People v. Medina CA1/4

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Filed 5/15/26 P. v. Medina CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171309
v.
MARTIN MEDINA (San Mateo County Super.
Defendant and Appellant. Ct. No. 22-SF-008251)

A jury convicted Martin Medina of attempted murder (Pen. Code,1
§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), discharging a
firearm at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246), and first degree burglary (§ 460,
subd. (a)). As to the attempted murder conviction, the jury found that
Medina personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). As to the criminal
threats and first degree burglary convictions, the jury found that Medina was
armed with a firearm during their commissions (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
On appeal, Medina argues the trial court erred by imposing the
sentencing enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1) related to his
criminal threats conviction. Finding no error, we affirm.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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BACKGROUND
Medina and the victim Juan Flores-Lopez (Lopez) worked at and lived
on a commercial mushroom farm in Half Moon Bay, California. They met
each other when Lopez began working on the farm in 2015. On July 1, 2022,
both men attended a barbeque on the farm. Both men drank alcohol at the
barbeque. Lopez thought Medina appeared upset and angry and heard
Medina raise his voice while using bad words toward another attendee
named Byron. Lopez suggested to Medina that he go home. Medina agreed
and the three men walked toward Medina’s residence. Before they reached
Medina’s residence, Medina said that he was going to kill Lopez and his
whole family and then ran to his home where he retrieved a gun. The threat
made Lopez feel afraid and concerned for his family. Lopez went to his
residence where his wife, Miriam Ortiz, and multiple other family members
were home. Once inside, Lopez locked the front door.
Within a minute, Medina approached Lopez’s front door. As he
approached, Medina told Lopez to come outside and that he had something to
settle with him. According to Lopez, Medina twice yelled that he was going
to kill Lopez and his family. Ortiz testified that she heard Medina say, “I’m
going to kill you now,” about four times. After hearing these threats, Lopez
stood near the inside of his front door and used his cell phone to record what
happened next.
When Medina reached the front door, he tried the doorknob in an
unsuccessful effort to force open the front door. Lopez felt afraid. Medina
then broke a glass panel on the front door. He next produced the firearm and
aimed through the broken glass panel at Lopez’s face. Medina fired the gun
as Lopez ducked to the floor. The bullet traveled through Lopez’ residence

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and into a neighbor’s residence where it lodged in a wall. No one was injured.
Medina fled and hid the gun in a nearby dump truck.
Medina was detained shortly after the incident. Lopez identified
Medina as the perpetrator in a field identification. The firearm was
recovered from its hiding place.
By information, the San Mateo County District Attorney charged
Medina with attempted murder and a special allegation of deliberation and
premeditation (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 189; Count 1), criminal threats against
Ortiz (§ 422, subd. (a); Count 2), criminal threats against Lopez (§ 422,
subd. (a); Count 3), discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246;
Count 4), and first-degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a); Count 5). With respect
to Count 1, the information alleged the personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b)) and the personal and intentional discharge of a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). With respect to Counts 2, 3, and 5, the information
alleged Madina was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
Jury trial took place in July 2024. The jury found Medina guilty of
attempted murder as alleged in Count 1, but it found that the special
allegation that the offense was willful, deliberate and premeditated was not
true. The jury found true both use enhancements related to Count 1. The
jury also found Medina guilty of criminal threats against Lopez as alleged in
Count 3, discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling as alleged in Count
4, and first-degree burglary as alleged in Count 5. The jury found true the
arming enhancements related to Count 3 and 5. The jury found Medina not
guilty of criminal threats against Ortiz as alleged in Count 2.
The trial court sentenced Medina to 18 years in state prison.
Specifically, the court imposed 17 years on Count 1, which was comprised of
the midterm of 7 years for the attempted murder conviction plus 10 years for

