CourtListener 10858458•People v. Martinez CA2/5
Texto completo
Filed 5/13/26 P. v. Martinez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B333722
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA475969)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
NEFTALY MARTINEZ, OPINION AND
DENYING PETITION
Defendant and Appellant. FOR REHEARING
[CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
Good cause appearing, the unpublished opinion filed
April 28, 2026, is modified as follows:
1. On the title page, first paragraph under
the caption, the second sentence which reads,
“Affirmed, in part, reversed in part, and remanded” is
amended to read, “Affirmed, in part, reversed in part,
and remanded with directions”;
2. On page 2, second paragraph, the first
sentence which reads, “We vacate the conviction on
count 10 and remand for a retrial”, is amended to
read, “We vacate the conviction on count 10 and
remand for a retrial and direct the court to hold
further proceedings to address the unauthorized
sentence on count 14 and correct an error in the
abstract of judgment”;
3. On page 13, the heading, “1. Legal
Principles and Standard or Review” is modified to
read, “1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review”;
4. On page 34, last paragraph, first
sentence, the clause “but he but did not attempt to
question him about that shooting” is modified to read,
“but he did not attempt to question him about that
shooting”; and
5. On page 52, first full paragraph, the first
sentence and citation are deleted and replaced with,
“A trial court must instruct on all lesser included
offenses supported by substantial evidence, including
voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Duff (2014) 58
Cal.4th 527, 561.)”
6. On page 55, the disposition is modified to
read as follows: “The conviction on count 10 is
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vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court
to allow the prosecution to retry defendant on that
count if the prosecution so elects. The court is then
directed to resentence defendant and address the
unauthorized sentence on count 14 and to ensure
that defendant’s correct date of birth is reflected on
the abstract of judgment”.
In all other respects, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
The petition for rehearing is denied. This modification changes
the judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(c)(2).)
HOFFSTADT, P. J. BAKER, J. KIM (D.), J.
3
Filed 4/28/26 P. v. Martinez CA2/5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B333722
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA475969)
v.
NEFTALY MARTINEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Charlaine F. Olmedo, Judge. Affirmed, in
part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, and Charles S. Lee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant Neftaly Martinez guilty of murder,
attempted murder, and related offenses in connection with a
gang-motivated series of murders in late 2017. On appeal, he
contends the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments by admitting his incriminating
statements to an undercover informant and under Code of Civil
Procedure section 231.7 (section 231.7) in ruling on two objections
to peremptory challenges. He also contests the sufficiency of the
evidence on the lying-in-wait and gang special circumstances
findings, the gang conspiracy offenses, and the gang
enhancements. And, he maintains the court misinstructed the
jury on the elements of gang conspiracy and failed to instruct on
self-defense and imperfect self-defense. Finally, he argues that
the sentences imposed on two counts must be modified and the
abstract of judgment corrected.
We vacate the conviction on count 10 and remand for a
retrial. We otherwise affirm the judgment.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Blythe Street Gang
Defendant and his brother, codefendant Santos Martinez
(Santos), were members of Blythe Street, a criminal street gang
in Panorama City, whose rivals included the Columbus Street,
Van Nuys, Langdon, and Pacoima gangs. Codefendants Ezequiel
Romo (Romo) and William Benitez (Benitez)1 were also members
1 Defendant was tried together with Santos, Romo, and
Benitez, but he is the only appellant in this appeal. In Santos’s
2
of Blythe Street. Defendant was known as Solider, Santos as
Raider, Romo as Wicked, and Benitez as Smokes.
According to former Blythe Street member witness 2,2 the
gang’s members were involved in various types of criminal
activity, including drive-by shootings, assaults, extortions, and
drugs sales. In 2015, witness 2 was receiving from Mexico large
amounts of drugs—both methamphetamine and heroin—and
distributing and selling3 them to Blythe Street members. During
the period January 1, 2015, through November 5, 2015, he
distributed and sold those drugs to gang members five days a
week. Gang members used the money from drug sales to buy
guns for protection, pay taxes to the Mexican Mafia, and send
money to Blythe Street members in prison.
appeal, we affirmed the judgment and that decision is now final.
(People v. Santos Martinez (Aug. 26, 2025, B331242 [nonpub.
opn.].) We abated Romo’s appeal before it was briefed due to his
death.
2 At the time of trial, witness 2 was incarcerated in a federal
facility for possession of crystal methamphetamine. Prior to trial,
he had entered into a leniency agreement in return for his
cooperation as a witness for the prosecution.
3 Witness 2 explained that he would initially give drugs to
members so they could “make money free of charge,” but if they
wanted more drugs, “they had to pay for it.”
3
B. Tagging Murder of Rios (Counts 1–3)
On October 28, 2017, Carlos Rios was shot multiple times
and killed. A total of 17 shell casings were recovered from the
scene.
Witness 14 spoke to his mentor Rene Molina, a Blythe
Street member, both before and after Rios’s murder. Molina
explained that Rios was murdered because he had a “B” tattooed
on his face while in jail, without first being “officially jumped in”
as a member of Blythe Street. According to Molina, Blythe Street
members devised a plan to drive Rios to another neighborhood in
Van Nuys on the pretense that “they were going to tag Blythe”
and, “[a]s soon as [Rios] got a little bit distracted and turned his
back to do the graffiti,” they would shoot him.
Witness 1 also spoke to Santos after the Rios murder and
Santos described the shooting as follows: “[T]hey pulled up to a
Van Nuys neighborhood. They got out of the car. [Santos] said
that [Rios] started graffitiing a little bit. As soon as [Rios] was
doing that, [Santos] took out the gun, emptied the clip on him,
but [Rios] didn’t die. [¶] So [Santos] went back to the car and
asked for a gun, and they were like, ‘what do you mean he’s not
dead? You emptied a clip on him.’ That’s when [defendant] got
out of the car and finished the job.” Witness 1 also spoke to
defendant, who “was just making fun of how [Santos] had
emptied a whole clip on him and … couldn’t kill him so
[defendant] had to do it.”
4 Witness 1, a former Blythe Street member, was charged
with murder in connection with a gang-related shooting at a
Denny’s restaurant—for which defendant was not charged—and
subsequently entered into a leniency agreement in return for his
cooperation as a witness for the prosecution.
4
On the evening of November 3, 2017, Los Angeles Police
Department Officer Joseph Meyers and his partner observed
defendant on the street leaning against a car. They searched him
and found a 12-round magazine containing six live rounds in his
front pocket. When Officer Meyers asked if he had anything else,
defendant said he had a “burner” in the car. Officer Meyers’s
partner searched the car and recovered a firearm from the back
seat loaded with a 12-round magazine and readied to fire with a
chambered round. A criminalist test-fired the weapon recovered
from defendant’s car, analyzed the casings recovered near Rios’s
body, and determined the casings were fired from that weapon.
C. Wendy’s Murder of Saldana (Count 10)
Rony Martinez (Rony)5 was a member of the Columbus
Street Gang. He was a close friend of Alexis Saldana, an
associate of Columbus Street.
On November 17, 2017, sometime between 10:00 p.m. and
10:30 p.m., Rony and Saldana were drinking and driving around
Blythe Street territory in a small brown car with two other
Columbus Street members, Bryan Portillo and Richard Rangel.
Saldana was driving.
Rony and his companions stopped next to a black SUV,
exchanged words with its occupants, and then someone in Rony’s
car threw a beer bottle at the SUV. The SUV began to chase
their brown car for about a minute at which point Rony heard
gunshots and their car crashed through the east side of a
Wendy’s restaurant “into the dining area, up towards the front
counter.”
5 Rony was not related to defendant or Santos.
5
Following the crash, Portillo and Rangel fled the scene.
But Rony stayed with Saldana, who had suffered a single fatal
gunshot wound to the back of the head.
Police arrived and arrested Rony who told them that he believed
it was Blythe Street gang members in the SUV. They recovered
seven .40 caliber casings from the nearby parking lot.
The next day, witness 1 went to Molina’s apartment and
spoke to him and Santos about the Wendy’s shooting. They told
witness 1 that they were driving away from Blythe Street
territory on Van Nuys Boulevard when they saw some Columbus
Street gang members in a car stopped at a red light. People in
both cars “started shooting at each other.” Molina drove while
Santos shot at the Columbus Street car. According to witness 1,
Santos and Molina celebrated the shooting.
After he was arrested, Santos told a Perkins agent6 that he
and defendant were in contact by “walkie talkie” during the
events leading up to the murder of Saldana at the Wendy’s.
Santos claimed defendant had an automatic rifle with a scope
and was near the scene of the shooting. When some Columbus
Street members drove into Blythe Street territory shouting “‘fuck
Burros’”—a derogatory reference to Blythe Street—Santos was
talking with defendant. Defendant asked Santos whether he
should “take them out,” referring to the Columbus Street
members, but Santos advised following them instead, and
6 A Perkins operation—based on Illinois v. Perkins (1990)
496 U.S. 292 (Perkins)—is a planned procedure during which
investigators place a criminal suspect in a cell with an
undercover, or Perkins, agent and record their conversations. As
explained below, after their arrest, both Santos and defendant
made incriminating statements to a Perkins agent.
