Estate of Beilman CA4/3

CourtListener 10859476Calctapp15 de mai. de 2026

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 5/15/26 Estate of Beilman CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Estate of RONALD KENT
BEILMAN,
G065860
Deceased.
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-01309472)
KEVIN TODD DANIEL,
OPINION
Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

ORANGE COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY, as Public
Administrator, etc., et al.,

Objectors and Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Ebrahim Baytieh, Judge. Affirmed.
Ward & Thorn and Richard D. Thorn for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, and D. Kevin Dunn, Deputy
County Counsel, for Objector and Respondent Orange County District
Attorney, as Public Administrator (Public Administrator).
Bunt & Shaver and David N. Shaver for Objector and Respondent
Robin Johnson.
* * *
Kevin Todd Daniel appeals a final order after trial denying his
claim that he is the rightful owner of real property based on an agreement he
made with Ronald Kent Beilman (decedent). Daniel argues there is
substantial evidence to support the enforceability of the agreement, that it
satisfies the requirements of the statute of frauds, or alternatively his
performance of his obligations under the agreement negates the statute of
frauds requirements. He further contests the trial court’s credibility
determinations and asserts the court was biased. We disagree on all points.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the
writings produced by Daniel do not qualify as memoranda to satisfy the
statute of frauds because the terms are not certain and because there are
questions as to their validity. Additionally, there is substantial evidence to
support the court’s finding that Daniel did not fully perform his side of the
agreement, and any partial performance is not sufficient to eliminate the
statute of frauds requirements. Finally, we conclude there is no evidence the
court was biased against Daniel or its credibility determinations were
arbitrary or unreasonable. We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The real property in question consists of two parcels of land on
which there was a manufactured home in Redlands, California (Redlands
Property). The Redlands Property had previously been owned by a trust to

2
which decedent was a beneficiary. When decedent’s mother died, decedent
inherited the Redlands Property and transferred it from his name as the
successor trustee of his mother’s trust to his individual name.
Daniel alleged he entered into an agreement with decedent to
purchase the Redlands Property, but decedent passed away before the
property could be transferred to Daniel. In September 2023, following
decedent’s death, Daniel filed a petition pursuant to Probate Code section 850
seeking an order declaring him the owner of the Redlands Property. Shortly
thereafter, Robin Johnson, a first cousin of decedent, filed a petition for
determination of entitlement to estate distribution pursuant to Probate Code
section 11700; Johnson’s petition was approved by the court in January 2024.
Both the Public Administrator and Johnson challenged Daniel’s Probate Code
section 850 petition.
Daniel testified at trial, along with two other witnesses; he also
offered several documents as exhibits. There are two key exhibits at issue.
The first is exhibit 52 (the ledger), which he claims is a handwritten list of
payments made toward the purchase of the Redlands Property beginning in
November of 2016 and going through October of 2020. The ledger title
indicates: “Rent for ranch to buy or mor[t]gage from Kevin Todd Daniel.” The
ledger also includes the address for the Redlands Property and shows only
48 payments in the amount of $400, amounting to $19,200.
The second key exhibit is exhibit 53 (acknowledgment), which is a
written statement that decedent “sold [his] property to Kevin Todd Daniel for
the sum of $20,000.” The acknowledgment dated December 2, 2020, includes
the address of the Redlands Property and purports to be signed by both
decedent and Daniel’s mother, Rita.

3
Daniel testified Rita began dating decedent when Daniel was 22
or 23 years old, and he and decedent treated each other as father and son.
Decedent did not live at the Redlands Property, and around 2012, he asked
Daniel to help take care of it because people were breaking in.
According to Daniel, in 2015, he and decedent discussed entering
into a payment plan for Daniel to purchase the Redlands Property. They
eventually agreed that Daniel would make 50 monthly payments of $400
each and he would assume responsibility for paying the utilities and taxes on
the property. Daniel testified he began making the monthly payments in late
2015. However, the ledger indicates payments began in November of 2016.
Payments were mostly made by Daniel mailing a money order to decedent.
Daniel kept the receipt portions of the money orders he sent. During this
time, decedent continued to pay the utilities and taxes, but Daniel testified
he would reimburse decedent for these property related costs. Daniel testified
the money orders he sent included these costs.
When asked if there was a written contract for the sale of the
Redlands Property, Daniel testified, “Not that I know of.” He also could not
recall signing a written contract. However, when asked if he believed there
was a contract between him and decedent, Daniel responded, “I do . . . it
wasn’t a big sale or realty company or anything. It was just me and my dad.”
He testified he thought the ledger (exhibit 52) was their contract. Daniel
further testified he was present when decedent and Rita signed the
acknowledgment to show that Daniel had finished paying the $20,000
purchase price.
Christopher Drury testified he had lived next door to the
Redlands Property for the past 11 years and was Daniel’s friend. Drury
testified he knew decedent as Daniel’s stepfather. He further testified Daniel

