CourtListener 10860841•MIP v. Mercado CA2/4
Texto completo
Filed 5/18/26 MIP v. Mercado CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
MIP, LLC, B345709
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 21BBCV00628)
v.
CRISTINA MERCADO,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from judgment and order of the Superior Court of
the County of Los Angeles, Jared D. Moses, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Ami Meyers and Ami Meyers for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Law Offices of Charles O. Agege and Charles O. Agege for
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff MIP, LLC (MIP) appeals from judgment entered in
favor of defendant Cristina Mercado (Mercado) after a bench
trial. In addition, it appeals from an order denying its motion to
vacate the judgment. MIP failed to provide a record sufficient to
demonstrate error. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Complaint and Pretrial Proceedings
We summarize the relevant allegations of MIP’s complaint
against Monitor Polishing & Plating, Inc. (the tenant), Mercado,
and Miguel Mercado (Miguel1). In 2005, the tenant agreed to
lease commercial property from MIP, and concurrently, Mercado
and Miguel executed a guaranty of the tenant’s obligations. The
tenant failed to pay rent and damaged the property by using
hazardous substances. MIP asserted claims for breach of
contract and breach of the guaranty against the tenant and the
guarantors, respectively, and claims for trespass and nuisance
against all defendants. MIP sought unpaid rent and remediation
expenses of $181,255.25 and attorney fees.
In January 2024, the tenant and Miguel settled with MIP.
They agreed MIP would take judgment against them in the
principal amount of $75,000, but the obligation could be fully
satisfied by payment of a lesser amount according to an agreed-
upon schedule. Mercado did not sign the settlement agreement.
The settlement payments were not made, and MIP successfully
moved to enforce the settlement agreement. Judgment in the
1 Because respondent Mercado and Miguel Mercado share a
surname, we refer to the latter by his first name. No disrespect is
intended.
2
amount of $80,676.38 was entered against the tenant and Miguel
in September 2024.
In mid-October 2024, MIP propounded requests for
admission upon Mercado. They asked her to admit she entered
into the guaranty, had no defenses, caused MIP to incur damages
of at least $220,000 by damaging the property and failing to pay
rent, and was responsible for attorney fees of at least $50,000.
When Mercado did not respond, MIP moved to have the
requests deemed admitted. In lieu of an opposition, Mercado
filed belated responses to the requests. The court issued its order
granting the motion (RFA Order) on December 27, 2024.
B. Trial
A bench trial commenced on January 7, 2025, but the
appellate record does not reflect much about what occurred
during the trial. The record omits a reporter’s transcript, settled
statement, trial exhibits, the register of actions, and a complete
set of pretrial and trial orders. The minutes of the first day of
trial indicate that MIP called one witness and introduced 36
exhibits into evidence, including the requests for admission and
the RFA Order. An in-chambers meeting with counsel was held,
after which both sides rested. The court directed the parties to
present authority regarding the settlement’s effect on Mercado’s
liability.
The parties filed briefs. Mercado argued her liability as a
guarantor was exonerated under Civil Code section 28192 because
2 “A surety is exonerated . . . if by any act of the creditor, without
the consent of the surety the original obligation of the principal is
altered in any respect, or the remedies or rights of the creditor against
3
the settlement agreement impaired MIP’s remedies and altered
the tenant’s original obligation without her consent.
Trial resumed on January 29, 2025, and after hearing
argument, the court found “insufficient evidence to hold Ms.
Mercado responsible in this matter.” Judgment was entered in
favor of Mercado.
C. Motion to Vacate Judgment
MIP moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 663, arguing the RFA Order conclusively
established Mercado’s liability for damages of $220,000 and
attorney fees.
In her opposition, Mercado argued her admissions should
not be given conclusive effect. She argued they were vague,
ambiguous, and susceptible to other meanings, as well as
misleading when viewed in light of the evidence presented and
the court’s findings made at trial.
