CourtListener 10860831•People v. Samaniego CA2/4
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Filed 5/18/26 P. v. Samaniego CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B341640
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA511590
v.
MIGUEL ANGEL SAMANIEGO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Serena R. Murillo, Judge. Affirmed.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A.
Lieberman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Appellant Miguel Angel Samaniego chased a rival gang
member, Gabriel Hernandez, into a barbershop that was a
stronghold of Hernandez’s gang. Then, while standing at the
entrance of the barbershop, Samaniego said the name of his gang
into the shop. In response, a different rival gang member, Jack
Urzua, exited the barbershop and confronted Samaniego in the
parking lot. The two men engaged in an altercation, which
escalated into them exchanging gunfire, and ended with
Samaniego shooting and killing Urzua. Video footage captured
these events, including the shooting, and that footage was played
for the jury.
The jury convicted Samaniego of first degree murder (Pen.
Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) of Urzua, found true the allegation that
Samaniego personally used a firearm in the commission of
murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and convicted him of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The
trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life in state prison for the
murder, and stayed sentencing on the firearm use allegation and
firearm possession count.
On appeal, Samaniego argues reversal is required based on
erroneous evidentiary rulings, instructional errors, ineffective
assistance of counsel, prosecutorial errors, lack of substantial
evidence supporting jury findings, and cumulative error. We
affirm.
1 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the
Penal Code.
2
BACKGROUND
The Opal Street and Varrio Nuevo Estrada (VNE) gangs
were rival gangs in Boyle Heights. Samaniego was a member of
the Opal Street gang. The victim, Jack Urzua (aka “Scooby”),
was a member of VNE, as was Gabriel Hernandez. The shooting
that gave rise to Samaniego’s murder conviction occurred on the
evening of November 2, 2022, in a strip mall parking lot outside a
barbershop that was a VNE stronghold.
The government presented to the jury two recordings as
evidence of the shooting and the events leading up to it. The first
recording is video surveillance footage of the parking lot where
the shooting occurred. The second recording is audio of a police
interview of Hernandez after Urzua’s homicide. We describe the
facts below primarily from these sources.
The events leading to Urzua’s death started when Opal
Street gang members approached Hernandez in their car while
he was riding his bicycle. Someone in the car said to Hernandez,
“fuck VNE.” Hernandez responded by saying “fuck you” and
saying the name of his own gang. The Opal Street gang members
then sped away.
Hernandez later rode his bicycle near the barbershop and
walked into the establishment. Meanwhile, the Opal Street gang
members pulled into the parking lot. Samaniego exited the car,
followed Hernandez, and went to the front door of the barbershop
but did not enter. While standing in front of the open door,
Samaniego called out into the barbershop, “Opal Street.” In
response, Urzua went outside and confronted Samaniego.
When Urzua exited the barbershop, Samaniego pulled out a
gun, pointed it at Urzua, and pushed Urzua up against a pillar.
Urzua tried to back Samaniego off of him, then began to walk
3
away. Samaniego followed Urzua and hit him in the head with
his gun. At that point, Urzua tried to run away, pulled out his
gun, and the men shot at each other. Urzua collapsed and
Samaniego drove away. Urzua died from multiple gunshot
wounds.
The parties stipulated that Samaniego was prohibited by
law from possessing a firearm on November 2, 2022, the evening
of the shooting.
Samaniego did not testify or present witnesses in his
defense.
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
limiting the defense’s impeachment of Hernandez,
and in any event, the purported errors were
harmless
Samaniego contends the trial court erred and violated his
constitutional rights by precluding impeachment of Hernandez
with (1) Hernandez’s pending charges for robbery, which involved
possession of a firearm and fleeing from the police; and (2) the
facts underlying his two prior felony convictions. We conclude
the trial court did not err and that the purported errors were
harmless.
A. Additional background
Defense counsel sought to impeach Hernandez with the
conduct underlying his pending charges for which he was in
custody. The prosecutor objected, stating, “even though the use
immunity does cover anything he says while on the stand, I don’t
4
believe that there is an evidentiary vehicle for the defense to ask
about felonious conduct that has not resulted in a conviction.”
Defense counsel responded, “I believe I can inquire as to
the underlying conduct. He did have a gun in that case. He was
fleeing from the police. It’s two counts of robbery. I think it’s
relevant to his veracity[.]” Defense counsel further argued, “[h]e
was with two other individuals, . . . demonstrating that he does
act in concert with others in his gang. In those cases a gun was
held to the clerk’s back, there was a threat that if anybody moved
they would be shot.” The court asked, “[a]nd if he denies that?”
Defense counsel responded, “[i]f he denies that I would have the
[investigating] officers under subpoena . . . . I would ask that I be
given the opportunity to obtain the witnesses.”
The prosecutor then argued the court should exclude
evidence of the pending charges against Hernandez pursuant to
Evidence Code section 352, though the government had no
objection to asking Hernandez “about his prior convictions” and
his “gang-related activity.”