6
defendant agreed. According to Santos, they then followed the
Columbus Street car with other members in “a gang of G rides”
and the shooting took place as their rivals’ car was entering the
Wendy’s drive-thru. When the Perkins agent asked Santos
whether he shot more than one of the Columbus Street members,
Santos replied, “[Defendant] hit a gang of people. That was him
though. Me and my brother from across the street.”
D. Burnet Avenue Attempted Murder of Pena (Counts 13–15)
On the morning of December 8, 2017, Salvador Pena and
his cousin Bryan Ortiz were smoking outside an apartment
complex located on Burnet Avenue, an area claimed by the
Columbus Street gang. Two Hispanic males wearing bandanas
approached and both began firing weapons at Pena as Ortiz stood
a few feet away. Pena, while at a hospital, described the shooting
to officers.
Pena was hit and fell to the ground bleeding, and Ortiz
immediately began rendering aid. Pena sustained three gunshot
wounds to his torso and one to his leg. He survived his wounds.
Police responded to the Burnet Avenue scene at
approximately 6:55 a.m. and observed bullet holes in the stucco
and windows of the apartment building and in a fence inside the
complex. They also recovered approximately twelve .40-caliber
casings.
As one of the officers arrived at the scene, he observed
Roberto Castillo, a known Columbus Street member, “sticking his
head out” from an apartment near the complex on Burnet
Avenue. Castillo jumped out the window and ran from the officer
who immediately set up a perimeter. About an hour later, the
officer located Castillo, who had blood on the back of his hands, in
7
an apartment in the Burnet Avenue complex that he shared with
his sister. Officers recovered a .38 caliber handgun, a .38 caliber
magazine, .45 caliber ammunition, and shotgun rounds.
According to witness 1, Santos told him about the
December 8, 2017, attempted murder that occurred on Burnet
Avenue that morning. Cynthia Valdez drove Santos and
defendant around early that morning looking for Columbus
Street gang members. Santos explained that, “[a]t first they
couldn’t find any, then they found some so they chased them into
a building. They were shooting at them. They were shooting at
[Santos], and [Neftaly] was shooting at the guy from Columbus.
[¶] But after I guess a couple seconds, they started getting shot
back ….” In the face of the return gunfire, Santos jumped a
fence. Defendant, who had dropped his gun, “just left it there”
and then also jumped the fence. They ran to Valdez’s car and fled
the scene.
Surveillance video recovered from a building near the scene
of the shooting depicted a Nissan Cube that looked like the car
registered to Valdez, traveling southbound that morning on
Burnet Avenue. It then showed defendant and Santos exit from
the car and walk southbound on Burnet as the Nissan followed.
That video later showed defendant and Santos running
northbound toward the Nissan. The surveillance video did not
depict the shooting.
E. The Perkins Operation with Santos
On February 2, 2018, police located and arrested
defendant, Santos, and Valdez. On February 5, 2018, at
1:50 p.m., investigators placed Santos in a jail cell with a Perkins
agent and recorded their conversation. The prosecution played
8
the audio recording at trial and provided a transcript to the jury.
We have described the relevant portions of Santos’s conversation
with the agent in our factual statement above and discuss them
further below.
F. The Perkins Operation with Defendant
On February 5, 2018, at 5:18 p.m., investigators placed
defendant in a jail cell with a Perkins agent and recorded their
conversation. The prosecution played the audio recording at trial
and provided a transcript to the jury. We discuss relevant
portions of defendant’s conversation with the agent in detail
below.
G. Defendant’s Evidence
A defense gang expert testified that gang members
considered the Los Angeles County jail much more dangerous
than state prison. To establish status and protect himself, a
young gang member “might say that they know somebody … of
high stature when in fact they don’t know that person” and might
brag to impress an older gang member as a survival mechanism.
The expert agreed that, to establish a gang member’s status and
dissuade others from victimizing him, a young gang member
entering a custodial setting, such as the county jail, might claim
to have committed crimes when, in fact, he had not committed
them. According to the expert, there was a hierarchy among
gang members in a custodial environment, and older members
who have spent more time in prison are given more deference
than younger, newly incarcerated members. Finally, the expert
9
confirmed that gang members frequently lie to the police and to
other gang members.
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 24, 2019, a Los Angeles County grand jury
returned a 29-count indictment against eight defendants,
including defendant, Santos, Romo, and Benitez. The indictment
charged defendant with 13 counts, including murder, attempted
murder, gang-conspiracy offenses, and firearm-related offenses.
As relevant to this appeal, defendant was charged:
in count 1, along with Santos and Romo, with the
October 28, 2017, murder of Rios in violation of section 187,
subdivision (a);
in count 2, along with Santos and Romo, with engaging in a
criminal street gang conspiracy on October 28, 2017, in violation
of section 182.5;
in count 3, with possession of a firearm by a felon on
October 28, 2017, in violation of section 29800, subdivision (a)(1);
in count 5, along with Santos, with the November 17, 2017,
murder of Saldana in violation of section 187, subdivision (a);
in count 6, along with Santos, with the November 17, 2017,
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Rony
in violation of sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a);
in count 7, along with Santos, with the November 17, 2017,
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of
Portillo in violation of sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a);
in count 8, along with Santos, with the November 17, 2017,
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Rangel
in violation of sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a);
10
in count 9, along with Santos, with shooting at an occupied
motor vehicle on November 17, 2017, in violation of section 246;
in count 10, along with Santos and Romo, with engaging in
a criminal street gang conspiracy on November 17, 2017, in
violation of section 182.5;
in count 11, with possession of a firearm by a felon on
November 17, 2017, in violation of section 29800, subdivision
(a)(1);
in count 13, along with Santos, with the December 8, 2017,
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Pena
in violation of sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a);
in count 14, along with Romo and Santos, with engaging in
a criminal street gang conspiracy on December 8, 2017, in
violation of section 182.5; and
in count 15, with possession of a firearm by a felon on
December 8, 2017, in violation of section 29800, subdivision
(a)(1).
The indictment alleged the following three special
circumstances under section 190.2: as to counts 1 and 5, lying-in-
wait within the meaning subdivision (a)(15), and gang-murder
within the meaning of subdivision (a)(22); and, as to count 5,
multiple-murder within the meaning of subdivision (a)(3).
The indictment further alleged, as to counts 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 13, and 14, personal use of a firearm and gang-related
principal use of a firearm enhancements within the meaning of
section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1). The
indictment also alleged that counts 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, and
15 were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b). Finally,
the indictment alleged that defendant suffered a prior serious or
11
violent felony conviction under the Three Strikes law within the
meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12,
subdivision (a) through (d).
As noted, defendant was tried together with Santos, Romo,
and Benitez. On April 25, 2023, the jury found defendant guilty
on counts 1 through 3 (the tagging murder of Rios), 10 (the gang
conspiracy count based on the Wendy’s murder and attempted
murders), and 13 through 15 (the Burnet Avenue attempted
murder of Pena), but acquitted him on counts 5 through 9 and 11
(the other counts based on the Wendy’s murder and attempted
murders).
As to count 1, the jury found the murder was in the first
degree and the lying-in-wait and gang-murder special
circumstances were true. As to counts 1, 2, 13, and 14, the jury
also found that the personal use of a firearm allegations were
true.
On June 26, 2023, the trial court held a bench trial on the
strike allegation and found it true. On June 30, 2023, the court
held a bench trial on the gang and gang-related principal use of a
firearm allegations and found true the gang enhancements as to
counts 1, 3, 13, and 15 and the gang-related firearm
enhancements as to counts 13 and 14.
The trial court sentenced defendant to life without the
possibility of parole, plus consecutive terms of 125 years-to-life,
and life with parole ineligibility of 30 years.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
12
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Peremptory Challenges7
Defendant challenges two voir dire rulings made under
section 231.7, one sustaining an objection by the prosecutor and
another overruling a defense objection.
1. Legal Principles and Standard or Review
“The Legislature enacted section 231.7, effective in criminal
trials beginning January 1, 2022, to establish ‘a new process for
identifying unlawful bias in the use of peremptory challenges
during jury selection’ because studies showed that the existing
Batson/Wheeler[8] analysis … was inadequate to prevent racial
discrimination…. Discrimination in violation of this section need
not be purposeful, but may involve ‘unconscious bias,’ which
‘includes implicit and institutional biases.’” (People v. Jimenez
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 534, 539–540 (Jimenez).)
Section 231.7 prohibits the “use [of] a peremptory challenge
to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective
7 Defendant challenges the two rulings by “join[ing] in and
adopt[ing]” the arguments made by Santos in his opening,
supplemental, and reply briefs in his appeal from the same two
rulings (case number B331242). Because he makes no arguments
other than those which we rejected in our unpublished opinion in
Santos’s appeal, we adopt here the background, analysis, and
disposition of those contentions. (People v. Santos Martinez,
supra, B331242.)
8 Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) and People
v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).
13
juror’s [actual or perceived] race,” as well as six other protected
groups. (§ 231.7, subds. (a), (i).) Once an objection to a
peremptory challenge is made, the party exercising the challenge
must “state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been
exercised.” (Id., subd. (c).) The court shall then “evaluate the
reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the
totality of the circumstances. … If the court determines there is
a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person
would view race … or perceived [race] as a factor in the use of the
peremptory challenge, then the objection shall be sustained. The
court need not find purposeful discrimination to sustain the
objection.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).)
