People v. Porter CA4/1

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Filed 5/5/26 P. v. Porter CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084897

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE415694)

ROCHELLE RENE PORTER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Eugenia A. Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed.
Courtney Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Kristen Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rochelle Rene Porter appeals from her convictions for trespassing and
violating court orders. On the trespassing count, Porter claims the trial court
improperly instructed the jury that she had the burden to prove her
prescriptive easement defense, and the charge was not supported by
sufficient evidence. She further contends the prosecutor violated the Racial
Justice Act (RJA) by discussing racial comments made by the victim.
Review of the alleged instructional error is barred under the invited
error doctrine, and we reject Porter’s associated claim that she received
ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the jury instruction.
Additionally, sufficient evidence supports that trespassing charge, and Porter
has failed to establish an RJA violation. We therefore affirm the convictions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Clinton Johnson owns a rental property in Spring Valley. Porter lives

on an adjoining lot to the south of Clinton’s1 rental property. In June of
2022, Porter and Clinton got into an altercation on Clinton’s rental property.
On November 14, 2022, Clinton obtained a restraining order against Porter
prohibiting her from coming within 50 yards of Clinton, his family, and
Clinton’s rental property. Porter returned to Clinton’s rental property on at
least two occasions.
Based on these incidents, the San Diego District Attorney’s Office filed
misdemeanor (case No. C420616) and felony (case No. SCE415694) charges
against Porter. The trial court granted the People’s motion to consolidate the
two cases and dismiss several counts, resulting in the following charges

1 We refer to Clinton and his wife, Griselda Johnson, by their first names
for clarity. No disrespect is intended. (In re Marriage of Olsen (1994)
24 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1704, fn. 1.)
2
against Porter: assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,2 § 245,
subd, (a)(1); count 1), trespass and refusing to leave (§ 602, subd. (o)(1);
count 2), and two counts of disobeying a court order, (§ 166, subd. (a)(4);
counts 3–4).
B. Trial Proceedings
Clinton testified at Porter’s 2024 trial. He told the jury that he has a
“private driveway” on the west side of his rental property. Using a satellite
image of the neighborhood and photographs, Clinton identified the dividing
line between his and Porter’s property as being up a small hill and to the
south of his driveway. A fence sat on that property line, which had a gate
leading to Porter’s backyard. Photographs depicted vegetation partially
blocking the gate on Clinton’s side of the fence, and Clinton testified that he
was certain the gate had never been accessed since he purchased his rental
property in 2009.
As for the altercation, Clinton testified that he was cleaning in his
driveway when all of the sudden Porter was standing in front of him with a
camera. Clinton did not know Porter at that time, and she had parked her
car in Clinton’s driveway. Porter stated she was taking pictures of trees but
appeared to be taking pictures of Clinton, his truck, and his wife and
children.
According to Clinton, Porter ignored his repeated requests that she
leave, and she kept taking pictures. Porter eventually retreated to her
vehicle, grabbed a small metal bat, and then emerged from her car swinging
the bat at Clinton. Clinton did not remember exactly how, but he ended up
with Porter’s camera and a media badge she was wearing while trying to
protect himself from the bat.

