CourtListener 10860839•People v. Coleman CA2/4
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Filed 5/18/26 P. v. Coleman CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B341690
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 23CMCF00114-01)
v.
KEITH COLEMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Danette J. Gomez and Carol J. Najera,
Judges. Affirmed.
Nancy Sànchez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Zachary John Crvarich, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________________
Defendant Keith Coleman pled no contest to felony
obstructing or resisting an executive officer. He contends the
court erred in denying his motion under Penal Code
section 1538.51 to suppress evidence of a firearm discovered
during an inventory search of his vehicle. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Traffic Stop and Inventory Search
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Matthew
Yuzon testified to the following facts at the suppression hearing.
On November 30, 2023, at 6:45 a.m., Yuzon and his partner saw a
brown GMC Yukon in an alley north of Compton Boulevard in
Compton. Coleman acknowledges that “[t]he GMC was parked
illegally, and the front license plate was missing.” Yukon and his
partner approached the parked vehicle, initiating a traffic stop.
Coleman was in the driver’s seat, and the passenger had
marijuana and paraphernalia in her lap.
Coleman indicated he had a valid driver’s license. Yuzon
checked it against Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) records,
which revealed the license was suspended. He did not read the
entire record or see whether Coleman received notice of the
suspension from the DMV. Yuzon arrested Coleman “based on
1 Undesignated statutory references in this opinion are to the
Penal Code.
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the fact that his license was suspended . . . .” The passenger was
arrested for unlawful possession of marijuana. Yuzon later
learned that Coleman had not been notified of the suspension of
his license until he was arrested.
Consistent with the Sheriff’s Department’s standard
procedures, Yuzon decided to impound the vehicle because it was
parked illegally in a “known . . . high-crime area” where it was
“vulnerable to vandalism or theft.” Yuzon had personally
responded to several calls involving vehicle-related crimes in the
area. Though Coleman was not allowed to retrieve personal
items himself, Yuzon “asked him what he wanted to be taken out
of the vehicle.”2
Yuzon conducted an inventory search of the vehicle for the
purposes of ensuring the safety of law enforcement, the tow
company driver, and Coleman and identifying high-value items.
In the back seat, Yuzon found a black bag containing a .22-caliber
automatic rifle. After securing the firearm, the deputies
determined Coleman was a convicted felon and read him his
Miranda rights. Coleman stated he purchased the firearm a
couple of years earlier but was not the registered owner.
B. Motion to Suppress
The People filed a felony complaint charging Coleman with
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1),
count one).
The court conducted a hearing on Coleman’s motion to
suppress the seized firearm and the preliminary hearing on
March 13, 2024. Coleman argued that his arrest for driving with
2 Defense counsel elicited this testimony on cross-examination but
did not ask how Coleman responded.
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a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.13) was not supported by
probable cause given the absence of evidence he had actual
knowledge of the suspension, and therefore, the search that
followed was invalid. He also argued that the inventory search
did not fall within the “community caretaking” exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s search warrant requirement.
The court denied the motion, finding that the decision to
impound the vehicle was reasonable. The court found that
whether Coleman had prior notice of the suspension was not
relevant because once the deputies became aware of the
suspension, they could not permit him to drive away. The
vehicle, moreover, was illegally parked, and unless towed, would
have been left in a high-crime area where it would have been at
risk of vandalism or theft.
In June 2024, Coleman filed a renewed motion to suppress
the firearm, which also was denied.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the information was
amended to add one count of felony obstructing or resisting an
executive officer (§ 69, count two). Coleman pled no contest to
count two, and count one was dismissed. Coleman was placed on
probation for two years and imposition of his sentence was
suspended.
Coleman appealed from the judgment.
3 Vehicle Code section 14601.1, subdivision (a) provides, in
relevant part: “No person shall drive a motor vehicle when his or her
driving privilege is suspended . . . if the person so driving has
knowledge of the suspension or revocation. . . .” Knowledge is
“conclusively presumed if mailed notice has been given” by the DMV.
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DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. (People
v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 829.) A warrantless search or
seizure is presumed unconstitutional, and the government bears
the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that its action fell within an exception to the warrant
requirement. (People v. Perez (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 345, 359
(Perez); People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 939.)
One such exception is the community caretaking function,
which allows impoundment of vehicles that jeopardize public
safety and the efficient movement of traffic. (Perez, supra, 119
Cal.App.5th at p. 359.) Impoundment permits an officer to
conduct a warrantless search aimed at securing or protecting the
vehicle and its contents. (Ibid.)
