People v. Robinson CA2/5

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Filed 5/7/26 P. v. Robinson CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B340200

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA019803)
v.

GARLON GRADY ROBINSON,

Defendant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Emily J. Cole, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Teresa Biagini, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
At a full resentencing conducted while vacating Garlon
Grady Robinson’s (defendant’s) one-year prior prison sentence
enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75,1 the trial
court declined to consider whether two of defendant’s prior
“strike” convictions were still valid under the Three Strikes
Reform Act of 2012 (Reform Act) (§ 1170.126), denied his request
to dismiss those strikes under section 1385, imposed a new 10-
year criminal protective order, and re-imposed a $5,000
restitution fine. The People concede that our Supreme Court’s
recent decision in People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18
Cal.5th 838 (Guevara) warrants reversal for the trial court to
consider whether to apply the Reform Act. This concession is
well taken, and eliminates the need to address defendant’s
remaining arguments—except that the court is barred by section
1465.9 from imposing a restitution fine. We accordingly reverse
and remand for a full resentencing.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
On a Saturday night in December 1999, defendant got
angry with his wife once he learned she had thrown away his
marijuana plants. Enraged, defendant yelled at her,
“backhanded [her] twice across her face,” grabbed her by the hair,
“choked her with both hands,” and eventually kicked her in the
crotch area while wearing steel-toed boots. He then destroyed
several of their household belongings. Wife called law
enforcement, but when they arrived, defendant admitted only to
“trash[ing] the home” and wife did not mention his physical
assaults.
After the responding officers left, defendant strangled his
wife and also struck her again. Wife fled to her mother’s home
and called law enforcement again. Only then did she report the
initial assault. She experienced vaginal pain and bleeding that
lasted for weeks, had trouble swallowing, and had bruises on her
face. She also mentioned this was not defendant’s first eruption
of violence against her.
On January 4, 2000, wife reported that defendant struck
her once on the right side of her face, but responding law
enforcement officers only noticed a small scratch on her face.
II. Procedural Background
A. Prosecution, conviction, and appeal
In February 2000, the People charged defendant with (1)
assaulting wife with a deadly weapon (namely, the steel-toed
boots) (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); (2) assaulting wife by means likely to

2 We draw these facts from our prior unpublished opinion in
People v. Robinson (Apr. 19, 2001, B142456) [nonpub. opn.], of
which we take judicial notice (Evid. Code, §§ 459, 452, subd. (c)).

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cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); and (3) two counts
of inflicting corporal injury upon wife, one each for the attack
before and the attack after law enforcement responded (§ 273.5,
subd. (a)).3 The People alleged that defendant had three prior
convictions that qualified as “strikes” within the meaning of our
Three Strikes Law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-
(j))—namely, (1) a 1983 conviction for burglary (§ 459), (2) a 1984
conviction for burglary (§ 459), and (3) a 1991 conviction for
assault (§ 245, subd. (a)). The People further alleged that
defendant had served a prior prison term for each of those
convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
A jury convicted defendant of the four above-enumerated
charges. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the
allegations regarding his prior convictions, and the
trial court subsequently found them to be true.
The trial court imposed a prison sentence of 51 years to life.
The court designated the assault with a deadly weapon as the
principal count, and imposed a base sentence of 25 years to life (a
third-strike sentence) plus an additional year for one of the prior
prison term enhancements. The court then imposed a
consecutive term of 25 years to life (a third-strike sentence) for
the assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury count.
The court next imposed third-strike sentences of 25 years to life
on each of the two counts of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse,
but stayed their execution pursuant to section 654. The court
also imposed but stayed a one-year enhancement for a prior
prison term on one of the counts.

3 The People also charged defendant with inflicting corporal
injury upon wife (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) based on her injuries on
January 4, 2000, but the jury acquitted him of that count.

4
We affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion.
(People v. Robinson (Apr. 19, 2001, B142456) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. Request for resentencing under section 1170.126
In October 2014, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to the Reform Act, which at that time generally
authorized a defendant to seek a reduction in sentence for any
third-strike sentence for an offense—down to a second-strike
sentence of double the usual term—if that offense was not itself a
“strike” offense. (§ 1170.126, subd. (b).) The trial court denied
defendant relief, reasoning that defendant’s assault with a deadly
weapon conviction rendered him ineligible for relief as to all four
of the third-strike sentences the court had imposed. Defendant
appealed. We affirmed the court’s denial of relief as to the
assault with a deadly weapon conviction, but reversed as to the
other convictions with third-strike sentences and remanded.
(People v. Robinson (Sept. 10, 2015, B260635) [nonpub. opn.].)4
On remand, the trial court vacated its prior order denying
recall of sentence and sought further briefing. In December 2020,
the court ruled that defendant was ineligible for resentencing
under the Reform Act because it was true “beyond a reasonable
doubt” that defendant had “intended to cause great bodily
injury,” which rendered third-strike sentences appropriate under
section 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii).
Defendant did not appeal.
C. Request for resentencing under section 1172.75
In late 2022 or early 2023, the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant as
an individual potentially eligible for resentencing under Senate
Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which eliminated the prior