Defense counsel noted regarding Hernandez’s vandalism
conviction: “[I]t was VNE tagging. He does note his moniker as
Demon and that’s why the officers speak with him. And he has a
bag with a gun in it.” The court asked defense counsel, “[s]o you
want, in addition to the crime, to ask him about Demon, the fact
that he’s an active gang member and he had a gun on him at the
time?” Defense counsel responded, “[y]es.” The court asked the
prosecutor, “Are you opposed to those things?” The prosecutor
responded, “No.”
The court ruled that defense counsel could not ask
Hernandez about his pending charges. The court stated:
5
I think the current charge of the two [robberies] is going
down a little bit of a side path that is not entirely
pro[ba]tive of [Samaniego’s] credibility and under 352[.]
I think it’s an ancillary issue that is covered by the two
prior convictions that he does have involving prior use
of a gun and the graffiti charge. Especially in light of
the fact that [the prosecutor] is not objecting to [defense
counsel] asking with regard to the vandalism, his gang
membership, his moniker and the fact that he had a
gun at the time . . . .
So I’m going to rule that [defense counsel] . . . can’t
ask . . . about any of the pending charges. I will also
mention what he’s in for. But you can’t ask him about
the two priors.[2] (Italics added.)
On direct examination, the prosecution asked Hernandez if
he sustained prior convictions for possessing a firearm and
graffiti/gang tagging, and he admitted that he did. Defense
counsel did not ask Hernandez about his pending charges or their
underlying facts.
2 The government contends that the trial court judge meant
to say, “you can ask him about the two priors,” and that the judge
misspoke here. Samaniego contends the judge was ruling that
defense counsel could ask Hernandez whether he sustained the
two prior convictions, but could not ask follow-up questions about
the specific facts underlying those two convictions. We need not
resolve this dispute because it has no impact on our analysis. As
discussed below, regardless of which scenario is accurate, either
way we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
6
Using CALCRIM No. 316, the trial court instructed the
jury that it could use a finding that “a witness has committed a
crime or other misconduct” to evaluate that witness’s credibility.
B. Relevant law
A witness may be impeached with any prior conduct
involving moral turpitude “whether or not it resulted in a felony
conviction.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 931 (Clark).)
“Evidence of circumstances underlying a conviction is admissible
to impeach credibility if the proponent demonstrates that the
evidence has ‘any tendency in reason’ to disprove credibility.”
(People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 214 (Dalton).)
The court, however, may exclude impeachment evidence
pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th
at p. 931; Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 214.) This statute
provides: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing
the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
The trial court has broad discretion under Evidence Code
section 352 to admit or exclude impeachment evidence, and a
reviewing court will uphold the trial court’s ruling unless it
abused its discretion. (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 931–932.)
The trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner, outside the bounds of
reason. (People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 605-606
(Johnson).)
7
C. Analysis
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in excluding Hernandez’s pending
criminal charges under Evidence Code
section 352
The trial court concluded that impeaching Hernandez using
his pending robbery charges “is not entirely probative” of his
credibility and was “an ancillary issue that is covered by the two
prior convictions.” By “covered” the trial court meant
Hernandez’s credibility was already being impeached by evidence
that he was a gang member and criminal. The court further
found that allowing additional impeachment based on
Hernandez’s pending robbery charges would lead to a “trial
within a trial.” Weighing the factors of Evidence Code section
352, the court excluded evidence of the pending charges.
This was not an arbitrary or patently absurd ruling.
Indeed, the court’s ruling was fair to both parties. It allowed the
defense adequate opportunity to impeach Hernandez based on his
prior criminality while mitigating the danger that introducing
the pending robbery charges could be distracting, inefficient,
cumulative, and/or prejudicial. We therefore conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section
352 in excluding Hernandez’s pending criminal charges.
Quoting People v. Martinez (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1071,
1080 (Martinez), Samaniego argues the trial court erred because
“[i]t is longstanding law that a prosecution witness can be
impeached by the mere fact of pending charges.” But in the next
sentence, Martinez clarifies this principle applies where evidence
of pending charges supports the assertion the witness is
testifying in order to seek favor or leniency from the government.
8
(Ibid.) Nothing in the record in this case, however, indicates that
Hernandez testified in order to seek favor or leniency.
Hernandez initially invoked his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. Only after he was granted use
immunity did he agree to testify. When Hernandez did testify, he
was evasive. At one point, he claimed that he was drunk on the
day of the incident and did not remember that day. At another
point, he testified he entered the barbershop merely because he
had to use the restroom. He also claimed that he did not
remember his statements to the police, and he declined to look at
a transcript to try to refresh his memory. Hernandez’s
performance on the stand indicates he was not currying favor
with the prosecution. Accordingly, evidence of the pending
charges against him would have had limited impeachment value.