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the personal use of a firearm enhancement. The court struck the punishment
for the 20-year personal and intentional discharge of a firearm enhancement,
finding it was not in the interest of justice. On Count 3, the court imposed a
consecutive one-year sentence, which was comprised of one-third the midterm
for the criminal threats conviction and one-third of the arming enhancement.
The trial court explained how the factors enumerated in Rule 4.425
guided its decision to impose consecutive sentences for Counts 3 and 5. It
stated that, under the rule, “[o]ne of [the factors] is, are the crimes and their
objectives predominantly independent of each other; are they separate acts of
violence and/or separate threats of violence; were they committed at separate
times rather than so closely in time.” The court noted that “[s]ome of those
factors, quite frankly, go both ways.” But it concluded that the conduct
underlying Count 1 constituted a separate act of violence from Count 3
because the latter was “made earlier at the barbeque, . . . but even if it
[wasn’t] at the barbeque, it was made prior to the incident at the door, prior
to the decision to break in, and prior to the shooting.” The court provided two
reasons for its conclusion: “One, [Lopez] went to his house, pulled out his
phone, began to record it because of how worried he was from the threat at
the barbeque. [¶] To the Court, it defies logic for him to be standing there in
plain view with his phone out if he thought he was going to be shot. So there
is clearly empirical evidence of the distinct act separate in time from the
threat. [¶] The second reason, and we talked about this earlier, but it
factored in here and I want to bring it up. . . . [¶] Despite the jury finding the
premeditation allegation not true, there clearly was some portion of time
between the threat and the shooting.”
On Count 4 and 5, the trial court imposed but stayed midterm
sentences pursuant to section 654. The prosecution conceded, and the court

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agreed, that the attempted murder (count 1) and firing the gun in the
residence (count 4) was a single act, and the court reasoned that the shooting
and then Medina’s sustained efforts to unlock the door shared the same
intent—to kill Lopez—even though they were separate acts. Although the
court analyzed whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences for
Counts 3 and 5, it did not explicitly address the application of section 654 to
Count 3.
DISCUSSION
Medina raises a single issue. He claims the trial court erred in
imposing the sentencing enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1)
related to his criminal threats conviction. He postulates that because the
court did not stay the punishment for making a criminal threat pursuant to
section 654, it must have imposed punishment based on his initial threat
made at the barbeque; and that because he was not armed with a gun when
he made his initial threat at the barbeque, the court should not have imposed
punishment for the arming enhancement. He argues that the enhancement
“cannot be applied to his conduct before he retrieved his gun.” Because
substantial evidence supports imposition of sentence for the criminal threats
conviction and the arming enhancement based on Medina’s conduct after he
retrieved the gun, we affirm.
I.
Governing Law and Standard of Review
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act
or omission be punished under more than one provision.” This section
“precludes multiple punishment for a single act or omission, or an indivisible

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course of conduct.” (People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 591.) “The
purpose of the protection against multiple punishment is to insure that the
defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his criminal liability.”
(Neal v. State (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 20, disapproved on another point in People
v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 344.)
Few crimes are the result of a single physical act. (Neal v. State, supra,
55 Cal.2d at p. 19.) “It is defendant’s intent and objective, not the temporal
proximity of his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is
indivisible. [Citations.] . . . [I]f all of the offenses were merely incidental to,
or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant
may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished
only once.” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) On the other
hand, if the defendant “harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which were
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished
for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, ‘even
though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise
indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (Ibid.) In such a case, “the trial court may
impose punishment for independent violations committed in pursuit of each
objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an
otherwise indivisible course of conduct. [Citations.] The principal inquiry in
each case is whether the defendant’s criminal intent and objective were single
or multiple.” (People v. Liu (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1135.)
“Whether the defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives is a
factual question for the trial court, and its findings on this question will be
upheld on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to sustain them.”
(People v. Nubla (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 719, 730.) We review the trial court’s
findings in the light most favorable to the People, and we presume in support

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of the sentencing order the existence of every fact the trial court could
reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Atencio (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 1239, 1243.) Where, as here, the trial court makes no express
finding, an implied finding that the crimes were divisible inheres in the
judgment and must be upheld if supported by the evidence. (People v. Nelson
(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 634, 638.) A defendant’s failure to object to the
consecutive sentence in the trial court does not forfeit the section 654 issue.
(People v. Le (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 925, 931.)
II.
The Evidence Supports a Finding that Medina Harbored Multiple
Criminal Objectives After He Obtained the Gun
Medina claims to only challenge the consecutive four-month sentence
for the gun enhancement related to Count 3 without challenging the trial
court’s section 654 analysis regarding the eight-month consecutive sentence
for Count 3. Medina asserts that “[t]he trial court stated the choice to make
count 3 consecutive was due to the fact that the initial threats occurred in the
parking lot while the men were walking towards [Medina’s] house and were
thus, separated in time and distance from the shot [Medina] fired into the
trailer home of the victim.” Based on this view of the court’s ruling, Medina
argues that he was not armed when he made threats for which he was
convicted, rending the enhancement inapplicable to those threats. Medina
misapprehends the record.
The trial court’s statements on which Medina’s argument is premised
concerned the facts relating to crimes that affect whether to impose a
consecutive sentence pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a).
The court found that “there [was] clearly empirical evidence of the distinct
act [of the attempted murder] separate in time from the [criminal] threat,”
even though the jury found the attempted murder was not premeditated. It

