CourtListener 10857230•People v. Bazan CA2/3
Texto completo
Filed 5/11/26 P. v. Bazan CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B346821
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA079422)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
LUIS BAZAN, [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Appellant.
BY THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed May 8, 2026,
shall be modified to correct a misspelling in counsel’s name as
follows:
In the counsel listing, “Sydney Banack” under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, is replaced
with “Sydney Banach.” There is no change in judgment.
____________________________________________________________
OCHOA, J.* EGERTON, Acting P. J. HANASONO, J.
*
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
Filed 5/8/26 P. v. Bazan CA2/3 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B346821
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA079422)
v.
LUIS BAZAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura Laesecke, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Sydney Banack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A court sentenced Luis Bazan to a prison term of 80 years
to life for crimes committed when he was a juvenile. Years later,
he filed a petition under Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (d)
(hereafter, § 1170(d)), which permits juveniles sentenced to life
without parole to petition for recall and resentencing. The trial
court denied the petition on the ground that the statute applies
only to juveniles sentenced explicitly to a term of life without
parole, and not to juveniles sentenced to a term of years. Bazan
appealed, arguing that his term of 80 years to life was
functionally equivalent to life without parole and rendered him
eligible for relief under section 1170(d). In an unpublished
opinion filed November 25, 2024, this division reversed the trial
court’s order, holding that the Second Appellate District’s opinion
in People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 440 (Sorto) already
held that “offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP
terms . . . are entitled to section 1170(d) relief under the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.” This court held
that Bazan’s 80- years-to-life sentence was functionally
equivalent to life without parole and remanded for Bazan to file a
corrected petition, which the trial court was to consider “in
accordance with [our] opinion.”
On remand, the trial court again denied Bazan’s petition,
based on its finding that Bazan was ineligible for relief because
he was not sentenced to an explicit term of life without parole, in
reliance on an intervening case from the Third Appellate District.
Because the trial court’s order did not follow the remittitur, we
reverse.
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
BACKGROUND
In 2009, a jury convicted Bazan of, among other crimes, two
counts of attempted murder committed when he was 17 years old.
A court sentenced Bazan to 80 years to life.
In 2023, Bazan petitioned for recall and resentencing under
section 1170(d). The trial court denied the petition on the ground
that the statute applied only to juveniles sentenced to explicit life
without parole terms. Bazan appealed, and a different panel of
this division reversed the order. (People v. Bazan (Nov. 25, 2024,
B332938) [nonpub. opn.] (Bazan).) This division held that Bazan
was eligible for relief on the filing of a corrected petition.2
The remittitur issued on February 6, 2025.
On remand, Bazan filed a form petition for recall and
resentencing indicating that he was 17 years old when he
committed his crimes, was sentenced to 80 years to life and had
satisfied the other statutory requirements to be eligible for relief
under section 1170(d).
At the May 14, 2025, hearing on Bazan’s petition, the trial
court found that Bazan had not “met the prima facie [showing]
that he is entitled to a hearing” and denied the petition. The
minute order reflects that the court made this finding because
“[Bazan] was sentenced to 80 years-to-life, not Life Without [ ]
Parole.”
Bazan moved for reconsideration on the ground that the
trial court failed to follow the remittitur. On October 22, 2025,
the trial court denied the motion. At the hearing, the trial court
said it had reviewed new authority and cited People v. Isayev
2
Bazan’s original petition was procedurally defective
because it had not been served on the prosecuting agency.
(§ 1170(d).)
3
(2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1123, review granted November 12,
2025, S292860 (Isayev). In Isayev, the Third Appellate District
held that the availability of a youth offender parole hearing
under section 3051, which requires such a hearing to be held no
later than 25 years into the juvenile’s sentence, precludes finding
that the juvenile has a sentence “functionally equivalent” to life
without parole, and is thus ineligible for recall and resentencing
under section 1170(d).
At the hearing on reconsideration, the trial court observed
that Isayev “disagree[d] with the [Sorto] case that is repeatedly
cited in the remittitur.” The court then stated that it was taking
a “fresh look at Mr. Bazan’s case [and] . . . reading not only the
remittitur but Isayev.” It concluded that it was “going to continue
to stand by [its] ruling, . . . trying to follow what the Court of
Appeal said [it] could do, which is to consider the petition filed in
March in accordance with this opinion.” It further stated that it
was “also considering [the opinion] in conjunction with
subsequent case law.” For these reasons, the court again denied
Bazan’s motion for resentencing.
DISCUSSION
Bazan contends that, in denying his petition, the trial court
violated the law of the case doctrine and also exceeded its
jurisdiction by failing to act in accordance with the remittitur.
The Attorney General agrees. Because we hold that the trial
court exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to comply with the
remittitur, we do not reach the additional question whether the
court’s order also violated the law of the case doctrine.
