People v. Ibarra CA2/3

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Filed 5/8/26 P. v. Ibarra CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B337097

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA106571)
v.

ANTONIO IBARRA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Darrell Mavis, Judge. Affirmed.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Antonio Ibarra of
sexual penetration by force and kidnapping. On appeal, Ibarra
contends the evidence was insufficient to identify him as the
perpetrator of the crime. He further argues the court erred in
failing to clarify the burdens of proof in its response to a jury
question and in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on false
imprisonment as a lesser included offense of kidnapping. We
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2020, the People filed an information charging Ibarra
with two counts of sexual penetration by force (Pen. Code, § 289,
subd. (a)(1)(A);1 counts 1 & 2) and one count of kidnapping with
the intent to commit a violation of section 289 (§ 209, subd. (b)(1);
count 3), as well as several enhancements and special
allegations.2 In November 2023, the case was tried to a jury.
The People’s Evidence
A. Jeanette K.
In July 2018, Jeanette K. lived in a house in Pasadena that
shared a driveway, parking area, and laundry room with an
adjacent fourplex apartment building. The laundry room was
behind the carport at the back of the property. It was accessible
through a narrow walkway between the back of Jeanette’s house
and the carport. The laundry room locked from the outside. The
lock was “difficult to close.” The rear of the property was

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 The court ultimately dismissed count 2 and the related
enhancements pursuant to section 1385.

2
enclosed by a fence and a wall separating it from the neighboring
property.
On July 15, 2018, Jeanette was doing laundry at 2:30 a.m.
Because the motion detector lights outside the laundry room were
not working, it was “pitch dark.” She was standing in front of the
laundry room when she noticed a man at the end of the walkway
just beyond her parked car. At trial, Jeanette testified that the
man was six feet to six feet, two inches tall and somewhere
between 180 and 200 pounds. She did not recognize him.
Jeanette asked the man who he was. The man turned
around and asked her who she was. Jeanette told him she lived
there and was doing laundry. The man said he “ ‘live[d] here in
the front apartments’ ” and was also doing laundry. She told the
man she had a lot of laundry left to do, so he would be waiting a
while. He said that was okay, and he had time.
Jeanette decided to try to pass the man on the walkway
and return to her house. As she moved forward, the man also
walked forward toward her and the laundry room door. They
eventually “came face to face” by the laundry room door. The
man was twisting a piece of cloth in his hands. Jeanette noticed
that he had a “big” and “very flamboyant” letter “A” in “old-
fashioned writing” tattooed on his right hand. There was other
writing on that hand, but the “A” “was much larger than the rest
of the writing.” It extended from his index finger to his wrist and
“took up . . . the upper part of the hand.”
As Jeanette turned away from the man, he put the cloth
around her neck from behind. He began “smashing” her face by
hitting her repeatedly with his open, bare hand and his closed
fist, “mostly on the right side” of her face. The man forced
Jeanette back into the laundry room.

3
Jeanette ended up on the floor of the laundry room, where
the man continued to kick and hit her. He then removed her
clothes and digitally penetrated her vagina. The man told
Jeanette to “ ‘shut up’ ” when she tried to make a noise or scream.
Before he left, he told her not to follow him for “ ‘at least five
minutes’ ” or he would “ ‘come back and shoot [her].’ ”
After the man left, Jeanette could not open the door
because it had been locked from the outside. She managed to exit
through a window, then ran to her house and called the police.
The People played the 911 call for the jury. In the call,
Jeanette said she was “suspicious about [her] neighbor” because
he “left in his car a little after two” and returned 10 minutes
later. Jeanette described the attacker as a young Black man who
had “a lot of cream in his coffee.” She said his hair was “flat
shaven, it wasn’t bald, not an afro but it was shaven down.” She
recalled that he had tattoos on his forearms and hands in “fancy
writing” and she believed he had tattoos on his neck. Jeanette
said she had never seen the man before. She thought he was
wearing a red shirt. She estimated that it had been about 20
minutes since he left. After the call, she drew a picture of the
man’s letter “A” tattoo on a Post-It note.
Jeanette later spoke to Detective Derek Locklin at the
scene. Locklin’s body-worn camera recorded the conversation.
In the recording, Jeanette said the man who attacked her was
“between 6 and 6’2,” “closer to 220” pounds, and had “[v]ery light
black skin,” lighter than Locklin’s, and his hair was “cropped”
like Locklin’s. The only distinct features she identified were the
tattoos on his hands. She said the man had an “A” tattooed
somewhere on his right hand, “not even” an inch in size, with
“smaller writing” and letters “scattered around” the tattoo. She

4
described the “A” as “very fancy.” She thought she also saw
tattoos on his neck, but her attention was mainly on his hands.
At trial, the prosecutor asked Ibarra to show Jeanette his
tattoos. Jeanette recognized the tattoos on Ibarra’s hands as the
tattoos of the man who attacked her. However, she found it
“[v]ery difficult” to identify Ibarra at trial as the person who
attacked her. She did not “recognize him as he looked that
night.” Jeanette testified that she did not get “a very good look”
at her attacker’s face on the night of the incident.
On cross-examination, Jeanette was unable to explain why,
when Locklin showed her a photograph of Ibarra’s hand tattoo in
2018, she said it did not match her attacker’s tattoo. She also
admitted that none of the photographs in the six-pack
photographic lineups Locklin showed her, including Ibarra’s,
“look[ed] familiar to [her] now or then.” She testified that her
“initial” impression that night, “with no lighting, poor visibility,”
was that the attacker was of “Black heritage.” She confirmed
that, at the time, she had told Locklin that she saw her attacker’s
face very clearly.
Defense counsel asked Jeanette if she remembered
describing her attacker’s hair as being similar to Locklin’s, who is
Black. Counsel showed Jeanette a photo of Locklin. Jeanette
testified that the photo was of “the white detective” and she did
not recognize the person in the photo as Locklin. She testified
that the photo did not look like Locklin to her because “he looks
like he’s got white hair and a white beard.” Jeannette testified
that she did not see the man who attacked her again at the
apartment complex before she moved out at the end of 2018 or