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explained that “even if [the criminal threat underlying Count 3] wasn’t, even
if it weren’t at the barbeque, [the threat] was made prior to the incident at the
door, prior to the decision to break in, and prior to the shooting.” (Italics
added.) The court explicitly determined that “even if” it disregarded the
earlier threats made at the barbeque and only considered Medina’s later
threats made outside Lopez’s home, the threats were independent of and
separated in time from the attempted murder. Accordingly, it is evidence
that the court viewed the later threats as the basis for Count 3.
Indeed, the People did not argue that the earlier threats Medina made
at the barbeque violated section 422.2 Instead, at closing arguments, the
prosecutor focused solely on the threats Medina made outside Lopez’s house.
The prosecutor first observed that the reason Lopez began recording Medina
was “because Mr. Flores Lopez heard Mr. Medina coming. He heard the
threats, heard the yelling, heard the vulgar language before and that’s why
he got the phone out to start recording because he could hear him coming.”
When discussing the charges for criminal threats, the prosecutor did not

2 To show a criminal threat pursuant to section 422, the prosecution

must prove: “ ‘(1) that the defendant “willfully threaten[ed] to commit a
crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person,” (2)
that the defendant made the threat “with the specific intent that the
statement ... is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually
carrying it out,” (3) that the threat—which may be “made verbally, in writing,
or by means of an electronic communication device”—was “on its face and
under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened,
a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat,”
(4) that the threat actually caused the person threatened “to be in sustained
fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety,” and
(5) that the threatened person’s fear was “reasonabl[e]” under the
circumstances.’ ” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630; see also
CALCRIM No. 1300.)
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distinguish the alleged threats made against Ortiz underlying count 2 from
the threats against Lopez underlying count 3. To prove the first element of
each offense—i.e., that an unlawful threat was made—the prosecutor pointed
to the recording, arguing Lopez began recording after he and Ortiz heard
Medina make threats outside their home. As evidence in support of the third
element—i.e., that the threat was facially so unequivocal as to convey an
immediate prospect of execution of the threat—the prosecutor stated:
“[Medina] had a gun. He [was] yelling that he is going to kill [Lopez].” The
prosecutor continued: “[Medina] [was] saying, I am going to kill you right
then. That’s what that means. It means it is going to happen imminently so
as communicate to [Ortiz] and Mr. Flores Lopez that the defendant had
serious intent and immediate prospect of threat to be carried out.” The
prosecutor asserted the fourth element of each offense was established
because “the threat actually caused Ms. Ortiz in Count 2 and Mr. Flores
Lopez in Count 3 to be in sustained fear for their own safety or for their
family.” And the prosecutor rhetorically asked whether “their fear
reasonable under the circumstances”—i.e., the fifth element of the offenses—
before remarking, “[o]f course it was.” In short, the prosecution’s case in
support of Count 3 was premised solely on the threats that Medina made
when he was armed outside Lopez’s house in the presence of Ortiz.
With this understanding of the factual basis of Count 3, the inquiry
becomes whether the court violated section 654 when it imposed a
consecutive sentence on the gun enhancement for Count 3. (See People v.
Wynn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218–1221 [holding that section 654 can
bar multiple punishment for a conduct enhancement and for a crime other
than the crime underlying the conduct enhancement].) We think not.

