CourtListener 10859052•Potts v. Kern County Hospital Authority CA5
Potts v. Kern County Hospital Authority CA5
CourtListener 10859052Calctapp14 de mai. de 2026
Texto completo
Filed 5/14/26 Potts v. Kern County Hospital Authority CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JASMINE POTTS,
F089927
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-24-101925)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND
KERN COUNTY HOSPITAL DENYING REHEARING
AUTHORITY, [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the nonpublished opinion filed herein on April 24, 2026, be
modified as follows:
On page 17, the last sentence of the paragraph under the heading
“DISPOSITION” beginning with “KCHA” and ending with “costs on appeal” is
deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following sentence and footnote 10:
KCHA is entitled to its costs on appeal.1
Except for the modification set forth above, the opinion previously filed remains
unchanged. This modification does not effect a change in the judgment.
Appellant Potts’s petition for rehearing filed on April 27, 2026, is denied.
1 We express no opinion as to whether the trial court may consider appellant’s
ability to pay in awarding allowable costs on appeal.
DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
MEEHAN, J.
2.
Filed 4/24/26 Potts v. Kern County Hospital Authority CA5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JASMINE POTTS,
F089927
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-24-101925)
v.
KERN COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Bernard C.
Barmann, Jr., Judge.
Jasmine Potts, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hall Hieatt Connely & Bowen and Jay A. Hieatt, for Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Plaintiff and appellant Jasmine Potts, who was self-represented below and is self-
represented on appeal, filed a first amended complaint against Kern County Hospital
Authority (KCHA) (erroneously sued as Kern Medical Center and its outpatient clinics),
among other defendants. Potts challenges on appeal, a trial court ruling denying her
motion to strike KCHA’s general denial to the FAC as well as her related request for
entry of default as to KCHA. Potts also challenges a trial court ruling granting KCHA’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Operative Complaint
On June 11, 2024, Potts filed a civil complaint in the Kern County Superior Court
against multiple defendants. On July 3, 2024, Potts filed a first amended complaint
(FAC), which is the operative complaint in this matter. The FAC named as defendants,
Kern Medical Center and its outpatient clinics (the correct entity for purposes of suit is
KCHA); Kern Allergy Medical Clinic; Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings; and
WestPac, Labs, Inc.
The FAC alleged that starting in March 2024, Potts and her children sought
medical care because “she was sick, as were her children, and [she] suspected it was due
to mold in her apartment.” Potts initially obtained medical care for herself and her
children at KCHA’s facilities. Eventually, Potts sought and obtained specialist allergy
care at a separate entity, Kern Allergy Medical Clinic, for all four of her children, “for
suspected mold exposure.”
With respect to KCHA, the FAC alleged that, on March 10, 2024, Potts had an
initial visit with a nurse practitioner at Kern Medical Center, a KCHA facility. Potts
explained she was sick from suspected mold exposure. “Her symptoms were
documented, and she was treated with Loratadine and Fluticasone, and an allergy panel
was ordered.”
The FAC added: “[Potts] completed the allergy panel screening on May 12, 2024.
On May 26, 2024, at a follow-up visit, [the nurse practitioner], provided the results.
[Potts] indicated that she has consumed walnuts and peanuts daily without any issues
throughout her entire life. [The nurse practitioner] advised her to continue consuming
them and referred her to the Kern Allergy Specialist for further investigation.”
The FAC further alleged: “On March 20, 2024, [Potts’s daughter Po. G.] was seen
at Kern Medical Children’s Clinic for a same-day triage appointment for coughing due to
mold exposure. [Dr. Aiylam Paramewaran] verbally stated he was treating [Po. G.] for
2.
mycotoxins with Zithromax. However, the discharge paperwork incorrectly stated that
[Po. G.] came in for a well-child checkup and was treated for pneumonia. Blood
screening and chest X-rays were performed. [Potts] requested an allergy panel, but the
doctor denied the request, stating it was unnecessary. At a follow-up on March 29,
[2024] [Dr. Paramewaran] stated he had treated [Po. G.] for microplastics, not
mycotoxins.”
The FAC continued: “On March 20, 2024, [Potts’s daughter Pe. G.] was also seen
at Kern Medical Children’s Clinic for coughing due to mold exposure.
[Dr. Paramewaran] ordered a blood test and chest X-ray but denied [Potts’s] request for
an allergy panel, stating it was unnecessary.”
