Ehrlich v. The Jewish Federation etc. CA2/4

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Filed 5/4/26 Ehrlich v. The Jewish Federation etc. CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

REBECCA EHRLICH, B338478
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant Super. Ct. No. 22STCV14548)

v.

THE JEWISH FEDERATION-
COUNCIL OF GREATER LOS
ANGELES,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from judgment and order of the Superior Court of
the County of Los Angeles, Kristin S. Escalante, Judge.
Affirmed.
Pessah Law Group and Maurice D. Pessah; and Joseph S.
Socher for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Musick, Peeler & Garrett, Cheryl A. Orr and Jacquelene A.
Robinson, for Defendant and Respondent.
Rebecca Ehrlich appeals after summary judgment was
granted in favor of her former employer, the Jewish Federation-
Council of Greater Los Angeles (the Federation), on her
complaint for pregnancy and gender discrimination, retaliation,
and harassment in violation of the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940, et seq.) and for
infliction of emotional distress. She contends triable issues of
fact precluded summary judgment and the trial court erred in
denying her request for relief under Code of Civil Procedure,
section 437c, subdivision (h) (section 437c(h)).1 Ehrlich also
contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for a new
trial or to vacate the judgment. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The following facts are undisputed.2

1 Undesignated statutory references in this opinion are to the
Code of Civil Procedure. Undesignated references to rules are to the
California Rules of Court.
2 Ehrlich violated the requirements governing responses to a
moving party’s statement of undisputed material facts.
(Rule 3.1350(f)(2); § 437c, subd. (b)(3).) She avoided unequivocally
stating whether many facts were disputed or undisputed. She also
failed to describe the nature of her dispute or cite evidence supporting
the existence of a controversy. In these instances, we treat the facts as
undisputed. (See Choi v. Sagemark Consulting (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th
308, 319 [a plaintiff’s failure to follow each disputed material fact with
a reference to supporting evidence “essentially leav[es] those facts
uncontroverted”]; Whitehead v. Habig (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 896, 902
[opposing party’s noncompliance with separate statement
requirements is grounds for granting motion].)

2
1. Ehrlich’s Employment With the Federation and Move
to New York
The Federation, a California nonprofit corporation,
provides humanitarian relief and raises and distributes funds for
social and educational programs. Its principal place of business
is in Los Angeles, as are most of its donors, and it has never been
licensed to do business in New York.
The Federation hired Ehrlich in 2016 and promoted her to
Senior Donor Relations Associate in early 2019. The role
required her to “‘manag[e] a portfolio of donors primarily through
field-based face to face donor contact, securing meetings and
soliciting gifts.’” It also required travel to “‘frequent donor
meetings outside of the office.’” Before the COVID-19 pandemic,
she typically attended events “two to three nights a week,
minimum,” in addition to at least five weekly in-person donor
meetings.
Ehrlich went on maternity leave in early 2020 after the
birth of her first child. The pandemic began soon after, during
which Federation’s employees worked remotely. When her leave
ended in June 2020, Ehrlich was living in New York.

2. The Federation Announces Its Return-To-Work Policy
By early April 2021, others on the donor relations team had
resumed in-person donor meetings. Internal discussions ensued
about the entire team doing the same. In two meetings in April,
Ehrlich’s immediate supervisor, Andrew Cushnir, the
Federation’s Executive Vice President of Donor Relations, asked
her about returning to Los Angeles. Cushnir, in what Ehrlich
described as a “condescending” tone, told her it was her

3
responsibility to meet with donors and solicit donations, and she
should be doing that.
Human resources invited all employees to a Zoom meeting
on May 5, 2021. The invitation attached information about all
employees returning to in-person work on August 2, 2021. At the
May 5 meeting, Jay Sanderson, the Federation’s Chief Executive
Officer, discussed the office reopening and return-to-work plan.
He commented that multiple staff members were working
remotely, including “‘one individual working as far as New
York,’” and they all would need to return to in-person work in Los
Angeles.3

