CourtListener 10851801•Doe v. Sigma Alpha Mu Fraternity CA2/1
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Filed 5/1/26 Doe v. Sigma Alpha Mu Fraternity CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
JANE DOE, B341946
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV46495)
v.
SIGMA ALPHA MU
FRATERNITY, INC., et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rolf M. Treu, Judge. Affirmed.
Hillary Johns, Trial Lawyer, Hillary Johns and Stephen M.
Sirota for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Yoka Smith, Mary Childs, Patrick Ball and Shauna W.
Avrith for Defendants and Respondents.
_______________________________
Plaintiff and Appellant Jane Doe was allegedly raped by a
university fraternity member during a party hosted by the
fraternity’s local chapter at its leased residence (the Chapter
House). Plaintiff brought negligence claims against Defendant
and Respondent Sigma Alpha Mu, Inc. (SAM Inc.), which is the
national fraternity to which the local chapter belongs, and the
following affiliated entities: Defendants and Respondents SAM
USC Housing, LLC (SAM USC), the owner of the Chapter House
and the local chapter’s landlord; SAM Property Management,
LLC (SAM PM), the property manager; and SAM National
Properties, LLC (SAM National), SAM USC’s managing entity.
Plaintiff also sued the alleged rapist, the local chapter, and the
security company that the local chapter had hired for the event,
none of whom are parties to this appeal.
SAM USC, SAM PM, and SAM National (collectively
“Defendants”) filed a joint motion for summary judgment. The
trial court granted the motion, concluding that Defendants did
not owe Plaintiff a duty, as alleged in her operative complaint, to
hire security guards for the local chapter’s party (as the local
chapter allegedly did) and to implement a system to prevent
service of alcohol to underage partygoers. The trial court also
overruled Plaintiff’s objections to various evidence and sustained
Defendants’ objections to the declaration of Plaintiff’s expert
witness, who opined that Defendants had a duty to provide
security of an unspecified nature. Plaintiff appealed from the
judgment in Defendants’ favor.
Plaintiff also appealed from a separate judgment in favor of
SAM Inc., which had filed a separate summary judgment motion.
However, Plaintiff’s appellate briefs raised no issue concerning
the judgment in SAM Inc.’s favor. Moreover, Plaintiff omitted
2
the separate evidence and moving papers related to SAM Inc.’s
motion from her appellant’s appendix (and did not address those
documents in her reply brief, after Defendants included them in
their respondents’ appendix). Accordingly, we agree with
Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff forfeited any challenge to the
judgment in SAM Inc.’s favor. (E.g., Lee v. Kim (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 705, 721 (Lee) [“ ‘ “When an appellant fails to raise a
point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument
and citations to authority, we treat the point as [forfeited]” ’ ”].)
We need not further discuss the proceedings involving SAM Inc.
As to the judgment in Defendants’ favor, Plaintiff argues
that (1) the trial court prejudicially erred by overruling her
evidentiary objections and sustaining Defendants’; and (2) the
trial court erred by concluding that Defendants did not owe her a
duty to implement her proposed security measures at the local
chapter’s party. We conclude that Plaintiff forfeited her
challenge to the admission of Defendants’ evidence by failing to
present a reasoned argument regarding prejudice, and that the
trial court properly sustained Defendants’ objections to the
relevant portions of her expert’s declaration. On the merits,
assessing the scope of Defendants’ duty as landlords (or assumed
alter egos of the landlord) to protect guests at the Chapter House
from third-party sexual assault, we agree with the trial court’s
conclusion that Defendants did not have a duty to hire security
guards for the local chapter’s party or to implement a system to
prevent service of alcohol to underage attendees. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgments. We need not address Plaintiff’s arguments
regarding alter ego liability and punitive damages.
3
BACKGROUND
A. SAM USC purchased the Chapter House, leased it to
the local chapter, and hired SAM PM as the property
manager.
SAM Inc. is a nonprofit college fraternity. It recognizes
approximately 48 local chapters at various colleges and
universities in the United States and Canada. The local chapter
at the University of Southern California (USC) is the Sigma
Alpha Mu Fraternity, Mu Theta Chapter at University of
Southern California (Mu Theta). Mu Theta is an unincorporated
association of undergraduate students.
In 2015, SAM Inc. created SAM National and SAM PM for
the purposes, respectively, of obtaining housing for local chapters
and providing property management services. SAM National
recruited 27 investors to form SAM USC. Under SAM USC’s
operating agreement, SAM National has the power to manage
SAM USC’s business and affairs.