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
Clinton testified that he called the sheriff and told Porter he was going
to give her camera to the sheriff. After Porter tried to get into Clinton’s truck
and Griselda intervened, Porter attacked Clinton with the bat a second time.
Clinton eventually wrested the bat from Porter, and he suffered blunt force
injuries to his arms and legs.
Griselda testified, stating that Clinton repeatedly told Porter that she
was trespassing and that she needed to leave. Griselda explained that the
incident occurred “[o]n my driveway. Right outside my garage.” Griselda
stated she was unaware of any easement that crossed the driveway.
The jury also heard from Adi Cebo, who lives next to Clinton’s rental
property. Referencing the neighborhood satellite image, Cebo identified
Clinton’s driveway as splitting off of, and distinct from, an easement over
Cebo’s property that provides access to homes behinds Cebo and Clinton’s.
Consistent with the satellite image, Cebo explained that Clinton’s driveway
was older and therefore had lighter colored asphalt than the road over the
easement. Cebo testified that Porter does not need to use the easement road
because her driveway exits to the street south of her house.
Cebo observed the altercation between Clinton and Porter. From his
kitchen window, Cebo saw Porter taking pictures and approaching Clinton in
Clinton’s driveway. Clinton put his hands up attempting to stop Porter.
Clinton then tried to hide behind his truck, and Porter followed him. Cebo
told the jury that Porter retrieved a bat from her car and then assaulted
Clinton with it.
Cebo recorded a portion of the incident with his phone. That footage
was shown to the jury, which depicts Clinton and Porter standing in Clinton’s
driveway, Clinton demanding that Porter get off his property, and Clinton

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and Porter tussling over a bat and leaf blower. The jury also saw body-worn
camera footage from responding officers.
Porter testified in her own defense. Porter asserted that when she
purchased her home approximately 40 years ago, the seller told her that the
area where altercation occurred was an access road for her and her four
neighbors. She denied it was Clinton’s driveway, and claimed she and her
neighbors used it as a road. Porter also said that for over 40 years, she has
had access to the gate in the fence bordering her and Clinton’s properties.
She testified that she had been using that gate since she purchased her home
in the 1980’s, although she had not been using it for the past two years.
Regarding the June 2022 incident, Porter testified that she wanted to
talk to Clinton about his trees that were damaging her property. Porter
described Clinton as the aggressor, stating that he yelled at her and hit her
in the chest as he snatched her media badge. Porter then retreated to her car
and was planning to leave, but Clinton reached through her window, grabbed
her camera, and tore her rotator cuff in the process. Porter demanded her
camera back, and Clinton assaulted her six or seven times before she grabbed
her flashlight and hit him with it. Porter suffered swelling and bruising.
The People admitted the deed to Porter’s home, which described
Porter’s property as “Parcel 2” as well as “[a]n easement for road and utilities
over the Southeasterly portion of Parcel 3 of Parcel Map No. 4247.” Based on
this deed, both Clinton and Porter testified that Porter’s easement was on the
southern part of Porter’s property. They also both testified that Clinton’s
rental property was north of Porter’s property.
In response to the deed, Porter’s counsel requested that the trial court
instruct the jury on prescriptive easements, asserting that the defense had
the burden of proof on that issue. The trial court granted the request and

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instructed the jury that “Porter must prove” the elements giving rise to a
prescriptive easement. In closing argument, defense counsel reiterated that
the prescriptive easement was a defense that Porter had to prove.
The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the assault charge, resulting
in a mistrial on that count. The jury found Porter guilty of the remaining
counts. The trial court granted Porter misdemeanor summary probation and
ordered that she stay 100 yards away from Clinton and his rental property.
Porter’s timely appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Porter Did Not Receive Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding the
Prescriptive Easement Jury Instruction
Porter argues that by instructing the jury that Porter had to prove the
existence of a prescriptive easement, the trial court improperly shifted the
burden of proof on the trespass charge. However, Porter’s trial counsel
invited the alleged error by requesting the challenged instruction. This
typically bars appellate review. (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 138
[“The doctrine of invited error bars a defendant from challenging a jury
instruction given by the trial court when the defendant has requested the
instruction based on a ‘ “ ‘ “conscious and deliberate tactical choice.” ’ ” ’ ”];
People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49 [“In cases involving an
action affirmatively taken by defense counsel, we have found a clearly
implied tactical purpose to be sufficient to invoke the invited error rule.”].)
Nonetheless, Porter argues the request for the prescriptive easement
instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, so we will review the
issue in that framework. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that (1) counsel’s representation “ ‘fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,’ ”