Although Samaniego is correct that a prosecution witness
can be impeached by pending charges, the trial court nonetheless
has discretion to exclude such evidence under Evidence Code
section 352. The trial court did so here and as discussed above,
its ruling was not an abuse of discretion.3
3 Having rejected Samaniego’s argument on the merits, we
need not address whether Samaniego forfeited it by not raising it
in the trial court. We likewise need not address whether trial
counsel’s lack of objection constituted prejudicial ineffective
assistance of counsel.
9
2. Assuming the trial court excluded the
facts underlying Hernandez’s prior
convictions under Evidence Code section
352, this ruling was not an abuse of
discretion
Samaniego next argues the trial court erred by prohibiting
him from impeaching Hernandez using the facts underlying
Hernandez’s prior convictions. Assuming the trial court
prohibited such evidence (see footnote 2, ante), we reject
Samaniego’s argument.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding
impeachment based on the facts underlying Hernandez’s prior
convictions. Given the trial court allowed Hernandez to testify
about the fact of his convictions, the underlying circumstances
had relatively limited probative value. It was not arbitrary or
irrational for the trial court to find that this probative value was
substantially outweighed by other factors. The trial court
reasonably concluded that allowing further questioning regarding
the facts underlying Hernandez’s prior convictions could create a
substantial danger of undue prejudice, confuse the issues,
mislead the jury, or necessitate undue consumption of time. We
discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
3. The trial court’s exercise of its discretion
under Evidence Code section 352 did not
violate Samaniego’s constitutional rights
Because the trial court’s rulings concerning the scope of
admissible evidence that could be used to impeach Hernandez did
not violate state evidentiary law, it follows logically that the
court’s rulings did not violate Samaniego’s constitutional rights
to due process or to present a defense. (See, e.g., People v. Abilez
10
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503 [“Having found no state law
[evidentiary] error, we also reject defendant’s federal
constitutional claim”]; ibid. [garden-variety evidentiary issues
under state law do not implicate a defendant’s federal
constitutional right to present a defense].) Nor did the trial court
violate Samaniego’s right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. “Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the
trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination
that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of
marginal relevance.” (Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 217.) As
explained above, the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this
regard was proper—the court reasonably limited impeachment of
Hernandez to avoid duplicative, prejudicial, confusing evidence of
marginal relevance.
4. Prejudice
Because we conclude the trial court did not err by
narrowing the scope of admissible impeachment evidence, we
need not address whether the purported errors were harmless.
We nonetheless exercise our discretion to do so.
As explained, evidence of the underlying facts of
Hernandez’s convictions is of limited probative value because
Hernandez admitted to those convictions at trial. Moreover,
apart from Hernandez’s testimony, the evidence of Samaniego’s
guilt was overwhelming. The prosecution presented a video
showing Samaniego’s murder of Urzua.
In light of Hernandez’s testimony and the overwhelming
evidence of Samaniego’s guilt, it is difficult to envision how the
trial court’s evidentiary rulings could have led to a less favorable
result for defendant. We therefore conclude that, even assuming
11
(without deciding) the trial court’s evidentiary rulings concerning
the scope of admissible impeachment evidence violated state law
and federal constitutional law, any purported error was harmless
under the state and federal harmless error standards. (See
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [error under state law
requires reversal if the defendant can demonstrate it is
reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable
outcome absent the error]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 18, 24 [error under federal constitutional law requires
reversal unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt].)
II. The trial court properly omitted CALCRIM No.
570 from the jury instructions, and trial counsel
was not ineffective in declining to request it
Samaniego contends the trial court prejudicially erred by
not instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 570 on voluntary
manslaughter based on sudden quarrel/heat of passion, and that
his counsel was prejudicially ineffective in asserting there was no
evidence to support such an instruction. We are unpersuaded.
Because substantial evidence did not support the instruction, the
trial court did not err by omitting it, and counsel was not
ineffective in declining to ask for it.
A. Additional background
The jury was instructed on perfect self-defense (CALCRIM
No. 505) and voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-
defense (CALCRIM No. 571).
During the hearing on jury instructions, the trial court
stated it did not believe CALCRIM No. 570 regarding heat of
12
passion “necessarily applies.”4 Both defense counsel and the
prosecutor asked that CALCRIM No. 570 not be given, and the
court agreed.
B. Relevant law
Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of
murder. (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 181.) “An
unlawful killing with malice is murder[,]” but “an intentional
killing is reduced to voluntarily manslaughter if other evidence
negates malice.” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583
(Manriquez).) “Malice is presumptively absent when the
defendant acts upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion on
sufficient provocation . . . .” (Ibid., citing § 192, subd. (a).) “The
provocative conduct by the victim may be physical or verbal, but
the conduct must be sufficiently provocative that it would cause
an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without
due deliberation and reflection.” (Id. at pp. 583–584.) “ ‘Heat of
4 CALCRIM No. 570 provides:
“A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary
manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a
sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. [¶] The defendant
killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of
passion if:
1. The defendant was provoked;
2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and
under the influence of intense emotion that obscured (his/her)
reasoning or judgment;
AND
3. The provocation would have caused a person of average
disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is,
from passion rather than from judgment.”