4
told him he was paying the bills related to the Redlands Property and
indicated he had seen receipts or money orders for such payments. Drury also
testified decedent told him he had sold the property to Daniel.
Lee Benavidez testified he was decedent’s friend for 52 years.
Benavidez testified Daniel’s mother was in a relationship with decedent for
more than 20 years, and that Daniel was like a son to decedent. Benavidez
testified decedent initially offered to sell him the Redlands Property, but he
had declined. Decedent later told Benavidez he sold the Redlands Property to
Daniel. Benavidez testified he is familiar with and recognizes decedent’s
handwriting. He testified decedent wrote most of the ledger, but he was
unsure about lines 29–36. Benavidez also confirmed that decedent wrote the
words “Rent for ranch to buy or mor[t]gage from Kevin Todd Daniel” at the
top of the ledger.
As for the acknowledgment, Benavidez testified the upper-case
printing was definitely written by decedent, but he could not confirm whether
the cursive signature belonged to decedent. Benavidez did testify, however,
that decedent told him Daniel had paid $20,000 for the property.
After trial, the parties submitted written closing briefs. The trial
court issued a tentative ruling, giving the parties an opportunity to file any
objections or requests for clarification. No objections were filed, and the court
issued a detailed final statement of decision denying Daniel’s petition. The
statement of decision discussed the written and testimonial evidence in
detail. The court found Daniel’s testimony lacked “probative credibility,” was
mostly self-serving, and was inconsistent with other credible evidence. The
court similarly found Drury’s testimony to lack credibility, but found
Benavidez’s testimony was credible.

5
Trial exhibits 13–27 were notes and envelopes Daniel asserted he
mailed to decedent with money orders over a period of several years. The
court commented the notes all seemed to be the exact same size and appeared
to have been ripped out of the same notepad. Moreover, the notes would not
fit in the corresponding envelope without being folded, but most of the notes
did not appear to the naked eye to show signs of having been folded, giving
rise to a reasonable inference that they were not mailed in the envelopes over
time, but were either created or assembled sometime later.
The trial court observed that the term “RENT” and the words
“OR MOR[T]GAGE” are in an unusual location on the ledger, and to the
naked eye, they do not seem to be in the same handwriting as the rest of the
title. The acknowledgment has similar problems. The court observed the
cursive writing of “Redlands CA 92373” on the acknowledgment does not
appear to be consistent with the handwriting in which the remainder of the
address was written. Also, comparing the signature of decedent on the
acknowledgment to his signature from a prior legal document, the two
signatures did not match. Given that Benevidez could not confirm whether it
was actually decedent’s signature on the acknowledgment, the court was not
convinced decedent had signed the document.
The trial court found the alleged agreement between Daniel and
decedent did not satisfy the statute of frauds. Accordingly, Daniel’s petition
was denied, and the court ordered administration of the estate to be
completed accordingly. Daniel filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Daniel argues, in essence, that there is substantial evidence he
entered into an agreement with decedent to purchase the Redlands Property
and that agreement is enforceable under the statute of frauds. Daniel’s