3. Ehrlich’s Complaint to Human Resources
On May 10, 2021, Ehrlich complained to Cyndie Ayala, the
Federation’s Senior Vice President of Administration and Human
Resources, that she felt singled out, bullied, and harassed by
Sanderson and Cushnir. Ayala took notes and agreed to
investigate, and Ehrlich expressed she “felt good” about the
investigation plan. During this call, Ehrlich said she was not
willing to meet with donors outside of the office.
Ayala spoke with Cushnir and Sanderson. Cushnir
reported informing Ehrlich of his expectation that she meet face-
to-face with donors, but she repeatedly deflected inquiries about
her return plans. Ayala directed him to refrain from raising the

3 Ehrlich argues that Sanderson also commented that the New
York employee was on vacation and receiving free childcare. She did
not, however, provide a citation to evidence of this comment in her
response to the statement of undisputed facts. This failure precludes
her from relying on the alleged comment to raise a triable issue.
(Rule 3.1350(f)(3).)

4
subject, and he complied. Sanderson said he meant no offense,
only to reiterate his desire to have employees return to in-person
work and for the donor relations team to resume face-to-face
meetings to facilitate fundraising. Ayala concluded there was no
wrongdoing and no basis for further action.

4. Ehrlich’s Second Pregnancy and Conclusion of
Ayala’s Investigation
On July 9, 2021, Ehrlich learned she was pregnant.
Ayala and Ehrlich discussed the investigation on
July 16, 2021. Ehrlich indicated she was satisfied with the
results, and no further action was necessary. According to
Ehrlich, they also discussed her pregnancy.4 Ehrlich understood
the all-staff return remained scheduled for August but said she
was not yet comfortable meeting face-to-face with donors. In
discussing her comfort level, Ehrlich testified that Ayala asked
whether she “was affected by the pregnancy.” Ehrlich responded
“no” and explained that her position was because her son was not
vaccinated.

5. Ehrlich’s Separation from the Federation
On July 26, 2021, human resources emailed information to
all employees about the August 2, 2021 reopening. Ehrlich
understood she was expected to return to Los Angeles by then
and meet with donors in person.

4 Ayala denied learning of Ehrlich’s pregnancy in that
conversation, but for purposes of our analysis, we will assume she did.
Ehrlich informed other co-workers of her pregnancy the same day. She
does not contend the Federation was aware of her pregnancy before
July 16.

5
During a July 27, 2021, call, Ayala asked Ehrlich if she
planned to return to in-person work by the reopening date.
Ehrlich said she would not agree to resume in-person donor
meetings until her child received the COVID-19 vaccine. Ehrlich
understood that, if she were not willing to return to in-person
donor meetings by August 2, the Federation was “letting [her]
go.” They chose July 30, 2021, as her last day so she could close
out her donor portfolio. 5
On July 29, 2021, the Federation announced to employees
that the reopening date would be delayed to September 9, 2021,
due to a surge in COVID-19 infections.
On July 30, 2021, Ehrlich asked Maria Spassoff, the
Federation’s Vice President of Human Resources, to confirm
whether her termination was proceeding. Spassoff stated that
Ehrlich’s employment had not been terminated, and she wanted
to discuss Ehrlich’s “future with the Federation.” Ehrlich did not
reply.
On August 3, 2021, Ivan Wolkind, the Federation’s Chief
Financial and Operating Office, wrote to Ehrlich. He stated the
return-to-work policy applied to all staff, the date for returning
had been postponed until September, at which time, all
vaccinated fundraising staff, including Ehrlich, had to resume in-
person meetings and events. In addition, Wolkind expressed
concern about Ehrlich’s prolonged stay in New York, as taxes had
been withheld based on her California residency. The
Federation, he wrote, was not authorized to do business in New
York and could not employ a New York resident.

5 The Federation claims Ehrlich voluntarily resigned on
September 17, 2021. For purposes of our analysis, we accept Ehrlich’s
evidence that she was terminated as of July 30.