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We begin with the jury verdict. The jury was instructed that, to find
Medina guilty of Count 1, it needed to find that Medina had the specific
intent to kill Lopez. If it found Medina guilty of attempted murder, the jury
was instructed that separately it needed to determine if the attempted
murder was done willfully and with deliberation and premeditation.
Regarding Count 3, the jury was instructed it needed to determine if Medina
specifically intended to threaten Lopez. The jury was further instructed that
a special allegation attached to Count 3, and if it found Medina guilty of the
crime then it needed to decide whether the People had proven the allegation
that Medina was armed with a firearm in the commission of the crime. As a
“general rule,” courts presume that juries can and will dutifully follow the
instructions they are given. (People v. Washington (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19,
26.) Thus, although it found Medina guilty of attempted murder, by rejecting
the special allegation of deliberation and premeditation, the jury found
Medina did not make a calculated decision to kill. At the same time, the jury
necessarily found that Medina willfully threatened Lopez and that he did so
while armed with a firearm. Viewed holistically, the jury verdict establishes
that Medina’s willful intent to threaten Lopez, while armed, was not part of a
calculated plan to murder Lopez.
With the verdict in mind, we examine whether substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s implied finding that the criminal threats Medina
made while armed at Lopez’s home and Medina’s subsequent use of his gun
to attempt to murder Lopez each had a separate intent.
Lopez testified that he heard Medina before he reached the top step of
his porch and twice heard Medina say he was going to kill Lopez and his
family as Medina was coming toward his front door. And Ortiz testified that
she heard Medina say, “I’m going to kill you now,” about four times. Lopez

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was afraid, so he locked himself inside his residence. Lopez heard Medina
making threats as he approached the door, calling to Lopez to come outside to
“settle something.” Then Lopez began to record the incident on his cellphone
as Medina approached the front door.
The recording captured Medina’s attempts to open the door to Lopez’s
home. When that was unsuccessful, Medina broke the glass window on the
front door and attempted to unlock and open the door. Then Medina put his
gun through the broken front door window, pointed it at Lopez’s head, and
fired.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the People, there is sufficient
evidence in support of the trial court’s implied finding that Medina merely
intended to threaten or intimidate Lopez before he reached a distinct intent
to kill. Because substantial evidence proves that separate acts with distinct
intentions gave rise to the substantive offenses of criminal threats and
attempted murder, nothing in section 654 requires the staying of the gun
enhancement attached to the criminal threats offense. Put differently,
imposing the gun enhancement does not violate section 654’s prohibition on
multiple punishment for a single criminal act because the enhancement was
attached to an offense based on distinct actions and intent from the
attempted murder offense in which Medina used the gun.
Medina’s argument that “[w]hatever threats he uttered when he shot at
Mr. Flores Lopez were clearly in conjunction with the attempted murder” is
conclusory and unavailing. And his cited authorities People v. Bradford
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 8 and People v. Venegas (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 814 (Venegas)
are distinguishable. In Bradford, after being stopped for speeding, the
defendant wrestled away the officer’s revolver and used it to shoot at the
officer. (Bradford, at p. 13.) The California Supreme Court found that

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section 654 prohibited punishment for both assault with a deadly weapon
upon a peace officer and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon under these
circumstances because the defendant’s possession of the officer’s revolver was
not antecedent and separate from the use of the revolver in assaulting the
officer. (Id. at pp. 22–23.)
Similarly, in Venegas, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d 814, the defendant’s
convictions were based on the defendant’s shooting someone in a bar. There
was no evidence that the defendant had possessed the gun before the assault,
and the defense presented evidence suggesting that the defendant had
obtained the gun during a struggle at the bar moments before the shooting.
(Id. at pp. 818–819, 821.) Under these circumstances, the court held that
section 654 barred punishment for possession of a firearm by an ex-felon and
punishment for assault with a deadly weapon because the evidence showed “a
possession only at the time defendant shot [the victim]. Not only was the
possession physically simultaneous, but the possession was incidental to only
one objective, namely to shoot [the victim].” (Id. at p. 821.)
Here, by contrast, Medina armed himself before walking to Lopez’s
home and before he threatened Lopez as he approached his home. Unlike the
Bradford defendant and contrary to disputed evidence in Venegas, Medina
did not obtain the gun by wrestling it from his victim immediately before
firing it. Medina’s possession of the firearm was antecedent and separate
from, not physically simultaneous with, his use of the firearm to attempt to
murder Lopez.
We emphasize that our holding is limited to the circumstances of this
case. It is plausible that a substantially similar fact pattern could support a
finding that a defendant held the same objective when using a gun in the
commission of criminal threats and when subsequently attempting murder

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with the gun. But considering how the altercation escalated from threats to
attempting to break into Lopez’s house, the fact that Medina did not commit
the attempted murder with premeditation, and presuming the existence of
every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence in
support of its finding, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s determination that Medina harbored multiple criminal objectives.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_________________________
Sweet, J.*

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Streeter, Acting P. J.

_________________________
Goldman, J.

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Marin, assigned

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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