CourtListener 10858462•Royal Coach Tours v. Miletak CA6
Texto completo
Filed 5/13/26 Royal Coach Tours v. Miletak CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROYAL COACH TOURS, INC., H052687
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 20CV364698)
v.
NICK MILETAK,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Nick Miletak appeals from a judgment entered against him in the
amount of $257,197.53 and in favor of his former employer, plaintiff Royal Coach Tours,
Inc. (Royal Coach), following a court trial. Royal Coach obtained the judgment after
prevailing on a malicious prosecution cause of action against Miletak. Miletak had
previously sued Royal Coach unsuccessfully for promissory estoppel among other
claims.
In this appeal from the judgment in the malicious prosecution action, Miletak
contends the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction; he was improperly denied a court
reporter and a jury trial; probable cause existed for his promissory estoppel claim which
precluded Royal Coach’s malicious prosecution claim; the court erred in its evidentiary
rulings; there was judicial bias or misconduct; Royal Coach committed fraud on the court
but the court erroneously denied a motion to vacate the judgment; there are errors
regarding the settled statement of the oral proceedings of the trial; this court’s denial of
his writ petitions while the appeal was pending effectively denied him the resources
necessary to obtain an appellate attorney; and this court erred in his prior appeal from the
denial of his anti-SLAPP motion.
For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
A. Royal Coach’s Civil Complaint against Miletak
Royal Coach filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against Miletak. Royal
Coach’s allegations included the following: Miletak was hired to participate in Royal
Coach’s student driver trainee program. When formal classroom instruction was
scheduled to begin, Miletak appeared that morning, handed in his resignation, and
demanded compensation for the time that he had been available prior to the formal
classroom instruction. Royal Coach refused, but it still compensated him for 11 hours of
classroom time that he had apparently logged during informal training.
About a week after resigning, Miletak filed a civil complaint for damages against
Royal Coach, alleging five causes of action (the employment action). Following a
demurrer by Royal Coach, Miletak filed an amended complaint alleging two causes of
action for promissory estoppel and constructive discharge. After a court trial, judgment
was entered in Royal Coach’s favor. Miletak appealed, and this court affirmed the
judgment.
Royal Coach commenced the instant malicious prosecution action against Miletak.
Miletak filed various motions, including an anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 425.16). The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion. Miletak appealed, and this
1
Our summary of the factual and procedural background is primarily from the
trial court’s statement of decision after trial. The record on appeal does not contain other
basic documents such as the complaint.
2
court affirmed the order. (Royal Coach Tours, Inc. v. Miletak (Mar. 30, 2023, H050167)
[nonpub. opn.] (Royal Coach).)2
B. Trial
A bench trial was held on Royal Coach’s malicious prosecution claim. No court
reporter was present. The record reflects that the court denied without prejudice a pretrial
motion by Miletak to exclude evidence of prior lawsuits against Royal Coach and
evidence of his litigation history. The court later determined during trial that evidence of
Miletak’s litigation history was relevant. The court granted a pretrial motion by Miletak
to exclude evidence of his prior convictions, and the issue apparently never arose during
trial.
Following trial, the court filed a statement of decision finding that (1) Miletak’s
employment action against Royal Coach was terminated in Royal Coach’s favor,
(2) Miletak lacked probable cause, (3) Miletak pursued the employment action with
malice, and (4) Royal Coach incurred damages. The court further found that punitive
damages were warranted. The court awarded Royal Coach the sum of $257,197.53.
Miletak filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. While the appeal was
pending, Miletak filed several motions in the trial court, including for new trial, to
dismiss the action, and to vacate the judgment. The trial court denied each motion.
As the trial was not reported by a court reporter, Miletak sought to proceed on
appeal by way of a settled statement regarding the oral proceedings. He filed a proposed
settled statement with the trial court, and Royal Coach filed a response. The trial court
held a hearing and later filed a settled statement. While Miletak’s appeal was pending, he
filed petitions in this court, including for writ of supersedeas. We denied his petitions.
2
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of this court’s opinion in Royal
Coach, supra, H050167, as Miletak quotes from it in this appeal.
3
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Miletak contends: (1) the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over
him after he relocated out-of-state during the pendency of the action, (2) he was
improperly denied a court reporter for trial, (3) the court erred in denying a jury trial,
(4) probable cause existed for his promissory estoppel claim in the underlying
employment action which precluded Royal Coach’s malicious prosecution claim, (5) the
court failed to rule on a dispositive pretrial motion in limine, (6) the court erroneously
admitted prejudicial evidence regarding his prior lawsuits, (7) the court erroneously
excluded evidence of legal advice that he received which would have negated the
elements of malice and lack of probable cause for Royal Coach’s malicious prosecution
claim, (8) there was judicial bias or misconduct, (9) the court erroneously denied a
motion to vacate the judgment, (10) Royal Coach committed fraud on the court which
requires reversal of the judgment, (11) the court delayed certifying the settled statement
and it contains inaccuracies, (12) this court’s denial of his writ petitions effectively
denied him the resources necessary to obtain an attorney to represent him on appeal, and
(13) this court erred in his prior appeal regarding denial of his anti-SLAPP motion.
Before analyzing Miletak’s contentions, we set forth the general appellate rules
that govern our review of his claims.
A. General Appellate Rules
On appeal, “ ‘[a] judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the
record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; accord, In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 498-499.) In
other words, “the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
4
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies
reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 (Jameson).)