6
Wolkind also wrote that management had no knowledge
that the pregnancy impacted Ehrlich’s ability to work, but if that
belief was inaccurate or if she needed an accommodation to
perform her job, she should provide a doctor’s note detailing any
such accommodation. “Otherwise, based on Federation policy
and our inability to employ residents of New York, if you wish to
remain a Federation employee, you must return to in-person
work, in California, by September 9, 2021. If you choose to
remain in New York, we can explore options for your separation
from the Federation.” In her reply the next day, Ehrlich did not
commit to returning or request any accommodation.
On August 5, 2021, Wolkind asked Ehrlich again to confirm
her return to Los Angeles by the reopening date. Ehrlich did not
respond to this email or another on August 9, in which Wolkind
stated Ehrlich was being paid, had access to office systems, and
should perform her job duties as directed by her supervisors.
On September 9, 2021, all employees returned to in-person
work. Ehrlich did not fulfill her job duties in August or
September 2021, though she remained an active employee on the
Federation’s payroll. The Federation processed her separation as
a voluntary resignation as of September 17, 2021, and paid her
final paycheck and unused vacation time.

B. Procedural History
In early May 2022, Ehrlich filed the operative complaint,
which asserted claims for (1) retaliation (Gov. Code, § 12940,
subd. (h)); (2) unlawful pregnancy discrimination (id., § 12940,
subd. (a)); (3) unlawful gender discrimination (id., § 12940,
subd. (a)); (4) pregnancy harassment (id., § 12940, subd. (j));
(5) failure to prevent unlawful discrimination and harassment

7
(id., § 12940, subd. (k)); (6) failure to investigate or take
corrective action (id., § 12940, subd. (j)(1)); (7) intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED); and (8) negligent infliction
of emotional distress (NIED).
Trial was initially set for November 6, 2023. In July 2023,
the trial court granted the Federation’s contested request to
continue the trial date. Trial was continued to January 29, 2024,
and the discovery and discovery motion cutoffs were extended to
December 30, 2023, and January 15, 2024, respectively.
On October 5, 2023, the Federation filed its motion for
summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication.
Ehrlich filed her opposition on December 6, 2023. The motion
was heard on December 20, 2023 and granted on
January 8, 2024.
On January 29, 2024, Ehrlich filed her motion for new trial
(§ 657) and to vacate the judgment (§ 662) (new trial motion). On
February 5, 2024, the court entered judgment. On
March 29, 2024, it denied the new trial motion.
On April 30, 2024, Ehrlich filed notices of appeal from the
judgment and from the order denying the new trial/vacatur
motion.

DISCUSSION6
A. Summary Judgment Motion
1. Motion Proceedings and Claims of Error
The Federation’s motion relied on the above-recited
undisputed facts, which were supported by declarations from

6 The deadline to timely file a notice of appeal was April 29, 2024.
The Federation moves to dismiss the appeal because the notices were

8
Spassoff, Sanderson, Cushnir, and Ayala, excerpts from their and
Ehrlich’s depositions, and exhibits. Relevant to this appeal, the
Federation contended that Ehrlich could not establish that (1)
she suffered any adverse employment action because of her
pregnancy, (2) its legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
ending her employment were pretextual, or (3) it retaliated
against her based upon a protected activity. It further contended
that Ehrlich could not establish that harassment was
attributable to a protected characteristic or was sufficiently
severe or pervasive.
In her opposition, Ehrlich argued she was terminated
11 days after disclosing her pregnancy on July 16, 2021, and at
the time, was willing to work in the Federation’s office, though
unwilling to meet with donors externally. She argued the
reasons given for her discharge were pretextual. She filed a one-
page declaration and relied primarily on her own deposition
testimony to raise triable issues. The trial court sustained the
Federation’s objections to Ehrlich’s entire declaration and its
exhibits. This ruling is not challenged on appeal.
On appeal from summary judgment, Ehrlich contends there
were triable issues as to whether the given termination reasons
were pretextual and “on her harassment claims.” (Boldface

filed a day late. We deny the motion. Ehrlich’s counsel declares that
on April 29 notices of appeal were submitted to the superior court for
filing, but the clerk rejected them on April 30 because they omitted
counsel’s zip code. Corrected notices were filed on April 30. We deem
the notices of appeal to be timely filed. (See Lazar v. Bishop (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 668, 676 [notice of appeal deemed timely though dated
four days late, where submitted before deadline expired but
subsequently rejected because counsel miscategorized it in the
dropdown menu for electronic filing].)