“Section 231.7, subdivision (j), provides: ‘The denial of an
objection made under this section shall be reviewed by the
appellate court de novo, with the trial court’s express factual
findings reviewed for substantial evidence.’ (Italics added.) The
statute does not set forth a standard of review for a trial court’s
decision to sustain a section 231.7 objection …. Nonetheless,
applying traditional principles of appellate review, we determine
that the sustaining of a section 231.7 objection is also reviewed de
novo, deferring to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by
substantial evidence.” (People v. Hinojos (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
524, 541–542, fn. omitted (Hinojos).)
14
2. Peremptory Challenge to Juror No. 151
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it sustained
the prosecutor’s objection under section 231.7 to his peremptory
challenge to juror no. 1519.
a. Background
i. Juror No. 151
During voir dire by the trial court, juror no. 151, an Asian
female, provided the following information. She worked as a
juvenile probation officer in a juvenile facility. She had been a
probation officer for six or seven years. Her duties at the facility
focused on “safety and security” and included enforcement of the
facility’s disciplinary rules. If a rules violation was “significant”,
she would “do write-ups.”
As part of her duties, juror no. 151 dealt with juvenile gang
members. As she explained: “We have a lot of gang members in
the facility, but … I don’t allow the kids to really gang-bang or
talk about it if they[ are] there for rehabilitation.” Juror no. 151
said that she could be fair to both sides. She also believed she
could “judge a police officer using the same standard [she] would
[use with] any other witness.”
9 As we explain below, the objection to the peremptory
challenge to juror no. 151 was sustained and the juror was
empaneled as a juror. We therefore refer to this juror as such.
We will use the term “prospective juror” when referring to a juror
who was excused from the panel based on the exercise of a
peremptory challenge or when referring to the larger group of
potential jurors.
15
Later in the selection process, the prosecutor explained to
the prospective jurors that the law allows a police officer to use a
ruse or a trick and asked jurors if any of them would
“automatically dismiss evidence that was obtained through a
ruse or trick by law enforcement?” He then asked juror no. 151
whether she had used a ruse in her job, and she said, “Yes.” The
prosecutor followed up by asking her whether she had a problem
with using a ruse, and she said, “I don’t have a problem.”
After further follow-up questions to other prospective
jurors, the prosecutor returned to juror no. 151 and asked, “How
have you used a ruse or trick or deception, whatever you want to
call it?” She replied: “I would kind of describe it as manipulating
it a little bit to kind of get someone to be honest … I work with
juveniles, so it’s a little different. It’s like … I told one youth … [I
would] ask her one time and if she doesn’t tell me the truth or if
it goes this way or that way, then I’m going to have to call the
super[visor], this is going to happen and all that. [¶] And then
because of that, she was like, ‘Okay, fine.’ … I have done that to
that kid, but it wasn’t going to really be like that.” In response,
the prosecutor queried, “You were never going to call the
supervisor,” and juror no. 151 clarified, “No.”
ii. Prospective Juror No. 191
Prospective juror no. 191 was an Asian male who worked
for a startup company that conducted virtual inspections of cell
phone towers and provided analysis of the resulting data for
clients. He had served as a juror on a murder trial 10 years
prior. Asked by the trial court if he could judge a police officer
under the same standard as any other witness, he said, “I think I
might slightly favor police,” but he agreed with the court that
16
“there is good and bad in every job.” He also confirmed that, if
instructed to do so, he would judge a police officer under the same
standard as any other witness.
While questioning another prospective juror, Benitez’s
counsel asked if “see[ing] … three crying moms” in a courtroom
would influence that juror’s decision. Counsel then told the
prospective jurors they must put sympathy aside, and asked
those who could not follow that principle to raise their hands.
Prospective juror no. 191 raised his hand, explaining, “Without
knowing all the facts, I mean, it’s hard for me to say exactly
where I draw the line. But I think if details are really horrible or
if things were really bad, I’m not sure—I might have some
sympathy for people.” Counsel followed up by asking, “Are you
going to be able to put aside your sympathetic feelings and listen
to the rest of the evidence and testimony presented, or are you
going to feel like you’re so overwhelmed with emotion that you
might just stop listening and you make up your mind, basically?”
Prospective juror no. 191 replied, “I think it would be hard for me
to say. I would try to do my best to be objective, but, you know
….”
iii. Prospective Juror No. 160
Prospective juror no. 160, an Asian female, was a registered
nurse. In response to a juror questionnaire that asked, “Prior
jury experience where you were actually selected to listen to
evidence. Was the case civil or criminal? Did you reach a verdict
or was it a hung jury, mistrial or settled in the middle of the case
(do not indicate what the verdict was or which way you
voted)?” the juror responded: “DON’T REMEMBER. VERDICT
REACHED.” Referring to the prospective juror’s questionnaire
17
responses, the trial court asked, “You were on a trial once, but
you don't remember what the case was about or whether a verdict
was reached?” Prospective juror no. 160 responded that she
believed it was a murder case and “[p]robably five to ten years
ago. She confirmed she could be fair and impartial to both sides.
Benitez’s counsel asked prospective juror no. 160 for her
thoughts on a defendant exercising his right not to testify, and
she replied, “I wouldn’t hold that against them. I would just
listen to what they have to offer and what the evidence is.”
Counsel followed up by asking the juror, if she was a defendant
with nothing to hide, whether she would testify. She responded,
“I’m no legal expert, so I’d likely defer to my counsel. But I
couldn’t hold—”
iv. Peremptory challenges
During a subsequent sidebar conference, the trial court
observed that there were no challenges for cause that needed to
be heard and therefore indicated that the attorneys should make
their peremptory challenges. Defense counsel proceeded to
jointly exercise three peremptory challenges to prospective juror
nos. 191 (an Asian male), 16, and 160 (an Asian female),
following which they informed the court that they had no further
joint challenges. Counsel for Romo, Santos, and defendant then
accepted the jury as constituted, but counsel for Benitez exercised
an individual challenge to prospective juror no. 161.
At that point, defense counsel conferred and informed the
trial court that they now had a joint challenge to juror no. 151.
The prosecutor objected to the challenge, and the court called a
sidebar conference.
18
During the conference, the prosecutor confirmed that he
was making the objection pursuant to section 231.7 and
explained as follows: “My basis is on the basis of race. There
have been … three Asian jurors kicked off by the defense out [of]
a total of five.” The prosecutor also noted that his cocounsel was
an Asian female.
The trial court agreed with the prosecutor’s statement that
three of the defense’s five peremptory challenges had been
exercised against Asian jurors. Romo’s counsel then proffered
defendants’ race-neutral reasons for the joint challenge to juror
no. 151, explaining, “Your Honor, the non-race-based reasons are
that she has associations with lots of gang members at her job.
She is a juvenile probation officer in a delinquency facility, which
means there are people in that facility that are locked up because
they are wards of the court. [¶] She deals with safety and
security and rehabilitation. During her questioning by [the
prosecutor], during the attorney conducted voir dire, she
approved of using a ruse, approved of lying and also said that she
uses ruses as well and she thinks that those worked out well. [¶]
So I think that she has got some issues not related to her race,
and so those are the reasons that I had, at least, for feeling that
way. … [J]ust so the record is clear … and the court knows this,
a probation officer in a juvenile proceeding, they have roles of
being the actual courtroom security in the courtrooms. [¶] The
probation department administers the juvenile camps and also
the juvenile detention facilities in [Los Angeles] County. As such,
they are actually part of the prosecution. They have constant
contact with peace officers. [¶] And she’s been there for six or
seven years.”
19
As to juror no. 151, Santos’s counsel further asserted, “I’d
just add that, Your Honor … has indicated that the court is
tentatively inclined to allow [Santos’s] Perkins statement to be
used. There was a ruse used in that [operation]. My client was
18. That’s an added factor. [¶] We have someone who deals with
… juvenile gang members and uses ruses in her employment.”
Romo’s counsel then addressed defendants’ reasons for
challenging prospective juror no. 160, explaining, “There are a
couple issues I had with [prospective juror no.] 160. One is that
she was on a murder case and she does not remember the verdict
that was reached. … [T]hat is significant for a couple of reasons.
[¶] One is it showed that she perhaps either has faulty memory
or it didn’t impact her enough. A juror and the juries are given
instructions including you should have an abiding conviction of
the truth of the charge, and an abiding conviction is something
that stays with you and is not fleeting. [¶] Sitting on a murder
trial, I think, is a significant thing for most citizens. So the fact
she does not recall the verdict means she either was not being
truthful or it just didn’t have enough impact on her. [¶] Also,
Your Honor, in regard to her answer to some questions on the
second page of the questionnaire, which would be questions [nos].
16, 17, and 18, she said she was ‘in between.’ Regarding whether
she could be fair or not she said, ‘more so yes.’”
