CourtListener 10860836•People v. Lee CA2/4
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Filed 5/18/26 P. v. Lee CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B343756
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA101244
v.
DERION DAVON LEE, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Charlaine F. Olmedo, Judge. Affirmed, modified
in part.
Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Derion Davon Lee.
Michele A. Douglass, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Pernell Barnes.
Nancy Haydt, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Charod Robinson.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R.
Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellants Charod Robinson, Derion Davon Lee, and
Pernell Barnes argue their conviction for conspiracy to commit
murder must be reversed because the information charging them
with the crime included references to their gang membership.
They contend the inclusion of these references violated Assembly
Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333). We
reject this argument. Although Assembly Bill 333 amended
Penal Code section 186.221 by adding elements that must be
proven in order to establish a gang enhancement, it did not make
gang evidence inadmissible to prove facts relevant to charged
offenses such as conspiracy.
We do, however, find one error that must be corrected.
Barnes’s abstract of judgment must be modified to include his
custody credits for time served as of his resentencing hearing. In
all other respects, we affirm the judgment as to each appellant.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2018, a jury convicted appellants Derion Davon Lee,
Pernell Barnes, and Charod Robinson each of several crimes,
including two counts of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), two
counts of attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), shooting at
an inhabited dwelling (§ 246), and conspiracy to commit murder
(§ 182, subd. (a)(1)).2 The jury also found special circumstances
(§ 190, subds. (a)(3), (a)(21) & (a)(22)), gang allegations (§ 186.22,
subds. (b)(1)(B) & (b)(1)(C)), and firearm allegations (§ 12022.53,
1 All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The jury also convicted Lee of a third count of first degree
murder, though this nuance has no bearing on the narrow issue
presented in this appeal.
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subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1)) true. The trial court sentenced each
appellant to several consecutive terms of life without the
possibility of parole, and imposed other indeterminate and
determinate sentences on each appellant.
In appellants’ first appeal, a different panel of this court
modified the judgment in several respects, including vacating the
jury’s true findings on all gang enhancements, gang-related
firearm enhancements, and gang-murder special circumstances,
concluding the Legislature’s changes to Penal Code section
186.22 applied retroactively to appellants. (People v. Lee (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 232 (Lee).) Lee also made various other
corrections to the judgment that are not directly relevant to this
appeal, and otherwise affirmed the judgment. (Id. at pp. 246–
247.)
At a hearing held in January 2025, the prosecution elected
not to retry any of the allegations that this court vacated in Lee
in light of Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22.
The trial court resentenced each appellant to various determinate
and indeterminate terms. The court also sentenced each
appellant to consecutive terms of life without possibility of parole
for each of their murder convictions. The court stayed sentencing
on the conspiracy convictions appellants now challenge in this
appeal. Appellants timely appealed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following factual summary is taken from our opinion in
Lee. “Appellants Derion Davon Lee, Charod Robinson, and
Pernell Barnes, members of the Duarte Duroc Crips gang (DDC),
were convicted of various charges arising from two shootings that
occurred as part of a war between DDC and a rival gang, the
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Pasadena Denver Lane Bloods (PDL). The first shooting (the
Douglas shooting) occurred on December 22, 2016, at the Kings
Villages apartment complex in Pasadena, a known PDL hangout,
and resulted in the killing of Brandon Douglas, a PDL associate.
The second shooting (the Vigil shooting) occurred on January 6,
2017, during a candlelight vigil held for Douglas at Kings
Villages. Ormoni Duncan and Antoine Sutphen were killed, and
Janell Lipkin and Shamark Wright were wounded. Just hours
before the Vigil shooting, someone had opened fire on a residence
in DDC’s territory in Duarte (the Duarte shooting).” (Lee, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 235.)
DISCUSSION
I. Appellants Have Not Shown the Trial Court Committed
Error in Connection to Their Conspiracy to Commit Murder
Convictions
By enacting Assembly Bill 333, the Legislature sought to
address its concern that former section 186.22 sometimes applied
to “social networks of residents in neighborhoods” who were
“often mischaracterized as gangs despite their lack of basic
organizational requirements.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd.