The FAC added that Potts ultimately took her children to an urgent care facility,
which provided referrals for her children to Kern Allergy Medical Clinic. Potts thereafter
took her children to Kern Allergy Medical Clinic. She also took her children for blood
allergy tests at WestPac Labs, Inc. As noted, Kern Allergy Medical Clinic and WestPac
Labs, Inc., are also defendants in this matter. The FAC contained additional factual
allegations concerning Kern Allergy Medical Clinic and WestPac Labs, Inc. Those
allegations are not relevant to this appeal.
The FAC asserted seven causes of action; however, it did not specify to which
defendant or defendants each cause of action pertained. The causes of action alleged
violations of, respectively, (1) Health and Safety Code sections 123100 to 123149.5 (full
chapter: patient access to health records); (2) Business and Professions Code section
2266 (requiring preservation of medical records by physicians and surgeons for seven
years); (3) Civil Code section 56 (entire Confidentiality of Medical Information Act
(CMIA)); (4) Business and Professions Code section 810 (prescribing disciplinary action
for false or fraudulent claims by healthcare professionals); (5) Civil Code section 1710
(deceit); (6) Penal Code section 471.5 (codifying misdemeanor offense of falsifying
3.
medical records with fraudulent intent); and (7) California Code of Regulations, title 22,
section 70707 (requiring hospitals to adopt and publicly post list of patients’ rights).
The FAC’s prayer for relief requested, inter alia, “compensatory damages in an
amount to be determined at trial”; “punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish
Defendant [sic] for their wrongful conduct and deter future misconduct”; and “injunctive
relief requiring Defendant [sic] to comply with all applicable laws and regulations
governing medical records and patient rights.”
On November 8, 2024, Potts filed a proof of service indicating she had served the
original complaint and related summons on KCHA (the record does not disclose when
service was made).2 On December 3, 2024, Potts filed a proof of service indicating she
had served the FAC on KCHA.3 In any event, on November 15, 2024, KCHA had filed a
general denial to the FAC.4
On February 20, 2025, Potts filed a motion to strike KCHA’s general denial and a
request for entry of default. On March 14, 2025, the trial court denied Potts’s motion to
strike general denial and request for entry of default.
On April 28, 2025, KCHA filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP).
Potts filed an opposition. KCHA filed a reply. On May 28, 2025, the trial court granted
KCHA’s motion for judgment on pleadings.
This appeal followed.
2 The proof of service is noted on the trial court’s register of actions but does not
appear in the record.
3 Again, the record does not disclose when service was made. The proof of service
is noted on the trial court’s register of actions but does not appear in the record.
4 KCHA’s general denial clarified that it had been “erroneously sued as Kern
Medical Center, including its outpatient clinics.” (Capitalization omitted.)
4.
DISCUSSION
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED POTTS’S MOTION TO
STRIKE KCHA’S GENERAL DENIAL AND REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF
DEFAULT
As noted, KCHA filed its general denial to Potts’s FAC on November 15, 2024.
Thereafter, on February 20, 2025, Potts filed a motion to strike KCHA’s general denial
and a request for entry of default. The trial court denied Potts’s motion to strike and
request for entry of default. The court’s order states, in totality, “Motion to Strike
General Denial and Request for Entry of Default by Plaintiff is denied.”
Potts challenges the trial court’s ruling. Potts argues the trial court erred in
denying her motion to strike/request for entry of default because she had not been
properly served with KCHA’s general denial. We are not persuaded by Potts’s
contentions and affirm.
A. Background
The record shows that KCHA first attempted to file a general denial to the FAC on
October 17, 2024. On October 17, 2024, KCHA also served the general denial on Potts
via email. The email, with the general denial and an attached October 17, 2024 proof of
service, is in the record on appeal. However, on October 18, 2024, the trial court rejected
KCHA’s filing on grounds of nonconformity between the filing party’s name as reflected
in the general denial and the parties listed in the FAC, because the FAC erroneously
referred to KCHA as “Kern Medical Center, including its outpatient clinics.”
Upon the trial court’s rejection of the general denial on October 18, 2024, KCHA
attempted to refile the general denial several more times, but it was again rejected on
October 21, 2024, November 6, 2024, and November 13, 2024, for the same reason.
Once KCHA’s counsel’s office understood the reason underlying the rejections, the
general denial’s caption was corrected, and the general denial was properly filed on
November 15, 2024. However, KCHA’s counsel’s staff filed the general denial on
5.