9
omitted.) She argues that reversal of the ruling as to the primary
discrimination and retaliation claims also requires reversal of the
rulings on the derivative FEHA failure to prevent discrimination
claim and the IIED and NIED claims. Finally, she contends the
court erred in denying relief under section 437c(h).

2. Governing Law and Standard of Review
A party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no
triable issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. (§ 437c, subd. (c).) A triable issue of fact
exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find
the fact in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) We
review the trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion
de novo, liberally construe the evidence in favor of the party
opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of the opponent. (Miller v. Department of
Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460.)

3. Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
In her retaliation claim (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h)),
Ehrlich alleged she tried to report Cushnir’s and Sanderson’s
conduct, but instead of addressing her grievances, the Federation
discharged her. In her discrimination claims (id., § 12940,
subd. (a)), Ehrlich alleged she was a member of a protected class,
and her pregnancy and gender were a factor in the Federation’s
termination decision. The trial court granted summary
adjudication of these claims because it found Ehrlich was
terminated because of her refusal to return to work on an in-
person basis, and she failed to raise a triable issue that this

10
reason was pretextual. The court also found she did not raise a
triable issue as to discrimination or that she was harassed
because of her protected status.
FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge [a]
person from employment . . . or to discriminate against the
person . . . in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
because of the person’s sex or gender, among other protected
categories. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) “‘Sex’” is defined to
include pregnancy or medical conditions related to pregnancy.
(Id., § 12926, subd. (r)(1).) FEHA also makes it unlawful for an
employer “to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against
any person because the person has opposed any practices
forbidden under this part . . . .” (Id., § 12940, subd. (h).)
Presented with direct evidence of discrimination or
retaliation, a defendant can avoid liability by proving that the
plaintiff would have been subject to the same adverse
employment decision absent discrimination or retaliation.
(Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 1, 34 (Zamora).) “Direct evidence is evidence that
proves a fact without inference or presumption.” (Id. at p. 35.) In
most cases, however, only circumstantial evidence is available.
In those cases, California courts use the burden-shifting approach
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S.
792, at pages 802 through 805. (Harris v. City of Santa Monica
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 214 [discrimination]; Yanowitz v. L’Oreal
USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz) [retaliation].)
Under this framework, the employee bears the initial
burden of setting forth a prima facie case of discrimination or
retaliation. A plaintiff claiming discrimination must
demonstrate: “(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he

11
was qualified for the position he sought or was performing
competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse
employment action, such as termination . . . and (4) some other
circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz v. Bechtel
National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)
A plaintiff claiming retaliation must show: “(1) he or she
engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the
employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link
existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.”
(Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1042.)
Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the
employer must offer a legitimate reason for the adverse
employment action. (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1042.) If
the employer does so, the presumption of retaliation or
discrimination “‘“‘drops out of the picture,’”’ and the burden shifts
back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation” or
discrimination. (Ibid.) To meet this final burden, the plaintiff
“must produce substantial responsive evidence to show that [the
employer’s] ostensible motive was pretextual; that is, ‘that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or that
the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence.’” (King v.
United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 433
(King).) The plaintiff need not prove that discriminatory or
retaliatory animus was the sole motivation behind the challenged
action, but “must produce evidence that, taken as a whole,
permits a rational inference that intentional discrimination [or
retaliation] was a substantial motivating reason for the adverse
action.” (Carroll v. City and County of San Francisco (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 1192, 1204.)

12
These burdens are altered somewhat in the summary
judgment context. (Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 32.) The
employer, as the moving party, bears the initial burden of
producing admissible evidence showing either (1) a deficiency in
one or more elements of the employee’s prima facie case, or
(2) that legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors motivated the
adverse employment decision at issue. (Ibid.) If the employer
satisfies this burden, it is entitled to summary judgment or
adjudication unless the plaintiff comes forward with admissible
evidence that raises a triable issue of fact material to the
employer’s showing. (Ibid.)

a. The Federation Had a Legitimate Reason For
Termination
The trial court found, and we agree, that the Federation
carried its initial burden on summary judgment. The
Federation’s return-to-work mandate applied to all employees
and was announced before Ehrlich knew she was pregnant. In-
person donor meetings were a principal duty of Ehrlich’s job as a
fundraiser, and all members of her team were directed to resume
them. Ehrlich was terminated when she refused to comply. This
was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonretaliatory reason for
termination, and the burden shifted back to Ehrlich to produce
substantial responsive evidence to show the Federation’s
ostensible motive was pretextual. (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at
p. 1042.)