5
beginning of 2019. She confirmed that she had not been able to
positively identify the face of her attacker since the incident.3
B. Law enforcement investigation witnesses
1. Sergeant Matt Crawford
Pasadena Police Department Sergeant Matt Crawford
investigated the assault. In July 2018, Crawford and Detective
Locklin showed Jeanette a six-pack photographic line-up that did
not contain Ibarra’s photograph. She was unable to identify
anyone as the attacker.
Crawford and Locklin met with Jeanette again in
September 2018. Locklin’s body-worn camera recorded the
interview. In the recording, Crawford and Locklin showed
Jeanette another six-pack photographic line-up. Locklin told her
to “keep an open mind” knowing it had been very dark, but
Jeanette responded that she “saw his face very clearly.” Jeanette
said none of the men in the six-pack photos, including Ibarra,
looked like the man who attacked her because they looked
Hispanic and not Black. She said the attacker had broader
features and different hair. Locklin showed her photographs of
tattoos. She did not recognize any of them. When shown a
photograph of Ibarra’s right hand, Jeanette said the “A” tattoo
was “similar to what [she] saw” on her attacker’s hand but not
exactly the same.
2. Matthew Sanders
Matthew Sanders is Ibarra’s wife’s brother. He lived in the
fourplex that shared the laundry room, parking area, and

3 Jeanette sustained an orbital fracture from a fall in 2021,
and subsequently suffered migraines, headaches, and
“neurological issues.” She testified that her memory was better
in 2018 than it was at the time of trial.

6
driveway with Jeanette’s house. Ibarra and his family lived with
Sanders’s parents. Ibarra frequently visited Sanders’s home,
including most Saturdays. Sanders “sometimes” saw Jeanette
outside when Ibarra and his family were over.
Sanders testified that Ibarra and Sanders’s father came
over to his apartment the evening of July 14, 2018, to watch a
UFC fight. His father left at 7:00 p.m. Sanders and Ibarra drank
and smoked cigarettes on Sanders’s porch that evening. Ibarra
left around 12:30 or 1:00 in the morning. Sanders testified that
he called Ibarra around 3:20 a.m. “to make sure that he was
home safe because I didn’t want anything to get pinned on
something, what is happening now . . . .”
The police showed up at Sanders’s apartment later that
night and asked questions about the night before. Sanders told
them Ibarra had been at his place and that Pamela, Ibarra’s wife
and Sanders’s sister, had picked Ibarra up at 12:30 a.m.
However, Sanders told Locklin the next day that Ibarra left at
1:15 or 1:30 am. Sanders testified that he did not actually see
Ibarra get into a car. He saw Ibarra “walk to [a] vehicle” with its
taillights on and heard a door close. He had assumed Pamela
picked up Ibarra.
Sanders believed it took 10 minutes to drive and 35 to 40
minutes to walk from his home to Ibarra’s home. When defense
counsel showed him a map, Sanders agreed that walking took
“more like 45 minutes.”
Ibarra continued to visit Sanders at his apartment after the
incident on July 15, 2018.
3. DNA evidence
Jeanette received a sexual assault medical forensic exam
on the day of the incident. A nurse collected swabs of Jeanette’s

7
eye, neck, and genital area. She took swabs of Jeanette’s right
eye because Jeanette reported that the perpetrator hit her there
with his bare fist. A forensic specialist collected a white tank top
from the floor of the laundry room and swabbed areas of the room
for DNA, including the door hasp and lock. The specialist also
swabbed the doorknob and the bottom, neck, and armpit areas of
the tank top.
Susannah Knetchel, senior criminalist with the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, analyzed the swabs taken
from Jeanette. Samples from Jeanette’s neck and eye generated
a DNA profile that was consistent with a male contributor.
Knetchel received reference samples from Jeanette and Ibarra to
compare to the DNA profile. The swab from Jeanette’s right eye
and neck showed two people, Jeanette and Ibarra, contributed to
the mixture. Knetchel determined that it was 75,469 times more
likely that the DNA from the eye swab was a mixture of DNA
from Jeanette and Ibarra than from Jeanette and an unknown
person. Similarly, her analysis of the neck swab revealed that it
was “[two] times 10 to the 14 times more likely” to be a mixture of
Jeanette and Ibarra’s DNA than that of Jeanette and an
unknown person. Knetchel testified that the remaining sample
swabs from Jeanette’s vulva, hymen, and fingernail scrapings
revealed male DNA was present, but there was too little DNA to
create a genetic profile.
Knetchel also analyzed a sample from the lock and door
hasp of the laundry room. She testified that the DNA profile
from that sample was consistent with three contributors:
Jeanette, Ibarra, and an unknown third person. Ibarra was a
“four percent contributor” to the DNA mixture found in the
sample swab from Jeanette’s neck. Testing results showed it was

8
2,475 times more likely that the DNA “originated from Antonio
Ibarra and two unknown individuals than if it originated from
three unknown individuals.”
Criminalist Michelle Metchikian tested a swab sample
taken from the neck of the white tank top. She determined two
people contributed to the DNA mixture, one male and one female.
Metchikian compared the male DNA profile to Ibarra’s reference
sample. Applying different assumptions to the swab sample, she
determined that the possibility that someone other than Ibarra
was the source of the DNA on the swab was 1 in 18 quadrillion or
1 in 82 septillion.
Knetchel confirmed that “every time we touch something,
we transfer DNA,” and “every time our things touch something, it
transfers DNA.” She testified that clothing could transfer the
DNA of one person who wore it to another person who touches it.
She further explained that a person’s DNA can indirectly transfer
to other surfaces. For example, if she and counsel shook hands,
her DNA would transfer to counsel’s hands and could
subsequently be transferred to another surface that counsel
touched afterward. She confirmed that if Ibarra’s DNA “was on a
shirt and that shirt touched another surface, his DNA could
transfer to that other surface.”
Metchikian similarly testified that DNA could be
transferred from one surface to another by an intermediary, such
as a person or object. She explained that it was easier to deposit
DNA on a porous surface than on a smooth surface, but harder
for an intermediary to “pick up” DNA left on a porous surface like
a piece of clothing because the DNA “would get stuck” in the
fibers of the fabric. She also testified that the more friction
applied between two surfaces, the more likely it is that DNA will