4 We also take judicial notice of this prior opinion.

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prison term enhancement for convictions not involving a
“sexually violent offense.”5 (§ 1172.75, subd. (a); Stats. 2021, ch.
728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)
In August 2023, defendant (through appointed counsel)
filed a petition requesting a full resentencing, including
invalidation of the one-year prior prison term enhancements as
well as the dismissal of his prior “strike” convictions. The People
agreed to dismissal of the prior prison term enhancements but
opposed any further reductions in sentence.
Following receipt of defendant’s reply brief and a hearing,
the trial court struck all of the prior prison term enhancements
and dismissed the 1983 burglary conviction as a “strike” (because
the record indicated it was a commercial burglary that did not
qualify as a strike), but “decline[d to] exercis[e its] discretion”
under section 1385 to dismiss the two other “strike” offenses due
to defendant’s “prior [criminal] history” before the charged crimes
and the fact that he was “on parole” when he repeatedly attacked
his wife. The court did not address the Reform Act.
The court then imposed a total aggregate sentence of 25
years to life. Specifically, the court imposed a third-strike 25
year to life sentence on the assault with a deadly weapon count.
The court also imposed a third-strike 25 year to life sentence on
the assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, but
ran it concurrently (rather than consecutively, as in the original
sentence). The court imposed third-strike 25 year to life

5 Although the record on appeal does not include any
document from the CDCR, we infer the CDCR’s action from the
undisputed presence of enhancements eligible for dismissal under
section 1172.75 as well as the trial court’s unbidden setting of the
matter for “judicial action” and appointment of counsel.

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sentences on the two counts of inflicting corporal injury on a
spouse, but stayed them under section 654. The trial court also
entered a 10-year protective order prohibiting defendant from
having contact with his wife and her mother, and ordered
defendant to pay a $5,000 restitution fine pursuant to section
1202.4, subdivision (b).
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
In this appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in
(1) not addressing whether three of his four third-strike
sentences (that is, all except the assault with a deadly weapon
sentence) are valid under the Reform Act, (2) not exercising its
discretion to dismiss those “strike” allegations under section
1385, (3) imposing a new 10-year protective order, and (4) re-
imposing a restitution fine.
Under section 1172.75, a defendant who is eligible to have
a prior prison sentence enhancement stricken is entitled to a full
resentencing, at which time the trial court is to “apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1)-(2);
see also People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 193, 195,
review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987; People v. Green (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 365, 373.)
In Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 849-850, our Supreme
Court held that a trial court engaged in a full resentencing under
section 1172.75 must apply the Reform Act, including its
provision according trial courts a “discretionary . . . override”—as
to defendants who would otherwise be eligible for relief—not to
grant relief if the court “determines that resentencing the

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[defendant] would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety.”6 (§ 1170.126, subd. (f); Guevara, at pp. 861-862, 865-866,
878.)
Because the trial court in conducting the full resentencing
under section 1172.75 did not apply the Reform Act at all, the
parties agree that reversal and remand are necessary so that the
trial court may consider whether the Reform Act would apply to
the third-strike sentence running concurrent to the principal
term and the two third-strike sentences that are stayed—and, if
so, whether exercise of the court’s “discretionary . . . override” is
warranted. We agree with the parties. On remand, the court
may also entertain any further requests to dismiss the prior
“strike” convictions under section 1385, subdivision (a)—but not
under section 1385, subdivision (c). (People v. Burke (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 237, 243-244). The parties may additionally develop
facts and legal argument regarding the propriety of imposing a
10-year restraining order pursuant to section 136.2, subdivision
(i)(1). However, the court may not impose a restitution fine
pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b) because the 2025
amendment to section 1465.9 provides that a restitution fine
“expir[es]” “10 years after the date of imposition” (Stats. 2024, ch.
805, § 1); because the restitution fine in this case was imposed

6 Although section 1172.75 also has a provision that requires
any resentencing under that section to “result in a lesser
sentence than the one originally imposed” “unless the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence
would endanger public safety” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1)), that
standard—including its heightened standard of proof—is distinct
from the “public safety” consideration that courts are to apply
under the Reform Act. (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 852-
853.)

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over 25 years ago, it expired and may not be reimposed (accord,
People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601 [so holding],
review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, defendant’s sentence is vacated,
and the case is remanded to the trial court to conduct
resentencing consistent with this opinion and the holding in
Guevara.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
MOOR

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

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