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and (2) “ ‘resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different.’ ” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958.) Finding no error
in the challenged instruction, Porter is unable to establish either prong of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
“In criminal cases, . . . the prosecution has the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] . . . But it is constitutionally permissible to
place on the defendant the burden of proving affirmative defenses by a
preponderance of the evidence, as long as the defendant is not required to
negate an element of the offense.” (People v. Neidinger (2006) 40 Cal.4th
67, 72.) “ ‘[A]n affirmative defense is one which presumes the prima facie
elements of the crime are true, but exculpates the defendant because of
excuse or justification. [Citations.] Stated another way, in this context
an affirmative defense is one which does not negate any element of the
crime, but is new matter which excuses or justifies conduct which would
otherwise lead to criminal responsibility.’ ” (People v. Spry (1997)
58 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1369.)
As charged in this case, a person trespasses by “[r]efusing or failing to
leave land . . . belonging to . . . another and not open to the general public,
upon being requested to leave by . . . the owner.” (§ 602, subd. (o)(1).)
On the other hand, a prescriptive easement arises from the “open and
notorious use of another’s land, which use is continuous and uninterrupted
for five years and adverse to the land’s owner.” (Grant v. Ratliff (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1308.) Like other easements, a prescriptive easement
“is not a type of ownership,” but rather “the right to use the land in a
particular way.” (Hansen v. Sandridge Partners, L.P. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
1020, 1032, 1033.)

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Here, a prescriptive easement would not negate that Clinton owned the
driveway, that the driveway was not open to the public, or that Porter failed
to leave after Clinton asked her to do so. Indeed, “continually trespassing on
another’s land” is what creates a prescriptive easement. (Grant v. Ratliff,
supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1310.) Rather, the claimed easement was new
matter that could excuse Porter’s liability for trespass under section 602,
subdivision (o)(1), despite that crime’s elements being satisfied.
Accordingly, the prescriptive easement claim was an affirmative
defense, and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that Porter had
the burden to prove it. Because the trial court did not err, Porter cannot
show deficient performance by her trial counsel or resulting prejudice, and
her ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
B. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Trespassing Conviction
Porter challenges the evidence supporting the trespassing conviction.
She claims there was insufficient evidence that she refused to leave because
Clinton interrupted her attempted departure by taking her camera. Porter
further asserts the evidence failed to show that she was on property lawfully
occupied by another because she had a deeded easement over the area where
the incident occurred. We disagree.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a conviction, “ ‘ “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th
719, 780.) We do “ ‘ “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” ’ ” (People v. Helzer (2024)

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15 Cal.5th 622, 646.) Unless it is clearly shown that “ ‘on no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict’ ” we
will not reverse. (People v. Zaun (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1174.)
Clinton testified that the incident occurred in his “private driveway.”
Griselda testified similarly, telling the jury that Clinton owned the driveway,
and she had no knowledge of an easement that crossed the driveway. Cebo
also confirmed that the incident occurred in Clinton’s driveway, which is
separate from the easement that serves nearby houses.
The testimony from these three witnesses is consistent with the images
and footage shown to the jury, which depict two distinct paths. First, there is
a diagonal downhill road with newer and darker asphalt that passes Cebo’s
home and leads toward the homes behind Clinton’s rental property. Second,
there is a flat driveway with older lighter asphalt leading directly and
exclusively to Clinton’s rental property. These images and footage show the
altercation occurring on the second path. Based on these visuals and the
testimony from Clinton, Griselda, and Cebo, the jury could reasonably
conclude that Clinton owned the driveway where the incident occurred and
reject Porter’s contradictory testimony that she had access to that area
through a deeded or prescriptive easement.
Regarding the deed to Porter’s home, the legal description indicates
that Porter owns “Parcel 2” and “[a]n easement for road and utilities over the
Southeasterly portion of Parcel 3 of Parcel Map No. 4247.” As Porter
acknowledges, “[t]here was no evidence presented as to which parcel belongs