Romo’s counsel next addressed the reasons for challenging
prospective juror no. 191, adopting the comments about that
juror made earlier by Santos’s counsel. Defendant’s counsel then
added, “[prospective juror no. 191] was going to favor police
officers. He also indicated he would have sympathy [for] the
victims and, most prominently, he was going to believe police
officer testimony.” Benitez’s counsel stated that, “under
20
questioning regarding sympathy, [prospective juror no. 191] did
indicate that he would have a difficult time overcoming mothers
in the audience crying, Your Honor, and it would—he would try.
[¶] He would try to evaluate evidence, but it would deeply impact
his ability to evaluate the evidence without a bias.”
The prosecutor responded to defense counsels’
explanations, stating, “Your Honor, all three jurors said they
could be fair. [Prospective juror no.] 160 remembered her verdict
during voir dire, not in the questionnaire. I’m sorry. In the
questionnaire she said a verdict was reached, and then she also
clarified that the verdict was five to ten years ago. [¶] So I think
what [Romo’s counsel] is referring to in … the actual
questionnaire she says, ‘Don’t remember. Verdict reached.’ She
stated on the record that she reached a verdict, so I don’t think
she’s being cavalier about her duties as a juror. [¶] I’d also note
that in terms of [juror no.] 151, every single juror … that remains
said that they would accept a ruse and would not automatically
dismiss a ruse. [¶] And the ruse that [juror no.] 151 used was
that she said she was going to call her supervisor, and that was
the ruse. It was something extremely minor in this particular
case. [¶] … [W]hen she talks about the wards in her custody, she
talks about kids. When she refers to the gang member, she
doesn’t refer to them in any derogatory fashion. [¶] She says she
likes to bring activities for the kids and … from every indication,
she sounds more like she is part of a rehabilitative effort in terms
of the wards in her custody, not that she is acting as a law
enforcement officer. [¶] All three have said they could be fair,
and … that’s three out of the five people that were excused.”
Following the explanations by counsel, the trial court
sustained the prosecutor’s objection under section 231.7,
21
reasoning as follows: “The court does find by clear and
convincing evidence that the peremptories are being used on a
racial basis. One of the factors that [section 231.7] says to look at
… is whether or not the reasons you’re giving were also set forth
by other jurors and you’re not exercising the peremptories on
other jurors. [¶] There were a number of jurors who didn’t
remember their verdicts. There were a number of jurors who
indicated that they were okay with ruses. The reason why I
brought up the parent example is because saying ‘I’m going to
call my supervisor’ is akin to ‘I’m going to tell your dad when he
gets home.’ [¶] The ruse was not anything of a deceptive nature
like falsifying print cards or something of that nature. And most
telling to this court is the fact that this juror was accepted by all
counsel and then subsequently now being excluded. [¶] So
obviously, those factors that concern counsel that are being
stated on the record didn’t—the dynamics don’t change,
necessarily, that. Whether or not she accepts ruses or … used
ruses[,] her job[,] her exposure to … juveniles in the delinquency
system. [¶] All of that existed when you accepted her. There
was nothing new about a juror being placed in the box that
replaces many of the things you’re now telling the court you’re
concerned about. The court will reseat her.”
b. Analysis
Under section 231.7, once the prosecution objected to the
peremptory challenge to juror no. 151, claiming race was a
motivating factor, defendants had the burden, under the statute’s
objective standard, of showing that race was not a factor in
defendants’ joint exercise of a challenge. According to defendant,
the reasons for the challenge proffered by Santos’s counsel
22
demonstrated that there was no substantial likelihood10 that an
objectively reasonable person would view race as a factor in
defense counsels’ decision to excuse juror no. 151. We disagree.
In explaining his rationale for the challenge, Santos’s
counsel cited three reasons unrelated to race: juror no. 151
worked in law enforcement as a juvenile probation officer at a
delinquency facility; she had frequent contact with juvenile gang
members; and she approved of the use of ruses and had employed
them in the course of her work, experience that counsel argued
was relevant to defendant’s statements to the Perkins agent.
The trial court, however, did not find the proffered
explanations credible because defendants had exercised three of
their first five peremptory challenges on Asian jurors; counsel
had initially accepted juror no. 151; counsel had accepted other
non-Asian jurors who had approved of the use of ruses; and the
ruse the juror described using with a juvenile was unlike the
more deceptive ruses employed during defendant’s Perkins
operation.
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s factual
findings. The majority of defendants’ peremptory challenges up
to that point—60 percent—were exercised against Asian jurors, a
fact that supported an inference of actual or perceived bias
against that group. Further, defendant initially accepted juror
no. 151 but then, together with the other defendants, jointly
10 “‘[S]ubstantial likelihood’” means “more than a mere
possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not.”
(§ 231.7, subd. (d)(2)(B).) An “objectively reasonable person” is
defined as one who is “aware that unconscious bias, in addition to
purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion
of potential jurors in the State of California.” (Id., subd.
(d)(2)(A).)
23
challenged her, even though no new information about her had
been provided. Moreover, other prospective jurors also said that
they approved of the use of ruses, but were not challenged.11
And, the one ruse that juror no. 151 recalled using involved a
relatively innocuous threat to notify a supervisor if a juvenile
ward did not provide an honest response to the juror’s inquiry
about an undisclosed disciplinary matter. As the court noted,
that disciplinary tactic bore little resemblance to the Perkins
operation used on defendant during the murder investigation and
therefore called into question the genuineness of the proffered
reason for the challenge.
We therefore agree with the trial court that “in light of the
totality of the circumstances,” there was “more than a mere
possibility” that “an objectively reasonable person would view
race [or perceived race] … as a factor in the use of the peremptory
challenge ….” (§ 231.7, subd.(d)(1) & (2)(B); see Hinojos, supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 544–545 [Section 231.7 is “concerned with
the likelihood the peremptory challenge could be viewed as
motivated by an improper ground (i.e., a legal standard) rather
than whether the peremptory challenge actually was motivated
by an improper ground (i.e., a factual question)”].)
11 Several other prospective jurors said they would accept the
use of ruses by law enforcement, including prospective juror nos.
151, 154, 161, 167, 228, 231, 258, and 298. Of those, only juror
no. 151 was identified as Asian and, as noted, defendants
exercised a peremptory as to her.
24
3. Peremptory Challenge to Prospective Juror No. 46
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by
overruling the joint objection under section 231.7 to Benitez’s
challenge to prospective juror no. 46.
a. Background
During the trial court’s questioning of the prospective
jurors based on their answers to the juror questionnaire,
prospective juror no. 4612 provided the following responses. He
was retired from two previous jobs with a utility company and a
hospital. He had served on juries that reached verdicts, including
a criminal murder trial 40 years prior and a civil trial 25 years
prior. One of his brothers spent time in prison for drug sales 40
years ago. But he did not believe that fact would affect his ability
to be fair. His other brother was a director of youth gang services
for Los Angeles County for many years, but had been retired for
about 20 years. According to prospective juror no. 46, the “only
thing that [he could] actually say about [his brother’s job as the
director was] that [his] mother wanted [his brother] to send [him]
to camp so [he] wouldn’t get married.” He believed his brother’s
employment would not impact his ability to be fair and impartial.
During his questioning of the prospective jurors, Santos’s
counsel asked prospective juror no. 46 whether he dealt with
gangs as part of his work, and he answered, “No.” Counsel then
inquired if prospective juror no. 46’s “preliminarily [sic] source of
information” about gangs was from “[w]hat [he saw] on
[television], what [he] read in the newspaper[,] or [experiences he
12 Prospective juror no. 46 was a Latino male.
25
had] growing up?” Prospective juror no. 46 replied, “[a]ll of the
above” and then reiterated that one of his brothers was a director
of youth gang services for the county for many years. In
response, counsel asked whether his brother spoke with him
about his job, and prospective juror no. 46 replied, “Very seldom.
We … were kind of going separate paths of careers. Every once
in a while when [we] would get together, he would say something
about it.” But he agreed that, based on his conversations with his
brother, gang members were “human beings, they [were]
individuals, too, and there [were] differences in character and
personality and life experiences, things of that … sort.”
During his questioning, Benitez’s counsel asked whether
prospective juror no. 46 knew why he was the last attorney to
question him. Prospective juror no. 46 responded, “Because the
other three [defense attorneys] went before you,” to which counsel
replied, “That’s a great answer. [¶] … [¶] I’m not going last
because they’re saving the best for last, because the other three
defense counsel—we have an amazing defense team. The reason
I’m going last simply is because the judge said, ‘Here’s the order
you’re going,’ so I’m going last. [¶] But I bring this up because
sometimes when … the fourth attorney is questioning the same
… the same witness, people might tune out or you might be tired
by the end of the day or whatever.” Beyond that exchange,
Benitez’s counsel did not ask prospective juror no. 46 any further
questions.
Later in the proceedings, Benitez’s counsel exercised a
peremptory challenge to prospective juror no. 46, and Romo’s
counsel raised a joint objection on behalf of the other defendants
to the challenge under section 231.7. The trial court called for a
26
side bar conference, at which point the prosecutor joined in the
objection.