9
be left behind. She agreed with the prosecutor’s statement that
“repeatedly punching something with [a] hand,” would create an
opportunity to transfer DNA.
Defense Evidence
A. Pamela Ibarra
Ibarra’s wife Pamela testified that she and Ibarra often
visited Sanders at his apartment and continued to do so in the
months after Jeanette was attacked. She and Ibarra usually
exchanged greetings with Jeanette when they saw her.
On July 14, 2018, Ibarra went to Sanders’s house around
6:30 p.m. and returned home at 2:30 a.m. Pamela was awake in
the living room with her children when he came home. Ibarra
was alone. Pamela did not see any blood, scratches, or bruising
on him. As Pamela recounted to police, later that morning,
Sanders called her and told her about the assault on Jeanette.
Sanders said police “were looking for a Black man with tattoos on
his hands.” After learning this information, Pamela slapped
Ibarra and asked, “ ‘What happened?’ ” Pamela testified that she
slapped him “because he should have been home with me.”4
On cross-examination, Pamela admitted that Ibarra
returned home around 3:30 a.m. on July 15, 2018. She indicated
that she had previously testified from memory, but reviewing

4 On recross, Pamela testified that she did not remember
saying that she slapped Ibarra. The prosecutor played audio
from Pamela’s recorded interview with police to impeach her. In
the excerpt, she told police that when she learned about the
attack, she “slapped the shit out of [her] husband and said ‘what
happened?’ ” Pamela confirmed the transcript of the recording
was accurate, but denied that she slapped Ibarra, claiming “it
was a tap.” She further testified that Ibarra responded that he
did not know what happened.

10
phone records refreshed her recollection that Ibarra called her at
3:34 a.m. Ibarra had called her as he was coming up the stairs
and asked her to open the door. However, she had originally told
police that she did not know what time Ibarra came home
because she went to sleep at 12:30 a.m. She also told police that
Ibarra had not called her that night.
In a recorded conversation with Locklin and Crawford in
September 2019, Pamela said she was not sure how Ibarra got
home the morning of July 15, 2018. She did not recall getting a
phone call from him, but she had been texting him to come home.
She estimated that Ibarra got home “around 11:30, maybe 12.”
She did not know if Ibarra and her father arrived home together.
In July 2018, Ibarra weighed “160 something” because he
was sick. She described him as “slim.”
B. Defense DNA expert
Mehul Anjaria is an independent forensic DNA consultant.
He reviewed the DNA analysis performed on the swab samples
and advised the defense about the strengths and weaknesses of
the testing. He did not disagree with the prosecution analysts’
results and conclusions.
Defense counsel asked Anjaria what he would test to
determine whether an individual who handled a white tank top
by “holding the sides of it” and wringing it between his hands had
left DNA on the surface. Anjaria responded that he would want
“to look at the ends of the tank top where there would have been
contact with the hands . . . .” Defense counsel asked if Ibarra’s
DNA might be present on Jeanette’s eye and neck if a third
person took a tank top Ibarra had worn and wrapped it around
Jeanette’s neck. Anjaria opined that “there could be a transfer of
DNA from the tank top to [Jeanette’s] skin wherever the tank top

11
may have touched it.” Anjaria also testified that Ibarra did not
have to touch the door hasp and lock for his DNA to be found
there. A third person holding Ibarra’s tank top could have
transferred Ibarra’s DNA from the tank top to the lock and hasp
with his hand.
C. Ibarra
Ibarra testified in his own defense. He is 5 feet 11 inches
tall. He weighed about 166 pounds in 2018. At the time of trial,
he weighed 260 pounds. In 2018, his shoulder was injured. He
was unable to pick up, wrestle, slap, or punch anyone.
Ibarra has tattoos on his arms and hands. His son’s name
begins with the letter “A” and is tattooed on his right hand. The
tattoo is about four inches long and two inches wide.
In 2018, Ibarra visited Sanders’s apartment every other
weekend. If Ibarra saw Jeanette when he visited, they greeted
each other. Although Sanders complained to Ibarra about
Jeanette, Ibarra denied having any problems with her.5
On July 14, 2018, Ibarra and his father-in-law went to
Sanders’s apartment in the evening to watch a UFC fight. They
smoked cigarettes outside. Ibarra was wearing a new white,
blue, and black checkered shirt. He took off the shirt because it
was hot, so that he was wearing only his white tank top. After
the beer Ibarra was opening “exploded,” he took off the tank top
and hung it on a wooden fence to dry. He put his new shirt back
on. Jeanette came by and said: “ ‘Hey, you guys are smoking

5 Ibarra did not elaborate on the problems Sanders had with
Jeanette. Jeanette, however, testified that Sanders was a
“challenging” neighbor because he often invited people over to
party and barbecue outside.

12
those nasty cigarettes.’ ” The men put out the cigarettes and
went back inside.
Ibarra testified that his friend Danny Pacheco picked him
up from Sanders’s apartment somewhere between 1:00 and
1:30 a.m. the following morning. Pacheco was a close family
friend who lived in Altadena. Ibarra had been texting Pacheco
that night since about midnight. Ibarra testified that reviewing
phone records and recognizing Pacheco’s phone number helped
him remember that Pacheco picked him up that morning.
Ibarra’s phone records reflected a list of his incoming and
outgoing calls for July 14 and 15, 2018. Ibarra recognized
Pacheco’s phone number in the records. There were several calls
between Ibarra and Pacheco starting at 11:00 p.m. on July 14,
2018, with the last contact at 11:50 p.m.
Ibarra testified that Pacheco called him around 1:15 a.m. to
let Ibarra know that he was outside.6 Ibarra left Sanders’s
apartment and got in Pacheco’s Jeep. He and Pacheco went to a
bar Ibarra often frequented after going to Sanders’s apartment.
Ibarra and Pacheco then went to get tacos, which Ibarra
estimated took about 30 minutes. Pacheco later dropped Ibarra
off at home. Ibarra called Pamela when he got home because he
forgot his keys.
Ibarra recalled Sanders calling him later that day to tell
him that someone had assaulted Jeanette. He also testified that
Pamela slapped him and asked him what happened. Pamela
often slapped him when he went to bars and came home late
because she was worried, and because when he was out late, she
thought he was “with other girls.” Ibarra continued to visit
Sanders’s home every other weekend. He and Jeanette continued

