CourtListener 10857691•Wildwood Builders v. Lee CA1/3
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Filed 5/12/26 Wildwood Builders v. Lee CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
WILDWOOD BUILDERS, INC,
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and
Respondent, A175009
v.
SHIUH-KAI LEE, as Trustee, etc., (Alameda County
Defendant, Cross-complainant Super. Ct. No. RG21097358)
and Appellant.
After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Shiuh-Kai Lee, in his
capacity as trustee of the Lee-Wei Family Trust, breached his contract with
Wildwood Builders, Inc. (Wildwood) by refusing to pay a portion of its fees
after completion of repairs to his apartment building. He appeals, advancing
various theories of error. Finding none persuasive, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In April 2021, Wildwood sued Lee alleging breach of contract after he
refused to pay sums due under their agreement. In June, he countersued and
alleged Wildwood breached by failing to fully perform. In his cross-
complaint, he alleged that Wildwood was, at “[a]ll relevant times,” a “licensed
contractor.”
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In February 2020, Wildwood and Lee entered into an agreement under
which Wildwood would repair balconies at Lee’s apartment complex in
exchange for approximately $175,000. The agreement incorporated “Plans by
SDS Structural Engineering,” “phase II,” “[s]heet” “S10.0.” “Sheet S10.0
include[d] a plan sheet,” with “an arrow pointing to the bottom of a deck
section” and a note “that reads ‘(N) 5/8” Dens Glass Type-X Sheet Rock’ ” with
“ ‘Synthetic Finish Over Lay.’ ” (Some capitalization omitted.) The
agreement also explicitly excluded “labor or materials” for work including
“stucco,” “deck coating,” “paint,” or any “material except shop primed steel
beams.” (Italics omitted.)
The agreement provided that “final contract payment is due and
payable upon ‘Substantial Completion’ (not Final Completion) of all work
under contract.” It defined substantial completion “as being the point at
which the building/work of improvement is suitable for its intended use, or
the issuance of an occupancy consent, or final building department approval
from the city or county building department, whichever occurs first; for work
included in this contract” (capitalization omitted). In November 2020, the
city building inspector gave its “final ok pending completion of stucco.”
Wildwood did not apply a finish to the underside of the balconies, and Lee
withheld payment.
In 2024, the trial court held a six-day trial. Lee argued that the plans
incorporated into the agreement required Wildwood to install a synthetic
finish rather than stucco, and parol evidence was not necessary to interpret
the contract. Wildwood, for its part, argued that the agreement’s exclusion
clause included the synthetic finish because that is what contractors
“typically consider ‘stucco.’ ” At trial, the court heard parol evidence
concerning the meaning of stucco.
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After the trial, the trial court concluded Wildwood fulfilled its
obligations, and Lee breached the agreement. It found that, “[d]espite the
dispute over the application of the synthetic finish,” Wildwood had
substantially completed the project. It also found stucco is an “external
coating system” including “a finish, plaster layer, a layer of self-furring lath,
and layers of water-resistant barriers.” And it concluded that stucco, as used
in the exclusion clause, referred to “the finish of the building” — not just a
stucco assembly — because the clause also excluded labor and materials for
deck coating, paint, and all material except shop-primed steel beams. Thus,
it concluded the agreement did not require Wildwood to apply the synthetic
finish. Finally, it concluded that the incorporated plan’s reference to the
finish did not outweigh the exclusion clause since the plan was “appended to
the [c]ontract” and only referenced it in “a tiny mention.”
DISCUSSION
Lee first argues the trial court erred by concluding Wildwood
substantially completed its obligations under the agreement. He fails to
persuade.
When interpreting a contract, we give effect to the mutual intention of
the parties at the time they formed the contract. (DVD Copy Control Assn.,
Inc. v. Kaleidescape, Inc. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 697, 712.) That intent is
discerned from the contract language if it is clear, explicit, and does not
involve an absurdity. (Ibid.)
Wildwood substantially completed its obligations under the agreement.
(DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Kaleidescape, Inc., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th
at p. 712.) The agreement provides that “final contract payment is due and
payable upon ‘substantial completion’ (not final completion) of all work under
contract” (capitalizations omitted). It defines substantial completion as
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“final building department approval from the city or county building
department . . . for work included in this contract” (capitalization omitted).
The city building inspector gave its “final okay pending completion of stucco”
in November 2020, and the agreement expressly excluded stucco work. Thus,
Wildwood substantially completed all of the obligations the contract required
it to perform. (Ibid.)
Lee next argues the trial court erred by considering Wildwood’s parol
evidence. Assuming error, he fails to show prejudice. (Grappo v. McMills
(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1006 [appellant must demonstrate error and
prejudice].) The court reasoned that since the exclusion clause excluded labor
and materials for finishing work, the parties intended to exclude the finish.
Thus, it relied on the language of the exclusion clause — not parol
evidence — to reach its conclusion. (Ibid. [judgment is presumed correct,
and intendments and presumptions are indulged in its favor].)
Lee also contends the trial court erred because it did not find that
Wildwood was a licensed contractor, thus barring it from relief under
Business and Professions Code section 7031. We disagree. In his cross-
complaint, Lee alleged that Wildwood was at “all relevant times” a “licensed
contractor.” That admission is sufficient to satisfy section 7031. (Womack v.
Lovell (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 772, 774–776.)
Lee’s remaining arguments fare no better. He contends the trial court
erred by failing to construe ambiguities against Wildwood since — in his
view — it was the drafter of the agreement. But the agreement clearly states
“no party” is the “drafter.” (Capitalization omitted.) (DVD Copy Control
Assn., Inc. v. Kaleidescape, Inc., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 712.) He also
argues the court erred by “ignoring the ‘specific over general’ canon” and by
failing to construe ambiguities against the contractor. (Italics omitted.) But
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from our review of the record, he did not make these arguments below and
thereby forfeited them. (DiCola v. White Brothers Performance Products, Inc.
(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 676.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Wildwood shall recover its costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
_________________________
PETROU, J.
A175009; Wildwood Builders, Inc. v. Shiuh-Kai Lee
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