6
arguments depend upon a finding the trial court is biased and unfairly found
his testimony and evidence lacked credibility. We disagree and conclude the
court had substantial evidence to find that the evidence produced by Daniel
was insufficient to establish the requirements of the statute of frauds.
Moreover, we conclude there is no credible evidence of judicial bias or any
impropriety in the court’s actions or findings.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BURDEN OF PROOF
“We apply well-established standards of review to a judgment
based upon a statement of decision issued after a bench trial. [Citation.] We
review questions of law de novo and we review the trial court’s findings of
fact under the substantial evidence standard.” (Gajanan Inc. v. City and
County of San Francisco (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 780, 791–792.) Substantial
evidence is not just any evidence arguably tending to support a trial court’s
findings. The evidence must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid
value. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873.) Substantial
evidence “‘inspires confidence that the ultimate fact it addresses has been
justly determined.’” (People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 795, 804.)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT’S CREDIBILITY FINDINGS
Daniel argues the court improperly found testimony was not
credible. Appellate courts are generally “‘bound by the trial court’s credibility
determinations.’” (In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 94.)
Unless a trial court’s credibility determinations are “arbitrary or
unreasonable,” the appellate court must defer to them. (Shapell SoCal Rental
Properties, LLC v. Chico’s FAS, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 198, 218.) Rational
grounds for disbelieving a witness include the factors listed in Evidence Code

7
section 780, such as the witness’s demeanor (subd. (a)); the witness’s interest
in the matter (subd. (f)); the consistency of the witness’s statements with
other testimony they offer (subds. (g) & (h)); and the witness’s attitude.
(subd. (j).)
The trial court found Drury’s testimony was not “credibly
probative,” and found Daniel’s testimony was “mostly self-serving and at
times inconsistent with other credible evidence introduced during the trial,
including internal inconsistencies in his testimony, as well as inconsistencies
between his testimony when compared with exhibits 52 and 53 regarding the
timing of events, the numbering of payments, and when the actual
performance on the purported oral contract actually started.” The court’s
determinations on witness credibility rested on its observations of their
“demeanor, tone of voice, and body language.” The court based its credibility
determinations on the factors listed in Evidence Code section 780.
Daniel argues even if the court found testimony lacking in
credibility, “[t]hose findings do not create evidence of the opposite of the
testimony given under oath.” We agree “[t]he rejection of a witness’s
testimony by the trier of fact has only the effect of removing that testimony
from the evidentiary mix.” (Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific
Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1205.) However, this does not
help Daniel, who argues this results in a lack of evidence that “the contract
was a fraud perpetrated by [Daniel].” Daniel further asserts there is no
evidence that “payment in full was not made” or that he “did not pay taxes,
utilities and home registration for the Property.”
This conclusory argument misunderstands the burden of proof in
this case. It was Daniel who had the burden of proving an enforceable
agreement existed “in writing to convey real property.” (Prob. Code, § 850,

8
subd. (a)(2)(A).) In response to Daniel’s petition, the Public Administrator
disputed there was a written contract between Daniel and decedent for the
sale of the Redlands Property and asked the court to determine whether
there is “sufficient proof” establishing a “written contract.” Johnson
submitted a petition asking the court to “determine the nature and character
of the property contained in the decedent’s estate,” which would include a
determination as to ownership of the Redlands Property.
Neither the Public Administrator nor Johnson had the burden to
prove the property was never sold to Daniel or that Daniel committed fraud.
It was Daniel’s burden to prove a written agreement existed for the sale of
the Redlands Property to him, and “the decedent, if living, could have been
compelled to make the conveyance.” (Prob. Code, § 850, subd. (a)(2)(A).) On
appeal, Daniel does not dispute that the statute of frauds generally applies,
or that his petition depended on him establishing the existence of a written
contract for the purchase of the Redlands Property. He only asserts there is
substantial evidence that the statute of frauds requirements have been
satisfied by way of the memoranda he introduced as evidence, and by way of
his full or partial performance.
Excluding the testimony that the trial court found lacking in
credibility does not help Daniel establish the existence of that written
agreement. In fact, it does the opposite, because Daniel cannot meet his
burden of proof.
Daniel also argues on appeal “veracity judgments based on non-
verbal clues are accurate half the time whether the observer is a lay person
or a presumed lie expert. They are no better than chance. These clues have
been likened to medieval truth-finding concepts such as trial by ordeal.” In
support of this assertion, Daniel cites to an article about the use of nonverbal