6 No such call was reflected in Ibarra’s cell phone records.

13
to exchange pleasantries when they saw each other. He denied
ever attacking Jeanette.
In September 2019, Locklin and Crawford conducted a
recorded interview of Ibarra. They asked Ibarra about his
whereabouts on the night of July 14, 2018, and the early morning
hours of July 15, 2018. The officers pointed out that Ibarra’s
account of his movements was inconsistent with the locations of
calls he made and received on his cell phone that night. For
example, Ibarra initially said he and his father-in-law left
Sanders’s apartment at 10:30 p.m. But his cell phone records
reflected that he made an outgoing call at 1:24 a.m. from
Sanders’s neighborhood. Ibarra then claimed he had called
Pamela at that time to ask her to open the door when he got
home, after which he had “a couple of beers” with his father-in-
law. However, phone records showed a call Ibarra received from
Sanders at 3:20 a.m. indicated he was still not home at that time,
and further showed that Ibarra did not call Pamela that morning
until 3:34 a.m. Ibarra explained that he and his father-in-law
took an Uber home and stopped to get something to eat on the
way.
After the police interview, Ibarra called his wife from jail.
The call was recorded. Ibarra told Pamela that he had spilled
beer on his shirt, took it off, and put it on the gate across from
Sanders’s apartment. He continued: “I said probably anybody
grabbed it then choked her out with my shirt. You know. My
muscle shirt. You know?” Pamela responded: “Don’t say nothing
else. That’s just stupid.” On cross-examination, the prosecutor
asked how Ibarra knew the tank top was used to choke Jeanette.

14
Ibarra testified that Locklin told him before he started recording
the interview that someone used the tank top to choke Jeanette.7
When asked on cross-examination why his story to police
changed over the course of the interview, Ibarra testified that he
did not remember details in 2019, and he thought at the time
that Locklin was asking him about different visits to Sanders’s
apartment. Ibarra admitted that his trial testimony was the first
time he had ever mentioned Pacheco picking him up on July 15,
2018. Ibarra testified that he did not mention Pacheco to police
because he did not remember that Pacheco picked him up until
he saw his phone records. When asked why he “never thought
. . . to contact [his] alibi witness . . . and tell somebody about
him,” Ibarra said, “No, because I was waiting for trial because I
don’t want to take no time.”
D. Sergeant Crawford
Crawford testified that based on Jeanette’s 911 call, he
believed the attack on Jeanette happened at approximately
2:45 a.m. to 2:50 a.m. He obtained Ibarra’s cell phone records.
He explained that they showed that Ibarra’s phone
communicated with the cell tower providing coverage to
Jeanette’s home at 1:24 a.m.; communicated with a different cell
tower in an adjacent sector between Jeanette’s home and Ibarra’s
home at 3:20 a.m.; and communicated with the cell tower

7 Crawford subsequently testified that Locklin’s body worn
camera recorded their entire encounter with Ibarra, from the
moment they met Ibarra at the station to the point when Locklin
escorted him to jail after the interview. He further testified that
during the interview, he and Locklin intentionally omitted
anything about choking, strangulation, or Jeanette’s neck,
although they did indicate the tank top was used to drag Jeanette
into the laundry room.

15
providing coverage to Ibarra’s residence at 3:34 a.m. The data
indicated Ibarra was “moving.” Based on the records, Crawford
believed Ibarra walked home from the scene between 2:50 a.m.
and 3:34 a.m.
Crawford testified that another detective recovered
surveillance footage of an individual walking in the area. The
person in the surveillance footage was wearing a red shirt and
was heading west, away from the intersection, at approximately
2:51 am. Although “it was not of great quality,” Crawford
believed “it was possibly Mr. Ibarra.”
Verdict and Sentence
The jury convicted Ibarra of sexual penetration by force
(count 1) and aggravated kidnapping (count 3). It also found the
great bodily injury and weapon enhancements true as to both
counts. As to count 1, the jury also found true the allegations
that Ibarra kidnapped the victim (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(2),
(e)(1)); the movement substantially increased the risk of harm
over that necessarily inherent in the underlying event (id.,
subds. (a), (d)(2)); the offense was committed during the
commission of a burglary (id., subds. (a), (e)(2)); and Ibarra
engaged in tying or binding the victim (id., subds. (a), (e)(5)).
The trial court sentenced Ibarra to a total term of 29 years
to life. The sentence consisted of an indeterminate term of 25
years to life on count 1, pursuant to the One Strike law (§ 667.61,
subd. (a)); a consecutive determinate term of three years for the
great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); and a
consecutive one-year term for the weapons enhancement
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The court stayed the sentence on count 3
pursuant to section 654.
Ibarra timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Standard of review
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 944.)
“[W]e determine ‘ “whether from the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any
substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the
offense charged.” ’ [Citation.] Under such standard, we review
the facts adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the
judgment, drawing all inferences in support of the judgment to
determine whether there is substantial direct or circumstantial
evidence the defendant committed the charged crime.” (People v.
Misa (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 837, 842.)
“ ‘If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we
must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute
our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.’
[Citation.] ‘Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the
testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.]
Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or
inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient
to support a conviction.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jones (2013) 57
Cal.4th 899, 963.)
B. Discussion
Ibarra contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove

