CourtListener 10859014•Derderian v. Jabarian CA2/7
Texto completo
Filed 5/14/26 Derderian v. Jabarian CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
HOVNAN DERDERIAN, B343954
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCV24374)
APPO JABARIAN et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Bruce G. Iwasaki, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Harder Stonerock, Dilan A. Esper, Ryan J. Stonerock;
Newport Harbor Law Group and Mark V. Asdourian for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Davis Wright Tremaine, Diana Palacios and Joel Richert
for Defendants and Respondents.
______________________________
Hovnan Derderian, the Archbishop of the Western Diocese
of the Armenian Church of North America, appeals from the
judgment entered after the trial court granted publishers Appo
Jabarian and HYE Media Group’s (collectively, Jabarian)1 special
motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.2
Derderian alleged, as relevant on appeal, that Jabarian
published seven defamatory statements about Derderian in USA
Armenian Life, a weekly magazine owned by Jabarian.
Derderian does not dispute that he is a public figure.
Derderian contends he met his burden of showing a
probability of producing clear and convincing evidence of actual
malice with respect to six of the alleged defamatory statements,
including those alleging child abuse, misappropriation of funds,
and improper conduct at a seminary in Lebanon. With respect to
the seventh statement regarding alleged treason, Derderian
contends the trial court erred in finding it was a nonactionable
opinion. Finally, he argues the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request for discovery to meet his burden in opposing
the motion to strike, specifically, his request to depose three
declarants Jabarian relied on as sources for some of the
statements.
The trial court erred in granting Jabarian’s special motion
to strike with respect to Derderian’s allegations that Jabarian
made false statements that Derderian misappropriated funds
1 Derderian’s complaint alleged Jabarian “owned and/or
controlled” HYE Media Group, and the parties’ briefing refers to
the defendants collectively as Jabarian.
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure. Section 425.16 is commonly referred to as the
anti-SLAPP statute.
2
from the Armenian genocide settlement fund. However, we agree
with the trial court that Derderian has not met his burden of
proof with respect to the other statements he alleges were
defamatory. Derderian also has not shown the court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for discovery. We reverse the
judgment and remand for the trial court to issue a new order
denying Jabarian’s special motion to strike with respect to
allegations regarding the Armenian genocide settlement fund
and granting the special motion to strike with respect to all other
alleged defamatory statements.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
On October 6, 2023 Derderian filed a complaint against
Jabarian for defamation. The complaint alleged Derderian was
the current Archbishop (also referred to as a “Primate”) of the
Western Diocese of the Armenian Church of North America, and
he was the “spiritual leader of Christian Armenian communities
throughout the [Western] Diocese.” The Western Diocese was
comprised of 44 individual parishes across the western United
States with its headquarters in Burbank, California. The
complaint alleged Jabarian, as the “editor, owner and operator” of
the magazine USA Armenian Life, had published seven false and
defamatory statements about Derderian in the magazine’s
October 14-20, 2022 edition (the October 2022 publication).3
3 The complaint also alleged Jabarian published nine other
defamatory statements about two judicial proceedings involving
the Western Diocese. On appeal Derderian does not challenge
the trial court’s ruling striking all nine statements as privileged
3
Derderian attached a copy of the October 2022 publication to his
complaint.
1. Child abuse allegations (statement 1)
The October 2022 publication included a heading, “Alleged
Child Abuse Cover Up by Arch. Hovnan Derderian?” followed by
the phrase “Armenian clergy child molester?”4 Under the
heading was titled a “Media Inquiry” directed to the Executive
Director of the Western Diocese of the Armenian Church, asking
him to “confirm or deny the veracity of these allegations”:
“According to certain sources, Primate of the Western Diocese,
Hovnan Derderian, ‘committed child abuse.’ [¶] Reportedly, the
mother of the child turned to the well-known lawyer – now
deceased, Vartkes Yghaiyan, to initiate a lawsuit against the
Diocesan Primate Hovnan Derderian. . . . [¶] . . . However, at
the last moment, the mother of the child must have received a
‘large amount of hush-hush money[’] from Archbishop Hovnan
Derderian to remain silent and suspend the court case.”
2. Misappropriation of funds (statements 2, 3 & 4)
The October 2022 publication alleged three statements
about embezzlement and misappropriation of funds:
• Statement 2: “The person behind the team in the
embezzlement of Armenian Genocide Victims Settlement Funds:
Western Diocese’s Arch. Hovnan Derderian”;
“fair and true report[s]” of judicial proceedings under Civil Code
section 47, subdivision (d)(1).
4 Capitalization and boldface are omitted in the quotations
from the October 2022 publication.
4
• Statement 3: “Arch. Derderian is directly involved in the
numerous acts of misappropriation of funds”; and
• Statement 4: “Looting of 1st Artsakh War Fallen Soldier’s
Widows and Orphan Aid Fund in Canada: While he was the
primate [of] the Canada Diocese, Arch. Derderian
misappropriated thousands of dollars from that fund.”
3. Expulsion from seminary in Lebanon
(statements 5 & 6)
The October 2022 publication made two statements
regarding Derderian’s alleged expulsion from a seminary in
Lebanon:
• Statement 5: “Arch. Derderian expelled from Cilicia
Catholicosate in Lebanon for breaking his celibacy vows. He was
caught in engaging illegal sexual acts.”
• Statement 6: “[T]he young Derderian’s mother received
complaints from other mothers for his . . . sexual pass at other
boys. [His] mother decides to cover up his sexual tendencies by
enlisting him as a young student-priest for celibate priesthood.
But he gets caught in an illegal sexual act. He gets expelled from
the convent.”
4. Treasonous acts (statement 7)
The October 2022 publication also quoted a statement by
Jabarian purportedly made during a television broadcast of USA
Armenian Life TV: “‘Many are now convinced the three former
regime kleptomaniacs,’” i.e., three former Armenian presidents,
“‘with [chief bishop] Catholicos of All Armenians Karekin II along
with his clansmen such as Western Diocese primate Arch.