An appellate court’s review is generally “confined . . . to the proceedings which
took place in the court below and are brought up for review in a properly prepared record
on appeal [citation].” (USLIFE Savings & Loan Assn. v. National Surety Corp. (1981)
115 Cal.App.3d 336, 343.) “ ‘No facts outside the record and no affidavits which were
not before the trial court can be considered on appeal.’ [Citations.]” (Dryer v. Dryer
(1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 441, 451.) Consequently, factual allegations “which are not in
the record, but only in the briefs, cannot be considered by an appellate court.” (Ibid.;
accord, Ehman v. Moore (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 460, 463 [explaining that “[m]atter
which does not appear in the record may not be considered by an appellate court upon the
suggestion of counsel in their briefs”].) In other words, “ ‘if it is not in the record, it did
not happen.’ ” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609, fn. 11.)
Consequently, to affirmatively show error, the appellant has “the burden . . . to
provide an adequate record to assess error.” (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281,
1295 (Maria P.).) “ ‘Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the
issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ [Citation.]” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
p. 609.) In other words, “ ‘ “if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the
appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.)
“To demonstrate error, [the] appellant must present meaningful legal analysis
supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the
claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) “[C]onclusory claims of
error will fail.” (Ibid.) “[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to carry appellate
counsel’s burden.” (Id. at p. 412.) This means that a party must “support each point by
5
argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.”3 (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Further, an
appellant must “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the
record” on appeal. (Rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) To that end, a party must “[s]upport any
reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the
record where the matter appears. If any part of the record is submitted in an electronic
form, citations to that part must identify, with the same specificity required for the printed
record, the place in the record where the matter appears.” (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) “If a
party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the
argument [will be] deemed to have been waived. [Citation.]” (Duarte v. Chino
Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856 (Duarte).)
B. Analysis
1. Personal jurisdiction
Miletak contends that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him at the
time of trial and judgment because he “had relocated to Florida and severed ties with
California prior to judgment.” Royal Coach contends that the trial court had personal
jurisdiction over Miletak since the commencement of the action when he made a general
appearance. In reply, Miletak does not dispute that the trial court had personal
jurisdiction over him initially. Instead, he argues that “jurisdiction collapse[d]”
thereafter.
In general, “ ‘the court in which an action is pending has jurisdiction over a party
from the time summons is served on him . . . . Jurisdiction of the court over the parties
3
Generally, “an opinion of a California Court of Appeal . . . that is not certified
for publication or ordered published must not be cited or relied on by . . . a party in any
other action.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a) (all further rule references are to the
California Rules of Court).) Royal Coach in its respondent’s brief cites an unpublished
opinion by this court from another case. Royal Coach is admonished not to cite an
unpublished California appellate court opinion except as specifically permitted by the
California Rules of Court. (See id., rule 8.1115(b).)
6
and the subject matter of an action continues throughout subsequent proceedings in the
action.’ ” (Goldman v. Simpson (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 255, 263, italics omitted
(Goldman).) Upon a trial court acquiring “ ‘fundamental’ jurisdiction over the parties,”
“this jurisdiction continues to final judgment . . . .” (Ibid., italics omitted.) In other
words, “ ‘[w]here jurisdiction of the person . . . has once attached it is not defeated by the
removal of the person . . . beyond the jurisdiction of the court. [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 264.)
In this case, Miletak does not dispute that the trial court had personal jurisdiction
over him at or near the outset of the case. We determine that the court did not lose
personal jurisdiction when Miletak later moved out of state. (Goldman, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 263, 264.)
The only legal authority cited by Miletak to support his contention that the trial
court had no personal jurisdiction after he relocated is Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014)
571 U.S. 117. That case, however, addressed “the authority of a court in the United
States to entertain a claim brought by foreign plaintiffs against a foreign defendant based
on events occurring entirely outside the United States.” (Id. at p. 120.) Daimler AG does
not support Miletak’s contention that a trial court, having initially obtained personal
jurisdiction over a defendant, may lose jurisdiction if the defendant later moves out of
state during the pendency of the action.
Miletak argues in his reply brief on appeal that the trial court lost jurisdiction
when Royal Coach was sold to another company and purportedly no longer had standing
to maintain the action. To the extent Miletak is contending that this resulted in a loss of
personal jurisdiction over Miletak, this new theory, raised for the first time in the reply
brief, is “forfeited. ‘Obvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an issue
raised initially in the reply brief . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th
1192, 1218.) Further, Miletak fails to provide legal authority establishing that the
7
purported sale of Royal Coach to another entity precluded Royal Coach from continuing
to prosecute the action against Miletak.
In sum, Miletak fails to demonstrate that the trial court lost personal jurisdiction
over him.
2. Absence of court reporter at trial
Miletak contends that he was improperly denied a court reporter for trial. He
argues that he was granted a fee waiver in March 2022, and that he was therefore entitled
to a court reporter for trial upon request. Miletak contends that “[a]fter the start of trial,
[the trial court] informed the litigants that no court reporter was present.” Miletak argues
that he appeared at trial by Zoom, that he could not see “the well of the courtroom,” and
that he “immediately” requested a court reporter. He argues that his “request for a court
reporter was denied by the [court] who continued the trial.”4
“[A]n official court reporter or an official court reporter pro tempore of the
superior court must be provided . . . ‘[i]n a civil case, on the order of the court or at the
request of a party.’ ” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 610, fn. & some italics omitted.)
“[A] person who because of limited financial resources qualifies for a waiver of initial
court filing fees is [also] entitled . . . to a waiver of fees for the attendance of an official
court reporter at a hearing or trial. (Id. at p. 597.) Consequently, “an official court
reporter, or other valid means to create an official verbatim record for purposes of appeal,
must generally be made available to in forma pauperis litigants upon request.” (Id. at
p. 599, italics added.) In Jameson, the California Supreme Court held that a trial court
erred by ‘failing to make an official court reporter available to [a fee waiver recipient]
upon request.” (Id. at p. 623.)