13
passion arises when “at the time of the killing, the reason of the
accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent
as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average
disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and reflection,
and from such passion rather than from judgment.” ’ ” (Id. at p.
584.)
“ ‘[T]he existence of ‘any evidence, no matter how weak’ will
not justify instructions on a lesser included
offense . . . .’ [Citation.] Such instructions are required only
where there is “substantial evidence” from which a rational jury
could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense,
and that he is not guilty of the greater offense.” (People v.
Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 68, italics in original.) “Substantial
evidence is evidence sufficient to ‘deserve consideration by the
jury,’ that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find
persuasive.” (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8.)
C. Analysis
1. Substantial evidence did not support
including CALCRIM No. 570
The elements of sudden quarrel/heat of passion listed in
CALCRIM No. 570 are: (1) the defendant was provoked; (2) as a
result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under
the influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or
judgment; and (3) the provocation would have caused a person of
average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation,
that is, from passion rather than from judgment.
With respect to the first element (i.e., whether the
defendant was provoked), the record indicates that Samaniego
announced the name of his gang into the barbershop but did not
14
enter the barbershop, then Urzua exited the barbershop armed
with a gun and confronted Samaniego. The jury could have
reasonably interpreted Urzua exiting the barbershop and
confronting Samaniego as the victim provoking the killer.
Accordingly, there is substantial evidence supporting a
reasonable factual inference that the first element of CALCRIM
No. 570 was present.
Substantial evidence does not, however, support an
inference that the second element of the instruction was present
(i.e., as a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly
and under the influence of intense emotion). Indeed, the record
contains no evidence that Samaniego acted rashly under the
influence of intense emotion. Rather, it shows that he entered
rival gang territory, initiated contact with rival gang members at
their stronghold knowing this could lead to an escalation of
violence, then personally escalated the violence, which
culminated with him killing Urzua.5 Nothing in the record
suggests that Samaniego did so rashly and under the influence of
intense emotions. Rather, the record supports the inference that
Samaniego’s conduct in escalating the violence was calculated.
He knew that his conduct could lead to a gang shooting, and he
welcomed and initiated the escalation of violence as the
confrontation with Urzua unfolded.
Because no evidence supports the inference that Samaniego
acted from passion rather than judgment (element two), we need
5 The facts of this case are thus very different from the
classic heat of passion scenario, which would involve something
like a spouse unexpectedly discovering their partner in the act of
adultery, leading to an immediate, violent, and fatal reaction out
of sudden rage.
15
not address whether the provocation would have caused a person
of average disposition to act from passion rather than judgment
(element three). Given that substantial evidence did not
reasonably support a jury finding on the second element listed in
CALCRIM No. 570, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to give
that instruction, and we discern no error in the trial court’s
omission of it.6 Nor was trial counsel ineffective in not requesting
the instruction. (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122
(Thompson) [“Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make
frivolous or futile motions”].)
Samaniego’s reliance on People v. Dominguez (2021) 66
Cal.App.5th 163 (Dominguez) is misplaced. In Dominguez,
“[e]ach [defendant] testified he fired in a panic and fear when,
while about eight feet away from them, [a rival gang member]
said, ‘Where the fuck you from? . . . This is Eastside,’ and lunged
at them while reaching for an apparent weapon in his
waistband.” (Id. at p. 168.) Based on this testimony and expert
testimony regarding the nature of gang confrontations, the court
concluded that substantial evidence supported instructing the
jury on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion. (Id. at
pp. 169, 178.)
Here, by contrast, the record contains no evidence that
Samaniego shot abruptly in response to an unexpected challenge
by a gang member reaching for what appeared to be a gun.
Rather, Samaniego chose to enter rival gang territory, initiated
contact with a rival gang stronghold, then escalated the conflict
6 Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in
omitting CALCRIM No. 570, we need not address whether
Samaniego was prejudiced by its omission.
16
in a manner that directly led to him killing a rival gang member.
This case is factually distinguishable from Dominguez.
2. A note regarding the trial court’s
inclusion of CALCRIM No. 522
To the extent Samaniego suggests the trial court erred by
omitting CALCRIM No. 570 because that omission contradicted
the court’s inclusion of CALCRIM No. 522, we are unpersuaded.
Generally speaking, CALCRIM No. 522 allows the jury to weigh
whether the presence of provocation should reduce a murder from
first degree to second degree murder. It also contains bracketed
language that, when included in the instruction, allows the jury
to use provocation to reduce a murder to manslaughter. (See
People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 903–904 [“The existence
of provocation and its extent and effect, if any, upon the mind of
defendant in relation to premeditation and deliberation in
forming the specific intent to kill, as well as in regard to the
existence of malice (Pen. Code, § 188), constitute questions of fact
for the jury . . . .”].)