17
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was Jeanette’s attacker. We
disagree.
1. Substantial evidence supported the jury’s
conclusion that Ibarra was the
perpetrator
Substantial circumstantial evidence connected Ibarra to
the crime and proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
(People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932–933.) It is undisputed
that Ibarra was visiting Sanders the night of the attack.
Evidence supported the conclusion that Ibarra was present at the
time police believed the assault occurred between 2:45 and
2:50 a.m. Phone records indicate Ibarra was in the same
coverage area as Jeanette’s house at 1:24 a.m. and that he was in
an area between her house and his residence half an hour after
the assault.
Although Jeanette was unable to identify Ibarra’s face, she
described a distinctive tattoo on her attacker’s hand which
generally matched the tattoo on Ibarra’s hand. She told police in
2018 that the letter “A” tattooed on Ibarra’s right hand looked
similar to the tattoo she had noticed on her attacker’s hand. She
subsequently testified at trial that she recognized Ibarra’s tattoo
as her attacker’s.
Ibarra’s DNA was the only male DNA found on Jeanette’s
right eye, where Jeanette testified her attacker hit her repeatedly
with a bare hand. Jeanette testified that her attacker locked her
in the laundry room after the assault, and Ibarra’s DNA was
found on the laundry room’s door lock and hasp. Ibarra knew the
tank top was used to choke Jeanette, even though the police had
not disclosed that fact to him.

18
Ibarra argues that the presence of his DNA at the scene,
without evidence of when or how it got there, was insufficient to
connect him to the assault beyond a reasonable doubt. To
support the argument, he relies on authorities holding that, in
certain circumstances, fingerprints found on movable objects at
the crime scene were insufficient to establish the defendant’s
guilt. However, the cited cases are distinguishable from the case
at bar.
For example, in Mikes v. Borg (9th Cir. 1991) 947 F.2d 353,
the prosecution relied exclusively on the defendant’s fingerprints
found at the murder scene on chrome posts—which were
“portions of a disassembled turnstile unit”—as evidence of his
guilt. (Id. at p. 355; see id. at pp. 355–356.) Because the posts
were previously accessible to the public, including the defendant,
when they operated as turnstiles and when they were offered for
sale at a hardware store, the Ninth Circuit concluded there was
insufficient evidence for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt “that the defendant touched the object during the
commission of the crime.” (Id. at p. 361; see id. at p. 358.) The
prosecution in the other cases Ibarra cites similarly relied heavily
on fingerprints on movable objects without establishing that
those objects were inaccessible to the defendants before the
commission of the crime. (Birt v. Superior Court (1973) 34
Cal.App.3d 934, 938 [fingerprints on lighter found in “rental
vehicle available to the public”]; Borum v. U.S. (D.C. Cir. 1967)
380 F.2d 595, 597 [fingerprints on jars with no evidence of when
or where jars purchased]; State v. Payne (1982) 186 Conn. 179,
183, fn. 3 [fingerprints outside of window of victim’s car, which
had been accessible to public and in areas defendant
frequented].)

19
In the above cases, the prosecution relied on fingerprints
that were found on objects accessible to the defendants as
members of the general public before the commission of the
crimes. In contrast, here, Ibarra’s DNA was not only found on an
item to which he had legitimate access before the crime. It was
also on the victim’s body and on the door hasp and lock of the
laundry room of an apartment complex where Ibarra did not live.
In cases where fingerprints are found in similarly unique and
highly incriminating places, courts have concluded they are
sufficient to support guilty verdicts. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 516 [fingerprint found on magazine clip for
handgun used in crime supported conviction because no evidence
it was accessible to general public]; People v. Corral (1964) 224
Cal.App.2d 300, 305 [fingerprint on clasp of purse from where
money was stolen while at home]; People v. Rodis (1956) 145
Cal.App.2d 44, 46–47 [fingerprint on outside of window from shop
that was burglarized that was nine feet off the ground protected
by screen].)
Additionally, other evidence permitted the inference that
Ibarra’s DNA was found on Jeanette and at the scene because he
was the perpetrator of the attack. This was not a “DNA only”
case comparable to the fingerprint cases on which Ibarra relies.
(Cf. U.S. v. Talbert (9th Cir. 1983) 710 F.2d 528, 531 [not a
“ ‘fingerprints only’ ” case where defendant knew victim, knew he
had money, “ ‘joke[d]’ ” that he would retaliate, and alibi defense
did not account for whereabouts at time of murder].) Thus,
Ibarra’s cited authorities do not support his contention that the
DNA evidence in this case was not sufficiently probative for a
jury to infer guilt.

20
Ibarra contends the evidence supported the conclusion that
his DNA was found at the scene of the crime because a third
party used and handled his tank top, and not because he was
involved. Yet, the jury was not required to accept this theory.
The People’s experts testified that while it is possible for someone
to transfer DNA from one surface to another, it is harder for an
intermediary—in this case, an unknown perpetrator—to “pick
up” DNA from a porous surface, like clothing. Moreover, the
People’s expert testified that it was more likely that DNA would
be transferred when friction is applied between two surfaces,
such as when someone repeatedly strikes someone else with a
bare hand. It was undisputed that Jeanette and Ibarra were the
only contributors of the DNA found in areas of Jeanette’s face
and neck, including her eye, where she testified that she was hit
with a bare hand. The jury could reasonably conclude that the
presence of Ibarra’s DNA on Jeanette and on the hasp and lock of
the laundry room demonstrated his direct contact with these
surfaces, and was not due to secondary transfer from the tank
top.8
The evidence that Ibarra was in Jeanette’s complex the
evening before; that he was in the area at the time of the assault;
that he had a similar tattoo as the attacker; and that his DNA
was found on Jeanette and at the scene of the crime; was

8 As to Ibarra’s contention that none of his DNA was found
on other swabs from Jeanette’s body, this mischaracterizes the
evidence. The testing did not conclusively exclude Ibarra as a
contributor to those samples but instead found too little male
genetic material to generate a DNA profile for more specific
identification.