9
communication when assessing witness credibility. Regardless of the article’s
information, the factors a court should use in determining witness credibility
were set forth by the Legislature in Evidence Code section 780, which the
trial court used to determine credibility. A psychology article, even if
peer-reviewed, cannot overcome the Evidence Code. Daniel does not address
the factors in section 780, and we find nothing in the record to render the
court’s assessment unreasonable or arbitrary. We will, therefore, defer to the
court’s findings on witness credibility.1
III.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Daniel filed a petition pursuant to Probate Code section 850
seeking an order declaring him the owner of the Redlands Property. Under
that statute, Daniel was required to establish decedent, while living, was
“bound by a contract in writing to convey real property . . . and die[d] before
making the conveyance.” This includes proving “the decedent, if living, could
have been compelled to make the conveyance.” (Prob. Code, § 850,
subd. (a)(2)(A).)

1 Daniel also asserts the trial court was biased against him based

on his courtroom behavior, and because the judge is a former prosecutor who
knew Daniel had previously been convicted of a crime. The record does
include admonitions from the court to Daniel based on him talking in court
and disrupting proceedings. Controlling courtroom proceedings is not
evidence of judicial bias. Courtroom control is required. (Cal. Code Judicial
Ethics, canon 3B(3).) The assumption the trial judge is biased simply because
he is a former prosecutor is speculation and conjecture. Moreover, we cannot
find any objection or argument of judicial bias at the trial court level. Indeed,
when given the opportunity to object to the court’s tentative statement of
decision, Daniel did not file an objection. Failure to raise this issue before the
trial court constitutes forfeiture. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622,
731–732.)

10
Daniel’s petition initially argues there was a written agreement
in the form of “correspondence” admitted as exhibits 13–27 at trial, and the
ledger and acknowledgment admitted as exhibits 52 and 53 at trial,
respectively. The petition asserts Daniel “has fully performed all the terms
and conditions of the contract,” the “terms of the contract are sufficiently
definite and certain for enforcement,” and “[d]ecedent had already received
full consideration at the time of his death.”
The agreement Daniel seeks to enforce was to be performed over
a period of more than a year. The agreement is also a real property sales
contract. (Civ. Code, § 2985; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10029.) Based on these two
criteria, the statute of frauds applies. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(1) & (3).)
Accordingly, the agreement is not valid unless it is in writing. (Id.,
subd. (a)(3).)
The statute of frauds “‘“was intended to guard against the perils
of perjury and error in the spoken word.”’” (Sterling v. Taylor (2007)
40 Cal.4th 757, 771 (Sterling).) The statute’s purpose is “‘evidentiary, to
require reliable evidence of the existence and terms of the contract and to
prevent enforcement through fraud or perjury.’” (Id. at p. 766.)
A. Specificity of Terms
The statute of frauds does not require the parties to execute a full
written contract. A “note or memorandum” is adequate to satisfy the statute’s
requirements. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a); Sterling, supra, 40 Cal.4th at
p. 765.) The memorandum is “merely evidence of” the agreement and usually
does not contain all its terms. (Id. at pp. 765–766.) However, the
memorandum must include the contract’s essential terms. (Id. at p. 771.)
Extrinsic evidence can be used to resolve any ambiguities in the contract

11
terms (id. at p. 770), but it cannot be used to supplement or establish
essential terms (id. at p. 771).
Daniel argues that the ledger and acknowledgement include all
the terms of the agreement and together they qualify as memoranda which
satisfy the statute of frauds. The acknowledgement states decedent “sold” the
property to Daniel “for the sum of $20,000.” The acknowledgement also
includes the address of the Redlands Property and appears to be signed by
decedent. The ledger shows the payments made and also has the property’s
address, as well as the term “mor[t]gage” in the title.
While generally a property address is specific enough for a
memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds, the court found it was not
specific enough in this case, because the Redlands Property consists of two
parcels of land, and the mobile home on them. The memoranda did not
confirm whether the agreement was for one parcel, two parcels, just the
mobile home, or all three. Further, the court found the documents themselves
to be unreliable. The ledger says both “rent” and “mor[t]gage,” making the
document itself ambiguous. Additionally, the two documents are not solely in
decedent’s handwriting, and there was no evidence about who else wrote on
them, whether that writing was done with decedent’s knowledge and
permission, and when that writing was done.
Daniel argues the trial court should have used extrinsic evidence
to clarify any dispute in the meaning of the property to be conveyed,
pursuant to Sterling, supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 767. Specifically, Daniel
argues a quitclaim deed transferring ownership to decedent after his
mother’s death, entered as exhibit 2 at trial, includes a specific description of
the property, which the court could have used to resolve the ambiguity.
Daniel also points to various portions of his testimony, such as his desire for