The trial court included the bracketed CALCRIM No. 522
language regarding manslaughter.7 The court explained: “I think
provocation can be heat of passion but it can also be self-defense.”
7 The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 522 as
follows: “Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to
second degree and may reduce a murder to manslaughter. The
weight and significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to
decide. If you conclude that the defendant was provoked,
consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime was first
or second degree murder. Also, consider the provocation in
deciding whether the defendant committed murder or
manslaughter.”
17
Thus, in the trial court’s view, the proper course was to include
the bracketed manslaughter language in CALCRIM No. 522 in
order to reinforce the idea to the jury, which was fleshed out in
greater detail in CALCRIM No. 571, that the jury could convict
Samaniego of voluntary manslaughter if it concluded that he
killed Urzua after being provoked into acting in imperfect self-
defense. Nothing about this conclusion was inconsistent with the
court’s decision to omit CALCRIM No. 570, which as discussed
above, was unsupported by substantial evidence that Samaniego
acted rashly under the influence of intense emotions.
III. We reject Samaniego’s assertion that the trial
court erred by not further instructing the jury on
the relationship between provocation and
imperfect self-defense
Samaniego next contends the trial court erred by “not
including provocation and its relationship to imperfect self-
defense in CALCRIM No. 571, thus failing to instruct the jury on
the prosecutor’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
appellant did not act in imperfect self-defense, and thus, that he
acted with malice.”8 We reject this contention.
8 The trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as
follows using CALCRIM No. 571:
A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to
voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed a person
because he acted in imperfect self-defense.
[¶]
The defendant acted in imperfect self-defense if:
1. The defendant actually believed that he was in
imminent danger of being killed or suffering great
bodily injury;
18
“Jurors are presumed able to understand and correlate
instructions.” (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.)
CALCRIM No. 571 correctly explained to the jury the relevant
principles surrounding imperfect self-defense voluntary
manslaughter. The trial court explained it was including the
manslaughter language in CALCRIM No. 522 to reinforce to the
jury that it could convict Samaniego of voluntary manslaughter if
it concluded that he killed Urzua after being provoked into acting
in imperfect self-defense. Samaniego cites no case law suggesting
that the trial court was required to modify CALCRIM No. 571 to
further correlate it with CALCRIM No. 522, nor has he
persuaded this court that any such modification was necessary.
The instructions given articulated the relevant legal standard to
the jury concerning imperfect self-defense. Samaniego was thus
given a fair opportunity to have the jury decide that he acted in
imperfect self-defense, and the jury rejected that conclusion. We
discern no error by the trial court. Nor was trial counsel
ineffective in not requesting a modification correlating CALCRIM
Nos. 571 and 522. (Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 122
AND
2. The defendant actually believed that the immediate
use of deadly force was necessary to defend against the
danger;
BUT
3. At least one of those beliefs was unreasonable.
[¶]. . . .[¶]The People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in
imperfect self-defense. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of
murder.
19
[“Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make frivolous or futile
motions”].)9
IV. The trial court did not err by instructing the jury
using CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472
Samaniego next argues the trial court erred by instructing
the jury with CALCRIM No. 3471 (Right to Self-Defense: Mutual
Combat or Initial Aggressor) and CALCRIM No. 3472 (Right to
Self-Defense: May Not Be Contrived). We disagree.
A. Additional background
The parties agreed that CALCRIM No. 3471 should be
given.
Defense counsel objected to the inclusion of CALCRIM No.
3472, stating, “I don’t think there was any provocation or quarrel
in evidence.” The prosecution argued that Samaniego provoked
the initial interaction with Hernandez, and the “violent
interaction just happened to take place with another individual
who was at the barbershop.” The court asked, “[i]f Mr.
Hernandez wasn’t part of the equation, would the People still
believe their theory supports this instruction?” The prosecutor
responded, “[y]es. I have Mr. Samaniego going armed into a rival
gang territory and yelling his gang name into a rival gang strong
hold . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I think that’s a pretty provocative act.” The
court agreed with the prosecutor, finding there was substantial
9 Because we reject Samaniego’s argument on the merits and
conclude the trial court did not err, we need not address whether
the purported error was harmless.
20
evidence Samaniego provoked a fight by yelling into the
barbershop, supporting the inclusion of CALCRIM No. 3472.
B. Relevant law
A trial court must give a requested instruction if it is
supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15
Cal.4th 1, 39.) In order for this standard to be met, “ ‘there need
only be some evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury,
would sufficiently support the suggested inference.’ ” (People v.
Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 921.) We do not consider
witness credibility in determining whether the record contains
substantial evidence supporting a particular jury instruction.
(People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1419.)