November 15, 2024, with the original proof of service dated October 17, 2024, and did
not re-serve the general denial on Potts on the basis that its substance was unchanged.
On February 7, 2025, Potts filed a request for entry of default. Potts states in her
opening brief that a trial court clerk declined to enter the default based on KCHA’s
previously filed general denial and its associated proof of service dated October 17,
2024.5 On February 13, 2025, KCHA’s counsel informed Potts in a phone call that
KCHA had filed a general denial on November 15, 2024. Potts in turn called the trial
court clerk, who confirmed the general denial was on file.
Nonetheless, Potts followed up on February 20, 2024, with a motion to strike the
general denial and a request for entry of default. Potts stated in her papers that she did
not receive the October 17, 2024 email in which KCHA served her with the original,
miscaptioned general denial (that was submitted for filing to the court that same day).
Potts clarified that she received other emails from KCHA’s counsel’s office in October
and November 2024, but not the October 17, 2024 email. However, all the emails were
sent to the same email address, that is, the address for Potts on file with KCHA’s counsel.
On February 27, 2024, KCHA’s counsel again called Potts to explain matters;
Potts confirmed in the call that she had already obtained a file-stamped copy of the
general denial from the trial court.
On March 14, 2024, the trial court denied Potts’s motion to strike the general
denial and request for entry of default.
B. Analysis
Potts argues she was entitled to take KCHA’s default on February 7, 2025,
because KCHA’s service of its general denial on her was defective. She further argues
5 Potts notes in her opening brief that a trial court clerk verbally told her, on
February 7, 2025, that no responsive pleading had been filed in the case. However, Potts
also states that when she sought entry of default on February 7, 2025, the court clerk
declined to enter default given that KCHA’s general denial was on file.
6.
the trial court should have struck KCHA’s general denial for defective service and
granted her request for entry of default.
Code of Civil Procedure section 585 makes clear that a default may only be
entered against a defendant when no responsive pleadings have been filed with the trial
court. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 585, subds. (a), (b).) Here, the trial court properly denied
Potts’s request for entry of default because KCHA’s general denial was filed in the court
on November 15, 2024, well before Potts sought to take KCHA’s default.6 Furthermore,
the fact that the general denial was on file was brought to Potts’s attention before she
filed her motion to strike general denial and request for entry of default, and KCHA’s
counsel appeared at the hearing thereon. Therefore, there was no basis for the court to
strike the general denial for purposes of entering a default against KCHA. (See, e.g.,
Lorenz v. Commercial Acceptance Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 981, 997-998 [“[T]he
policy of the law … does not favor default.”]; Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th
1337, 1364 (Elkins) [recognizing the “ ‘ “strong policy favoring the disposition of cases
on their merits,” ’ ” italics in original].)
Potts’s reliance on potential technical defects in the service of KCHA’s general
denial on her is unavailing, because Potts was in receipt of a file-stamped copy of the
general denial at the time she filed her motion to strike the general denial and request for
entry of default. (See Elkins, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1364 [“ ‘ “Judges routinely reject
requests by counsel to function solely in a ministerial capacity.” ’ ”]; Kalivas v. Barry
Controls Corp. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1161 [“An order based upon a curable
6 The record does not disclose the applicable timeline for filing a responsive
pleading to the FAC. In any event, the important fact is that KCHA’s general denial was
filed on November 15, 2024, before any application for default was made. (See Goddard
v. Pollock (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 137, 141 [“it is now well established by the case law
that where a pleading is belatedly filed, but at a time when a default has not yet been
taken, the plaintiff has, in effect, granted the defendant additional time within which to
plead and he is not strictly in default.”].)
7.
procedural defect … which effectively results in a judgment against a party, is an abuse
of discretion.”].)
In addition, the record reflects that the trial court denied Potts’s motion to strike
the general denial and request for entry of default, at least in part, on grounds it was not
served on KCHA. The register of actions indicates the denial was based, at least in part,
on lack of service of the motion, and documents subsequently filed with the court by
KCHA similarly indicate the court denied the motion for lack of proper service.7 Potts
did not secure a reporter’s transcript of the hearing on her motion to strike/request for
entry of default. “It is the appellant’s affirmative duty to show error by an adequate
record.” (Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435 [appellant failed to secure
a hearing transcript].) Moreover, a “ ‘necessary corollary to this rule [is] that a record is
inadequate, and appellant defaults, if the appellant predicates error only on the part of the
record he provides the trial court, but ignores or does not present to the appellate court
portions of the proceedings below which may provide grounds upon which the decision
of the trial court could be affirmed.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, we cannot evaluate this aspect of the
court’s ruling.