During the conference, the trial court observed that
prospective juror no. 46 was an older Latino male and the first
Latino to be excused. Santos’s counsel then pointed out that the
prospective juror’s brother had been in prison, he had previously
been a juror on a murder case that went to verdict, and he had
another brother who “worked in administration with gangs; [he]
discussed gangs with him”; and he had answered “yes to
[question nos.] 16, 17, and 18” on the questionnaire. The court
responded, “I understand you may want this juror for a variety of
reasons, but on what basis do you believe it’s race-based?”
Santos’s counsel replied, “Because, first of all, there is a
possibility of Hispanics on the jury and—and we felt there was no
justification for his excusal.”
Defendant’s counsel added, “[T]here was really no other
reason than race because there is this man who said he could be
fair a multitude of times when questioned by all counsel”;
defendant’s counsel followed up with the observation that “the
defendants are all Hispanic”; and the prosecutor joined in the
argument of defendant’s counsel.
The trial court then asked Benitez’s counsel to explain the
basis for the challenge. Counsel responded, “I believe that the
fact that his brother works so closely with gangs might have
cemented his opinions on gang members, and I don’t believe that
he can be fair to the defendants. [¶] In terms of race, Your
Honor, I can’t even tell what race he is based on looking at him or
hearing him regarding his accent or appearance.”
The trial court noted that none of the presumptions of
invalidity under section 231.7, subdivision (e)(1) seemed to apply.
27
In response, the prosecutor said, “There [are] various sections …
within the code that apply, having a close relationship with the
people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime.
That sounds like one of the reasons why [he was challenged.]”
The trial court overruled the objection, explaining: “I think
[Benitez’s counsel] says because he works with gang members,
not because the brother was arrested or convicted. So I find that
that is not necessarily race-based, and it’s an exercise of a
peremptory even if other counsel don’t agree with it. So the court
will go ahead and excuse that juror and seat another juror.”
b. Analysis
Defendant initially suggests that the substantial evidence
standard does not apply to our review of the trial court’s ruling
because the court did not make any express factual findings in
support of its ruling accepting the explanation proffered by
Benitez’s counsel.13 In ruling on the joint objection to the
challenge, the court expressly found that the explanation
provided by counsel was “not necessarily race-based”14, and
13 Defendant also suggests that the reason proffered by
Benitez’s counsel was presumptively invalid under section 231.7,
subdivision (e). But he fails adequately to explain how the
proffered reason is covered by one of the 13 presumptively invalid
reasons set forth in subdivision (e). We therefore reject the
assertion.
14 Section 231.7, subdivision (d)(1) provides that “[t]he court
shall explain the reasons for its ruling on the record.”
Subdivision (j) provides that, in reviewing a trial court ruling on
an objection under section 231.7, “[t]he appellate court shall not
28
therefore accepted it as a credible rationale “unrelated to a
prospective juror’s race” which bears “on the prospective juror’s
ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (§ 231.7, subdivision
(e).) We therefore review that determination for substantial
evidence. (Id., subd. (j).)
According to defendant, the following three factors show
that the challenge violated section 231.7: (1) defendant and the
prospective juror were members of the same cognizable group;
(2) Benitez’s counsel failed to question the juror about whether
his brother’s work with gang members would influence his
decision-making in the case; and (3) the record does not support
the explanation proffered by Benitez’s counsel for the challenge.
Based on those factors, defendant concludes that “[t]here was ‘a
substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person
would view race … as a factor in the use of the peremptory
challenge’ to [prospective] [j]uror [n]o. 46.” We address each
factor.
As to defendant and prospective juror no. 46 being part of
the same cognizable group, although section 231.7, subdivision
(d)(3)(B) permits the trial court to consider whether “race [or]
ethnicity … bear on the facts of the case to be tried,” being a
member of the same cognizable group as a defendant is only one
factor to be considered and, alone, is not especially probative in
this case.
Benitez’s counsel did not, as defendant notes, question
prospective juror no. 46 about his brother’s work experience with
gang members. But Benitez’s counsel was the last defense
impute to the trial court any findings, including findings of a
prospective juror’s demeanor, that the trial court did not
expressly state on the record.”
29
attorney to question jurors. By that point in the proceedings, he
already had heard answers from prospective juror no. 46
supporting an inference that the brother’s work with gangs was a
source of specific information about them, beyond other generally
available sources, and that the juror’s access to such information
over the years could have an impact on his ability to be fair and
impartial. Thus, there was no need for counsel to question him
further about the brother’s work or specific opinions he may have
formed as counsel was exercising a peremptory challenge. This is
not a case like Hinojos, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th 524, in which the
defense counsel admitted that he had not questioned the juror
about his gang views, but nevertheless excused him based on
purported concerns about those views. (Id. at pp. 537–538; see
also Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281 [“failure … to engage …
jurors in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any
questions at all” can be inferential evidence that the peremptory
challenge is motivated by improper bias].)
The record showed that prospective juror no. 46 had a
brother who retired after serving as the director of youth gang
services in Los Angeles County “for many years.” The record also
showed that the juror had occasionally spoken to his brother
about his gang-related work over the years. And, it further
revealed that, when Santos’s counsel asked the juror about the
sources of his knowledge about gang members, he made a point of
reminding counsel that the brother worked with gang members
for many years. The record therefore supported a reasonable
inference that Benitez’s counsel’s concern about the brother’s
work experience with gangs, and its potential impact on
prospective juror no. 46’s impartiality, was legitimate and not
pretextual. (See Hinojos, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 543 [The
30
totality of the circumstances inquiry “focuses on the nature of the
case, the parties, and—importantly—the voir dire proceedings.
Because the trial court is in the best position to gather historical
facts and to assess credibility based on tone, demeanor, and
conduct during voir dire proceedings, we defer to its findings if
supported by substantial evidence”].)
Finally, unlike the context in which defense counsel sought
to excuse juror no. 151—which showed a disproportional use of
peremptories against Asian jurors—prospective juror no. 46 was
the first Latino to be excused by any attorney during the
selection process. (See § 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(G) [providing that,
among other factors, the trial court should consider whether the
attorney exercising the challenge “has used peremptory
challenges disproportionately against a given race … in the
present case”].) Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it
overruled defendant’s objection to Benitez’s exercise of a
peremptory challenge.15
B. Defendant’s Statements to Perkins Agent
We next consider defendant’s contention that the trial
court’s ruling allowing the admission of his audio-taped
statements to the Perkins agent violated his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and Fourteenth Amendment
right to a fair trial.
15 Having rejected defendant’s section 231.7 argument, and
seeing no other basis on which a Batson challenge could be
meritorious, we also reject his contention that the court’s ruling
violated Batson/Wheeler. (Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at
p. 548; People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 807–808.)
31
1. Background
a. Defendant’s Statements
As explained, three days after he was arrested,
investigators placed defendant in a jail cell with a Perkins agent
and recorded their conversation.16 At the beginning of the
conversation, defendant told the Perkins agent that he was
known as Soldier from Blythe Street, and the agent replied that
he was Listo or Nesio from South Central. Defendant asked the
agent if he had seen his younger brother, Raider from Blythe, and
when the agent said no, defendant complained that he and his
brother had been in jail for the last four days, arrested for
murder. Defendant also told the Perkins agent that they had
been arrested with a female and expressed concern she might
cooperate with investigators.
According to defendant, at the time of his arrest, he did not
know the reason, claiming, “So much bullshit that we’ve been
doing that I’m, like, which one is it? I told my brother, like,
which one, you know?” He added, “There’s a lot. But a lot going
on in Panorama.” Defendant also suggested that he and his
brother were not responsible, saying, “Bullshit, fool. Murders
being committed, not even by us, fool. Like, residents trying to
kill each other and shit, you know? Like, damn, these [racial
16 The record of defendant’s Perkins operation does not show
whether he had been advised of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) prior to the beginning of
the operation. But, as explained below, in his motion to exclude
his Perkins statements, defendant relied on Santos’s motion to
exclude which specifically argued that his operation violated
Miranda.
32
slur] is killing each other. … [¶] … [¶] [The police] think we’re
doing everything, and we’re just sitting there sitting back, like,
kicking it, you know?”
Defendant next explained that prior to his current arrest,
he had been arrested for violating his parole, bailed out, and on
the run. He claimed he “would only come out to shoot [racial
slur].”
Later in the conversation, the Perkins agent asked, “Who’s
nuttier, fool, you or your brother?” Defendant responded, “[M]y
brother. [¶] … [¶] Yeah. That fool’s younger than me. He’s 18.
[¶] … [¶] That fool’s a nut.” Defendant went on to describe the
competitive nature of their relationship: “Yeah. We kind of, like,
compete, fool. Like the homies … even tell us, like, you fools
think this is a competition. This is not a competition, dawg. This
shit’s real. Like, no. This is a game, dawg. Me and my brother
are stupid, that’s why. I’ll come … back from a fuckin’ job. [¶] …
[¶] I’ll be, like, I got two [racial slur]. My brother will be, like, I
got three, dawg. [¶] … [¶] I’ll be, like, what the fuck? So I’ll get
back in the car. I’ll be, like, say no more. I’ll be back right now.”
According to defendant, “the homies got mad” at them because
they were “bringing so much attention to the hood …. They’re
arresting all … these homies, and it’s not even them, you know?
Like, they’re … just getting arrested for bullshit.”