13
b. Ehrlich Failed to Raise a Triable Issue as to
Pretext
Ehrlich fails to persuade us that she raised a triable issue
as to whether a discriminatory reason motivated her discharge.
First, Ehrlich argues she did not refuse to return to all in-
person work, only meetings outside of the office with donors. She
does not explain, however, how this selective unwillingness
shows that her gender or pregnancy motivated the termination
decision.
Second, Ehrlich contends her refusal to resume in-person
meetings became a basis for termination only after she disclosed
her pregnancy. She argues this inference may be drawn from the
Federation’s decision to extend the return-to-work mandate from
August to September 2021 and from evidence that, until
July 27, 2021, return to in-person work was dependent on the
employees’ comfort level. We disagree.
A surge in COVID-19 infections was the reason for the
Federation’s decision to briefly delay implementation of the
return-to-work policy. After the new date was announced, the
Federation informed Ehrlich multiple times that her employment
had not been terminated, and it continued to pay her, kept open
her access to office systems, and invited her to request an
accommodation of her pregnancy. A motivation to terminate
Ehrlich because of her pregnancy cannot reasonably be inferred
from these circumstances.
As for a return-to-work policy that depended on individual
comfort level, Ehrlich did not raise or develop this argument in
the trial court. Her opposition brief did not suggest there were
exceptions to the policy. (Bitner v. Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1065 [plaintiff forfeits

14
contention that evidence raised a triable issue where argument
was not made in opposition brief].) If not forfeited, her argument
is unpersuasive. Even if the Federation had at one time
permitted fundraisers to avoid in-person donor interactions based
on their personal preferences, the Federation consistently
communicated that such interactions would become mandatory
no later than the companywide reopening.
Third, Ehrlich argues that pretext may be inferred from the
Federation’s shifting and inconsistent reasons for ending her
employment. She argues that Ayala cited the violation of the
return-to-work mandate as the basis for termination, while
Wolkind cited the Federation’s inability to employ New York
residents. It is undisputed, however, that Wolkind’s
August 3, 2021, email stated both that Ehrlich was required to
comply with the Federation’s in-person work policy, and “[i]n
addition,” the Federation could not employ a New York resident.
These reasons are not incompatible and may not properly be
characterized as shifting reasons that give rise to an inference of
a discriminatory motive. (See Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield
Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 815, citing Nidds v.
Schindler Elevator Corp. (9th Cir. 1996) 113 F.3d 912, 918.) The
Federation could reasonably expect a fundraiser to engage donors
in the manner prescribed by her job description and as directed
by her supervisors while simultaneously seeking to comply with
business and tax laws.
Fourth, Ehrlich argues that pretext may be inferred from
an inadequate investigation of her complaints. She argues that
“no real investigation occurred” because Spassoff, the Vice
President of Human Resources, never saw Ayala’s notes or other
documentation. However, undisputed evidence established that

15
Ayala heard Ehrlich’s complaints, took notes, proposed and
received her approval of an investigation plan, spoke with
Sanderson and Cushnir, reported the results to Ehrlich, and
confirmed Ehrlich’s satisfaction with the results. Ayala also
directed Cushnir to cease the specific behavior Ehrlich reported,
and he complied. No reasonable factfinder would find this
investigation gave rise to an inference of a discriminatory motive.
Finally, Ehrlich argues that pretext may be inferred from
the fact she was terminated shortly after disclosing her
pregnancy. Temporal proximity alone is insufficient to carry an
employee’s burden to show a triable issue of fact on whether the
employer’s articulated reason was pretextual. (Loggins v. Kaiser
Permanente Internat. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1112; see
King, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 436 [employee’s discharge for
violating corporate integrity policy less than two months after he
returned from a medical leave was insufficient to raise inference
that medical condition prompted his discharge].) Here, the
Federation ended Ehrlich’s employment because she stated her
refusal to comply with the return-to-work mandate and perform a
core job duty. The fact that this occurred close in time to the
revelation of her pregnancy is insufficient to permit an inference
that the pregnancy prompted the decision.
Because Ehrlich failed to show a triable issue as to a
pretextual termination reason, the trial court did not err in
granting summary adjudication of the discrimination and
retaliation claims. 7 (Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 32.)

