CourtListener 10860149•People v. Young CA2/1
Texto completo
Filed 5/15/26 P. v. Young CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B348864
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA196110)
v.
EARL YOUNG,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Charlaine F. Olmedo, Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant Earl Young appeals from the denial of his
second and successive petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal
2
Code section 1172.6. In a prior appeal decided last year, we
affirmed the trial court’s finding that Young was ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. Young’s latest
petition provides no basis for revisiting our decision or reaching a
different result. We accordingly affirm.
A. Procedural Background
In 2003, a jury convicted Young among other offenses of
first degree murder and found true a special circumstance that
the murder was committed during a robbery. We affirmed the
conviction on direct appeal. (People v. Young (Jan. 31, 2005,
B168977) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2021, Young filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6, which the trial court denied at the prima facie
stage finding that the record of conviction showed defendant was
the actual shooter. (People v. Young (Nov. 7, 2022, B317740
[nonpub. opn.].) We affirmed, finding that Young’s contentions
could have been fully litigated on his direct appeal and his
contentions were an improper collateral attack on the judgment
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We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“is determined by a controlling statute which is not challenged for
unconstitutionality and does not present any substantial question
of interpretation or application.” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin.,
§ 8.1(1).) We set forth only those portions of the factual and
procedural history necessary to explain our disposition.
2
All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
and were no longer cognizable. (Ibid.) We also conducted an
independent review of the entire record and found no arguable
issues. (Ibid.)
After this affirmance, Young filed a second and successive
petition for resentencing in July 2023, which the trial court
summarily denied.3 Young appealed. Young’s appointed
appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues and requesting
that we exercise our discretion to independently review the
record for error pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216. In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court established procedures for
cases in which counsel determines that an appeal from an order
denying postconviction relief lacks merit. In such cases,
“(1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that
determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing
on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send, with a
copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the
defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and
that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may
dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp. 231-232.) Because a defendant
who has been denied postconviction relief has no constitutional
right to an appeal, we are not required to conduct an independent
review of the record before dismissing the appeal, but we may
conduct such a review at our discretion. (Id. at pp. 227-228, 232.)
If the defendant files a supplemental brief or letter, we are
“required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that
brief and to issue a written opinion. The filing of a supplemental
3 In denying the petition, the trial court found that it had
previously denied two prior section 1172.6 petitions. Our review
of the record only found one previous denial, as referenced in our
affirmance in (People v. Young, supra, B317740 [nonpub. opn.].)
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brief or letter does not compel an independent review of the
entire record to identify unraised issues.” (People v. Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
On December 18, 2025, we notified Young by letter of the
no-merits brief filed by his counsel and informed him that he had
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30 days to file a supplemental brief. We received Young’s
supplemental brief on March 27, 2026.
B. Young Remains Ineligible for Relief Under Section
1172.6
Section 1172.6 was enacted by the Legislature in 2018 as
part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). The
legislation’s overall purpose was “to amend the felony murder
rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed
on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the
intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) To accomplish this, the bill
added section 189, subdivision (e) “to amend the felony-murder
rule,” and added section 188, subdivision (a)(3) “to amend the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) made further amendments to the resentencing
statute, effective January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
We previously affirmed the denial of Young’s first section
1172.6 petition because Young’s contentions on appeal “were fully
4
In a declaration submitted with her brief, Young’s counsel
averred that she sent Young a copy of counsel’s brief along with
the transcripts of the record on appeal.
4
litigated on his direct appeal, [or] they could have been.” (People
v. Young, supra, B317740.) We also “reviewed the entire record
and found no arguable issues.” (Ibid.) Young requests we
appoint new counsel because his attorney was ineffective for
filing a “no-issue brief.” Young offers no support for his
conclusory statement that “new or existing evidence could have
been readily available if the appointed counsel would have done
the job she was assigned to do.” Young also argues that the
record of conviction does not conclusively establish, as a matter of
law, that he was the actual shooter. There has been no
intervening amendment to section 1172.6 since the time of our
2022 decision, and no change to the record of conviction. As the
record of conviction continues to demonstrate Young is ineligible
for relief, we reject the arguments in his successive petition to the
contrary.
Finally, we decline counsel’s request that we independently
review the record, as nothing before us suggests such an exercise
is necessary. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Young’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J. WEINGART, J.
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