In sum, Potts has not shown the trial court erred in denying her motion to strike
KCHA’s general denial and request for entry of default.
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED KCHA’S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Potts next challenges the trial court’s ruling granting KCHA’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.
7 A proof of service indicating the motion was electronically served by Potts
appears in the record; however, the validity of the service is unclear in the absence of a
complete record, including the reporter’s transcript of the motion hearing.
8.
A. Applicable Legal Framework
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general
demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired.” (Weil & Brown, Cal.
Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (2021 ed.) ¶ 7:275; Fire Ins. Exchange v.
Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452 [“A motion for judgment on the
pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer.”]; Alameda County Waste
Management Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1162,
1173-1174 (Alameda County) [“A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a
demurrer in most respects.”].)
Like a demurrer, we review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment
on the pleadings. (Alameda County, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173.) “Except as
provided in the statute governing motions for judgment on the pleadings, Code of Civil
Procedure section 438, the rules governing demurrers apply.” (Id. at p. 1174.) “Like a
demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings attacks defects disclosed on the face of
the pleadings or by matters that may be judicially noticed.” (Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 438, subd. (d).) The motion is warranted when the complaint, or a claim therein, fails
to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) “ ‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be
made at any time prior to trial or at the trial itself.’ ” (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100
Cal.App.4th 644, 650.)
B. Background
As noted, KCHA filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on April 28, 2025.
Potts filed an opposition. KCHA filed a reply. On May 28, 2025, the trial court heard
argument on the motion. Following argument, the court adopted its tentative ruling
granting the motion, without leave to amend.
The trial court’s tentative ruling, adopted as its final ruling, provided that the
motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted on grounds of standing, as well as on
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the merits. As to standing, the court ruled: “Ms. Potts is the only named plaintiff in this
action. There are no allegations of any wrongdoing involving her own legal rights and
interests, and she has no right to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties,
including those of her children.” With respect to the merits, the court ruled:
“Independent of standing, [Ms. Potts] fails to state any cause of action against KCHA.”
C. Analysis
(i) Jurisdiction
Potts first argues: “Because KCHA never validly appeared [in this action], the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain or grant its motion [for judgment on the
pleadings].” Potts adds: “The resulting judgment is void and must be reversed.” Potts
further posits that, to the extent “judgment was entered on an unserved pleading,” it
violates due process. However, these contentions are unavailing because, as discussed
above, KCHA filed a general denial on November 15, 2024, and the trial court properly
declined to strike the general denial.
(ii) Evidence
Potts further argues that the trial court improperly granted KCHA’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings because KCHA did not offer any evidence in support of its
motion. This contention is, however, also unavailing because the grounds for a motion
for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or be
based on facts which the court may judicially notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d);
Alameda County, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.) Here, the court properly ruled on
the motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the face of the pleadings.
(iii) Standing
Potts next argues that three of the claims asserted in the FAC constituted properly
pleaded causes of action and, therefore, the trial court erroneously granted KCHA’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Specifically, Potts contends that the FAC properly
states causes of actions under Health and Safety Code section 123120 (access to health
10.
records), Civil Code section 56 (CMIA), and Civil Code section 1710 (deceit). As
discussed below, we disagree.
Preliminarily, we note the trial court found that Potts did not have standing to
assert claims on behalf of her children. Specifically, the court ruled that Potts “has no
right to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties, including those of her
children.” Potts, in her opening brief, does not address or challenge the court’s ruling on
this point. Since the issue of standing was not raised or briefed, Potts has forfeited any
challenge to the court’s determination that she could not bring any claims in relation to
her children’s treatment at KCHA facilities. (Limon v. Circle K Stores, Inc. (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 671, 687 [“ ‘Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or
abandoned,’ ” quoting Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6].) The
court’s ruling on this point therefore stands.
(iv) Health and Safety Code Section 123120
Potts’s claim that the FAC states a cause of action under Health and Safety Code
section 123120 (access to health records), fails. As to this claim, KCHA responds:
“Although [Potts] cites the entire chapter of statutes initially in her FAC, [she] now
acknowledges that only [Health and Safety Code] Section 123120 grants a private right
of action to enforce a violation of [Health and Safety Code] Section 123110, which
provides for a patient’s access to inspection and copying of their medical records.”