7 Our holding on this basis renders it unnecessary for us to
address any argument concerning the trial court’s alternative grounds
for summary adjudication on the discrimination and harassment
claims.

16
4. Pregnancy Harassment
In support of her fourth cause of action for pregnancy
harassment, Ehrlich alleged the Federation engaged in a pattern
of harassment “for her decision to temporarily locate out of Los
Angeles,” causing her to “perceive her work environment as
intimidating, hostile, abusive and/or offensive.” Cushnir, she
alleged, began harassing her in “early 2021” by inquiring about
when she would return to Los Angeles. The alleged harassment
“worsened [and came] to a head” at the May 5 Zoom meeting,
when Sanderson “[ridiculed her] decision to work remotely.” The
Federation allegedly did not conduct “a prompt and thorough
investigation,” allowing the harassment to continue.
“To establish a prima facie case of unlawful harassment
under FEHA, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) [s]he was a member of a
protected class; (2) [s]he was subjected to
unwelcome . . . harassment; (3) the harassment was based on [the
plaintiff's membership in an enumerated class]; (4) the
harassment unreasonably interfered with h[er] work performance
by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment; and (5) [the employer] is liable for the harassment.’
[Citation.]” (Martin v. Trustees of California State University
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 149, 170.) Relevant here, “‘[t]he law
prohibiting harassment is violated “[w]hen the workplace is
permeated with discriminatory intimation, ridicule and insult
that is ‘“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.”’”’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., italics added.)
On appeal, Ehrlich does not challenge the trial court’s
finding that she failed to raise a triable issue regarding
sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment. Even on de novo

17
review, Ehrlich, as the appellant, bears the burden to
affirmatively demonstrate error. (Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892, 913 [even under a de novo standard
of review, “the appellant must frame the issues for us, show us
where the superior court erred, and provide us with the proper
citations to the record and case law”]; Wurzl v. Holloway (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 1740, 1754, fn. 1 [argument not raised in opening
brief is deemed to have been abandoned or waived].) Because she
failed to demonstrate a triable issue on a requisite element of
harassment, we discern no error in summarily adjudicating this
claim.

5. Failure to Prevent Discrimination, IIED, and NIED
Ehrlich’s next contention of error is directed to the claim for
failure to prevent discrimination (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k))
and “common claims,” which are presumably the IIED and NIED
claims. She argues that reversal of summary adjudication of the
discrimination and retaliation claims requires reversal of
summary adjudication of these claims.
We agree that the FEHA failure-to-prevent claim stands or
falls on the merits of Ehrlich’s discrimination and retaliation
claims. (See Paleny v. Fireplace Products U.S., Inc. (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 199, 213.) As Ehrlich’s claims for discrimination and
harassment fail as a matter of law for the reasons we have
explained, so too does her FEHA failure-to-prevent claim.
Ehrlich does not address the trial court’s rulings on the
emotional distress claims. She does not discuss the court’s
findings that the Federation carried its initial burden of
demonstrating no extreme or outrageous conduct and that

18
Ehrlich failed to raise a triable issue on that fact. She does not
challenge the court’s findings that her NIED claim was barred by
the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule and that she could not
show the violation of any duty to prevent emotional distress. As
Ehrlich has not demonstrated error by the court, we conclude
summary adjudication was properly granted on these claims.