Hovnan Derderian . . . have perpetrated treason against the
5
Armenian nation. Their treasonous acts range from acts of
sabotage of Armenia/Artsakh’s war efforts behind the front line,
cutting off military supply by bribed Army general officers;
corrupt army general officers’ unwarranted withdrawal of
Armenian army units from strategic positions; old regime assets’
false propaganda designed to demoralize Armenian frontline
soldiers, to massive misappropriation of funds from Diaspora
designated for the twin Armenian republics’ economic
development and humanitarian mission.’”
In his answer, Jabarian asserted as affirmative defenses
that Derderian was a public figure and could not present clear
and convincing evidence of actual malice, and that some of the
alleged defamatory statements were “rhetorical hyperbole or
subjective statements of opinion.”
B. Jabarian’s Special Motion To Strike
On February 7, 2024 Jabarian filed a special motion to
strike under section 425.16 in which he argued that Derderian
had conceded he was a public figure and could not show clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice with respect to six of the
statements that Derderian alleged were defamatory. Jabarian
supported the motion with his declaration and declarations from
Reverend Father Kevork Halladjian, Vosgan Mekhitarian, and
Reverend Petros Bagramyan setting forth the basis for his belief
that the six statements were true.
Jabarian argued the seventh statement about alleged
treason was a nonactionable opinion because it was punctuated
by vigorous insults, passionate declarations, and hyperbolic
comments, and it expressed Jabarian’s belief that Derderian was
6
aligned with political and church figures who were working
against Armenia’s best interests in “the 44-Day War.”5
1. Halladjian’s declaration
Halladjian was a deacon in charge of the Armenian
Apostolic Church of Upland, California. He declared that while
he was attending St. James Theological Seminary of the
Armenian Patriarchate in Jerusalem in 1978, he saw two visitors
enter through the seminary’s gate, and the gatekeeper told him
that Derderian was one of the visitors and he was there to apply
for admission. Two years later, Halladjian was attending a
seminary class during which the Armenian Patriarch told the
5 On September 27, 2020 a war broke out between
Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in
the South Caucasus. The region had been controlled by Armenia
since an earlier war in 1994. (Encyclopedia Britannica, Nagorno-
Karabakh (updated Mar. 18, 2026)
https://www.britannica.com/place/Nagorno-Karabakh [as of Mar.
26, 2026].) Over the course of 44 days, “Azeri forces captured
one-third of the [Nagorno-Karabakh] region, including two ethnic
Armenian population centers, as well as all of the surrounding
areas that . . . [were] occupied as a buffer zone.” (Epstein,
Grassroots Narrative Building As an Answer to State-Controlled
Disinformation: Creating an “Artsakh Archive” to Document
Ethnic Displacement in Nagorno-Karabakh (2024) 26 Loy. J. Pub.
Int. L 1, fns. omitted.) The war resulted in significant
displacement of the 120,000 ethnic Armenians in the region”
(ibid.) and substantial casualties on both sides. (Tom Ruys &
Felipe Rodríguez Silvestre, Illegal: The Recourse to Force to
Recover Occupied Territory and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh
War, (2021) 32 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1287, 1287-1288.)
7
class that Derderian was not accepted to the St. James seminary
because he had been expelled from a seminary in Lebanon and
“was not worth ordaining as a celibate priest.” At some point
between 1982 and 1985, three visiting priests said during one of
Halladjian’s classes that Derderian had been expelled from the
Lebanon seminary for having a homosexual relationship with
another seminarian. Halladjian shared this information with
Jabarian in 2021.
Halladjian stated regarding Derderian’s alleged abuse of
children that Halladjian taught at an Armenian youth camp in
Dunlap, California from 2005 to 2008, and at some point he
noticed that a teenage boy had stopped attending the camp. In
2022 Halladjian called the boy, who stated Derderian had invited
him and two other boys to his house several years prior, and they
realized when they arrived that they were alone with Derderian.
“The boy did not share with [Halladjian] the specific details of
what had occurred,” but the boy stated “he was disgusted with
the Archbishop” and “the Archbishop had abused his power.”
According to Halladjian, “[the boy] was angry with his mother
because she had not protected him.” Halladjian explained that
“given the way the boy was talking and my decades of experience
working with young persons . . . , it was my impression that the
boy had been abused in some manner by the Archbishop . . . and
was harmed psychologically by what had happened.” Halladjian
shared this information with Jabarian in 2022.
2. Mekhitarian’s declaration
Mekhitarian formerly worked as an ordained priest for the
Armenian Apostolic Church in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the
1990s he worked as an investigative journalist and paralegal in
8
Los Angeles and contributed articles to USA Armenian Life.
From 2000 to 2005 he worked as a paralegal for attorney Vartkes
Yeghiayan. Mekhitarian averred he “heard it discussed within
the Armenian community on numerous occasions” that Derderian
was caught engaging in sexual activity with another seminarian
while at the Lebanon seminary. Mekhitarian learned through
his “network within the Armenian community” that the other
seminarian involved was “Father Ararat.” Mekhitarian located
Ararat “at least twenty years ago selling jeans in the garment
district in downtown Los Angeles” and told him several people
had identified him as the seminarian who engaged in sexual acts
with Derderian at the Lebanon seminary. Ararat stated he did
not want to discuss the matter, but he did not deny the
allegation. Mekhitarian told Jabarian this information “[a]t least
fifteen years ago.”
3. Bagramyan’s declaration
Bagramyan served as the pastor of St. Sarkis Armenian
Apostolic Church of Glendale, California. He declared that in
2021 a painting contractor assisting with a church remodel told
Bagramyan that a “female acquaintance” had told the contractor
that Derderian molested a child several years ago. The child’s
family had “initiated steps to file a lawsuit” against Derderian,
but the case was not pursued. Bagramyan believed what the
contractor told him and had no reason to doubt the information.
Bagramyan shared the information with Jabarian in 2022.
In addition, from 1979 to 1991 Bagramyan attended a
seminary in Armenia while Derderian was serving as a deacon.
Bagramyan heard students and reverends at the seminary
discuss that Derderian had been expelled from a Lebanese
9
seminary for engaging in homosexual activity. Bagramyan did
not state whether he shared this information with Jabarian.