C. Analysis
1. Substantial evidence supported giving
CALCRIM No. 3471
We reject Samaniego’s assertion that the trial court erred
by giving CALCRIM No. 3471 because there was insufficient
evidence of mutual combat or that he started a fight.10
10 Using CALCRIM No. 3471, the court instructed the jury as
follows: “A person who engages in mutual combat or who starts a
fight has a right to self-defense only if: [¶ 1. He actually and in
good faith tried to stop fighting; [¶] 2. He indicated, by word or
by conduct, to his opponent . . . that he wanted to stop fighting
and that he had stopped fighting; [¶] AND 3. He gave his
opponent a chance to stop fighting. [¶ . . . ¶] A fight is mutual
combat when it began or continued by mutual consent or
agreement. That agreement may be expressly stated or implied
and must occur before the claim to self defense arose.” (Italics in
original.)
21
Hernandez’s pretrial statement to the police that Samaniego said
“Opal Street” into a VNE barbershop constituted substantial
evidence that Samaniego wanted to start a fight with someone
there. And Urzua exiting the shop and walking up to Samaniego,
in response to Samaniego calling out his gang name, constituted
substantial evidence of an implied agreement to fight. (See
People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1036 [mutual combat
applies to “a violent confrontation conducted pursuant to
prearrangement, mutual consent, or an express or implied
agreement to fight”].)
2. Substantial evidence supported giving
CALCRIM No. 3472
CALCRIM No. 3472, the instruction on contrived self-
defense, instructed the jury in pertinent part that “[a] person
does not have the right to self-defense if he or she provokes a
fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.”
Samaniego saying “Opal Street” into the barbershop constituted
substantial evidence that supported giving CALCRIM No. 3472
on contrived self-defense. The court’s decision to give the
instruction was further supported by the video evidence showing
that Samaniego provoked the gunfight by following Urzua with
his gun drawn as Urzua walked away.
V. Samaniego’s claim of prosecutorial error during
closing argument is belied by the record
Samaniego next contends the prosecutor committed
prejudicial error during closing argument by misstating the law
on mutual combat. We are unpersuaded.
22
A. Additional background
In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated the
following regarding the mutual combat instruction: “[I]f you go
down to the very bottom of it, it will actually define what mutual
combat is.[11] It’s pretty much the same idea that we all have
which is where . . . two parties agree to fight, either that can be
implied agreement or express agreement.”
The prosecutor further argued:
So let’s concede that . . . Mr. Hernandez was
trying to . . . call [Samaniego] over and engage him in
mutual combat of some sort, right, that he is out there
waving at him, telling him to come over.
Well, Mr. Samaniego by then driving over there is
engaging in mutual combat. And not only that, this is
giving him time to reflect, premeditate and deliberate. . . .
And though not supported by any facts, let’s say, Mr.
Hernandez goes in there and tells Jack Urzua
hey, there’s a gangster outside and then hides in the
bathroom.
Mr. Urzua gets out and he is now engaging in
mutual combat, right?
And now both parties are engaging in mutual
Combat.
Defense counsel did not object to this argument.
11 The prosecution was referring to language in CALCRIM
No. 3471. (See footnote 12, ante.)
23
B. Relevant law
Prosecutorial error “occurs, as a matter of state law, when a
prosecutor ‘engage[s] in deceptive or reprehensible tactics in
order to persuade the trier of fact to convict.’ ” (People v.
Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 854 (Daveggio).)
“Federal constitutional error occurs only when the prosecutor’s
actions ‘comprise a pattern of conduct that is serious and
egregious, such that the trial is rendered so unfair that the
resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process
of law.’ ” (Ibid.)
A prosecutor is given wide latitude during closing
argument. (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 951.) “The
argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment
on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or
deductions to be drawn therefrom.” (Ibid.) When challenging a
prosecutor’s remarks to the jury, a defendant must show that,
“ ‘in the context of the whole argument and the instructions’
[citation], there was ‘a reasonable likelihood the jury understood
or applied’ ” the comments in an improper or erroneous manner.
(People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 667 (Centeno).) In this
inquiry, reviewing courts do not lightly infer that the jury drew
the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from
the prosecutor’s statements. (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
Samaniego argues the prosecutor erred by “urg[ing] the
jury to find mutual combat without finding the required intent
and agreement by both parties to fight[.]” This contention is
belied by the record. The prosecutor told the jury that mutual
24
combat occurs when “two parties agree to fight,” and “that can be
implied agreement or express agreement.” The prosecutor also
discussed Samaniego’s intent to engage in mutual combat and
opportunity to deliberate while driving to the barbershop. As the
prosecutor further explained, when Urzua exited the shop, he and
Samaniego engaged in mutual combat. The prosecutor’s
comments accurately summarized evidence presented at trial.
Consequently, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury
understood or applied the prosecutor’s comments in an improper
manner. (See Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.)
Because we reach the merits and conclude there was no
prosecutorial error, we need not address forfeiture, whether
Samaniego’s counsel was ineffective by not objecting, or whether
the purported prosecutorial error was prejudicial.