21
reasonable, credible, and of solid value, and sufficiently
supported the jury’s identification of him as the perpetrator.
2. Jeanette’s non-matching description of
her attacker, the lack of an eyewitness
identification, and conflicts in the
evidence do not demonstrate a lack of
substantial evidence to support the
verdict
Ibarra contends the evidence was insufficient to support
the jury’s findings because no rational juror could have concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator, given the
discrepancies between Jeanette’s description of her attacker in
2018 and Ibarra’s physical appearance; Jeanette’s failure to
identify him as her attacker from the six-pack photographic line-
up or from his tattoos; and other evidence from which the jury
could infer Ibarra was not the perpetrator. We disagree.
“[T]o entitle a reviewing court to set aside a jury’s finding of
guilt the evidence of identity must be so weak as to constitute
practically no evidence at all. [Citations.] The strength or
weakness of the identification, the incompatibility of and
discrepancies in the testimony, if there were any, the uncertainty
of recollection, and the qualification of identity and lack of
positiveness in testimony are matters which go to the weight of
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and are for the
observation and consideration, and directed solely to the
attention of the jury . . . .” (People v. Lindsay (1964) 227
Cal.App.2d 482, 493–494; People v. Mohamed (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 515, 522.) “[T]he evidence identifying an accused as
the perpetrator of the crime charged need not be positive and

22
uncontradicted.” (People v. Arenas (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 594,
601.)
Further, “[e]ven where, as here, the evidence of guilt is
largely circumstantial, our task is not to resolve credibility issues
or evidentiary conflicts, nor is it to inquire whether the evidence
might ‘ “ ‘be reasonably reconciled with the defendant’s
innocence.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243,
278.)
That Jeanette did not affirmatively identify Ibarra as her
attacker does not mean, as Ibarra suggests, that the jury resorted
to speculative inferences to conclude Ibarra was the perpetrator.
As explained above, other evidence—including phone records,
DNA, Ibarra’s tattoo of the letter “A” on his right hand, and
Jeanette’s comment that the tattoo was “similar” to her attacker’s
in 2018 and her subsequent identification of the tattoo at trial—
supported the jury’s identification of Ibarra as the perpetrator.
Likewise, the jury could rationally have concluded the
evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Ibarra was
the perpetrator, even though he did not match Jeanette’s
description of her attacker. There was evidence that Jeanette did
not, in fact, have an opportunity to get a good look at her
attacker’s face. She had difficulty identifying even a detective
from a photo. In addition, her testimony about Black and
Hispanic “features” suggested that her perception of racial and
ethnic identity was unreliable. The jury could reasonably
discredit Jeanette’s description of her attacker, while still relying
on the other circumstantial evidence of Ibarra’s guilt.
We further disagree that Ibarra’s alibi testimony or other
evidence from which the jury could have inferred Ibarra’s
innocence, such as surveillance video, Sanders’s testimony, or the

23
cell phone records, fatally undermines the jury’s findings.
Ibarra’s shifting narrative about how he left Sanders’s apartment
and his whereabouts at the time of the assault permitted the
inference that his testimony at trial was not true. (People v.
Zgurski (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 250, 267 [“material change” in
defendant’s story “is evidence from which the jury could have
concluded that [defendant’s] trial testimony was untrue”].) The
jury was entitled to discredit his alternate version of events. We
do “not substitute the jury’s implied findings with an alternate
version, preferred by defendant, that the jury considered and
rejected.” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 578.) With
respect to the inferences the jury could have drawn from
surveillance video or the cell phone records, “[i]t is of no
consequence that the jury believing other evidence, or drawing
different inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.”
(People v. Brown (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 968, 970.)
In sum, the record contains substantial evidence that
Ibarra was the perpetrator, including the DNA evidence found at
the scene and on Jeanette’s person. The jury’s verdict is
supported by substantial evidence.
II. The Trial Court’s Response to the Jury’s Question
Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
Ibarra contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to clarify the burdens of proof in response to the jury’s
question during deliberations.9 We find no error.

9 Although Ibarra’s trial counsel did not raise this issue
below, Ibarra contends the argument remains cognizable on
appeal because the trial court’s error affected his substantial
rights. (§ 1259.) He alternatively argues his counsel was

24
A. Relevant background
During cross-examination, Knetchel, the criminalist who
analyzed the swab samples, testified that her laboratory did not
perform Y-STR testing, a type of DNA testing that can generate a
DNA profile for male chromosomes found in a DNA sample. No
Y-STR testing was performed on the samples from Jeanette’s nail
scrapings or genitalia. On redirect, Knetchel confirmed there
were no rules prohibiting the defense from testing the swab
samples she had analyzed from the crime scene. The defense
expert Anjaria testified that Y-STR testing may have provided
information about the male contributor to two of the swabs taken
from Jeanette’s genitalia and the fingernail scraping swabs.
However, on cross-examination he confirmed that he did not
advise the defense to have the remaining six swabs tested for
DNA or to have any swab samples undergo Y-STR testing.
In the defense closing argument, counsel argued that the
DNA evidence was insufficient to prove Ibarra’s guilt because no
Y-STR testing was performed on the DNA samples from
Jeanette’s fingernails and genitalia. Counsel also argued that
Ibarra’s alibi involving Danny Pacheco was true and confirmed
his innocence.
In her rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor suggested
the defense could have tested the remaining swabs and could
have done Y-STR testing. She argued that the defense did not
conduct the testing because it would have created more evidence
against Ibarra. As to Pacheco, the prosecutor argued: “So then

ineffective for failing to object. We agree that Ibarra’s due
process argument is not forfeited by trial counsel’s failure to
object, and we need not address his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.