to [Clinton],” nor were any parcel maps admitted.3 Without such evidence,

3 Porter cites an incomplete parcel map that was attached as an exhibit
to the People’s supplemental opposition to Porter’s motion to continue trial.
However, that map was never admitted into evidence, so we do not consider it
in our substantial evidence review.
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there is no way to determine where Parcel 2 and Parcel 3 are situated in
relation to each other or whether Clinton owned Parcel 3. Accordingly, the
deed merely proves that Porter had an easement. It does not prove where

that easement was located.4
As for Porter’s refusal to leave after requested, Clinton testified that
Porter ignored his repeated requests to leave. Clinton explained that
although Porter temporarily returned to her car, which was parked inside
Clinton’s driveway, Porter retrieved a metal bat and pursued Clinton with it,
after which Clinton took Porter’s camera while trying to protect himself.
Griselda also testified that Clinton repeatedly told Porter she was
trespassing and that she needed to leave. The jury also heard from Cebo that
Porter approached Clinton in the driveway, Clinton put his hands up and
tried to hide behind his truck, and Porter followed him. Finally, the jury also
saw Cebo’s cell phone footage, which captured Clinton requesting that Porter
leave before the two tussled over the bat and leaf blower. From this evidence,
the jury could reasonably conclude that Porter refused Clinton’s requests that
she leave, notwithstanding Porter’s testimony that she was planning to leave
until Clinton took her camera.
Based on the foregoing, the evidence sufficiently supported the
trespassing charge.
C. Porter Did Not Receive Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding the
Racial Justice Act
1. Additional Background
When cross-examining Clinton, defense counsel asked him, “When the
police asked you to describe Ms. Porter, you described her as ‘She fits the MO

4 For these reasons, we do not consider Clinton and Porter’s testimony
interpreting the deeds to be substantial evidence.
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of a crazy [B]lack lady’?” The prosecutor asserted a hearsay objection and
Clinton stated, “[t]hat’s very racist,” and “[s]he’s trying to say that I’m racist.”
After an unreported sidebar conference and recess, defense counsel
resumed cross-examining Clinton:
Q. . . . You told police that Ms. Porter fits the typical
MO of a crazy old black lady? Yes or no?
A. I stated that she was crazy and that she was
black, yes. So, yes, I stated she was crazy, and, yes, I
stated she was black.
[¶] . . . [¶]
Q. You also told police that if Black Lives Matter was
not on the news, that you would have used lethal force?
A. I believe -- I don’t know if I said that to the sheriff
that day. I think that I said that in the preliminary
hearing when questioned on why I did not retaliate with
force.
Q. My question to you is: did you say you would
have used lethal force if Black Lives Matter was not on the
news?
A. I said I think I could have used a higher degree of
force, but I chose not to because I was considering that fact
that was in the news at that time.
On redirect examination, the prosecutor questioned Clinton on this
topic as follows:
Q. Was -- any interaction you had with Ms. Porter on
the day she assaulted you, was any of it racially motivated?
A. Absolutely not. Again, I’m a retired naval officer.
I’ve never had any racial incidents in my career. And
stating that she’s black and that she’s crazy are facts.
[¶] . . . [¶]
Q. So if she had been a crazy white lady, would you
have described her in that fashion?
A. Anybody who would have acted in the manner
that she acted, I would have described it as crazy, and any
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other adjective or synonym to describe them that would be
appropriate.
Q. When you made the comment about Black Lives
Matter, you weren’t allowed on cross to explain what you
really meant by referencing Black Lives Matter. Can you
explain that to the jury.
A. I believe this was around the time when -- like, I
think, Minneapolis/St. Paul where I’m from Minnesota,
was, like, on fire for these racially spurred topics. And it
was in my mind of, like, hey, I need to, you know, be
conscientious about how I handle this situation. Yeah, I
mean, it’s something, as a naval officer, you think about
every situation like that; right. As a helicopter pilot, I
analyzed risks and make decisions.
[¶] . . . [¶]
Q. So the way you conducted yourself when she came
onto your property, would you have conducted yourself in
the same manner if she had been white?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you have conducted yourself in the same
manner if she had been Asian?
A. Yes.
In her closing argument, the prosecutor challenged the defense’s
attempt “to paint Clinton as a racist.” The prosecutor acknowledged that
Clinton made “an inappropriate comment” by referring to Porter as a “Crazy
black lady,” and that Clinton referenced Black Lives Matter and said he did
not want to end up on the news. The prosecutor asserted that despite these
statements, “it’s just not fair that all of a sudden [Clinton’s] this racist guy
and this was a racially-motivated crime. That’s not what this case is.”
Defense counsel then argued in closing that Clinton “may have said
something racist.” Defense counsel therefore asserted that Clinton’s
testimony may have been influenced by bias or prejudice, and she was “just
trying to show you the person that Mr. Clinton is.”

