People v. Dunston CA2/8

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Filed 5/8/26 P. v. Dunston CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B340265

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23PDCF00048

KEVIN DUNSTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Donna Hollingsworth, Judge. Affirmed.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Kevin Dunston took a bottle of tequila from a store without
paying and waved a knife at employees who asked for its return.
He had two prior robbery convictions and was on parole.
Dunston challenges this robbery conviction and the court’s upper-
term sentence. We affirm. Unspecified citations are to the Penal
Code.
Sean Macias and Kenneth Hall were two managers at a
Stater Bros. Market in Pasadena. On December 9, 2023, Macias
saw Dunston put a bottle of tequila inside his jacket. Dunston
headed for the door. Macias asked Dunston to return the bottle
or pay for it. Dunston said he would not, and threw some papers
and unrelated receipts toward Macias and Hall before leaving.
Hall and Macias followed Dunston out. They were within a
few feet of Dunston at this point. They again asked Dunston to
return the bottle. Dunston replied “I feel threatened. Back up.”
He held up a folding pocket knife. That scared Macias and Hall,
and Macias told Hall not to engage further.
Police arrested Dunston. The jury convicted him of
robbery. Dunston waived his right to a jury trial on his prior
convictions and the court found true that Dunston had two prior
convictions for robbery, he had served a prison term for those
convictions, and he had been on parole when he took the tequila.
The trial court reviewed the probation report, arguments
from counsel, and the evidence presented at trial. The court
struck one of Dunston’s priors and sentenced him to the upper
term of five years, doubled for the prior strike, for a total of 10
years. The trial court calculated 289 days of credit. Dunston
appealed the conviction and the sentence.

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I
We review the robbery conviction for substantial evidence.
(People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 (Johnson).)
Robbery is “the felonious taking of personal property in the
possession of another, from his person or immediate presence,
and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”
(§ 211.)
The evidence was more than sufficient to convict Dunston
of robbery. Dunston took a bottle of tequila from a store without
paying for it, over the objections of two employees. The
employees followed Dunston out of the store. He told them to
“back up” and held out a knife, which was a threat of violence
should they continue to pursue him. Dunston left with the bottle.
Dunston protests there was no evidence he opened the
knife, and he was five feet from the employees when he pulled it
from his pocket – “out of their immediate presence,” according to
him. This is irrelevant. When you tell someone to “back up” and
you take out a knife, everyone understands what that means.
Everyone also knows that it does not take much to unfold a folded
knife, or suddenly to lunge five feet forward. Macias and Hall
each testified to their fear. This evidence satisfied the fear
element.
Dunston does not challenge evidence supporting the other
elements of robbery.
II
We review a trial court’s decision to impose a particular
sentence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Nicolas (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 1165, 1182 (Nicolas).) In exercising her discretion to
select one of the three authorized terms of imprisonment, the
sentencing judge may consider circumstances in aggravation or

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mitigation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(b).) Only a single
aggravating factor is necessary to empower the trial court to
impose the upper term. (Nicolas, supra, at p. 1182.)
The court had discretion to choose the upper term in this
case. The California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b) lists factors the
court can consider to move the sentence from the presumptive
mid term to the upper term. These include serving a prior prison
term (subdivision (b)(3)) and committing the current crime while
on parole (subdivision (b)(4)), both of which the trial court found
true of Dunston. One factor alone can justify the upper term.
(Nicolas, supra, at p. 1182.)
The court properly doubled the upper term under section
1170.12, subsection (c)(1), after finding it true that Dunston
previously had been convicted of a serious felony.
Dunston argues “the facts of the case and [his] personal
circumstances justified imposition of a low term sentence.”
Though his briefing does not say so, he appears to reference
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), which requires the trial court to
choose the low term if the defendant “has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma” that “was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense” unless the
court also finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances “such that imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice.”
Dunston does not point to evidence in the record supporting
this argument. He did not submit a sentencing brief or present
evidence to the trial court on this point. During the sentencing
hearing, Dunston’s counsel argued, without evidence, that he
believed Dunston’s criminal record showed mental health

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problems and drug use. Vague statements unsupported by
evidence do not trigger the low term presumption.
III
The abstract of judgment filed August 20, 2024 incorrectly
states Dunston was convicted pursuant to a plea. We agree with
the People this error should be corrected.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the conviction and sentence. We remand to the
trial court with directions to correct the abstract of judgment to
show a jury convicted Dunston.

WILEY, J.
We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

SCHERB, J.

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