25
last week for the first time we hear about Danny. The defense
keeps saying this trial is about the shirt. No, it’s about Danny.
[¶] Where is Danny? Where is Danny? [¶] The defense has a
subpoena power. They can call whoever they want. He’s a long-
time family friend. He’s still a family friend. He lives in
Altadena. It’s, what, 10 miles away. He’s been waiting for trial
for five years. Danny is the ultimate alibi witness. [¶] Where is
he? [¶] He’s not here because it’s a lie.”
During deliberations, the jury sent a written note to the
court asking: “Why was Dan[n]y Pacheco not subpoena[ed] to
testify[?] [¶] Why was not [sic] Mr. Ibarra father in law not
subpoena[ed] to testify[?]” The court, “after confirmation with
Counsel,” responded: “The court cannot answer those questions.”
Ten minutes later, the jury reached a verdict.
B. Applicable legal principles and standard of
review
“A trial court is required to ‘ “instruct[ ] the jury on all the
general principles of law raised by the evidence which are
necessary for the jury’s proper understanding of the case.” ’
[Citation.] A court also has ‘a general obligation to “clear up any
instructional confusion expressed by the jury.” ’ [Citation.] This
obligation arises under section 1138, which provides that if
deliberating jurors ‘desire to be informed on any point of law
arising in the case, . . . the information required must be given’ to
them in court.
“Thus, ‘ “[w]hen a jury asks a question after retiring for
deliberation, ‘. . . [s]ection 1138 imposes upon the court a duty to
provide the jury with information the jury desires on points of
law.’ [Citation.] But ‘[t]his does not mean the court must always
elaborate on the standard instructions.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Rather, if

26
‘ “the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the
court has discretion . . . to determine what additional
explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for
information.” ’ [Citation.] On the other hand, ‘it is generally not
acceptable for a trial court to “merely repeat for a jury the text of
an instruction it has already indicated it doesn’t understand,” ’
and ‘the court “must at least consider how it can best aid the
jury.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Doane (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 965,
980.) We review the trial court’s decision not to provide further
instructions for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Franklin (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 881, 887, fn. 4.)
C. Discussion
The jury instructions made clear that the People bore the
burden of proof, and Ibarra did not. Both before and after the
presentation of evidence, the court instructed that Ibarra was
presumed innocent, the People were required to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that Ibarra was not required to
present evidence to prove his innocence. The court also
instructed that neither the prosecution nor the defense was
“required to call all witnesses who may have information about
the case or to produce all physical evidence that might be
relevant.” The court reiterated in a separate instruction that the
jury “may not convict the defendant unless the People have
proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] If the defendant
failed in his testimony to explain or deny evidence against him[,]
and if he could reasonably be expected to have done so based
upon what he knew, you may consider his failure to explain or
deny in evaluating that evidence. Any such failure is not enough
by itself to prove guilt. The People must still prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] If the defendant failed to

27
explain or deny, it is up to you to decide the meaning and
importance of that failure.” (Italics added.)
The jury’s question did not demonstrate that the jury
misunderstood the instructions about the burden of proof. The
question asked only why certain witnesses were not subpoenaed,
not specifically why the defense did not subpoena the witnesses.
Nor did the jury’s question ask the court whether or how the
absence of these witnesses should affect their assessment of
Ibarra’s guilt.
People v. Loza (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 332 (Loza) provides a
useful contrast. There, the court instructed the jury that a
person was guilty of a crime as an aider and abettor if, among
other things, the person knew of the perpetrator’s unlawful
purpose and specifically intended to aid the commission of the
crime. (Id. at p. 349.) During deliberations, the jury sent a note
asking whether “ ‘the state of mind of the aider and abettor
need/should be considered’ ” or whether an aider and abettor
“ ‘worried about an attack from the perp[e]trator’ ” affected “ ‘the
degrees of murder.’ ” (Ibid.) The court responded that the jury
“ ‘ “must apply the evidence to the law as [it had] been
instructed.” ’ ” (Ibid.) On appeal, the court found defense counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial
court’s response. (Id. at p. 350.) The court found that “[b]y
asking whether it was required to or should consider the state of
mind of the aider and abettor, the jury clearly indicated that it
had not understood, from the instructions that the court had
already provided, that it had to determine [the defendant’s]
intent as to each offense she was accused of aiding and abetting.”
(Id. at p. 355.) Under these circumstances, the court concluded

28
section 1138 required more than advising the jury to “rely on the
very instructions that had confused them.” (Loza, at p. 355.)
Here, the jury did not pose a question to the court about a
legal principle that an instruction had already addressed. It did
not ask the court whether or how the absence of the two
witnesses affected the burden of proof or its assessment of
Ibarra’s guilt. Nothing indicated that “the instructions that the
court had already given had left the jurors confused,” triggering
the court’s obligation “ ‘to clear up any instructional confusion
expressed by the jury.’ [Citation.]” (Loza, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th
at p. 355.) In the absence of any indication that confusion about
the burden of proof motivated the jury’s question, we presume the
jurors understood and followed jury instructions that made clear
that Ibarra did not have the burden to present evidence
explaining or denying the evidence against him. (People v.
Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852 [“Jurors are presumed able
to understand and correlate instructions and are further
presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.”].)
Ibarra contends that, considering the People had “implicitly
urged the jury to disbelieve appellant’s defense . . . based on his
failure to prove otherwise,” the instruction under CALCRIM
No. 361 requiring the jury to determine the significance of
Ibarra’s failure to explain or deny evidence led to confusion about
the burden of proof.
We disagree that CALCRIM No. 361 or the prosecutor’s
arguments allow us to presume jury confusion. The jury’s factual
question about why certain witnesses were not called to testify
does not suggest it misconstrued CALCRIM No. 361, which “rests
on the logical inference that if a person charged with a crime is
given the opportunity to explain or deny evidence against him or

