq].” (§§ 3000.08, subd. (b); 3451; People v.
Johnson (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 379, 400, fn. 14.) When
appellant’s prior strike was dismissed, he no longer met the
requirements for parole.
Regardless, the trial court correctly found that since
appellant had been on PRCS for a year, he was required to
remain subject to PRCS under section 3451, subdivision (d).
Appellant relies on People v. Ruiz (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 372 to
support his position that section 3451, subdivision (d) violates his
due process rights, but Ruiz is inapposite. The 60-day limitation
violated Ruiz’s due process rights because the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation had mistakenly classified him as
a serious felon, giving the trial court jurisdiction to correct the

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mistake. (Id., at pp. 379-380.) Here, the record does not
demonstrate a mistake in appellant’s placement in PRCS.
Rather, appellant sought “the most lenient sentence” possible and
urged the court to grant his Romero motion to strike and dismiss
his prior serious felony. The court did so, and as a result, the
statute required placing appellant under PRCS, not parole.
DISPOSITION
Judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Catherine J. Swysen, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________

Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Lauren Sanchez, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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