4
We note that although Miletak in his opening brief on appeal contends that the
trial court “denied” his request for a court reporter, he argued in his proposed settled
statement filed in the trial court that the court “ignored” his request.
8
In this case, Miletak fails to establish that he requested a court reporter for trial.
According to an order denying Miletak’s motion for a new trial, “the trial commenced
without [Miletak] inquiring about the presence of a court reporter or electronic recording
or anything else.” Similarly, the settled statement of the trial does not reflect that he
requested a court reporter.
Miletak argues on appeal that Royal Coach’s counsel did not dispute or object to
his contention at the hearing on the settled statement that he had requested a court
reporter at trial. At the hearing on the settled statement, however, the trial court—
consistent with the settled statement of the trial and the order denying a new trial—stated
that “there was no request by [Miletak] for a court reporter . . . of which [the court] was
aware.”
Accordingly, in the absence of the record reflecting a request by Miletak for a
court reporter for trial, he fails to demonstrate error in the trial court’s failure to provide a
court reporter for trial.
3. Denial of jury trial
Miletak contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury trial.
According to Miletak, he timely and “expressly demanded a jury trial” at a pretrial
conference. He argues that he was “granted a fee waiver on March 8, 2022 and was
therefore exempt from paying jury fees . . . .” Miletak further contends that even when
the right to a jury trial has been waived, such as by the failure to deposit jury fees, a trial
court has the discretion to allow a jury trial. In this case, we understand Miletak to argue
that the court abused its discretion in denying his request for a jury trial.
In civil cases, the right to a jury trial can be waived as prescribed by statute,
including by failing to make a timely demand for a jury and by failing to timely deposit a
jury fee. (TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra (2024) 15 Cal.5th 766, 773 (TriCoast
Builders).) In this case, Miletak fails to provide adequate record citations supporting his
contention that he timely requested a jury trial and that a fee waiver exempted him from
9
paying a jury fee. Further, our review of the record indicates to the contrary on both
points. For example, in contending that he timely requested a jury trial, Miletak in his
opening brief on appeal initially states that he made the request the “day after” a May 30,
2024 trial setting conference. Elsewhere in his opening brief, however, he repeats an
assertion that he made in the trial court that his jury trial request was made “[i]n the
May 30th pretrial conference” itself. However, he later states in his opening brief that he
“requested a jury trial on March 30, 2024.” Nowhere in his opening brief does Miletak
provide a citation to the record reflecting a jury trial request before the day of trial.
Further, a May 30, 2024 minute order for the hearing setting the trial date reflects that
“Miletak request[ed] to have Court Trial remotely.” In addition, according to the settled
statement regarding trial, the trial court found that Miletak’s May 31, 2024 trial brief
“never mentioned that he had made a proper request for a jury trial . . . .”
Similarly, although Miletak contends that he was exempt from paying jury fees
due to an approved fee waiver, he does not provide a citation to the record showing that
the approved fee waiver also encompassed jury fees. (See Rule 3.56(1) [listing jury fees
as one of several “court fees and costs that may be waived upon granting an application
for an initial fee waiver, either at the outset or upon later application” (italics added)];
cf. Rule 3.55 [listing “[c]ourt fees and costs that must be waived upon granting an
application for an initial fee waiver” (italics added)].) Moreover, in the trial court’s order
denying Miletak’s motion for a new trial, the court stated that “the fee waiver filed on 08
March 2022 shows that [Miletak] was granted a fee waiver but not for jury fees and
expenses.” Similarly, according to the settled statement regarding trial, the trial court
“reviewed the order [by another judge] on 08 March 22 wherein [Miletak] was granted a
partial fee waiver. According to Box 4.a.2, the order granting a partial fee request, there
was no granting of any waiver of jury fees and expenses, contrary to any claim made by
[Miletak].” In sum, Miletak fails to demonstrate, with adequate record citations, that he
timely requested a jury trial and that he was not required to pay jury fees. We therefore
10
turn to the issue of whether the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion in denying
Miletak a jury trial.
“[A] litigant that has waived jury trial may seek relief from the waiver. The trial
court has discretion whether to grant relief, on such terms as may be just. (§ 631,
subd. (g) . . . .)” (TriCoast Builders, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 766, 773.) “[C]ourts should
consider all factors relevant to whether granting relief in the particular situation before
them would be ‘just.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 779.) Relevant factors include “whether
granting relief from waiver would result in any hardship to other parties or to the court,
such as delay in rescheduling the trial for a jury or inconvenience to witnesses”; “the
timeliness of the request; whether the requester is willing to comply with applicable
requirements for payment of jury fees; and the reasons supporting the request.
[Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 779-780.)
If a party contends that the trial court failed to properly exercise its discretion to
grant relief from a jury trial waiver, and this argument is made for the first time on appeal
from the judgment, rather than pretrial by a petition for extraordinary writ, the party
“must show it was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of its request for relief from
waiver.” (TriCoast Builders, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 791; see id. at pp. 785-786.)
We determine that Miletak fails to demonstrate reversible error. First, the record
does not reflect that Miletak requested relief from a waiver upon the trial court denying a
jury trial. “Since the trial court was not asked to exercise its discretion in this manner, it
could not have abused its discretion as defendant claims.” (People v. Spirlin (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 119, 128; accord, Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Laflin & Laflin
(1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 651, 667, fn. 16 [“It would be both inappropriate and futile for us
to attempt to review for abuse a discretion the court was never requested to exercise and
did not purport to exercise”].) Second, Miletak fails to persuasively demonstrate an
abuse of discretion by the trial court. He simply contends that he timely requested a jury
trial. As we have just explained, he fails to provide a supporting record citation and the
11
record indicates otherwise. Miletak also continues to insist, despite the record indicating
to the contrary, that his approved fee waiver included a waiver of jury fees. No abuse of
discretion has been shown. Third, even if there was an abuse of discretion, Miletak fails
to argue, let alone show, that he was prejudiced by a denial of a request for relief from a
jury waiver. (See TriCoast Builders, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 791.)