4. Jabarian’s declaration
Jabarian averred that in 2016, Yeghiayan told him that a
boy’s family had asked Yeghiayan to file a lawsuit against
Derderian for child molestation, but the boy’s mother stopped
pursuing the lawsuit after Derderian paid her a large sum of
money. Yeghiayan asked Jabarian to wait three years to publish
the information, but he did not explain why. Jabarian later
learned the California State Bar had recommended Yeghiayan be
disbarred for misappropriating Armenian genocide settlement
funds, but this did not cause Jabarian to have any doubts about
Yeghiayan’s report because he “had known . . . Yeghiayan for
many decades and knew that he was a very well-respected
attorney.” Yeghiayan also “was a fervent advocate for important
Armenian issues and causes,” and his work to help a child
“pursue justice for abuse suffered at the hands of an Armenian
Church official was entirely consistent with Mr. Yeghiayan’s
character as I knew him.”
In addition, the late California Supreme Court Associate
Justice Armand Arabian, who was “one of the pillars of the
Western Diocese,” told Jabarian that Derderian had abused a
boy. What Halladjian and Bagramyan told Jabarian in 2022
about reports of sexual abuse of boys “reinforced [his] belief that
Mr. Yeghiayan had told [him] the truth.” Further, Yeghiayan,
Halladjian, and Bagramyan had previously proven to be reliable
and accurate sources of information for Jabarian’s reporting in
the Armenian Weekly. On October 6, 2022 Jabarian sent an
email titled “Media Inquiry” to Derderian and other Western
10
Diocese officials, asking them to confirm or deny the child abuse
allegations. (Capitalization omitted.) Western Diocese attorney
Brian Kabateck responded with a letter on October 11 stating the
accusations were false and the Diocese had “evidence which
proves that the story you have concocted is a complete farce”;
however, no evidence was provided with the letter.
Jabarian declared the statements he made about Derderian
being “‘directly involved’” in misappropriating funds and being
“‘behind’” the team that embezzled from the Armenian genocide
settlement fund were based on a March 23, 2022 Los Angeles
Times article, which he attached to his declaration. The article
stated that attorney Mark Garagos reported that $450,000 in
settlement funds for Armenian victims had been paid to the “local
diocese in Burbank” for routing to the Armenian Apostolic
Church in Armenia, but church officials told the newspaper that
the church never received the money. Jabarian knew “from [his]
discussions with numerous members of the [Western Diocese]
over the years” that Derderian had complete control over the
Western Diocese and that nothing important was done without
his approval; thus, Jabarian believed Derderian would have
noticed such a large payment.
With respect to misappropriation of funds from the
charitable foundation for Canadian widows and orphans,
Jabarian believed the article was true because it was based on a
firsthand account of the misappropriation written by Chris
Chakmakian, a “respected financial consultant,” who established
and funded the foundation with his wife. Jabarian attached as
exhibits to his declaration a copy of Chakmakian’s article and an
email Chakmakian sent to Jabarian a few days before the article
was published that explained what had happened.
11
Jabarian stated as to the seminary expulsion statements
that he had relied on Mekhitarian’s and Halladjian’s accounts,
and he had no reason to doubt them.
5. Derderian’s opposition
In his opposition, Derderian argued Jabarian’s statements
regarding child abuse and misappropriation of funds
demonstrated actual malice because Derderian made serious
charges that were “based purely on sketchy sources, often
multiple levels of hearsay, and rumors, without obtaining any
detailed information, questioning any of the sources, or
confirming the stories.” Further, Yeghiayan’s alleged child abuse
report was “incredible on its face” because the report would have
violated the lawyer-client privilege, and the Los Angeles Times
article Jabarian relied on for two of the statements about
misappropriation of funds named many individuals but not
Derderian.
Derderian argued Jabarian’s statements about expulsion
from the seminary were based on “third-hand rumors,” and
Jabarian could have contacted the Lebanon seminary to confirm
the information. Derderian submitted a 2024 letter from the
Lebanon seminary certifying he had graduated from the
institution. Derderian further argued two of Jabarian’s sources
were unreliable: The California State Bar had disciplined
Yeghiayan, and Mekhitarian was a convicted felon. Finally, the
treason statement was not an opinion because it identified
specific acts committed by Derderian “on the battlefields of
Armenia,” for example, cutting off military supplies, withdrawing
troops, and sabotaging the war effort.
12
6. The trial court’s ruling
On November 22, 2024, after a hearing, the trial court
granted Jabarian’s motion, striking Derderian’s complaint in its
entirety. In its order, the court noted there was “no real dispute”
that Derderian’s claims arose from protected activity. The court
then considered whether Derderian’s defamation claims had
“‘“minimal merit”’” in light of his status as a public figure, and
whether Derderian had demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence that Jabarian acted with actual malice in publishing the
statements. The court concluded Derderian failed to show actual
malice as to the first six alleged defamatory statements, and the
treason statement was nonactionable opinion.
C. Derderian’s Discovery Motion
While Jabarian’s special motion to strike was pending,
Derderian filed a discovery motion under section 425.16,
subdivision (g), requesting to serve written discovery and to
depose Jabarian, Halladjian, Mekhitarian, and Bagramyan.
Derderian argued that taking the declarants’ depositions would
enable him to prove actual malice by determining what they told
Jabarian and revealing their inherent unreliability and the lack
of evidence to support their statements. The depositions would
also enable Derderian to rebut Bagramyan’s testimony that
Derderian had “‘complete control’” over the Western Diocese and
to examine the specific facts supporting the statements in
Halladjian’s declaration. Derderian averred he could use this
information to show “Jabarian had to entertain serious doubts
about [their] reliability.” Jabarian opposed the motion.
After a hearing, on April 12, 2024 the trial court granted
Derderian’s motion in part, allowing him to depose and serve
13
written discovery on Jabarian but not the three other declarants.
The court reasoned as to the declarants, “The veracity of their
statements [was] only tangentially related to showing whether
Defendant Jabarian had actual malice . . . .” “[W]hat Defendant
Jabarian was told and what he did to verify the accounts” was
relevant to the actual malice inquiry, and that information
“c[ould] be obtained directly from Defendant Jabarian.” Further,
Derderian did not state what specific facts he expected to obtain
from the declarants that would show malicious intent. Instead,
Derderian sought to “test and negate” the three declarations,
which was not a proper basis for discovery.