The remittitur both terminates the reviewing court’s
jurisdiction of the case and proscribes the remaining jurisdiction
of the receiving court. (See § 1265 [after the remittitur “the
4
appellate court has no further jurisdiction of the appeal . . . and
all orders necessary to carry the judgment into effect shall be
made by the court to which the certificate is remitted”], italics
added; see also Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 688, 701 [“The order of the reviewing court is contained
in its remittitur, which defines the scope of the jurisdiction of the
court to which the matter is returned”]; Snukal v. Flightways
Manufacturing, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 754, 774, fn. 5 “[T]he terms
of the remittitur define the trial court’s jurisdiction to act”].)
“[T]he trial court is bound by the directions given and has
no authority to retry any other issue or to make any other
findings. Its authority is limited wholly and solely to following
the directions of the reviewing court.” (Rice v. Schmid (1944) 25
Cal.2d 259, 263; see also Hampton v. Superior Court (1952) 38
Cal.2d 652, 656 [“The order of the appellate court as stated in the
remittitur, ‘is decisive of the character of the judgment to which
the appellant is entitled. . . .’ [¶] . . . [¶] . . . ‘A trial court may not
exceed the specific directions of a court of review in remanding a
cause after a reversal’ ” (internal citations omitted)].) “[A]ction
which does not conform to [the appellate court’s] directions is
void.” (Hampton, at p. 655.)
The remittitur in Bazan, supra, B332938, directed the trial
court “to permit Bazan to file a corrected petition and to consider
it in accordance with this opinion.” (Italics added.) That opinion
expressly held, consistent with Second Appellate District
precedent in Sorto, that denying section 1170(d) relief to juvenile
offenders with sentences functionally equivalent to life without
parole violated constitutional equal protection guarantees. It
further considered and rejected the argument that prevailed in
Isayev that the availability of a section 3051 youth offender
5
parole hearing precluded relief under section 1170(d). The
remittitur’s direction to consider Bazan’s re-filed petition “in
accordance with this opinion” unambiguously directed the trial
court to substantively consider his section 1170(d) petition and
left no room for it to reconsider the question whether Bazan’s
sentence satisfied the prima facie requirement, which was
directly posed and addressed in Bazan.
The trial court did not follow the Court of Appeal’s order in
the remittitur because it believed that new authority called into
question Bazan’s holding and the case on which Bazan expressly
relied—Sorto—which adopted the Fourth Appellate District’s
reasoning in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608.3 These
cases held that the relief provided in section 1170(d) for juveniles
sentenced to life without parole extended to those sentenced to a
term of years functionally equivalent to life without parole,
including those subject to section 3051 parole hearings. Isayev
held otherwise, directly disapproving Sorto and Heard. (Isayev,
supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1142 [“In reaching this conclusion,
we part ways with Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby, each of which
3
In People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058, review
granted September 24, 2025, S292540, this division held that
denying section 1170(d), relief to a juvenile sentenced to 50 years
to life did not violate equal protection principles. In doing so, the
court distinguished the sentences in Heard (23 years plus 80
years to life) and Sorto (10 years plus 130 years to life) because
they “clearly exceeded natural life expectancy and were therefore
functionally equivalent to life without parole as an actuarial
matter.” (Thompson, at p. 1073; accord, People v. Munoz (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 499, 507–508 [50-years-to-life sentence is not
functionally equivalent to life without parole], review granted
June 25, 2025, S290828.)
6
concluded that the availability of a youth offender parole hearing
under section 3051 does not render a juvenile offender ineligible
for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)”].) On remand, the
trial court chose to follow Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th 1117,
review granted, to find that Bazan was not eligible for relief. It
was not free to do so, however, as the trial court must follow a
remittitur even if it believes the decision was wrong or has been
impaired by subsequent decisions. (People v. Dutra (2006) 145
Cal.App.4th 1359, 1367.)
The law is clear that “whether the trial court believed our
decision was right or wrong, or had been impaired by subsequent
decisions, it was bound to follow the remittitur.” (People v.
Dutra, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1367.) The trial court
correctly recognized that there exists a split of authority between
the Courts of Appeal on the question whether a term of years
sentence that is subject to section 3051 youth offender parole
hearing is “functionally equivalent” to a life without parole
sentence for purposes of section 1170(d). However, the trial court
acted outside of its jurisdiction when it decided to follow Isayev
rather than the remittitur that directly controls this case.
Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Bazan’s petition and
direct the trial court to find that Bazan is eligible for relief under
section 1170(d), as a juvenile sentenced to a term of years that is
functionally equivalent to life without parole, and for further
proceedings as necessary pursuant to that finding.
7
DISPOSITION
We reverse the order denying Bazan’s petition. The matter
is remanded to the trial court with the direction to find Bazan
eligible for relief and to consider the merits of his petition.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
OCHOA, J.*
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
*
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
8
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