VI. We are unpersuaded that the prosecutor
erroneously obtained a favorable ruling to admit
gang evidence
Samaniego argues the prosecutor, through
misrepresentations at an in-limine hearing, obtained a favorable
ruling to admit gang evidence. We are unpersuaded. The record
does not affirmatively demonstrate the prosecutor
mischaracterized the evidence showing Samaniego was a gang
member, and in any event, the purported misconduct was
harmless because defense counsel offered to stipulate that
Samaniego indeed was a gang member.
25
A. Additional background
1. Motion to admit gang evidence
The prosecution filed a motion to admit gang evidence.
Defense counsel filed a response arguing the gang evidence
should be limited to the stipulated fact that Samaniego was a
documented Opal Street gang member. Additional evidence that
Samaniego or others were members of the Opal Street gang,
defendant argued, would be highly prejudicial.
At a hearing on the motion, the trial court tentatively ruled
gang evidence was admissible; “[t]he question [was] to what
extent.” The prosecutor stated he intended to adduce evidence
regarding a 2019 traffic stop, which Officer Zaragoza “used . . . to
further establish his opinion that Mr. Samaniego was a member
of Opal Street.” The court asked, “what about [Officer Zaragoza’s
contacts with Samaniego] made him think it’s gang involved?”
The prosecutor responded, “that he’s with another gang member
from Opal Street.”
The court then asked the prosecutor, “what do we expect
[Officer] Zaragoza to say?” The prosecutor responded, “basically
that he has had several interactions with Mr. Samaniego where
he’s hanging out with gang members and that he knows him to
be a member of that gang.”
The following colloquy ensued:
The court: Is he going to say that Mr. Samaniego has
ever admitted to being in that gang?
[The prosecutor]: Yes.
[Defense counsel]: Did he say that at the prelim?
[The prosecutor]: Yeah. And he completed –
there’s some FI cards as well with his moniker.
The court: Filled out by Zaragoza?
26
[The prosecutor]: Yeah.
The court: And he claims that Mr. Samaniego admits
he’s an Opal Street Loco?
[The prosecutor]: Yeah.
Defense counsel reasserted that the gang evidence was
more prejudicial than probative because the defense was
“conceding that Samaniego is an Opal Street gang member.”
The court overruled the defense objection, finding the
relevance of gang evidence was “not entirely foreclosed by the
stip[ulation].”
2. Officer Zaragoza’s preliminary hearing and
trial testimony
At the preliminary hearing, Los Angeles Police Officer
Ruben Zaragoza, a gang expert, testified he had had about four
encounters with Samaniego. He would see Samaniego in Opal
Street territory. The prosecutor asked, “[t]hroughout your
encounters with Mr. Samaniego and your discussions with him,
did you form an opinion as to whether or not he was a member of
any particular gang?” Officer Zaragoza answered in the
affirmative and opined that Samaniego was an Opal Street gang
member.
At trial, Officer Zaragoza testified that he had seen
Samaniego on Opal Street on multiple occasions, that he had had
conversations with Samaniego, and that he had seen Samaniego
around other people identified as Opal Street gang members.
One such contact was in 2019, when Officer Zaragoza conducted a
traffic stop of a car in which Samaniego was a passenger. The
prosecutor asked Officer Zaragoza if based on his experience with
Samaniego, he had any opinion whether Samaniego was a gang
27
member, and Officer Zaragoza opined that Samaniego was an
Opal Street gang member.
3. Trial testimony of Officer Menasakanian and
Detective Gonzalez
Officer Tadeh Menasakanian, a gang expert, testified that
in 2021, he conducted a traffic stop of Rafael Lopez. Lopez wore
an Orioles baseball hat, indicating affiliation with the Opal
Street gang. The prosecutor asked if there were other indications
Lopez was a member of Opal Street. Officer Menasakanian
responded, “yes. He would openly talk about it with me.” Lopez
also had gang tattoos. Officer Menasakanian arrested Lopez, and
allowed him to give his car to somebody in lieu of it being towed.
Lopez made a phone call, and Samaniego arrived to take
possession of the car. Lopez referred to Samaniego as “Happy.”
Detective Keith Gonzalez testified that Mauricio
Gonzalez—Samaniego’s companion at the time of the shooting—
had a tattoo of the letters “OSL,” for Opal Street Locos, on his
stomach.
B. Analysis
Samaniego contends that, at the in-limine hearing, the
prosecutor erred by misrepresenting the facts of the 2019 traffic
stop. According to Samaniego, the prosecution falsely asserted
Officer Zaragoza stated at the preliminary hearing that
Samaniego was with an Opal Street member. Samaniego also
argues the prosecutor misstated the gang evidence by incorrectly
asserting that Samaniego admitted he was a gang member. He
further argues: “Simply put, living on a street on a block claimed
by a small, local gang, and knowing two of its members around
28
[Samaniego’s] age, does not establish one’s gang membership. To
overcome this, the prosecutor, whether intentionally or
inadvertently, misled the trial court to obtain a favorable in-
limine evidentiary ruling that he relied on for guilt, thus
violating” Samaniego’s rights under state law and under federal
constitutional law.