The trial court denied the motion, stating it had “already
evaluated both sides’ evidence at trial, at which time the Court
determined that [Mercado’s] guaranty liability was exonerated
and the evidence in the briefs, which was contradictory to the
admissions, properly established that [Mercado] is not liable for
[MIP’s] damages.” Further, after weighing the parties’ evidence
at trial, it “found that, notwithstanding the admissions, there is
insufficient evidence to hold [Mercado] responsible in this
matter.” Whether the court explained its decision further is
unknown because MIP has not furnished a transcript of the
hearing.
the principal, in respect thereto, in any way impaired or
suspended. . . .” (Civ. Code, § 2819.)
4
MIP appealed from the judgment and order denying the
motion to vacate.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, MIP argues that Mercado’s admissions
conclusively established her liability for $220,000 in damages and
attorney fees. MIP contends the trial court erred in finding
insufficient evidence to support a judgment in MIP’s favor.
According to MIP, the court should have granted its motion to
vacate the judgment.
A. The Trial Judgment
MIP asserts the substantial evidence standard of review
should be applied in this appeal. Where, as in this case, the
appellant failed to carry its burden of proof at trial, it is
“‘misleading to characterize [a] failure-of-proof issue as whether
substantial evidence supports the judgment.’ [Citations.]” (St.
Mary & St. John Coptic Orthodox Church v. SBC Ins. Services,
Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 817, 828–829.) Instead, the question
for a reviewing court is whether the evidence compels a finding in
favor of the appellant as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 829.) We ask
whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) uncontradicted and
unimpeached and (2) of such a character and weight as to leave
no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding. (Ibid.) Based upon the record provided, MIP
cannot make this showing.
“Although admissions are dispositive in most cases, a trial
court retains discretion to determine their scope and effect.”
(Fredericks v. Kontos Industries, Inc. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 272,
277.) Sometimes an admission is misleading or ambiguous. In
5
analyzing such an admission, the court must ensure “that it
accurately reflects what facts are admitted in the light of other
evidence.” (Ibid.)3
Here, MIP, as the party challenging a trial judgment, had
the burden to show reversible error by an adequate record, and it
has not done so. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.)
MIP’s failure to furnish a reporter’s transcript or settled
statement prevents us from knowing the conditions under which
the court received the requests and RFA Order into evidence, its
interpretation of each admission, evidence that informed its
decision on each admission’s scope and effect, and its specific
findings. Without a trial transcript or settled statement, we
must “presume[ ] that the trial court acted duly and regularly
and received substantial evidence to support” its implied finding
that the admissions left room for the introduction of evidence
bearing on exoneration. (Stevens v. Stevens (1954) 129
Cal.App.2d 19, 20 (Stevens).) We must further presume there
was substantial evidence introduced to support the trial court’s
judgment in favor of Mercado. (Ibid.)
B. Motion to Vacate the Judgment
MIP’s challenge to the order denying its motion to vacate
mirrors its challenge to the judgment. MIP argues Mercado’s
admissions conclusively established liability, damages, and the
absence of any defense. Because MIP has not shown the trial
3 MIP cites cases stating the general rule that matters admitted
through requests for admission may not be contested. These cases are
distinguishable because they did not involve questions as to the scope
and effect of admissions that were asserted to be misleading or
susceptible of other meanings.
6
court erred in treating the admissions as inconclusive, it also has
shown no basis for vacating the judgment. MIP does not show
that the court was compelled as a matter of law to enter
judgment in its favor.
MIP argues, in the alternative, that the judgment should
have been vacated because no evidence was presented at trial to
support an exoneration defense. This argument is forfeited as
MIP did not raise it in its motion to vacate. (Cook v. University of
Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, 325.)
Furthermore, the absence of trial transcript or settled statement
precludes MIP from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting exoneration. (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th
973, 992.) We must again presume the trial court received
substantial evidence to support its exoneration finding. (Stevens,
supra, 129 Cal.App.2d at p. 20.)4
4 The limited record provides reason to believe the trial court
received evidence bearing on exoneration. Mercado attached a copy of
the settlement agreement to her exhibit list. The minutes indicate
defense counsel cross-examined MIP’s witness, Adom Ratner-Stauber,
who signed the agreement. After hearing his testimony, the court
asked for briefing on the settlement’s effect on Mercado’s liability.
7
DISPOSITION
The judgment and order denying the motion to vacate are
affirmed. Mercado shall recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
8
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.