Miletak also contends that he “preserves for federal review his claim that the trial
court’s denial of a jury trial violated the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Similar to his
claim under state law, Miletak contends that he “timely demanded a jury and did not
waive his right” and thus “the trial court’s denial constitutes structural error requiring
reversal under federal law.” Because he fails to provide adequate record citations to
support his factual contentions, Miletak fails to demonstrate reversible error.
4. Whether probable cause existed for Miletak’s promissory estoppel
claim in the employment action which precluded Royal Coach’s
subsequent malicious prosecution claim
Miletak contends that the trial court erred in finding in favor of Royal Coach on its
malicious prosecution claim because there was probable cause for his prosecution of the
promissory estoppel claim in the underlying employment action. Specifically, Miletak
argues that probable cause was conclusively established by the denial of Royal Coach’s
motion for nonsuit on the promissory estoppel claim in the employment action.
“To establish liability for the tort of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must
demonstrate, among other things, that the defendant previously caused the
commencement or continuation of an action against the plaintiff that was not supported
by probable cause.” (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767, 771
(Parrish).)5 “[A]s a general rule, ‘the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is a
5
“The tort [of malicious prosecution] consists of three elements. The underlying
action must have been: (i) initiated or maintained by, or at the direction of, the
defendant, and pursued to a legal termination in favor of the malicious prosecution
12
legal question to be resolved by the court in the malicious prosecution case . . . .’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 781, fn. omitted.) “ ‘[T]he probable cause element calls on the trial
court to make an objective determination of the “reasonableness” of the defendant’s
conduct, i.e., to determine whether, on the basis of the facts known to the defendant, the
institution of the prior action was legally tenable,’ as opposed to whether the litigant
subjectively believed the claim was tenable. [Citation.] A claim is unsupported by
probable cause only if ‘ “ ‘any reasonable attorney would agree [that it is] totally and
completely without merit.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 776.)
The California Supreme Court has “held that if an action succeeds after a hearing
on the merits, that success ordinarily establishes the existence of probable cause (and thus
forecloses a later malicious prosecution suit), even if the result is overturned on appeal or
by later ruling of the trial court. (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th
811, 818 (Wilson).) This principle has come to be known as the interim adverse
judgment rule.” (Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 771.)
“Although the [interim adverse judgment] rule arose from cases that had been
resolved after trial, the rule has also been applied to the ‘denial of defense summary
judgment motions, directed verdict motions, and similar efforts at pretrial termination of
the underlying case.’ [Citations.]” (Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 776-777.) “Denial of
a defense summary judgment motion on grounds that a triable issue exists, or of a
nonsuit, while falling short of a determination of the merits, establishes that the plaintiff
has substantiated, or can substantiate, the elements of his or her cause of action with
evidence that, if believed, would justify a favorable verdict. . . . [A] claimant or attorney
who is in possession of such evidence has the right to bring the claim, even where it is
plaintiff; (ii) initiated or maintained without probable cause; and (iii) initiated or
maintained with malice. [Citations.]” (Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 775-776,
fn. omitted.)
13
very doubtful the claim will ultimately prevail. [Citation.]” (Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at
p. 824, italics added.)
However, “the interim adverse judgment rule has its limits. The rule applies only
to rulings regarding the merits of the claim, not those that rest ‘solely on technical or
procedural grounds.’ [Citation.]” (Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 778, italics added.) For
example, “[d]enial of a summary judgment motion on procedural or technical grounds,
rather than for existence of triable issues of material fact, says nothing regarding the
potential merit of the action and hence does not establish probable cause for its
initiation.” (Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 823.)
In the context of a nonsuit motion, a defendant may bring such a motion “after . . .
the plaintiff has completed his or her opening statement, or after the presentation of his or
her evidence in a trial by jury . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 581c, subd. (a), italics added.)
In the former situation, upon a motion for nonsuit after an opening statement, a trial court
“must accept as true all of the facts set forth in the statement . . . .” (Timmsen v. Forest E.
Olson, Inc. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 860, 867-868.) In the latter situation, a nonsuit motion
at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case “tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence
before the defense is presented. [Citation.]” (County of Kern v. Sparks (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 11, 16.) In this latter situation, “a ruling denying the prior defendant’s
motion for nonsuit, if based on an evaluation of the evidence,” indicates that the prior
case was legally tenable for purposes of determining the existence of probable cause.
(Hart v. Darwish (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 218, 226, italics added (Hart); see Cowles v.
Carter (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 350, 353 [stating that “if the trial judge denies a motion
for nonsuit and permits a question of fact to go to the jury, he has, of necessity, decided
there is sufficient evidence to permit the jury to determine that issue”].)
The trial court in its statement of decision regarding Royal Coach’s malicious
prosecution action explained the circumstances under which Royal Coach’s nonsuit
motion was denied in the underlying employment action. Specifically, the court
14
explained that the denial of Royal Coach’s nonsuit motion on Miletak’s promissory
estoppel claim “ ‘occurred based on Miletak’s supplemental opening statement and
before the presentation of evidence, so . . . [the] denial of [Royal Coach’s] nonsuit motion
with regard to the promissory estoppel cause of action was not based on the evaluation of
the evidence and does not constitute success on the merits on Miletak’s part.’ ” The court
in the malicious prosecution action ultimately determined that the promissory estoppel
claim, which the court in the employment action later dismissed on a motion for
judgment, was prosecuted by Miletak without probable cause.