29
her but fails to do so, then that evidence may be entitled to added
weight.” (People v. Grandberry (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 605.)
Further, it is well established that a prosecutor “ ‘may allude to
the defense’s failure to present exculpatory evidence’ [citation],
and such commentary does not . . . erroneously imply that the
defendant bears a burden of proof.” (People v. Lewis (2004) 117
Cal.App.4th 246, 257.) When a defendant testifies in his defense
and “offer[s] an alibi defense in which he identifies other persons
who could support his testimony, and those witnesses are
available and subject to subpoena,” a prosecutor’s “comment on a
defendant’s failure to call witnesses” is “appropriate and
permissible.” (People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 447; People v.
Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102, 157.)
The jury’s understandable curiosity about why individuals
referred to in the trial testimony were not called as witnesses
indicates it permissibly considered the absence of logical
witnesses, not that it was confused about the burden of proof.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by informing the jury
it could not answer the questions posed.
III. Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offense
Ibarra also contends the trial court erred by failing to sua
sponte instruct the jury on felony false imprisonment as a lesser
included offense of aggravated kidnapping. We find no error.
A. Applicable legal principles and standard of
review
Section 209 codifies the crime of aggravated kidnapping for
several enumerated sexual offenses, including sexual penetration
by force. (Id., subd. (b)(1); People v. Robertson (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 965, 978.) Aggravated kidnapping occurs if, in the
course of committing the crime, “the movement of the victim is

30
beyond that merely incidental to the commission of, and
increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that
necessarily present in, the intended underlying offense.” (§ 209,
subd. (b)(2).)
“False imprisonment is a lesser included offense of
aggravated kidnapping.” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 298, 380.) Felony false imprisonment occurs when a
defendant restrains another person’s liberty through “violence,
menace, fraud, or deceit.” (§§ 237, 236; People v. Wagstaff (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1232–1233.) “[K]idnapping, be it simple or
aggravated, requires a degree of asportation not found in the
definition of false imprisonment. Indeed, false imprisonment can
occur with any movement or no movement at all.” (People v. Reed
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 274, 284, fn. omitted.)
“A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on
a lesser included uncharged offense if there is substantial
evidence that would absolve the defendant from guilt of the
greater, but not the lesser, offense. [Citation.] Substantial
evidence is evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the lesser offense was committed.
[Citations.] Speculative, minimal, or insubstantial evidence is
insufficient to require an instruction on a lesser included offense.”
(People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132.) We review de novo
the trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense.
(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733.)
B. There was no substantial evidence from which
the jury could conclude Ibarra committed false
imprisonment and not aggravated kidnapping
Ibarra asserts that the record supported an instruction on
false imprisonment because the jury could have reasonably

31
doubted whether the underlying crime involved the requisite
degree of asportation. We disagree.
The evidence was undisputed that Ibarra advanced toward
Jeanette in the narrow walkway behind her house, backing her
into the threshold of the laundry room before using the tank top
to drag her inside, where he assaulted her. This evidence does
not permit the conclusion that the distance Ibarra forced
Jeanette to move was merely incidental to the commission of
sexual penetration by force, or that it did not increase the risk of
harm already inherent in the offense.
Ibarra contends that Jeanette’s testimony left unresolved
“whether she was so close to the doorway that she was not
actually moved a substantial distance.” Yet, the “[m]easured
distance” a victim is forcibly moved “is a relevant factor, but one
that must be considered in context, including the nature of the
crime and its environment.” (People v. Dominguez (2006) 39
Cal.4th 1141, 1152 (Dominguez).) “[T]here is no minimum
number of feet a defendant must move a victim” to establish that
the distance was not merely incidental to the underlying offense.
(People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12.) Additionally, “[w]here
movement changes the victim’s environment, it does not have to
be great in distance to be substantial.” (People v. Shadden (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 164, 169 (Shadden).)
Considering these principles, there is no evidence from
which the jury could have concluded that Jeanette’s forced
movement was merely incidental. Ibarra’s “forcible movement” of
Jeanette was not limited to his use of the tank top to drag her
over the threshold of the laundry room. The asportation element
of kidnapping can be carried out through force or fear. (People v.
Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 890; CALCRIM No. 1203.)

32
Jeanette’s testimony established that Ibarra was at the other end
of the walkway when he began advancing toward her. His
approach cut off other escape routes and forced her backward
toward the laundry room. Although the record does not disclose
the actual distance involved, the evidence indicates that it was at
least the length of her car. This undisputed evidence reflected
that Ibarra forcibly moved Jeanette over a substantial distance.
(See, e.g., People v. Waqa (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 565, 583 [eight to
ten feet between bathroom stalls sufficient for substantial
distance]; Shadden, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 167 [victim
dragged nine feet within video store was moved substantial
distance].) Additionally, Jeanette testified that she was forcibly
moved from an outdoor area in her complex to inside the laundry
room. Her movement “from an open area to a closed room”
constituted a change to the environment that rendered the
distance substantial. (See Shadden, at p. 169 [victim dragged
from front of video store to back room for attempted rape moved
substantial distance].) No other evidence supported a contrary
inference.
We likewise reject Ibarra’s argument that substantial
evidence supported the inference that moving Jeanette into the
laundry room did not increase the risk of harm because there was
no evidence that the door was closed or locked. The laundry room
was in the back corner of the property. The north, south, and
back of the property were enclosed by either a wire fence or brick
walls. By forcing Jeanette to move from a narrow, outdoor
walkway that was accessible to and visible from the carport into
a room concealed from outside view, Ibarra “changed [Jeanette’s]
environment from a relatively open area . . . to a place
significantly more secluded, substantially decreasing the

33
possibility of detection, escape or rescue.” (Dominguez, supra, 39
Cal.4th at p. 1153.) Being inside the laundry room, irrespective
of whether the door was closed or locked, helped conceal Ibarra’s
crime from view and appreciably decreased the likelihood of
detection. Further, the movement into the laundry room
impeded any chance Jeanette otherwise may have had to escape
or call for help.
For this reason, Ibarra’s reliance on People v. Perkins
(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 454, is misplaced. The court in Perkins
found that the victim’s forced movement between two rooms in a
private residence did not increase the risk of harm because no
evidence showed the doors to either room were closed while the
defendant raped her. (Id. at p. 470.) Here, Jeanette’s forced
movement did not occur within a private dwelling. She was
moved from an outdoor area into an enclosed structure. Perkins,
therefore, does not suggest that because the laundry room’s door
was open or unlocked, there was substantial evidence from which
a jury could have concluded Jeanette’s movement did not increase
the inherent risk of harm.

34
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

35

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