Defendant also described the origins of the recent “war”
with Columbus Street. He said it began when Columbus Street
members came to Blythe Street territory and shot a homie “in
front of his job.” According to defendant, “we went to their hood,
fool, and we started like … let these fools have it, and they
couldn’t handle it, fool. So they started crying to the homies, like
the big homies. Like, fuck that, you [racial slur] started this shit
33
so now you’re going to have a green light. [¶] … [¶] [W]e could
go to their hood whenever we want, you know? But they can’t do
shit; they can’t come to our hood.”
At that point in the conversation, Los Angeles Police
Department Detective Gabriel Bucknell came to the cell to
explain to defendant why he was arrested, but told defendant,
“You don’t have to say anything. I’m not asking you anything,
but I’m explaining to you why you’re here … is because you’re
being investigated for that case, okay?” When advised that he
was suspected of murdering Rios, defendant denied knowing him.
He also denied knowledge of “a few other homicides” in which the
detective said he was a suspect.
When Detective Bucknell left, the Perkins agent inquired
about the photo the detective showed defendant. He replied,
“Some fuckin’ vato that [the detective] said that I killed,”
claiming, “I don’t know that fool.” The agent also asked whether
defendant was concerned that the detectives would “hit your
brother with the same shit,” and defendant responded, “Well, he’s
my crimey so they’re going to probably ask him the same shit”
about all of the murders. Defendant, however, clarified that they
had not “done most of them together,” insisting that “[e]verything
[they] did, [they] did it separate.”
After further conversation between defendant and the
Perkins agent, another officer, Detective Gutierrez, came to the
cell, advised defendant that he would also be charged with the
Wendy’s shooting, and requested a DNA sample; but he but did
not attempt to question him about that shooting. When that
detective left, the Perkins agent asked, “And the Wendy’s what—
he said that the car crashed, huh? Defendant replied, “Yeah.
(Inaudible) they crashed into the Wendy’s.” The agent then
34
asked if two people inside the car died, and defendant responded,
“Yeah.” The agent remarked that it must be difficult to hit a
moving vehicle and asked where the people in the car were from.
Defendant said they were from Columbus Street and agreed that
they must have been “caught slipping.” The agent commented,
“Motherfuckers gangbanging with no guns. I’ll be damned if I get
killed and I’m holding a gun, you know?” Defendant agreed, “It’s
fuckin’ embarrassing.”
Later in their conversation, the Perkins agent asked
defendant whether he thought he prevailed in the competition
with Santos, and defendant conceded that Santos won. He
believed Santos was “trying to impress everybody … the whole
hood” and that he had succeeded, but complained that “at the end
of the day, what the fuck does that matter? The homies ain’t
doing shit.”
At the end of the conversation, the Perkins agent returned
to the topic of the Wendy’s incident, asking, “So you looking at
three then, fool. The two in Wendy’s and your homie [Rios],
huh?” But defendant replied, “Nah. I didn’t—I didn’t do the one
at Wendy’s. [¶] … [¶] … I just know about it because I live
right next to it.”
2. Motion in Limine
In his trial brief, defendant requested that the trial court
exclude the statements he made during the Perkins operation.
He objected to their admission on “[Evidence Code section] 352
relevance grounds, hearsay, and foundation.” He also cited to
Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. 292 and argued that his statements
were the product of coercion because the Perkins agent “was
significantly older than him ([defendant] was just 20 at the time
35
and the agent was between 30–50 years old), was taller, . . .
heavier[,]” and likely a gang member.17 Finally, defendant relied
on “the extensive case law cited by Santos … in his motion to
exclude his Perkins statement regarding voluntariness and
psychologically coercive environments.”18
The prosecution opposed the requests to exclude, and
following a hearing, the trial court denied them.
3. Legal Principles
a. Miranda
“To safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination from the ‘inherently compelling
pressures’ of custodial interrogation (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at
p. 467), the high court adopted a set of prophylactic measures
requiring law enforcement officers to advise an accused of his
right to remain silent and to have counsel present prior to any
17 The Perkins agent was between 30 and 50 years old,
weighed between 180 and 230 pounds, and was between five feet
eight inches and six feet one inch tall.
18 On July 14, 2025, defendant filed a request for judicial
notice of the record in Santos’s appeal which included a copy of
Santos’s motion to exclude his statements to the Perkins agent.
We grant that request.
In his motion, Santos contended that his statements were
obtained without advising him of his rights under Miranda,
supra, 384 U.S. 436, his statements were involuntary because he
faced a credible threat of violence, and his Perkins operation was
psychologically coercive.
36
custodial interrogation (id. at pp. 444–445).” (People v. Jackson
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 338–339.)
“In Perkins, the United States Supreme Court held that a
conversation between an incarcerated suspect and an undercover
agent posing as a fellow inmate did not implicate the concerns
underlying Miranda. The court’s ruling was clearly articulated:
‘We reject the argument that Miranda warnings are required
whenever a suspect is in custody in a technical sense and
converses with someone who happens to be a government agent.
Questioning by captors, who appear to control the suspect’s fate,
may create mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court has
assumed will weaken the suspect’s will, but where a suspect does
not know that he is conversing with a government agent, these
pressures do not exist….’ (… Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 297.)”
(People v. Guilmette (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1539–1540.)
b. Voluntariness
Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, “‘[a] statement is involuntary if it is not the product
of “‘a rational intellect and free will.’” [Citation.] The test for
determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the
defendant’s “will was overborne at the time he confessed.”
[Citation.] “‘The question posed by the due process clause in
cases of claimed psychological coercion is whether the influences
brought to bear upon the accused were “such as to overbear
petitioner’s will to resist and bring about confessions not freely
self-determined.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In determining whether
or not an accused’s will was overborne, ‘an examination must be
made of “all the surrounding circumstances—both the
37
characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
“‘A finding of coercive police activity is a prerequisite to a
finding that a confession was involuntary under the federal and
state Constitutions. [Citations.] A confession may be found
involuntary if extracted by threats or violence, obtained by direct
or implied promises, or secured by the exertion of improper
influence. [Citation.]’” (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th
318, 346–347.)
4. Analysis
a. Miranda
Defendant contends that the admission of his statements to
the Perkins agent violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. According to defendant, “[t]he 67[-]page
transcript of the Perkins operation reflects that the lengthy
conversation between the agent and [defendant] was led by the
agent. Unlike Perkins, where there were no interventions by
officers, in [defendant’s] case two stimulations took place—first
by [Detective] Bucknell, and later by [Detective] Gutierrez.”
We disagree with defendant’s description of the detectives’
interaction with him. Although detectives visited the cell twice
at different points of the operation, they did not attempt to
question defendant. Instead, during the first visit, Detective
Bucknell informed defendant that he was being investigated for
the Rios murder but made it clear he was not going to question
him until later. And, during the second interaction, Detective
Gutierrez informed defendant he was a suspect in the Wendy’s
murder but did not ask him for any information about it. The
38
detectives’ brief involvement in the operation did not create an
atmosphere in which defendant could have believed he was being
interrogated by law enforcement. To the contrary, the transcript
reflects that, during the entirety of his conversation with the
agent, defendant believed he was speaking with an older gang
member, a fact defendant does not dispute. Absent facts showing
a police interrogation, the officers were not required to deliver
Miranda warnings. (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127,
1142.)
Defendant also complains that he was placed alone in a cell
with a physically larger, much older and experienced gang
member who persisted in questioning him about the murders
when he was “‘nodding out’” and “‘tired,’” suggesting that such an
intimidating atmosphere was sufficiently coercive to trigger the
Fifth Amendment protections of Miranda. But, as explained,
Miranda was specifically concerned with formal custodial
interrogations and the attendant risk that such an environment
would weaken or overcome a suspect’s will. Because the agent
here acted as a fellow gang member, and not a police officer or
detective, neither the size and age disparities between the agent
and defendant nor the agent’s questioning of defendant while he
was fatigued were sufficient to implicate the concerns underlying
Miranda.
b. Voluntariness
We also reject defendant’s related contention that his
statements during the Perkins operation were coerced and
involuntary in violation of his due process rights. According to
defendant, he “was psychologically coerced by [Detective]
Bucknell informing him he was a suspect in multiple murders,
39
and later by [Detective] Gutierrez informing him that a murder
charge was being added for the Wendy’s incident. [His]
incriminating statements related to the charged offenses occurred
after one or both of these stimulations, and thus they were the
product of the detectives’ coercive influence, regardless of the fact
that they were not in the immediate presence of [defendant] at
the time of his statements.”
Defendant spoke openly with the Perkins agent about
subjects unrelated to the murders, including his gang
membership and moniker, parole status, subsequent arrest for a
parole violation, release on bail, and relationship with his
younger brother Santos which suggested he was comfortable
being with the agent and not intimidated by him. And, the
transcript does not show that the agent ever used threats or
other forms of intimidation to induce defendant to speak about
the murders. To the contrary, defendant spoke freely about them
and included details without prompting. Thus, the record
supports a finding that defendant spoke to the agent and confided
incriminating information, not because the detectives’ visits
informing him of the charges prompted the disclosures, but
because he believed he was speaking to a trustworthy fellow gang
member.