KCHA continues: “Assuming this statute applies, [Potts] has not factually alleged that
KCHA thwarted her access to inspect and obtain a copy of her own medical records.”
KCHA adds: “The Trial Court confirmed that [Potts] has no right to relief on the legal
rights or interests of third parties, including those of her children, who are the basis of her
claim.”
For purposes of our analysis, we assume without deciding that Health and Safety
Code section 123120 establishes a private right of action to enforce violations of Health
11.
and Safety Code section 123110.8 Under Health and Safety Code section 123110,
subdivision (a), medical providers must, upon request, permit inspection of medical
records.
We agree with KCHA that the FAC does not allege that Potts requested and was
denied access to her own medical records by KCHA providers; Potts’s opening brief
appears to concede as much. In turn, we conclude the FAC does not allege sufficient
facts to state a cause of action under Health and Safety Code section 123120.
To the extent Health and Safety Code sections 123120 and 123105, subdivision
(e)(1), permit Potts to personally bring an action based on denial of a request to inspect
her minor children’s medical records, this avenue is also not available to Potts.9 The
FAC does not allege that Potts submitted a request to KCHA to inspect her children’s
medical records and that KCHA denied her request to inspect the records. Accordingly,
even assuming Potts has standing to bring a claim regarding her children’s medical
records under Health and Safety Code sections 123110, subdivision (a), 123105,
subdivision (e)(1), and 123120, the FAC does not allege facts sufficient to state a cause
of action thereunder.10
8 Health and Safety Code section 123120 provides that “[a]ny patient or
representative” aggrieved by a violation of Health and Safety Code section 123110 may
“bring an action against the health care provider to enforce the obligations prescribed by
[Health and Safety Code section] 123110.”
9 As noted, Health and Safety Code section 123120 provides that “[a]ny patient or
representative” aggrieved by a violation of Health and Safety Code section 123110 may
“bring an action against the health care provider to enforce the obligations prescribed by
[Health and Safety Code section] 123110.” Health and Safety Code section 123105,
subdivision (e)(1) defines “ ‘representative’ ” as, among other things, “[a] parent or
guardian of a minor who is a patient.”
10 In her briefs, Potts does not assert she was denied access, upon request, to her
children’s medical records. Rather, she contends she has the “right to request
amendments” to her children’s “inaccurate records.” She has not shown that Health and
Safety Code sections 123120 and 123110 are applicable for this purpose.
12.
(v) Civil Code Section 56, et seq.
Potts’s claim that the FAC alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action under
Civil Code section 56 (CMIA) is similarly unavailing. With respect to this claim, KCHA
responds: “[Potts] alleges that each defendant violated California Civil Code section 56
by failing ‘to provide accurate medical information and the concealment of serious
illnesses.’ ” KCHA adds: “[Potts] cited the entire Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act, which contains numerous code provisions regarding medical
information and its disclosure. Generally, Civil Code section 56 [et seq.] prohibits a
health care provider from disclosing medical information regarding a patient without first
obtaining an authorization. In that way, it protects medical patients’ right to privacy in
their personal medical information. (Brown v. Mortenson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1070-
1071.)” KCHA continues: “As there are no facts alleging KCHA improperly disclosed
confidential medical information, it was appropriate for the trial court to grant [KCHA’s]
motion for judgment on the pleadings.”
Here, the FAC does not allege that KCHA providers improperly disclosed or
otherwise mishandled Potts’s personal medical information; nor does Potts have standing
to bring claims based on the interests of her children. Accordingly, we conclude the FAC
does not allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action pursuant to the CMIA (Civ.
Code, § 56 et seq.). (See Brown v. Mortenson, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1070 [the CMIA
“ ‘is intended to protect the confidentiality of individually identifiable medical
information obtained from a patient by a health care provider’ ”].)
(vi) Civil Code Section 1710
Potts’s claim that the FAC alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action under
Civil Code section 1710 (deceit), also fails. Potts asserts that the FAC alleges that her
child’s treating physician at a KCHA facility made conflicting statements about the
child’s diagnosis and, further, the child’s medical records were inconsistent with the
13.
treating physician’s statements, which facts are sufficient to state a claim for intentional
misrepresentation under Civil Code section 1710.