B. Denial of Relief Under Section 437c(h)
As an alternative basis for relief, Ehrlich alleged the
Federation engaged in various discovery abuses,8 and she
requested either a continuance of the summary judgment hearing
or denial of the motion outright pursuant section 437c(h).9 The
court denied the request, finding Ehrlich did not identify any
facts she was unable to obtain were essential to opposing
summary judgment. We discern no abuse of the trial court’s
discretion. (See Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76,
100.)
A party requesting relief under section 437c(h) must show,
through supporting declarations, “‘“[f]acts establishing a
likelihood that controverting evidence may exist and why the

8 The purported misconduct included service of defective or
belated privilege logs, conducting an inadequate search for documents
responsive to production requests, failing to produce Ayala to complete
a deposition that began in early 2023, and instructing Spassoff not to
answer certain questions at her deposition.
9 Section 437c(h) provides, in pertinent part: “If it appears from
the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to
justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be
presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any
other order as may be just. . . .”

19
information sought is essential to opposing the motion . . . .”’”
(501 East 51st Street, etc. v. Kookmin Best Ins. Co., Ltd. (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 924, 939.) Despite vaguely declaring that “essential
facts” may exist and could be discovered through the depositions
of Ayala, Spassoff, and Cushnir and pending discovery motions,
Ehrlich did not identify any fact(s) that could raise a triable
issue.
On appeal, Ehrlich still does not articulate what facts were
unavailable to her that could have raised a triable issue. Instead,
she argues she was held to an “impossibly high” degree of
specificity, and a similarly nonspecific declaration was found to
be sufficient to support a continuance in Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95
Cal.App.4th 627 (Frazee).
Frazee is distinguishable. There, a continuance was
warranted to allow preparation of the defendant’s deposition
transcript, where the declaration of plaintiff’s counsel established
that the testimony included admissions tending to prove
elements essential to claims of legal malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty, such as misrepresentations made to the plaintiff.
(Frazee, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 633.) Here, Ehrlich failed to
identify even the claims as to which a triable issue might be
raised if she could complete discovery. Even under Frazee, her
showing was deficient.

C. Motion For New Trial
Ehrlich argued to the trial court that the Federation’s
alleged discovery abuses were irregularities in the proceedings
warranting a new trial pursuant to section 657. She also
contended that “‘newly discovered evidence’” came to light after
the summary judgment motion was fully briefed: deposition

20
testimony given by her former coworker, Alexi Baker, on
December 29, 2023.
A motion for a new trial may challenge an order granting
summary judgment. (Doe v. United Air Lines, Inc. (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504.) Section 657 provides that a new trial
may be granted for “causes, materially affecting the substantial
rights of such party” including “1. Irregularity in the proceedings
. . . by which either party was prevented from having a fair
trial . . . 4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.” We review
the trial court’s order for abuse of discretion. (Doe, supra, 160
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1504–1505; Higginson v. Kia Motors America,
Inc. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 316, 344.)
Section 657 required Ehrlich to show how the alleged
discovery abuses “materially affect[ed] [her] substantial rights.”
To do so, she had to demonstrate a reasonable probability she
would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the
alleged discovery issues. (TRC Operating Co., Inc. v. Chevron
USA, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1063.) Ehrlich did not
meet this requirement, as her motion papers did not identify any
facts she was prevented from discovering that would establish
triable issues on, e.g., pretext, discrimination, retaliation,
harassment, and she does not do so on appeal. Thus, she failed to
show any probability of a more favorable result on summary
judgment if a new trial were granted.
Ehrlich’s alternative basis for a new trial—the deposition of
her former coworker Baker —fares no better. A party requesting
a new trial for newly discovered evidence must establish
reasonable diligence in discovering and producing that evidence.

21
(Plancarte v. Guardsmark (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 640, 646.) The
Federation presented evidence indicating Ehrlich believed Baker
possessed relevant knowledge but waited until after the deadline
to oppose summary judgment to notice her deposition. Ehrlich
did not explain why the deposition could not have been taken
earlier. The trial court found that she did not exercise reasonable
diligence in obtaining Baker’s deposition, and Ehrlich does not
contest this finding on appeal. Even if we were to assume Baker
gave relevant testimony, the court was within its discretion to
find Ehrlich unjustifiably delayed in obtaining it and denying a
new trial on that basis.

DISPOSITION
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are
affirmed. The Federation shall recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

MORI, Acting P. J.
We concur:

TAMZARIAN, J.

**COGLIATI, J.

** Judge of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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