(d)(8); see id., § 2, subd. (d)(7) [“People frequently receive gang
enhancements based on the conduct of other people whom they
have never even met”].) To address this concern, Assembly Bill
333 amended section 186.22 to require proof of additional
elements to establish a gang enhancement.3 Assembly Bill 333
3 “[P]ursuant to the new legislation, imposition of a gang
enhancement [now] requires proof of the following additional
requirements with respect to predicate offenses: (1) the offenses
must have ‘commonly benefited a criminal street gang’ where the
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also added section 1109 to the Penal Code, which provides that
“[i]f requested by the defense, a case in which a gang
enhancement is charged under subdivision (b) or (d) of Section
186.22 shall be tried in separate phases.” (§ 1109, subd. (a).)
Appellant Robinson contends his conspiracy conviction
must be reversed in light of Assembly Bill 333. Specifically, he
notes the overt acts of the conspiracy count, as alleged in the
information, referred to him and his codefendants as Duarte
Duroc Crip gang members. He argues because Assembly Bill 333
amended section 186.22 to require proof of additional elements to
establish a gang enhancement, this heightened standard should
also apply when the overt acts alleged to sustain a conspiracy
conviction are gang-related. Appellants Lee and Barnes join
Robinson’s argument and likewise contend their conspiracy
convictions must be reversed.
We begin by noting that appellants could have raised this
argument in their first appeal but did not do so. Appellants thus
forfeited their argument on that basis. (See People v. Senior
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 531, 533 [“[W]hen a criminal defendant
could have raised an issue in a previous appeal but did not do so,
the defendant may be deemed to have [forfeited] the right to raise
the issue in a subsequent appeal, absent a showing of good cause
or justification for the delay”].) However, in the interest of
‘common benefit . . . is more than reputational’; (2) the last
predicate offense must have occurred within three years of the
date of the currently charged offense; (3) the predicate offenses
must be committed on separate occasions or by two or more gang
members, as opposed to persons; and (4) the charged offense
cannot be used as a predicate offense.” (People v. Lopez (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 327, 345, quoting § 186.22, subd. (e)(1)–(2).)
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providing substantive finality for appellants regarding the impact
of Assembly Bill 333 on their case, we exercise our discretion to
reach the merits of their argument. (See, e.g., People v. Williams
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [“An appellate court is generally
not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been
preserved for review by a party . . . . Indeed, it has the authority
to do so”].)
Turning to the merits, we are unpersuaded the trial court
committed error relating to their conspiracy convictions merely
because the alleged overt acts in the information described them
as Duarte Duroc Crips. Although appellants are correct that
Assembly Bill 333 amended section 186.22 to require proof of
additional elements to establish a gang enhancement, it did not
bar gang evidence from being admitted to prove facts relevant to
charged offenses such as motive and intent. (See, e.g., People v.
Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1208 [“[G]ang evidence, even if not
admitted to prove a gang enhancement, may still be relevant and
admissible to prove other facts related to a crime”]; People v.
Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049 [“evidence of gang
membership is often relevant to, and admissible regarding, the
charged offense”].) Given the prosecution’s theory was that
appellants’ gang membership served as the basis for their
agreement/conspiracy to commit murder, the fact that appellants
were Duarte Duroc Crips was relevant and admissible to prove
facts germane to that offense. (See, e.g., People v. Lamb (2024)
16 Cal.5th 400, 443 [defendant’s gang affiliation reasonably
supported jury’s finding that defendant conspired to murder
because it “provided insight into [the conspirators’] common
understandings and motivations, and ultimately the bases for an
agreement” to commit murder].) We therefore reject their
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argument that their conspiracy convictions must be reversed in
light of Assembly Bill 333.
II. Barnes’ Abstract of Judgment Must be Corrected
As Barnes and the Attorney General point out, it appears
the trial court, at resentencing, orally awarded Barnes credit for
time served from his arrest to the date of resentencing, but those
credits do not appear on Barnes’s abstract of judgment. The
parties agree that Barnes was entitled to 2,794 days of credit for
time served from the date of his arrest (June 1, 2017) to the date
of his resentencing (January 23, 2025). We agree with the
parties and direct the trial court to amend Barnes’s abstract of
judgment to include those credits.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to amend Barnes’s abstract of
judgment to include 2,794 days of credit for time served from his
arrest until his resentencing hearing. The judgment as to each
appellant is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
COGLIATI, J.*
* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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