On August 23, 2024 Derderian’s counsel deposed Jabarian
and inquired about Jabarian’s sources for the statements in the
complaint, the reliability of those sources, and Jabarian’s
investigation into the veracity of their reports (among other
topics).
DISCUSSION
A. Special Motions To Strike Under Section 425.16
A cause of action arising from an act in furtherance of a
defendant’s constitutional right of petition or free speech in
connection with a public issue is subject to a special motion to
strike unless the plaintiff demonstrates a probability of
prevailing on the claim. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see Serova v.
Sony Music Entertainment (2022) 13 Cal.5th 859, 871.) An “‘act
in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States or California Constitution in connection with a
public issue’” includes, in relevant part, “any written or oral
statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a
14
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).)
“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step
process. First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e]
from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.’
[Citation.] Second, for each claim that does arise from protected
activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal
merit.”’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the
court will strike the claim.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)
“‘“Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the
anti-SLAPP statute . . . is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken
under the statute.”’” (Barry v. State Bar of California (2017)
2 Cal.5th 318, 321.) Where, as here, the parties do not dispute
that the challenged allegations arise from protected activity,
courts have bypassed the first-prong analysis. (See Issa v.
Applegate (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 689, 701 (Issa); Cruz v. City of
Culver City (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 239, 250.)
“As to the second step, a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate
the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even
if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent
admissible evidence.’” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019)
7 Cal.5th 781, 788; § 425.16, subd. (b)(2) [“In making its
determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which
the liability or defense is based.”].) “‘We have described this
second step as a “summary-judgment-like procedure.” [Citation.]
The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual
claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a
15
legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing
sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the
plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s
showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a
matter of law.’” (Monster Energy, at p. 788.)
We review de novo the grant or denial of a special motion to
strike, “evaluating the context and content of the asserted
activity.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
871, 884-885.)
B. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Jabarian’s Special
Motion To Strike Two Statements Regarding Alleged
Misappropriation of Armenian Genocide Settlement Funds
but Not the Other Statements
1. Governing law
The elements of a defamation claim are “‘(a) a publication
that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that
(e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special
damage.’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.) Where, as
here, the plaintiff is a public figure, the plaintiff must prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, “that the libelous statement was
made with ‘“actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’”
(Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244,
256-257 (Reader’s Digest); accord, Edward v. Ellis (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 780, 793.) In the context of a special motion to
strike, “[a] public figure suing for libel must therefore establish a
probability that [he or] she will be able to produce clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice.” (Annette F. v. Sharon S.
16
(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167 (Annette F.); accord, Hoang v.
Tran (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 513, 537.)
“Reckless disregard . . . requires [a] defendant . . . to have a
high degree of awareness of probable falsity” (Collins v. Waters
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 70, 73; accord, Young v. CBS Broadcasting,
Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 551, 563), and “‘[t]here must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.’”
(Hoang v. Tran, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 537; accord,
Annette F., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1167 [“The existence of
actual malice turns on the defendant’s subjective belief as to the
truthfulness of the allegedly false statement.”].) Accordingly,
“‘[g]ross or even extreme negligence will not suffice to establish
actual malice.’” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 71, 88 (Christian Research); accord, Annette F.,
at p. 1167.)
“Actual malice may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence. Factors such as failure to investigate, anger and
hostility, and reliance on sources known to be unreliable or
biased ‘may in an appropriate case, indicate that the publisher
himself had serious doubts regarding the truth of his publication.’
[Citation.] However, any one of these factors, standing alone,
may be insufficient to prove actual malice or even raise a triable
issue of fact.” (Annette F., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1167;
accord, Reader’s Digest, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 257-258.)
Further, “such evidence is relevant only to the extent that it
reflects on the subjective attitude of the publisher.” (Reader’s
Digest, at p. 258.)
17
2. Derderian’s evidence of Jabarian’s protests against
him does not show actual malice
Derderian contends Jabarian published the defamatory
statements based on his hostility toward Derderian. He relies on
evidence showing that in late 2018 Jabarian held a “peaceful
protest” in front of the Western Diocese headquarters by hanging
signs from a truck, one of which stated, “‘New Catholicos, New
Primate’” with an image of Derderian.6
“A court may consider a defendant’s anger or hostility
toward a plaintiff in determining the presence of malice only to
the extent it impacts the defendant’s actual belief concerning the
truthfulness of the publication. [Citation.] The focus is thus on
the ‘“defendant’s attitude toward the truth or falsity of the
material published . . . [not] the defendant’s attitude toward the
plaintiff.”’” (Christian Research, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th 71, 92.)
Courts have found a publisher’s anger or hostility toward a
plaintiff supports a finding of actual malice where the statements
are made close in time to the published statements and are
directly related to those statements. (See, e.g., Balla v. Hall
(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 661, 683 [text message that defendant
needed “‘retaliation’” against plaintiff made a few months before
challenged statements showed vengeful motive]; Burrill v. Nair
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 374-375, 391 (Burrill) [defendant
threatened plaintiff he would “follow up with . . . the media”
before making the first challenged statements (italics omitted)],
6 Derderian argues Jabarian conducted multiple protests
against him outside the Western Diocese. Although Jabarian
admitted he conducted protests before the 2018 protest, there is
no evidence that any were directed toward Derderian.
18
disapproved on another ground in Baral v. Schnitt (2016)
1 Cal.5th 376, 391, 394-396.)
Although Jabarian’s protest shows that in 2018 Jabarian
wanted Derderian to be replaced as the archbishop, the protests
do not support an inference that Jabarian fabricated the
statements four years later or doubted the veracity of the
statements when he published them. (See Fletcher v. San Jose
Mercury News (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 172, 186 [reporter’s
statement that plaintiff was a “‘crook’” and he wanted to “‘get
people like [him] out of office’” were “personal attitudes” and not
linked to defendant’s awareness of probable falsity].)