Defendant also maintains that the detectives’ two visits to
his cell informing him of the charges and advising he would be
questioned about them shortly supported an inference that his
subsequent statements to the Perkins agent were involuntary.
But, as noted, the two visits were brief and, during each, the
detectives imparted only limited information about the charges
and did not question defendant about his knowledge of or
participation in the crimes. Thus, that limited interaction was
40
insufficient to show that his subsequent statements to the agent
were made involuntarily or against his free will. Indeed, if
merely informing a suspect of the charges on which he is being
detained constitutes coercion, almost all statements made by
suspects after such an encounter would be deemed involuntary.
C. Lying-in-Wait Special Circumstance
Defendant maintains that the jury’s finding on the lying-in-
wait special circumstance alleged in count 1, the tagging murder
of Rios, was not supported by substantial evidence. As he views
the record, “there [was] no evidence that Santos watched and
waited for an opportune time to kill Rios before he began
shooting him.” Instead, he concludes that although “the evidence
establishe[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that Santos, [defendant],
and Molina committed first degree premeditated murder because
they carried out their plan to murder Rios by a surprise attack,
. . . it falls short of establishing that Rios was killed by means of
lying in wait.”
1. Legal Principles
The elements of the lying-in-wait special circumstance
require (1) an intentional killing, committed under circumstances
that include: (2) a physical concealment or concealment of
purpose; (3) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an
opportune time to act; and, (4) immediately thereafter, a surprise
attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.
(People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 201 (Stevens).) “The
purpose of the watching and waiting element is to distinguish
those cases in which a defendant acts insidiously from those in
41
which he acts out of rash impulse. [Citation.] This period need
not continue for any particular length ‘“of time provided that its
duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to
premeditation or deliberation.”’ [Citation.] … The factors of
concealing murderous intent, and striking from a position of
advantage and surprise, ‘are the hallmark of a murder by lying in
wait.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 202, fn. omitted.)
2. Analysis
When viewed in a light most favorable to the jury’s finding,
the evidence supported a reasonable inference that defendant,
Santos, and Molina used the ruse of a tagging trip to Van Nuys to
lure an unsuspecting Rios to that location, thereby concealing
from Rios the true purpose of their trip. Once the group arrived
at a Van Nuys neighborhood, Santos exited the car with Rios, as
if to join him in tagging. But Santos did not shoot Rios
immediately upon exiting the vehicle, choosing instead to watch
and wait for a more opportune moment, that is, long enough for
Rios to become focused on spraying graffiti while his back was to
Santos. (People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 279 [“The lying in
wait need not continue for any particular period of time provided
that its duration is substantial in the sense that it shows a state
of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation”].) Santos
then shot Rios, in the back, “striking from a position of advantage
and surprise.” (Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 202.)
Accordingly, the lying-in-wait special circumstance finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
42
D. Pattern of Gang-Related Criminal Activity
Defendant next contends that “the three gang conspiracies
and findings on the gang-related allegations must be reversed”
because they were not supported by sufficient evidence.
According to defendant, “[a]lthough this was clearly a case with a
mountain of gang-related evidence, the prosecutor never bothered
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite pattern of
criminal gang activity.”
1. Legal Principles
Each of the challenged convictions and enhancements
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a pattern of criminal
gang activity.
Section 186.22, subdivision (f) defines a “‘criminal street
gang’” as “an ongoing, organized association or group of three or
more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its
primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal
acts enumerated in subdivision (e), having a common name or
common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal
gang activity.” (Emphasis added.)
Subdivision (e) provides the requirements for
demonstrating a pattern of criminal activity: (1) the commission,
attempted commission, or conspiracy to commit two or more of
the offenses enumerated in that subdivision; (2) at least one of
the offenses occurred after the effective date of the statute,
September 26, 1988; (3) the most recent offense occurred within
three years of a prior offense and three years of the current one;
(4) the offenses were committed on separate occasions or by two
43
or more members; and (5) the offenses commonly benefited the
gang and the benefit was more than reputational. (§ 186.22,
subd. (e)(1).)
2. Analysis
To prove the requisite pattern of criminal activity, the
prosecution was required to show that, on at least two or more
occasions, members of Blythe Street committed, attempted to
commit, or conspired to commit one of the enumerated offenses in
section 186.22, subdivision (e) within the specified time frames.
One of those enumerated offenses is “[t]he sale, possession for
sale, transportation, manufacture, offer for sale, or offer to
manufacture a controlled substance as defined in Section 11007
of the Health and Safety Code.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1)(D).) Both
heroin and methamphetamine are controlled substances under
the Health and Safety Code. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11054,
11055.)
The evidence here showed that, while he was an active
Blythe Street gang member, witness 2 would receive from Mexico
large amounts of controlled substances, including
methamphetamine and heroin, which he distributed and sold to
fellow gang members. Members then sold the drugs for money,
which the gang used to buy guns, pay taxes to the Mexican mafia,
and send funds to incarcerated fellow members. During most of
2015, witness 2 was engaged in this activity with fellow Blythe
Street members five days a week, that is, on separate occasions
during that year, two or more members committed multiple
enumerated offenses within two years of the charged offenses in
this case which commonly benefited the gang in a manner that
was more than reputational. That evidence was sufficient to
44
show a pattern of criminal activity by the gang from which it
benefitted under section 186.22, subdivisions (e) and (f).
Defendant does not dispute these facts but suggests that
further evidence was needed to carry the prosecution’s burden on
the requisite pattern of criminal activity. According to defendant,
witness 2 was a convicted felon and the prosecution failed to
provide any corroboration of his testimony or certified documents
evidencing the commission of the enumerated drug crimes. But
he provides no authority that such an additional showing is
required to establish the necessary pattern of criminal activity.
Here, the jury was aware that witness 2 was a convicted felon
and nevertheless weighed and accepted his testimony as credible.
(See People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 202 [“‘[E]ven
testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion [does] not
justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province
of the trial judge [in a court trial] or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon
which a determination depends’”].)
Defendant also argues that because the jury was not
instructed on the elements of the enumerated drug offenses, it
had no basis upon which to determine whether those offenses had
actually been committed by gang members. Again, defendant
provides no authority that the trial court had a sua sponte duty
to deliver such instructions before the matter could be submitted
to the jury and the record shows that defendant did not request
special instructions on the elements of the offenses at trial. The
court therefore did not err in allowing the jury to consider, weigh,
and assess the credibility of witness 2’s admission that he
distributed and sold to fellow gang members heroin and
methamphetamine on multiple occasions in 2015 in deciding
45
whether the prosecution had carried its burden on the pattern of
criminal activity element.
E. Gang Conspiracy Conviction
Defendant argues that there was no substantial evidence to
support the jury’s verdict on count 10, the gang conspiracy.
According to defendant, “the evidence fail[ed] to establish that
[defendant] promoted, furthered, or assisted in the commission of
the murder of Saldana, and other than the gang conspiracy, the
jury appropriately acquitted [defendant] of all charges related to
the Wendy’s incident.” He alternatively argues that “the jury
received a legally erroneous instruction on the elements of the
gang conspiracy offense, and the error was not harmless as to
count 10.”
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Before we consider defendant’s challenge to the jury
instruction, we will address defendant’s related argument that
the jury’s guilty verdict on count 10 was not supported by
substantial evidence. In his statement to the Perkins agent,
Santos claimed that during the initial portion of the
confrontation with the Columbus Street members in Blythe
territory, he was in communication with defendant by walkie
talkie, suggesting that they were in separate cars at the time.
Santos also claimed defendant was armed with an automatic rifle
equipped with a scope. As the Columbus Street members entered
Blythe Street territory shouting insults from their car, Santos
was on the walkie talkie with defendant who volunteered to “take
them out” immediately. According to Santos, he persuaded
46
defendant that they should instead wait for a more advantageous
setting. Accompanied by other Blythe Street members, they then
proceeded to follow the Columbus Street members until their car
entered a Wendy’s drive-thru, at which point, he and defendant
shot at them from across the street. Further, defendant’s own
statements to the Perkins agent corroborated key parts of
Santos’s description of the events. Defendant told the agent that
the Columbus Street members crashed into a Wendy’s after they
“got caught slipping,” that is, without guns, in Blythe Street
territory. The evidence at trial was thus sufficient for the jury to
find that defendant actively participated in the events leading up
to the murder of Saldana by agreeing with fellow Blythe Street
members to follow the Columbus Street members and wait for a
more opportune time to shoot at them.
2. Jury Instruction Error
The trial court instructed the jury on count 10 as follows:
“The defendant is charged in [c]ounts 2, 10, 14, 19, 23, and 27[19]
with participating in a criminal street gang conspiracy, in
violation of … section 182.5. As to [c]ounts 2, 10, 19, 23, and 27,
it is charged that the felony committed was murder, in violation
of … section 187[, subdivision ](a)…. [¶] To prove that the
defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶]
1. The defendant was an active participant in a criminal street
gang; [¶] 2. The defendant had knowledge that its members
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity;
[¶] 3. The crime of murder, in violation of … section 187, … was
committed by the gang in which the defendant belongs; and [¶]
19 Defendant was not charged in counts 19, 23, and 27.
47
4. The defendant intended to promote, further, assist, or benefit
in the commission of the crime by other gang members.” (Italics
added.) In delivering this instruction, the court failed to advise
the jury that it must find defendant in fact promoted, furthered,
assisted, or benefitted in the commission of the crime and did not
just intend to do so. (People v. Abbate (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 100,
110.) The Attorney General concedes the error but maintains the
error was harmless. We accept the concession but disagree that
the error was harmless.