On this record, Miletak fails to demonstrate error. The denial of Royal Coach’s
nonsuit motion in the underlying employment action was based on Miletak’s assertions in
his opening statement, not “based on an evaluation of the evidence.” (Hart, supra,
12 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.) Under these circumstances, the trial court in the malicious
prosecution action properly determined that the denial of Royal Coach’s nonsuit motion
was insufficient to establish probable cause on Miletak’s part in pursuing the promissory
estoppel claim.6
6
We note that Miletak in his opening brief on appeal attributes the following
quote to Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th 767: “ ‘So long as there is probable cause to support at
least one claim, a suit will not be considered to have been brought without probable
cause.’ ” This statement is nowhere contained in Parrish.
Moreover, the California Supreme Court has held to the contrary by stating that “a
suit for malicious prosecution lies for bringing an action charging multiple grounds of
liability when some but not all of those grounds were asserted with malice and without
probable cause.” (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 671; accord, Parrish,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 776, fn. 1; Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43,
57 [“We see no reason for permitting plaintiffs and cross-complainants to pursue shotgun
tactics by proceeding on counts and theories which they know or should know to be
groundless”]; Citi-Wide Preferred Couriers, Inc. v. Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. (2003)
114 Cal.App.4th 906, 913 [“the rule is that a malicious prosecution suit may be
maintained where only one of several claims in the prior action lacked probable cause”];
Maleti v. Wickers (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 181, 219 [“a malicious prosecution plaintiff
must show that the defendant lacked probable cause in the assertion of at least one theory
15
In his reply brief on appeal, Miletak purports to quote from the reporter’s
transcript for the trial in the underlying employment action. However, the quotes that he
provides do not support his argument that denial of the nonsuit motion was a “denial
based on the merits” in the employment action. To the contrary, the quotes reflect that
the trial court in the underlying employment action denied the nonsuit motion after
plaintiff’s “ ‘supplemental opening statement’ ” and before the presentation of any
evidence. In other words, the quotes from the underlying employment action relied on by
Miletak about the circumstances under which the nonsuit motion was denied are
consistent with the recitation in the trial court’s statement of decision in the instant
action.7
Miletak also contends that in his prior appeal in this case regarding the denial of
his anti-SLAPP motion, this court’s opinion “recognized probable cause in the
underlying” employment action. In support of this contention, Miletak quotes the
following from this court’s prior opinion: “In the 2015 civil action, Miletak alleged
in the prior suit, even if such defendant had probable cause in asserting other theories in
that case” (italics omitted)].)
In this case, Miletak prosecuted more than one clam against Royal Coach. On
appeal, however, Miletak only addresses whether there was probable cause for the
promissory estoppel claim. He does not argue, let alone establish, that the trial court
erred in finding a lack of probable cause regarding his other causes of action. As we
determine that Miletak fails to establish his claim of error regarding the promissory
estoppel claim, we need not determine whether Miletak also fails to meet his burden to
show reversible error in view of his failure to address the lack of probable cause as to all
his other causes of action.
7
We understand Miletak to contend in his reply brief on appeal that the trial
court’s statement of decision incorrectly states in the introduction that Royal Coach’s
motion for judgment was granted in the underlying employment action on Miletak’s
promissory estoppel claim after his opening statement and before the presentation of
evidence. However, we note that elsewhere in the statement of decision, the court in its
legal analysis twice clarifies that Miletak’s promissory estoppel claim was dismissed
upon Royal Coach’s motion for judgment after the presentation of evidence, and that it
was the constructive discharge claim that was dismissed upon Royal Coach’s motion for
nonsuit after Miletak’s opening statement.
16
causes of action for promissory estoppel and constructive discharge. [Citation.] At trial,
the court granted Royal Coach’s motion for non-suit as to the constructive discharge
cause of action after Miletak’s opening statement, granted a motion for judgment on the
promissory estoppel claim after hearing Miletak’s evidence, and dismissed the action
with prejudice. [Citation.]” (Royal Coach, supra, H050167, at p. 2.) This quote is
simply a recitation of the procedural history in the case, and nowhere in the opinion did
this court “recognize[] probable cause” for Miletak’s employment action.
In sum, Miletak fails to establish that the denial of Royal Coach’s nonsuit motion
in the underlying employment action necessarily demonstrated probable cause for his
promissory estoppel claim.
5. Failure to rule on motion in limine
Miletak contends that the trial court erred in failing to rule on a dispositive pretrial
motion in limine that would have eliminated Royal Coach’s sole cause of action for
malicious prosecution. According to Miletak, the motion in limine sought to preclude the
malicious prosecution claim on the ground that it was barred, because the denial of Royal
Coach’s nonsuit motion in the underlying employment action established probable cause
as a matter of law. Miletak fails to provide a record citation showing that he made such a
motion. Moreover, as we have explained, the denial of the nonsuit motion in the
employment action did not legally preclude Royal Coach from pursuing a malicious
prosecution claim against Miletak. Accordingly, Miletak fails to demonstrate error
warranting reversal based on the trial court’s purported failure to rule.
6. Admission of evidence regarding prior lawsuits
Miletak contends that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of prejudicial
evidence. According to Miletak, the court made a pretrial ruling precluding references to
his prior litigation history. However, Royal Coach “introduced evidence of his prior
lawsuits during post-trial enforcement filings and briefings” over his objection. Miletak
17
argues that evidence of his litigation history was irrelevant and highly prejudicial under
Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352, and that reversal is warranted.