3. Derderian failed to make a prima facie showing of
actual malice regarding the child abuse statement
Derderian contends Jabarian had reason to question
Yeghiayan’s reliability as a source because Derderian knew about
the State Bar’s proposed disbarment of Yeghiayan for
misappropriating money from the Armenian genocide settlement
fund. We agree this information should have caused Jabarian to
question the veracity of Yeghiayan’s report and to investigate his
claims of child abuse. (See Burrill, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at
p. 393 [source’s arrest and placement in psychiatric facility
provided obvious reason to doubt his reports]; see also In re
Garcia (2014) 58 Cal.4th 440, 460 [“‘“There is certain conduct
involving fraud, perjury, theft, embezzlement, and bribery where
there is no question but that moral turpitude is involved.”’”].)
But, as Jabarian argues, he waited to publish the accusations
until he had three corroborating sources, two of whom provided
declarations. In light of the corroboration, Derderian did not
19
meet his burden of making a prima facie showing of actual malice
regarding the child abuse statements.7
As discussed, all three corroborating sources were
prominent members of the Armenian community. Derderian
seeks to poke holes in the three accounts, but each source
provided some corroboration of Yeghiayan’s description of what
had happened. Halladjian, a deacon in an Armenian church,
recounted that based on his decades of experience with young
people, he believed Derderian had abused and psychologically
harmed a teenage boy who later spoke with Halladjian.
Derderian argues Halladjian’s account was not credible because
Jabarian’s description of what Halladjian told him was different
from what Halladjian stated in his declaration, specifically, that
Halladjian reported the abuse took place in Derderian’s house in
Burbank, but Jabarian recalled Halladjian stating the abuse took
place at Derderian’s house on the campground. The fact
Jabarian in 2024 incorrectly recalled a detail he was told two
years earlier does not show that he fabricated the story (which
would mean Halladjian did as well) or that Jabarian entertained
serious doubts about the truth of the report.
Moreover, Derderian does not on appeal challenge the
statements by pastor Bagramyan, who in his declaration
corroborated Yeghiayan’s account of child abuse and the proposed
7 Derderian also argues Jabarian had an obvious reason to
doubt Yeghiayan’s report of child abuse because the disclosure
would have breached the attorney-client privilege. However,
clients may waive the privilege by consenting to disclosure (Evid.
Code § 912, subd. (a)), and nothing in the record shows that
Jabarian had a reason to believe Yeghiayan’s disclosure would
have breached the privilege.
20
lawsuit. We recognize Bagramyan relied on what the painting
contractor for the church heard from a female acquaintance,
reducing its reliability, but Bagramyan declared he believed the
painting contractor and had no reason to question the veracity of
his statements.
The third source was Supreme Court Justice Arabian, who
(according to Jabarian) told Jabarian in late 2016 that Derderian
had abused a boy. Derderian contends Jabarian’s report was not
credible because Jabarian claimed Justice Arabian told him he
had severed his relationship with Derderian as a result of the
abuse, but Derderian and Justice Arabian had a “cordial
relationship” until Justice Arabian’s death. Further, Derderian
stated that in 2017 he presided over an event honoring Justice
Arabian’s wife, and Justice Arabian thanked Derderian for his
kind words at the event. We accept the statements in
Derderian’s declaration as true for purposes of the special motion
to strike, but Derderian submitted no evidence that Jabarian was
aware of Justice Arabian’s attendance at the 2017 event.
Moreover, Justice Arabian could have remained cordial with
Derderian in his role as the archbishop and thanked him for his
kind words at the 2017 event but still severed their prior
personal relationship.
Derderian also argues the fact that Jabarian published the
child abuse statements only after two of his claimed sources died
(Yeghiayan and Justice Arabian) shows that Jabarian fabricated
the statements and purposefully waited to publish the
statements so his sources could not be tested. It is speculation
that Jabarian purposefully “waited years until these individuals
died” to publish the child abuse allegations. Further, during the
two-year interval Jabarian obtained corroboration from
21
Halladjian and Bagramyan, both of whom submitted
declarations. Finally, Derderian argues Jabarian’s failure to
provide details of the child abuse, including the full name of the
boy, when the incident occurred, or what Derderian did to the
boy, shows the “tall tales” of child abuse were fabricated. This
too is speculation—it is not surprising that Justice Arabian and
the other sources would not have felt comfortable disclosing the
boy’s full name or details about what had happened.
At most, the issues raised by Derderian suggest that
Jabarian should have responsibly investigated further whether
Derderian had sexually abused a boy before publishing that the
abuse took place. But a “‘mere failure to investigate the
truthfulness of a statement, even when a reasonably prudent
person would have done so, is insufficient’ to demonstrate actual
malice.” (Christian Research, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 90;
see Reader’s Digest, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 259 [“A publisher does
not have to investigate personally, but may rely on the
investigation and conclusions of reputable sources.”].)8
8 The fact the Western Diocese prior to publication sent a
letter claiming the child abuse statement in the media inquiry
were not true does not show actual malice. “‘A denial only serves
to buttress a case for actual malice when there is something in
the content of the denial or supporting evidence produced in
conjunction with the denial that carries a doubt-inducing
quality.’” (Young v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., supra,
212 Cal.App.4th at p. 564; accord, OneTaste Inc. v. Netflix, Inc.
(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 174, 192.) The Western Diocese’s letter
denied the allegation and stated it had evidence demonstrating
the statement was false, but it did not describe or attach any
evidence.
22
4. Derderian made a prima facie showing of actual
malice with respect to misappropriation of funds for
the Armenian genocide settlement fund but not as to
the Canadian fund
Derderian contends he met his burden to make a prima
facie showing of actual malice with respect to Jabarian’s
statements accusing him of being “directly involved” in and
“behind” the team that misappropriated funds from the
Armenian genocide settlement fund. Specifically, he argues the
Los Angeles Times article Jabarian relied on did not mention
Derderian, and Jabarian’s personal belief that Derderian must
have been involved was not sufficient to defeat a showing of
actual malice. We agree Derderian met his burden.