To fall within the exception, an impound decision must be
justified by a community caretaking function other than
suspicion of evidence of criminal activity, for example, when a
vehicle is parked illegally, blocks traffic, or stands at risk of theft
or vandalism. (Perez, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 359–360.)
Whether someone other than the defendant could remove the car
to a safe location is a relevant consideration. (Id. at p. 360.) We
consider both the objective reasonableness of the impound
decision and the subjective intent of the impounding officer in
determining whether an impound decision was motivated by an
improper investigatory purpose. (Ibid.) The ultimate question is
whether the decision was reasonable under all the circumstances.
(Ibid.)
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On review of a motion to suppress evidence based upon a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, we view the facts in the light
most favorable to the respondent and will uphold the trial court’s
factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. (People v.
Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) We exercise our independent
judgment in determining the legality of a search on the facts so
found. (Id. at pp. 673–674.)
B. Analysis
On appeal, Coleman contends the firearm should have been
suppressed because the deputies arrested him without having an
objectively reasonable suspicion that he violated Vehicle Code
section 14601.1. The crime for which he was arrested, he argues,
requires a driver’s actual knowledge of the suspension of his
license. He argues the deputies had no basis for believing he had
such knowledge before they arrested him. Because the arrest
was made without probable cause, he contends, the decision to
impound the vehicle was a pretextual basis for conducting an
unlawful search.
We disagree. As the trial court observed, Coleman’s prior
knowledge of the suspension of his license is not determinative.
Coleman does not contest the lawfulness of the traffic stop or
dispute the violations that precipitated it. (See People v. Valle
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 195, 202–203 [lack of a front license plate
is a legitimate basis for a traffic stop]; People v. Bennett (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 907, 917 [stop initiated after officers observed
defendant sitting in an illegally parked vehicle was reasonable
under Fourth Amendment].) During the stop, the deputies
legitimately checked Coleman’s license against DMV records.
(See People v. Valencia (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 906, 918.) Upon
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learning the license was suspended, they could not permit
Coleman to drive away. Coleman does not contend the passenger
who was discovered with marijuana paraphernalia on her lap
could have lawfully and safely moved the vehicle from the alley.
He also does not dispute that, were the vehicle not moved, it
would have been illegally parked and at risk of theft or
vandalism. Under these circumstances, impoundment of the
vehicle and the preparatory inventory search were proper
community caretaking functions and not the product of pretext.
(See People v. Benites (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 309, 328
[impoundment and inventory search after stop for a license plate
violation were reasonable where driver and passenger lacked
valid licenses, and vehicle was at risk of vandalism if not moved
from highway]; see also Coalition on Homelessness v. City and
County of San Francisco (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 928, 941
[“illegally parked cars may be towed under the vehicular
community caretaking exception”].)
The cases cited by Coleman are distinguishable and do not
compel a different outcome. In People v. Torres (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 775, the deputy “conceded a narcotics officer had
previously asked him to ‘develop some basis for stopping’
defendant.” (Id. at p. 781.) After the deputy pulled the
defendant over for traffic violations, the defendant parked in a
stall in a public lot near a restaurant and admitted his license
was suspended. (Id. at p. 780.) The deputy then impounded the
truck so that he could “‘look for whatever narcotics-related
evidence might be in the [truck].’” (Id. at p. 789.) Here, there
was no evidence that deputies knew of Coleman’s criminal
history before they saw the illegally parked vehicle missing a
license plate or that they impounded the vehicle to search for
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evidence of unrelated crimes. Yuzon ascertained Coleman’s prior
felony conviction only after finding the rifle. Further, rather than
parking in a stall in a public lot, Coleman was illegally parked in
a high risk location.
United States v. Twilley (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3d 1092 is
not controlling because it involved the propriety of an initial
traffic stop and did not involve a community caretaking search.
There, an officer conducted a traffic stop based on a
misunderstanding of Michigan license plate laws, then
questioned the driver and passengers to ascertain whether they
were transporting narcotics. Officers obtained the driver’s
consent to search the vehicle and found cocaine in the trunk. The
Ninth Circuit held the cocaine should have been suppressed. The
initial stop was made without reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the search
and seizure of the cocaine were a product of that stop. (Id. at
1097.) Because Coleman does not contend the initial stop in this
case was unjustified, this case is distinguishable.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
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