We are unpersuaded. The record demonstrates Officer
Zaragoza based his opinion that Samaniego was a member of the
Opal Street gang, in part, on his conversations with Samaniego.
Defense counsel was free to cross-examine Officer Zaragoza on
what those discussions were but elected not to. On this record,
Samaniego has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that the
prosecutor made misleading statements to the court.
Moreover, the prosecution’s assertion was harmless. “In
order to demonstrate that prosecutorial error under was
prejudicial under state law, the defendant bears the burden of
showing a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable verdict
absent the error. (Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 854.) Under
federal law, prosecutorial error is prejudicial unless it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.) Samaniego cannot
show prejudice under either standard because the defense was
going to stipulate that Samaniego was an Opal Street gang
member. In other words, evidence of Samaniego’s gang
membership was inevitably going to be introduced at trial.12 For
12 We note that it was not erroneous for the court to allow
evidence of Samaniego’s gang membership. This evidence was
relevant and admissible to prove the prosecution’s theory of the
case—that Samaniego entered enemy gang territory knowing
that doing so could lead to violent confrontation and death, and
welcomed and invited those risks.
29
this same reason (i.e., that Samaniego cannot demonstrate
prejudice), he likewise cannot succeed in demonstrating that his
trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective. (People v. Denard
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1020, fn. 2.)
VII. The jury’s findings of premeditation and
deliberation are supported by substantial
evidence
We reject Samaniego’s assertion that the jury’s findings of
premeditation and deliberation are unsupported by substantial
evidence.
A. Relevant law
The unjust killing of a human being is presumed to be
murder in the second, rather than first, degree. (People v.
Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 25, 73.) First degree murder has
the additional elements of willfulness, premeditation, and
deliberation. (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 282.) “These
elements require ‘more than a showing of intent to kill; the killer
must act deliberately, carefully weighing the considerations for
and against a choice to kill before he or she completes the acts
that caused the death.’ ” (Ibid.)
“The very definition of ‘premeditation’ encompasses the
idea that a defendant thought about or considered the act
beforehand.” (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 443.)
“ ‘ “Deliberation” refers to careful weighing of considerations in
forming a course of action; “premeditation” means thought over
in advance.’ ” (People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 824,
disapproved on another ground in Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p.
214.) “Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief
30
interval.” (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863.) Some
basic categories of evidence sufficient to support a finding of
premeditation and deliberation include planning, motive, and a
deliberate manner of killing. (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th
76, 88–89.) This list of categories is not exhaustive, and
reviewing courts need not accord these categories any particular
weight. (Id. at p. 89.)
In assessing Samaniego’s sufficiency argument, we review
the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine if there is substantial evidence from which any
rational trier of fact could find premeditation and deliberation
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S.
307, 318–319; People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 460.)
Substantial evidence is evidence that is “ ‘reasonable in nature,
credible, and of solid value’ ” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d
557, 576) and includes circumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences based on that evidence (In re James D. (1981) 116
Cal.App.3d 810, 813).
In reviewing a sufficiency claim, we “presume in support of
the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact
could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Medina
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) In conducting this analysis, we do
not substitute our own evaluation of witness credibility for that of
the finder of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
A defendant “bears an enormous burden’ when challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence.” (People v. Vasco (2005) 131
Cal.App.4th 137, 161.)
B. Analysis
Applying the above-stated principles, we conclude
Samaniego cannot satisfy his enormous burden of showing no
31
reasonable jury could find premeditation and deliberation. After
initiating an encounter with rival gang member Hernandez,
Samaniego, armed with a gun, followed Hernandez to a rival
gang stronghold, called out the name of his gang, then engaged in
a violent altercation with Urzua that ended with him pistol-
whipping then shooting and killing Urzua. On these facts, the
jury could reasonably infer that Samaniego premeditated and
deliberated the murder. (See, e.g., People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th
620, 636 [jury findings of premeditation and deliberation were
reasonably supported by the fact that “defendant bought a loaded
handgun with him on the night [the victim] was killed, indicating
he had considered the possibility of a violent encounter”]; People
v. Martinez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 400, 413 [motive for a
shooting involving gang rivalry, coupled with the defendant’s
deliberate conduct aiming a gun at a rival gang member before
firing the weapon, reasonably supported jury findings of
premeditation and deliberation].)
VIII. We discern no prejudicial cumulative error
Samaniego lastly argues that reversal is required due to
prejudicial cumulative error, which deprived him of a fair trial.
We reject this contention. Because we find no individual errors,
it follows logically that there was no cumulative error. (People v.
Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1291 [“We have either found no
error or, in those instances where error has been . . . assumed, no
prejudice. Thus, there is no prejudice to accumulate.”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
32
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
MORI, Acting P. J.
COGLIATI, J.*
* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
33
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