KCHA responds: “The elements of intentional misrepresentation ‘are (1) a
misrepresentation … (3) intent to induce reliance … and (5) resulting damage[.]’ Aton
Ctr., Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. [(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1245].” KCHA
suggests Potts has not alleged facts showing reliance or any damages. KCHA adds:
“Finally, as the [t]rial [c]ourt found, [Potts] has no right to relief concerning the legal
rights or interests of third parties, including those of her children [citation]. [Potts’s]
claim relies on the legal interests of her children, who are not plaintiffs in this matter.”
We agree with KCHA that Potts does not have standing to bring a claim for intentional
misrepresentation on behalf of her children and that the FAC does not allege sufficient
facts to state a claim for intentional misrepresentation on her own behalf. We therefore
conclude the trial court properly granted KCHA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
as to this claim.
(vii) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Potts also contends that the FAC alleges facts sufficient to state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); the FAC did not include a claim for
IIED. “A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there
is ‘ “ ‘ “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of
causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the
plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate
causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” ’ ” ’ ”
(Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) “A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’
when it is so ‘ “ ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized
community.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 1050-1051.) “And the defendant’s conduct must be
‘ “ ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will
14.
result.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1051.) Liability “ ‘ “does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
In short, “[w]ith respect to the requirement that the plaintiff show severe
emotional distress, [our Supreme Court] has set a high bar. ‘Severe emotional distress
means “emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no
reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” ’ ” (Hughes v.
Pair, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1051.) Here, the only facts alleged in the FAC as to Potts
herself describe a relatively routine visit with a nurse practitioner at Kern Medical Center.
Furthermore, the FAC does not allege that Potts suffered emotional harm based on the
visit. Accordingly, we conclude the FAC does not allege facts sufficient to state a cause
of action for IIED.
(viii) Leave to Amend
Potts does not challenge in her opening brief, the trial court’s denial of leave to
amend. She has therefore forfeited any argument that the court abused its discretion in
denying leave to amend. In any event, it is Potts’s “burden to show ‘that the trial court
abused its discretion’ [in denying leave to amend] and ‘show in what manner [she] can
amend [her] complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his
pleading.’ ” (Performance Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California, Inc.
(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 659, 668.) Potts has not met that burden.
(ix) Miscellaneous
Potts makes a “cumulative error” argument that is misplaced and without merit,
and we need not further address it.
KCHA also argues, relying on Government Code section 911.2 and 945.4, that
KCHA is a public entity and therefore any lawsuit against it is subject to government
claim presentation requirements. KCHA contends: “Neither the FAC [nor] the [opening
brief] allege compliance with the government claim presentation requirements, or even
make any mention of a government tort claim … [and] therefore, each cause of action
15.
against KCHA is subject to dismissal.” (Italics added.) However, in light of our
disposition in this matter, we need not address KCHA’s arguments with respect to the
application of government claim presentation requirements here.
(x) Appealability
Potts filed her notice of appeal directly from the trial court’s May 28, 2025 ruling
granting KCHA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, before a judgment of dismissal
in favor of KCHA was entered. Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (h)(3)
provides: “If [a motion for judgment on the pleadings] is granted with respect to the
entire complaint … without leave to file an amended complaint … then judgment shall be
entered forthwith in accordance with the motion granting judgment to the moving party.”
Here, the clerk’s transcript does not contain a judgment (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.122(b)(1)(B)); nor does the register of actions included in the record on appeal reflect
that judgment was entered. Accordingly, we must presume no judgment was entered.
(See Connell v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 382, 392 [“An appealable
judgment or order is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1
[an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not appealable].)
Potts’s attempt to appeal from a nonexistent judgment does not require dismissal
of the appeal. The merits of the appeal have been fully briefed by both parties and no
prejudice to KCHA would result from considering the merits. Under these
circumstances, “ ‘[t]o dismiss the appeal ‘merely to have a judgment formally entered
below with a new appeal would be a useless waste of judicial and litigant time.’ ”
(Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 800 (Donohue).)
Accordingly, we order the trial court to enter, nunc pro tunc as of the date of the order
granting KCHA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, a judgment dismissing the
action as to KCHA, and we construe the notice of appeal to refer to such judgment. (See
Donohue at p. 800; Coe v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 88, 91, fn. 3.)
16.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to enter, nunc pro tunc as of May 28, 2025, a judgment
dismissing the action as to Kern County Hospital Authority. The judgment is affirmed.
KCHA is awarded its costs on appeal.
DESANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
MEEHAN, J.
17.
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