The Los Angeles Times article supported Jabarian’s
assertion that $450,000 in settlement funds were transferred to
the “local diocese in Burbank” (the Western Diocese), which was
supposed to transfer the funds to a church in Armenia, but the
church never received the funds. But the article does not
mention Derderian or any role he played in the receipt, transfer,
or misappropriation of the funds. Jabarian’s reliance on the Los
Angeles Times article, without any evidence Derderian was
involved, supports an inference the statement was fabricated or
made with reckless disregard for the truth. (See Burrill, supra,
217 Cal.App.4th at p. 393 [an “an unambiguous inference of
fabrication” arose where defendant cited no source supporting his
allegation].)
The only other support Jabarian provided for his
statements that Derderian misappropriated the settlement funds
was his personal belief from conversations with unidentified
church members “over the years” that Derderian had “complete
23
control” over the Western Diocese; thus Jabarian believed such a
large transfer of money would not “go unnoticed” by Derderian.
However, it is a large leap from the fact an archbishop has
control over a diocese to the conclusion he must have been
involved in the theft of funds intended for the church in
Armenia.9 As the United States Supreme Court explained in St.
Amant v. Thompson (1968) 390 U.S. 727, 732, a publisher cannot
“insure a favorable verdict by testifying that he published with a
belief that the statements were true.” Because Jabarian provided
no other basis for his statements beyond his personal belief it was
true, Derderian has shown a probability he will be able to
produce clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.
We reach a different conclusion with respect to Jabarian’s
statement that Derderian misappropriated funds from a
charitable foundation for Canadian widows and orphans.
Chakmakian, a founder of the fund, described in his email to
Jabarian how Derderian redirected the funds intended for needy
children in Armenia to “children and families of [Derderian’s]
puppet priests and minions in Armenia.” Derderian contends
Jabarian had actual malice in reporting the story because
Jabarian knew Chakmakian disliked Derderian, and further,
Jabarian admitted he never fact-checked Chakmakian’s
9 Bagramyan made a similar statement in his declaration
that, based on his observation of Derderian at church events over
the prior five years, “Derderian has complete control over the
Western Diocese and that nothing of consequence happens
without his knowledge.” Neither Bagramyan nor Jabarian state
that Bagramyan shared this observation with Jabarian.
Moreover, Bagramyan does not provide any basis for the
statement (other than his observation of Derderian at church
events).
24
statements, reviewed any documents regarding the
misappropriation, or recalled if the Canadian fund demanded
Derderian repay the money. However, as discussed, a failure to
investigate, without more, does not show the publisher had
actual malice. (Christian Research, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at
p. 90.) Nor does the fact that Chakmakian severed ties with
Derderian after learning of the misdirection of the Canadian
funds show he was biased in his reporting of what had happened
(or that Jabarian would have had serious doubts about the
reporting). (See Reader’s Digest, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 260
[individual’s statement that plaintiff seemed “‘very, very
nasty . . . and litigious as hell’” did not demonstrate bias and
instead was “a reasonable reaction” to what individual learned
about plaintiff’s previous actions].)
5. Derderian failed to make a prima facie showing of
actual malice with respect to the seminary expulsion
statements
Derderian contends Jabarian acted with actual malice in
publishing the seminary expulsion statements because he failed
to check readily available sources to confirm he was expelled.
Derderian relies on a letter he obtained in 2024 from the
Lebanese seminary certifying he graduated from the seminary in
1975. Derderian has not met his burden to make a prima facie
showing of actual malice.
“Although failure to investigate will not alone support a
finding of actual malice, [citation], the purposeful avoidance of
the truth is in a different category.” (Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton (1989) 491 U.S. 657, 692;
see Khawar v. Globe Int’l., Inc. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1073A, 259, 276-
25
277 [plaintiff made showing of actual malice to support damages
award where the publisher accused a private figure of
assassinating Robert Kennedy without “review[ing] the
voluminous public records” to the contrary or “contact[ing] any of
the eyewitnesses to the assassination, some of whom were
prominent individuals who could easily have been located”].) In
Harte-Hanks, the United States Supreme Court held a
newspaper’s failure to listen to exculpatory audiotapes that the
plaintiff had made available to the newspaper supported a
finding of actual malice. (Harte-Hanks, at pp. 683, 692.)
Likewise, in Collins v. Waters (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 70, 73-75,
85, the plaintiff made a prime facie showing of actual malice
where the defendant continued to state a political opponent’s
military discharge was dishonorable after the plaintiff provided
the defendant a copy of what appeared to be an official document
showing the contrary.
Derderian’s reliance on Connaughton, Collins, and Khawar
is misplaced. Unlike the facts in those cases, Derderian provided
no evidence that Jabarian was aware of a record of Derderian’s
1975 graduation or that Jabarian could have obtained the record
from the seminary without Derderian’s consent. Jabarian’s lack
of any effort to confirm whether Derderian graduated from the
seminary may have shown Jabarian’s negligent investigation, but
not his purposeful avoidance of the truth. (See Beilenson v.
Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 944, 952 [plaintiff “charges
that had [defendant] contacted the [Fair Political Practices
Commission] he would have discovered that [plaintiff] was in
compliance with the law. ‘Failure to investigate does not in itself
establish bad faith.’”].)
26
Derderian also argues Mekhitarian was an unreliable
source because he was convicted of felony grand theft and
immigration fraud. However, Jabarian testified at his deposition
that he was unaware of Mekhitarian’s felony convictions, and
Derderian provided no evidence that Jabarian was aware of the
convictions. Thus, Derderian has not shown Jabarian had a
subjective belief Mekhitarian was not a reliable source.
Moreover, Derderian does not question the reliability of
Halladjian, who corroborated Mekhitarian’s account that
Derderian was expelled from the seminary for homosexual
conduct.10
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Concluding Jabarian’s
Statement Regarding Treason Was a Nonactionable
Opinion
1. Governing law
“‘“‘The sine qua non of recovery for defamation . . . is the
existence of falsehood.’ [Citation.] Because the statement must
contain a provable falsehood, courts distinguish between
statements of fact and statements of opinion for purposes of
defamation liability. Although statements of fact may be
actionable as libel, statements of opinion are constitutionally
10 Derderian also argues Jabarian’s failure to locate Father
Ararat (the other seminarian allegedly involved in the sexual
activity), who was living in Los Angeles, supported a finding of
actual malice. At most this is further evidence of negligent
failure to investigate, not actual malice. Derderian does not
provide any argument regarding Jabarian’s report that
Derderian’s mother sent him to the seminary because of
complaints about his homosexual tendencies as a child.