Miletak does not provide any record citations to support his claim of error. We
therefore deem his claim waived. (Duarte, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 856.) Moreover,
in the absence of supporting record citations, it is not clear that the record on appeal is
adequate to assess the claimed error. Miletak fails to meet his burden on appeal to show
error. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)
7. Exclusion of evidence regarding advice of counsel
Miletak contends that trial court erred in excluding evidence of legal advice that
he received, which would have negated the elements of malice and lack of probable cause
for Royal Coach’s malicious prosecution claim. Miletak indicates that he submitted one
attorney’s declaration before trial, that the same attorney testified at trial, and that he
submitted a second attorney’s declaration in a motion for new trial. However, Miletak
argues that the “[t]rial court excluded this advice-of-counsel evidence,” that exclusion of
such evidence in a bench trial is “even more damaging,” and that if the court had
admitted the “declarations, there is a reasonable probability that judgment would have
been entered for [him] or that a motion for new trial . . . would have been granted.”
Miletak does not provide any record citations to support his claim of error. We
therefore deem his claim waived. (Duarte, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 856.) Moreover,
based on the limited record and Miletak’s undeveloped argument on appeal, it is not clear
that the record supports the claimed error. As an initial matter, Miletak himself admits
that one of his attorneys testified at trial. Further, the settled statement indicates that the
trial court considered the second attorney’s declaration in posttrial motions, but that the
court found the declaration “was not helpful at all.” Miletak fails to meet his burden on
appeal to show error. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)
18
8. Judicial bias or misconduct
Miletak contends that a statement by the trial court and various rulings indicate
bias by the court and warrant reversal of the judgment. For example, according to
Miletak, he requested recusal, and the court purportedly responded, “ ‘[T]hat is why I
don’t like when self-represented litigants are involved.’ ” Miletak argues that the court
denied his recusal request, a jury trial, and a court reporter; failed to rule on motions; and
“made rulings that consistently disfavored [him] as a self-represented litigant.” He
further contends that the record reflects “inconsistencies” or “contradictory statements
[by the trial court] about whether [his] prior litigation history as a pro per litigant was
considered at trial or in post judgment proceedings.”
We are not persuaded by Miletak’s claim of judicial bias or misconduct. First,
Miletak does not provide a citation to the record where the trial court’s purported
negative statement about self-represented litigants appears.8
Second, regarding the various rulings that were adverse to Miletak and which he
raises on appeal, he fails to demonstrate error. We are therefore unpersuaded that those
rulings suggest bias by the trial court. (See People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318,
374 [determining that the defendant’s judicial bias claim failed where trial court properly
ruled against the defendant on several pretrial issues]; Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v.
Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219-1220.)
Third, regarding the purported “inconsistencies” or “contradictory statements” by
the trial court about whether Miletak’s prior litigation history would be or was
considered, the record reflects the following: Before trial, the trial court denied without
prejudice Miletak’s motion to exclude evidence of prior lawsuits against Royal Coach
and evidence of his litigation history “as to the determination that these matters were
8
We also note that the trial court, in its order denying Miletak’s motion for new
trial and in the settled statement, denied ever stating that it disliked self-represented
litigants.
19
relevant as raised by the evidence.” The court granted Miletak’s “motion to preclude his
prior litigation history against other parties.” The court later determined that Miletak’s
“history as a pro per litigant . . . was very relevant during the trial.” Specifically,
Miletak’s “prior lawsuit against [Royal Coach] was relevant on the issue of malice.”
Consistent with this record, the trial court at the hearing on the proposed settled statement
indicated that it had “declined” to consider Miletak’s prior litigation “against other
people,” but that it did consider his “prior conduct” regarding “this case” —an apparent
reference to the employment action against Royal Coach. On this record, Miletak fails to
establish prejudicial evidentiary error by the trial court. He also fails to demonstrate
“inconsistencies” or “contradictory statements” by the trial court, let alone any that
suggest bias or misconduct.
9. Denial of motion to vacate judgment
We understand Miletak to contend that the trial court erred in a July 25, 2025
order denying his motion to vacate the judgment and/or erred in a July 30, 2025 order9
denying his motion for reconsideration. At the time the court made these orders,
Miletak’s instant appeal from the judgment was pending.
According to Miletak, in the first order, the court denied the motion to vacate on
the grounds that (1) the court believed it did not have jurisdiction to vacate the judgment
while the case was on appeal, and (2) the motion to vacate otherwise lacked merit.
Regarding the second order, according to Miletak, the court denied reconsideration
because the court again determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter while
the appeal was pending. Miletak contends that the court erred because: (1) it raised the
jurisdictional issue itself, (2) the court had the “inherent power to vacate a void judgment
at any time, notwithstanding a pending appeal,” (3) “the court should have addressed the
9
The order denying Miletak’s motion for reconsideration was dated July 29, 2025,
and filed on July 30, 2025.
20
merits” of his motion, and (4) the “[b]y refusing to hear and decide the merits, the trial
court deprived [him] of a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the claims . . . .”
Royal Coach contends that Miletak’s argument “must be disregarded” because the
latter July order is not contained in the record on appeal, and he fails to recite the entirety
of relevant portions of the order. Royal Coach also argues that the court’s latter July
order included a finding that there was no basis for reconsideration under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1008 because Miletak failed to show any new or different facts,
circumstances, or law.
We determine that Miletak fails to meet his burden of showing reversible error.10
First, Miletak does not provide citations to the record on appeal showing where the two
July 2025 orders, his moving papers for both motions, and Royal Coach’s opposition
papers for both motions appear. Although it appears from our review of the record that
one of the July 2025 orders is attached to one of Miletak’s several filings in this court
outside the normal briefing process, and although an excerpt from some of Royal Coach’s
opposition papers is contained in one of Miletak’s several requests for judicial notice in
this court concerning other issues, these portions are inadequate to assess Miletak’s claim
of error. In the absence of an adequate record, with necessary record citations, Miletak
cannot meet his burden to show that the trial court erred regarding either of the two
orders. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609; Maria P., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1295; see
Duarte, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 856.)