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2. Porter’s Argument
Porter argues the prosecutor violated the RJA by questioning Clinton
about his racial comments and mentioning those comments in closing
argument. Porter claims that by doing so, the prosecutor appealed to racial
bias and encouraged the jury to consider Porter’s race in its analysis of the
case. We find no RJA violation.
3. The RJA
A violation of the RJA occurs when, “[d]uring the defendant’s
trial, . . . an attorney in the case . . . used racially discriminatory language
about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise
exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s
race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.” (§ 745,
subd. (a)(2).) However, there is an exception “if the person speaking is
relating language used by another that is relevant to the case or if the person
speaking is giving a racially neutral and unbiased physical description of the
suspect.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Racially discriminatory language’ means language that, to an
objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including,
but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that
compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the
defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin.”
(§ 745, subd. (h)(4).)
4. Analysis
As several courts of appeal have now held, where a defendant could
have raised an RJA claim at trial but failed to do so, the claim is forfeited.
(See, e.g., People v. Midell (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1075–1076 [First
Dist., Div. Two]; People v. Corbi (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 25, 38–43 [Fourth

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Dist., Div. One]; People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 112–116 [Fifth
Dist.]; People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 810–816 [First Dist.,
Div. Three].) We agree with the reasoning of these cases and reject Porter’s
claim that they were wrongly decided. We therefore find Porter’s RJA claim
forfeited because she could have raised it during trial. We also decline
Porter’s request to exercise our discretion to disregard her forfeiture. (See,
e.g., People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 720.)
Nonetheless, Porter claims infective assistance of counsel based on trial
counsel’s failure to assert an RJA claim. We therefore reach the issue on that
ground.
Porter’s trial counsel was the first to introduce Clinton’s racial
comments. Porter acknowledges her trial counsel had a valid basis for doing
so because those comments impeached Clinton. As the complaining witness,
Clinton’s credibility was important, and the prosecutor was permitted to
respond. (See, e.g., Evid. Code, § 774 [“A witness . . . may be reexamined as
to any new matter upon which he has been examined by another party to the
action.”]; People v. Thomas (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 924, 954 [prosecutors are
permitted “ ‘ “to fairly respond to arguments by defense counsel” ’ ”].)
When the prosecutor repeated Clinton’s statements, she did not violate
the RJA because she was “relating language used by another that is relevant
to the case.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).) Further, in attempting to rehabilitate
Clinton’s credibility, the prosecutor sought to remove race from the case, as
opposed to inviting jury to consider Porter’s race in weighing the evidence.
We therefore see nothing in the prosecutor’s questions or argument
indicating that she exhibited or appealed to racial bias.
Under these circumstances, Porter fails “to persuade us that had [her]
counsel made a timely motion asserting that the People violated the RJA . . . ,

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the motion would have been granted. Thus, [she has] not established either
the deficient performance or the resulting prejudice required to prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Quintero (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1078.)
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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