27
protected.”’” (ZL Technologies, Inc. v. Does 1-7 (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 603, 624; accord, Baker v. Los Angeles Herald
Examiner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 254, 259-260 [“‘In this context courts
apply the Constitution by carefully distinguishing between
statements of opinion and fact, treating the one as
constitutionally protected and imposing on the other civil liability
for its abuse’”].)
“‘Though mere opinions are generally not actionable,’ a
‘statement . . . that implies a false assertion of fact is actionable.’”
(Billauer v. Escobar-Eck (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953, 967
[statements suggesting lobbyist for church had improperly
lobbied city officials in the past were statements of fact, not
opinion]; see Issa, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 702, 706
[statement that politician had “‘[g]amed the system to line his
own pockets’” was not provably false, and therefore was
nonactionable opinion].) “Thus, the ‘inquiry is not merely
whether the statements are fact or opinion, but “‘whether a
reasonable fact finder could conclude the published statement
declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact.’”’” (Jackson
v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1261; accord,
Billauer, at p. 967.) Further, “‘it is not the literal truth or falsity
of each word or detail used in a statement which determines
whether or not it is defamatory; rather, the determinative
question is whether the “gist or sting” of the statement is true or
false, benign or defamatory, in substance.’” (Issa, at p. 702;
accord, Ringler Associates Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2000)
80 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1181-1182.)
“To ascertain whether the statements in question are
provably false factual assertions, courts consider the totality of
the circumstances.” (GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP (2013)
28
220 Cal.App.4th 141, 156; accord, Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi–Kerttula
(2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1049.) “‘Under the totality of the
circumstances test, “[f]irst, the language of the statement is
examined. . . . [¶] Next, the context in which the statement was
made must be considered.”’” (Issa, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at
p. 703; accord, Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc. (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 375, 385.) “Whether challenged statements
convey the requisite factual imputation is ordinarily a question of
law for the court.” (GetFugu, at p. 156; accord, Nygard, at
p. 1049.)
2. The treason statement was a nonactionable opinion
The treason statement in the October 2022 publication was
couched in “‘rhetorical hyperbole,’ ‘vigorous epithet[s],’ ‘lusty and
imaginative expression[s] of . . . contempt,’ and language used ‘in
a loose, figurative sense,’” which “have all been accorded
constitutional protection.” (Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, supra,
159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048.) The beginning of the article
discussed how many Armenians felt about the “‘mindset among
certain Armenian male-chauvinistic, ignorant, self-centered,
egomaniacs, unpatriotic, un-Armenian elements.’” The article
then referred to three former Armenian presidents as “regime
kleptomaniacs” and described Derderian and other religious
leaders as “clansmen” who “perpetrated treason against the
Armenian nation.” Jabarian exclaimed his “‘firm belief . . . that
the Armenians have . . . lost the war . . . to treason!’’’ These
hyperbolic statements would indicate to the average reader that
Jabarian was expressing his personal opinion about the quality of
political and religious leadership in the Armenian community.
Moreover, the statements are not provably false.
29
Further, terms of “apparency” qualified the article’s
language. (See Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (1986)
42 Cal.3d 254, 260-261.)11 As the court in Baker explained,
“[w]here the language of [a] statement is ‘cautiously phrased in
terms of apparency,’ the statement is less likely to be reasonably
understood as a statement of fact rather than opinion.” (Ibid., fn.
omitted.) On that basis the court in Baker held the statement
beginning with the phrase “‘[m]y impression is’” was an opinion,
reasoning that “[w]hen one states a view in terms of an
‘impression,’ the listener or reader is on notice that the maker is
not vouching for its accuracy. A reasonable person would
understand that a statement of opinion rather than of fact was to
follow.” (Id. at pp. 261-262.)
Jabarian prefaced the treason article with language of
apparency, including that “‘many Diaspora and Homeland
Armenians feel that they’ve had it with the . . . mindset among
Armenian . . . egomaniacs.” (Italics added.) The article
continued by saying many in the Armenian community were now
“convinced” and Jabarian was of the “firm belief” that the
Armenians lost the war as a result of treason. These phrases
signaled to the reader that the publication was expressing the
opinions of the author and other members of the Armenian
community.
Moreover, the 44-day war and its losses for Armenia, which
was the focus of the article, were an issue of public concern in the
Armenian community. Thus, the statement was “the same kind
11 The court in Baker explained that “apparency” referred to
something being “apparent,” as if the publisher was saying “‘[i]t
appears to me.’” (Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, supra,
42 Cal.3d at pp. 260-261, 263, fn. 4.)
30
of expression of opinion . . . typically generated in the heat of a
political controversy.” (Carr v. Warden (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d
1166, 1168, 1170 [published statement by project opponent that
“I think someone is being bought on the Planning Commission”
was nonactionable opinion where made in connection with vote
on zoning ordinance that was subject of “considerable [public]
debate”]; see Issa, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 704 [“‘“[T]hose
engaged in political debate are entitled not only to speak
responsibly but to ‘ . . . speak foolishly and without
moderation.’”’”].)
Derderian contends the treason statement was not an
opinion because it included a series of factual claims, including
that Derderian sabotaged Armenia’s war efforts and cut off
military supplies. However, these claims lacked sufficient
specificity to constitute provable factual assertions. For example,
the article accused Derderian and the three other leaders of
playing a role in the “corrupt army general officers’ unwarranted
withdrawal of Armenian army,” the cutting off of military
supplies by unidentified army officers who were bribed, and “false
propaganda designed to demoralize Armenian frontline soldiers.”
Whether an officer is corrupt, a withdrawal of solders is
unwarranted, unidentified officers were bribed to cut off military
supplies, or something is propaganda are not provable
statements. Likewise, it is not provable whether Derderian and
others engaged in unspecified acts of sabotage of the Armenian
war efforts. The article failed to specify what acts were taken,
when or where they occurred, or how Derderian was involved,
preventing the statements from being proven true or false. (See
Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1142, 1149-1150
[statements accusing former romantic partner “of fraud, deceit
31
and picking up street walkers and homeless drug addicts,”
“taking steroids,” and being involved in “illegal activities” were
nonactionable opinions because “they lack[ed] any specificity as
to the time or place of [plaintiff]’s supposed behavior”].)