Second, according to the parties’ descriptions of the orders, the trial court
determined that it had no jurisdiction to consider Miletak’s motions, and that even if it
had jurisdiction, Miletak failed to show that he was entitled to relief. In other words, the
trial court ruled on the substantive merit (or lack thereof) of each motion. Miletak on
10
For purposes of this appeal, we assume, without deciding, that the July 2025
orders are appealable and are encompassed within Miletak’s earlier filed notice of appeal
from the judgment.
21
appeal fails to present any argument as to why the court erred in its ruling on the
substance of each motion, and he otherwise fails to demonstrate that the court erred in
denying each motion on the merits.
In sum, without deciding (1) whether the trial court had jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the pending appeal, to rule on Miletak’s motion to vacate the judgment
and motion for reconsideration, and (2) whether he could properly bring a motion for
reconsideration, we determine that he fails to meet his burden of “demonstrat[ing], on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error
that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)
10. Whether there was fraud on the trial court requiring reversal of the
judgment
We understand Miletak to contend that the trial court erred in denying an
October 2025 renewed motion to vacate the judgment. He argues that Royal Coach
committed fraud on the court which requires reversal of the judgment. Specifically,
Miletak contends that Sandra Allen, who was apparently the former owner of Royal
Coach, “continued prosecuting this case without disclosing that Royal Couch Tours had
been sold to TKRG Holdings Inc. months before trial.” Miletak argues that a civil action
must “be prosecuted by the real party in interest,” and that “concealment of the
company’s sale deprived [him] of the ability to challenge standing, to conduct discovery
on the proper plaintiff, and to raise objections that go to the heart of the adversarial
process.” According to Miletak, the “concealment of corporate ownership changes
during litigation can constitute extrinsic fraud when it prevents the opposing party from
adequately defending or challenging the real party in interest.” Miletak argues that a
judgment procured by extrinsic fraud may be challenged by a motion in the same action
or by an independent action.
In making this contention, Miletak relies on the following factual assertions: (1) a
trial witness, Allen, “falsely testified that she was the ‘President/Owner’ of Royal Coach
22
Tours”; (2) Allen “submitted a false sworn affidavit dated October 29, 2024 in [a] Florida
post-judgment action repeating this misrepresentation in order to enforce the California
judgment against [Miletak’s] Florida homestead”; and (3) “official records from the
Surface Transportation Board and the Federal Register . . . establish that Royal Coach
Tours was sold to TKRG Holdings, Inc. by October 3, 2023 about eight . . . months
before trial.”
In support of these factual assertions, Miletak filed in this court a request for
judicial notice on November 4, 2025, seeking judicial notice of the following four sets of
documents: (1) two statements of information regarding Stockland, Inc. filed by Allen
with the California Secretary of State in November 2024, along with an additional four-
page document by an “online directory,” to establish that Allen and another individual
own Stockland, Inc.; (2) a 2023 notice by the federal Surface Transportation Board
contained in the Federal Register regarding a proposed acquisition involving TKRG
Holdings, Inc. and Royal Coach, among others, to establish that the Surface
Transportation Board approved TKRG Holdings, Inc.’s acquisition of Royal Coach;
(3) an excerpt from a purchase agreement dated December 31, 2023, involving Allen,
Stockland, Inc., and TKRG Holdings, Inc., among others—which was apparently filed by
Royal Coach with its July 2025 opposition to an ex parte application and motion for
reconsideration by Miletak—to “prov[e] transfer of ownership and litigation rights before
trial”; and (4) an October 2024 affidavit by Allen filed in Florida indicating that she was
the president/owner of Royal Coach after the purported sale of the company to TKRG
Holdings, Inc.
Royal Coach has filed opposition to Miletak’s request for judicial notice. Royal
Coach contends, among other arguments, that although judicial notice may be taken of
the existence of certain documents, judicial notice may not be used to establish the truth
of the matters contained within those documents.
23
We determine that Miletak fails to meet his burden on appeal to show reversible
error.11 He does not provide legal authority establishing that a purported sale of Royal
Coach to another entity precluded Royal Coach from continuing to prosecute the action
against him. In view of Miletak’s failure to demonstrate as a legal matter that Royal
Coach was precluded from continuing to prosecute him after it was purportedly sold to
another entity, we need not determine whether he established as a factual matter if or
when Royal Coach was sold. We therefore deny Miletak’s November 4, 2025 request for
judicial notice in its entirety.
11. Settled Statement
“A settled statement is a summary of the superior court proceedings approved by
the superior court.” (Rule 8.137(a).) In this case, the trial court filed a settled statement
of the oral proceedings on the trial of Royal Coach’s malicious prosecution claim.
Miletak contends that the court “deliberately delayed to finalize or certify any version of
the settled statement” after the hearing on his proposed statement. Instead, the “final
version of the settled statement was only certified after” this court issued an order to the
trial court. Second, Miletak contends that the settled statement contains “several
inaccuracies.”
Regarding the trial court’s purported delay in filing the settled statement, Miletak
fails to provide persuasive argument with supporting legal authority demonstrating that
he is entitled to any relief, including that any error was prejudicial or otherwise requires
11
Miletak fails to provide citations to the record on appeal showing where his
October 2025 renewed motion to vacate the judgment and the trial court’s order appear.