Although, as we explain above, the evidence was sufficient
to support the conviction, it was far from overwhelming. Indeed,
the jury found defendant not guilty on the substantive counts
associated with the Wendy’s murder and attempted murders,
namely, counts 5 through 9 and 11, which supports the
conclusion that the evidence of defendant’s participation in the
Wendy’s murder was not strong. Indeed, the jury concluded that
the prosecution had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant shot or possessed a firearm during the incident and
intended to murder anyone in the Columbus Street car.
The prosecutor’s argument to the jury further undermines
any finding of harmlessness. (See People v. Young (2005) 34
Cal.4th 1149, 1202 [“The reviewing court … must consider the
arguments of counsel in assessing the probable impact of the
instruction on the jury”].) In discussing the conspiracy charges
under section 182.5, the prosecutor referred to the erroneous
fourth element of the instruction, telling the jury: “And this is
the most important element, the fourth element is that they
either intended to further[,] to promote, [or] further assist in the
commission of crimes of other gang members.”
48
On this record, we cannot conclude that the instructional
error was harmless. We will therefore vacate the conviction on
count 10 and remand the matter to the trial court to allow the
prosecution an opportunity to retry count 10. (See People v.
Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 746–747; People v. E.H. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 467, 480; People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327,
346.)20
F. Self-Defense and Voluntary Manslaughter (Counts 13–14)
On counts 13 and 14, defendant was convicted of the
attempted premeditated murder of Pena on Burnet Avenue and
engaging in a gang conspiracy to commit that attempted murder.
As to those counts, he argues that “the trial court erred by failing
to instruct on self-defense and on voluntary manslaughter based
on imperfect self-defense as a lesser included offense of
attempted murder in count 13 ….” As he reads the record, “there
was substantial evidence to support the instructions,” even if
defendants were “the initial aggressors,” as long as they did not
“employ[] or attempt[] to employ deadly force” before shots were
fired at them.
1. Background
During the jury instruction conference, defendant’s counsel
asked for an instruction on self-defense using CALCRIM No. 505
20 Because we vacate the conviction on count 10 and remand
the matter for further proceedings, we do not consider the merits
of defendant’s challenges to his sentence or the abstract of
judgment as his arguments can be raised with the trial court on
remand.
49
and joined in a request by Santos’s counsel for an instruction on
imperfect self-defense.
On the self-defense instruction, defendant’s counsel argued
that the video evidence showed defendant and Santos “walk into
the building but did not show them shoot anybody. [¶] Five
seconds later, it show[ed] them running away. I know there were
.40 caliber shells found at the scene, but I believe—based on
[witness 1]’s testimony, I believe it’s reasonable that a jury could
infer they walked into the building and they were shot at and had
to return fire.”
On the imperfect self-defense instruction, Santos’s counsel
argued “[s]o Santos … would request the self-defense instruction
and an imperfect self-defense instruction based on the case law.
[¶] Additionally, it does appear they may have walked into an
ambush because there is evidence that the occupants of the
apartment building were firing at them. [¶] Allegedly, if
[defendant] was there—which I’m not conceding—he supposedly
dropped his gun out of fear and ran for his life and dropped his
hat, assuming that person is him. So it appears that there is
evidence of self-defense or imperfect self-defense. [¶] Imperfect
self-defense can be based on objectively, unreasonable
apprehension of fear and danger. However, that instruction,
you’re still entitled to it.”
The trial court denied the requests for the jury instructions.
2. Legal Principles
a. Self-Defense
“Self-defense, when based on a reasonable belief that killing
is necessary to avert an imminent threat of death or great bodily
50
injury, is a complete justification, and such a killing is not a
crime. [Citations.]” (People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121,
133–134.) For an act to qualify as self-defense, a defendant
“‘must have an honest and reasonable belief that bodily injury is
about to be inflicted on him.’” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th
1055, 1064.) Any right of self-defense is limited to such force as
is “‘reasonable under the circumstances.’” (Id. at p. 1065.)
“[A]lthough the test is objective, reasonableness is determined
from the point of view of a reasonable person in the defendant’s
position. The jury must consider all the facts and circumstances
it might ‘“expect[] to operate on [the defendant’s] mind ….”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
A trial court is not required to give an instruction on self-
defense upon request, unless there is substantial evidence to
support it. (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 551.) “‘In
determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury
instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of
the defense evidence, but only whether “there was evidence
which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt ….” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Mentch (2008) 45
Cal.4th 274, 288.)
b. Voluntary Manslaughter
“‘Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) A defendant who
commits an intentional and unlawful killing but who lacks malice
is guilty of … voluntary manslaughter. (§ 192.)’ [Citation.]
Generally, the intent to unlawfully kill constitutes malice. (§ 188
….) ‘But a defendant who intentionally and unlawfully kills
lacks malice … in limited, explicitly defined circumstances:
51
either when the defendant acts in a “sudden quarrel or heat of
passion” (§ 192, subd. (a)), or when the defendant kills in
“unreasonable self-defense”—the unreasonable but good faith
belief in having to act in self-defense [citations].’ [Citation.]
Because heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense reduce an
intentional, unlawful killing from murder to voluntary
manslaughter by negating the element of malice that otherwise
inheres in such a homicide [citation], voluntary manslaughter of
these two forms is considered a lesser necessarily included
offense of intentional murder [citation].” (People v. Breverman
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153–154, fn. omitted (Breverman)
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Schuller (2023) 15
Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7.)
An instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser
included offense of murder is required whenever there is
substantial evidence defendant acted without malice. (People v.
Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 515.) “[T]he existence of ‘any
evidence, no matter how weak’ will not justify instructions on a
lesser included offense, but such instructions are required
whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser
offense is ‘substantial enough to merit consideration’ by the jury.”
(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162.) “Substantial evidence
is evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the lesser offense was committed. [Citations.]
Speculative, minimal, or insubstantial evidence is insufficient to
require an instruction on a lesser included offense. [Citations.]”
(People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132.) “‘In assessing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the instruction, ‘we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.’
[Citation.]” (In re Hampton (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 463, 480.)
52
3. Analysis
The testimony describing and the video depicting the
Burnet Avenue shooting did not support an instruction on either
self-defense or voluntary manslaughter. Witness 1 explained
that defendant and Santos traveled to rival gang territory with
firearms, “looking for Columbus guys.” Pena told an officer at the
hospital after the shooting that he and Ortiz21 were standing on
the street smoking when two Hispanic men approached them and
began to shoot.
Defendant cites to the following portions of witness 1’s
testimony in support of his contention that there was substantial
evidence for his requested instructions. According to witness 1,
at first, defendant and Santos could not locate any of their rivals,
but “then [defendant and Santos] found some so they chased [the
Columbus guys] into a building. They were shooting at them.
They were shooting at [Santos], and [defendant] was shooting at
the guy from Columbus. [¶] But after … a couple seconds, they
started getting shot back, so they jumped a fence ….” (Emphasis
added.)
We disagree with defendant’s characterization of that
testimony, which, read in the context of the other evidence,
supported only one reasonable inference—defendant and Santos
admittedly went into Columbus Street territory intending to find
21 Ortiz, who claimed not to remember much about the
shooting, confirmed that he was standing next to Pena when he
was shot. When asked whether Pena had a gun, Ortiz replied,
“Nope. No. I didn’t see nothing. Like I told you, he got hit and
that was it, man, you know. That’s it. Next thing I know, trying
to save his life. Other than that, I don’t remember nothing,
man.” (Emphasis added.)
53
and shoot Columbus Street gang members; and, when they found
targets, they began shooting at them. Witness 1 explained that,
after a few seconds, defendant and Santos started getting “shot
back,” testimony which strongly supported the inference that the
Columbus Street members returned fire, but only after they were
fired upon by the brothers. Although the return fire may have
happened quickly, causing defendant and Santos to retreat and
flee the scene, that testimony was insufficient to support either
self-defense or voluntary manslaughter.
Defendant also suggests that Castillo’s flight from officers
at the scene, the handgun and ammunition recovered from his
nearby apartment, the bullet holes in the apartment building and
adjacent fence, and the spent .40 caliber casings left at the scene
serve to corroborate that Columbus Street members initiated the
exchange of gun fire. We disagree. It was undisputed that
someone returned defendant and Santos’s fire, but neither
Castillo’s flight nor the evidence recovered from his apartment
constituted substantial evidence that Columbus gang members
shot at defendant and Santos first, thus provoking their return
fire. Moreover, the 12 spent .40 caliber shell casings were tested
and determined to have been shot from the gun recovered from
defendant’s car.
54
V. DISPOSITION
The conviction on count 10 is vacated and the matter is
remanded to the trial court to allow the prosecution to retry
defendant on that count and, if necessary, conduct further
sentencing proceedings.
In all other respects, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
BAKER, J.
55
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