Sanders v. Walsh (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 855, relied on by
Derderian, is distinguishable. The disputed statements in
Sanders were mostly preceded by the word “‘Fact,’” recited
“specific factual claims” of perjury and fraud, referred to the
plaintiff in stating city contracts were being awarded to friends
and family members, and stated plaintiff took “bribes.” (Id. at
p. 864.) For example, one statement read: “Fact: [Plaintiff] who
works for the City of [Anaheim], CA . . . wrote an unauthorized
check out of her boyfriend[’]s . . . account” to pay for a wig
purchased by her mother, and wrote on the check that it was for
a “‘“Prosthetic Donation.”’” (Id. at p. 859.) By contrast,
Jabarian’s statement in the article lacked the specificity of the
statements in Sanders, was made in connection with a
contentious political issue, and was preceded by language of
apparency.
D. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
Derderian’s Request To Depose Jabarian’s Declarants
1. Governing law and standard of review
Section 425.16, subdivision (g), provides that upon the
filing of a special motion to strike, “[a]ll discovery proceedings in
the action shall be stayed . . . until notice of entry of the order
ruling on the motion.” The discovery stay “reflect[s] the statutory
purpose to prevent and deter SLAPP suits by ending them early
and without great cost to the SLAPP target.” (Britts v. Superior
Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1124.)
32
“A trial court may lift the statutory stay for ‘good cause’
[citations], which requires a showing that the specific discovery
sought is both ‘needed . . . to establish a prima facie case’ and
‘tailored to that end.’” (Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v. Lahiji
(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 882, 891; accord, Britts v. Superior Court,
supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1125.) “To satisfy this ‘good cause’
standard, a party must “‘explain what additional facts [it] expects
to uncover.’” (Six4Three, LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 635, 659; accord, Sipple v. Foundation For Nat.
Progress (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 247). Further, “‘[d]iscovery
may not be obtained merely to “test” the opponent’s
declarations.’” (Abir, at p. 891.) “We review a trial court’s denial
of a motion to lift the stay for abuse of discretion.” (Abir, at
p. 891; accord, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg (2003)
107 Cal.App.4th 568, 593.) A ruling constitutes an abuse of
discretion if it is “‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.’” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v.
University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.)
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
Derderian contends the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request to depose the three individuals who
submitted declarations in support of Jabarian’s special motion to
strike and then relying on the declarations to grant the motion.
The court did not abuse its discretion.
In his motion, Derderian argued the depositions would
“show that the information upon which Jabarian claims to have
relied was entirely unreliable (because it was self-contradictory,
contained unbelievable details, or came from obviously unreliable
sources).” ~(5 AA 461)~ And on appeal, Derderian highlights that
33
there were inconsistencies between the facts as described by the
declarants and the facts presented by Jabarian. ~(AOB 58)~ But
testing the reliability of the declarants was not a proper basis for
conducting discovery under section 425.16. (Abir Cohen Treyzon
Salo, LLP v. Lahiji, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.) Further,
Derderian was allowed to take Jabarian’s deposition, during
which he could have elicited facts to challenge the reliability of
Jabarian’s sources.
Whether Derderian is correct that the trial court should
have allowed him to take the depositions of the declarants to
determine what they told Jabarian is a closer call. The court
agreed that what the declarants told Jabarian was relevant, but
it observed this information could “be obtained directly from
Defendant Jabarian.” ~(5 AA 499)~ Further, as Jabarian points
out, Derderian could have sought to interview the declarants (all
of whom were or had been clergy in Armenian churches), and
nothing prevented Derderian from performing his own
investigation—which he did, discovering that Mekhitarian had
prior convictions and Yeghiayan was disciplined by the State Bar.
(See Paterno v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1342,
1351, fn. 4 [plaintiff should address in seeking discovery to
oppose anti-SLAPP motion “‘whether the information the plaintiff
seeks to obtain through formal discovery proceedings is readily
available from other sources or can be obtained through informal
discovery’”]; The Garment Workers Center v. Superior Court
(2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1162 [same].)12 Although the court
12 Derderian argues on appeal that Jabarian forfeited the
argument that Derderian could take informal discovery from
other sources by failing to raise it in the trial court. ~(ARB 40)~
We decline to find forfeiture because Jabarian argued in the trial
34
reasonably could have allowed Derderian to depose the three
declarants (with appropriate time or subject matter limitations),
we cannot say the court’s decision in denying discovery of the
declarants but allowing Derderian to obtain the information from
Jabarian (or other sources) was irrational or arbitrary. (See
Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
relying on the declarants’ statements in granting Jabarian’s
special motion to strike. Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2),
provides that “the court shall consider . . . supporting and
opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or
defense is based” in ruling on a special motion to strike.
Derderian argues it was unfair to rely on the three declarations
because he could not present rebuttal evidence without taking
the declarants’ depositions. But the court granted Derderian’s
request to depose and seek documents from Jabarian, and the
central question was whether Jabarian believed the statements
from the declarants were true, not whether the declarants
provided false statements. (See Balla v. Hall, supra,
59 Cal.App.5th at p. 693 [“libel defendant ‘will generally be the
principal . . . source of evidence’” of actual malice].)
court that there was no need to take the depositions of the third-
party declarants to learn what they told Jabarian (among other
topics),~(5 AA 482)~ and his contention on appeal that Derderian
could have inquired about those communications from both
Jabarian and informal discovery of the declarants is consistent
with that argument.
35
DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of Jabarian and the order granting
Jabarian’s special motion to strike are reversed. The cause is
remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a new order
denying Jabarian’s special motion to strike the allegations that
Jabarian made false statements that Derderian misappropriated
funds from the Armenian genocide settlement fund (statements 2
and 3) and granting the special motion to strike all other alleged
defamatory statements. The parties are to bear their own costs
on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
GIZA, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
36
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.