Based on our review of the record, it appears that copies of these documents are attached
to a “supplemental statement” filed by Miletak in this court outside the normal briefing
procedure. (Uppercase omitted.) For purposes of this appeal, we assume, without
deciding that the trial court’s denial of Miletak’s October 2025 renewed motion to vacate
the judgment is appealable and is encompassed within his earlier filed notice of appeal
from the judgment. For purposes of this appeal, we also assume, without deciding that
Miletak could properly bring a “renewed” motion to vacate the judgment.
24
reversal of the judgment. (See Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.) Regarding
Miletak’s contention that the settled statement is inaccurate, we observe that when a
“litigant fails to convince the trial judge that his proposed statement accurately reflects
the proceedings in question, the action of the judge who heard and tried the case must be
regarded as final since his familiarity with the trial and knowledge of what took place
make him specially qualified to determine what the evidence and the proceedings were.”
(Cross v. Tustin (1951) 37 Cal.2d 821, 826.) “The purpose of the settled statement
procedure is ‘to conserve the time and effort of the reviewing court . . .’ [citation], and to
that end this court cannot be asked to settle a statement [citation]. Rather, ‘. . . full and
plenary power over [a settled statement] is reposed in the trial judge, subject only to the
limitation that he does not act arbitrarily. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Castro
(1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 30, 32.) No such showing has been made here.
12. Denial of writ petitions by this court
Miletak contends that this court’s denial of his prior (unspecified) “petitions for
supersedeas and mandate” had the “practical effect” of denying him “the resources
necessary to secure professional appellate representation.” We are not unsympathetic to
a litigant’s need for appellate counsel. However, Miletak fails to establish that this court
may reconsider in this appeal any of his prior writ petitions. He also does not provide
adequate citations to the record to support any of his factual assertions. We therefore
determine that Miletak fails to demonstrate reversible error.
13. Prior appeal
We understand Miletak to contend that this court erred in affirming the denial of
his anti-SLAPP motion in his prior appeal. (See Royal Coach Tours, supra, H050167.)
This court filed the opinion in March 2023. The remittitur issued in June 2023. A
remittitur issues only after an opinion is final for all purposes. (In re Anna S. (2010)
180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1500.) As this court’s prior opinion is final for all purposes, we
cannot and do not consider Miletak’s claims of error regarding the prior opinion.
25
14. Other filings in this court
In addition to the request for judicial notice that we have already discussed in
connection with Miletak’s contention that there was fraud committed on the trial court,
Miletak filed a second request for judicial notice on November 24, 2025. In this second
request, Miletak seeks judicial notice of (1) a memorandum of points and authorities and
(2) a declaration by Miletak with attached exhibits, all of which he filed in the trial court
on November 18, 2025, in support of an ex parte application to vacate the judgment. The
record on appeal does not reflect the trial court’s ruling on the ex parte application.
Instead, Miletak in his request for judicial notice asks that we consider these documents
“in support of” his opening brief on appeal.
We deny the November 24, 2025 request for judicial notice in its entirety. In
assessing whether the trial court committed error, we may not judicially notice
documents—here, a memorandum of points and authorities and a declaration with
exhibits—that were filed after the relevant rulings by the trial court. (See Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [explaining that
“normally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court
will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was
entered’ ”].) Further, to the extent Miletak seeks to incorporate in this appeal the
arguments that he made in the November 18, 2025 memorandum of points and authorities
that he filed in the trial court, we decline to consider those arguments as they should have
been contained in his opening brief on appeal. (See Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1064 [explaining that “[r]equests for judicial notice should not
be used to ‘circumvent[]’ appellate rules and procedures, including the normal briefing
process”].)
Miletak filed a third request for judicial notice in this court on February 17, 2026.
He seeks judicial notice of the minute order for the June 14, 2024 trial. Miletak argues
that the minute order is relevant to “issues raised in [his] briefing” regarding procedural
26
improprieties concerning the statement of decision. However, this issue concerning the
statement of decision was not raised in Miletak’s opening brief on appeal. Further, his
request for judicial notice of the minute order was not filed until after Royal Coach filed
its respondent’s brief on appeal. Miletak fails to offer any explanation as to why the
minute order for trial was not included in his notice designating the record on appeal, or
why he waited to request judicial until after Royal Coach filed its respondent’s brief. We
therefore deny Miletak’s February 17, 2026 request for judicial notice.
Miletak filed a “supplemental statement” on February 17, 2026, objecting to “the
procedure used by the trial court in adopting the proposed statement of decision.” As we
have just explained, Miletak did not raise any procedural issue regarding the statement of
decision in his opening brief on appeal. Moreover, he filed the supplemental statement in
this court after appellate briefing was complete and without obtaining permission from
this court, which deprived Royal Coach of an opportunity to address the issue in its
respondent’s brief. We therefore decline to consider the arguments raised by Miletak in
his February 17, 2026 “supplemental statement.”
Lastly, Miletak filed a motion to seal on February 17, 2026. The document that
Miletak seeks to file under seal is attached as exhibit A to the motion and reflects
settlement communications between the parties in 2015. Miletak contends that the
exhibit “is submitted for the limited purpose of demonstrating prejudice resulting from
the trial court’s procedure regarding proposed statements of decision.” As we have just
explained, Miletak did not raise any procedural issue regarding the statement of decision
in his opening brief on appeal and, by raising this issue after normal appellate briefing
has been completed, he deprived Royal Coach of an opportunity to address the issue in its
respondent’s brief. We therefore deny Miletak’s February 17, 2026 motion to seal. The
Clerk of the Court is directed to return exhibit A, which is attached to the February 17,
2026 motion to seal, to Miletak unfiled.
27
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
28
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________________
Danner, J.
______________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H052687 Royal Coach Tours, Inc. v. Miletak
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