12
a fixed address and the relationship between the parties, as evidence that
would resolve any potential ambiguity. The court found Daniel’s and Drury’s
testimony to lack credibility, so their testimony cannot be the clarifying
extrinsic evidence Daniel presumes them to be.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the
contract terms are too ambiguous to enforce. A property description on a deed
previously conveying the property is not evidence decedent intended to
transfer the same described property to Daniel. Additionally, there is
ambiguity as to the date the agreement was formed, when performance was
to be completed, and whether it was completed. The acknowledgement is
dated December 2020, but the ledger indicates payments began in November
of 2016. Making things more confusing, Daniel testified he began making
payments in late 2015, but even if he was wrong about that date, he had been
making payments for five years. Moreover, Daniel testified decedent told him
that he would only own the property once he finished making payments to
decedent. Even if the court had found Daniel’s testimony credible, it does
nothing but add confusion and more ambiguity to the terms of the agreement.
The trial court found Daniel “failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating with reasonable certainty the terms that he is claiming the
Decedent agreed upon.” We agree.
B. Partial / Complete Performance
Daniel argues that full or partial performance of his obligations
under the contract’s terms entitles him to ownership of the property even if
the statute of frauds is not satisfied by the terms of the memoranda he
submitted.
When a party performs his or her obligations under an
agreement, the other party can be estopped from contesting enforcement

13
based on the statute of frauds. (Secrest v. Security National Mortgage Loan
Trust 2002-2 (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 544, 556.) However, that principle is
“limited to the situation where performance consist[s] of conveying property,
rendering personal services, or doing something other than payment of
money.” (Ibid.) The idea is that the enforcing party must change his position
so much “that the application of the statutory bar would result in an unjust
and unconscionable loss.” (Anderson v. Stansbury (1952) 38 Cal.2d 707, 715.)
When a party has lost only money, he has an adequate remedy at law to
recover those funds. (Id. at p. 716.) If the buyer, in addition to paying the
money, makes, for example, valuable and substantial improvements to the
property in reliance on the agreement, performance may be an exception to
the statute of frauds. (Sutton v. Warner (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 415, 422
(Sutton).)
Daniel argues he fully performed the terms of the agreement
because he paid the full $20,000. However, the evidence does not bear this
out. The acknowledgement indicates the full $20,000 was paid, but the ledger
does not confirm the last two payments were made. Daniel claims he made
payments in early 2021, after the date of the acknowledgment in December
2020. The trial court was “not satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence
that there was ever full performance.” Substantial evidence supports the
court’s finding.
Even if Daniel had paid the full $20,000, it would not be enough
to avoid the statute of frauds. (Sutton, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 422.)
However, Daniel argues that he did more than just pay money. He testified
he took possession of the Redlands Property in 2012, prior to his agreement
to purchase it, and he improved the property by making repairs after
break-ins, painting it, and handling yard work. He used his own funds for the

14
improvements. Daniel testified he continued to live on the property after
making the agreement with decedent. Even if this testimony was credible, it
merely shows Daniel’s possession and the improvements he made to the
property took place before the agreement was contemplated. Daniel did not
change his position or invest his time and money in furtherance of the
agreement. He did it before there was a purported agreement.
The trial court found, after considering the memoranda offered by
Daniel, in the context of the extrinsic evidence Daniel offered, the witness
credibility issues, and the conflicts in the evidence, there remained “a degree
of doubt that the statute of frauds does not, and should not, tolerate.” We
agree. Daniel did not meet his burden of offering admissible evidence of an
agreement certain enough in its terms to ensure the tenets of the statute of
frauds were met.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents to recover costs on
appeal.

BANCROFT, J.*

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

15

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.