On July 1, 2019, SAM USC purchased the Chapter House,
located at 904 West 28th Street in Los Angeles. SAM USC leased
the Chapter House to Mu Theta and hired SAM PM as the
property manager. As permitted by the lease, Mu Theta executed
residency agreements with individual Mu Theta members,
including Peter Hwang.
The lease authorized SAM USC and SAM PM to enter the
Chapter House with prior notice to conduct regularly scheduled
periodic inspections or repairs. Otherwise, the lease required Mu
Theta to notify SAM USC or SAM PM of any need for repairs.
SAM PM’s custom and practice was to inspect the Chapter House
for dangerous conditions and other maintenance issues annually,
prior to the beginning of each academic year at USC. Before
4
January 25, 2020, SAM PM did not identify any dangerous
condition at the Chapter House or receive notice from Mu Theta
of any dangerous condition there.
B. Defendants knew of a general risk of sexual assault
at fraternity parties but had no notice of any sexual
assault allegations against Mu Theta or Hwang, or of
Mu Theta’s intent to host a party.
SAM Inc. procured a liability insurance policy that applied
to itself, SAM USC, SAM PM, and SAM National. The policy
covered sexual abuse or misconduct (unless the insured actively
participated in or directly caused the abuse or misconduct).
SAM Inc. maintained a risk management policy that
addressed known risks at fraternity parties. The policy
prohibited sexual assault and other sexually abusive behavior.
SAM Inc.’s executive director, Andy Huston, testified that sexual
assault is a known risk at fraternity parties.
The risk management policy also prohibited illegal use of
alcohol and other drugs at fraternity events and on chapter
premises. SAM Inc. warned Mu Theta and its members that
violations of the risk management policy could lead to suspension
or termination of their membership in the fraternity.
SAM USC hired one of its investors, Blake Newman, as a
live-in residential advisor to monitor the Chapter House and to
report violations of fraternity rules to SAM USC and SAM PM.
The record contains no evidence that Newman observed or
reported any violations.
At the time SAM USC purchased the Chapter House, Mu
Theta was on probation with USC and SAM Inc. Huston testified
that he believed Mu Theta’s probation “was a result of some
hazing allegations.” The record contains no other evidence
5
regarding the reasons for Mu Theta’s probation. Its probation
ended in December 2019 (the month before Hwang allegedly
raped Plaintiff on January 25, 2020).
SAM PM’s president, Teresa Wright, declared: “Prior to
the alleged incident, SAM PM did not have any information that
Hwang was dangerous or had a history of sexually assaulting
females. SAM PM also did not have any knowledge that Mu
Theta had any reputation at USC for sexually assaulting females,
or that anyone had ever accused a Mu Theta member in the past
of sexually assaulting them.” The trial court overruled Plaintiff’s
foundation and hearsay objections to the quoted portion of
Wright’s declaration. Wright had worked for SAM PM as a
property manager from the time it first started managing the
Chapter House to the time of the incident. She had never met
Hwang.
SAM USC and SAM PM had no advance notice that Mu
Theta intended to host a party on January 25, 2020. SAM USC
did not have any policy that required Mu Theta to obtain security
for parties (as noted below, however, Plaintiff alleges that Mu
Theta hired security for the January 25 party). No employee of
SAM PM was present during the party.1
C. According to Plaintiff’s complaint, Mu Theta hosted
a party at the Chapter House and hired security
guards. Plaintiff attended the party, where Hwang
forced her into a gym and raped her.
In connection with Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, the parties cited Plaintiff’s complaint (rather than
1 SAM National and SAM USC had no employees. Thus, no
employee of any Defendant was present during the party.
6
admissible evidence) to describe the alleged events of January 25,
2020. We summarize the following factual allegations in
Plaintiff’s complaint to provide context for her claims.
On January 21, 2020, Mu Theta entered into an event
services agreement with The Perfect Event, Inc. (TPE),
concerning a party scheduled to take place at the Chapter House
on the evening of January 25.2 Pursuant to the agreement, TPE
provided 10 “security and/or event staff” members for the party.
The agreement provided: “TPE will monitor the event to
reasonably ensure that only invited guests are permitted into the
Event. If applicable, event staff shall require identification to
verify guests are of legal drinking age, and shall supply
identifying wristbands where necessary.” The agreement
indicated that Mu Theta (not TPE) would host a bar.
On January 25, Plaintiff visited a friend at USC, drank
alcohol in her friend’s student housing, and accompanied her
friend to Mu Theta’s party at the Chapter House. Plaintiff, who
was then under 21 years old, showed her ID to individuals at the
door (presumably TPE staff). Those individuals did not provide
her with any wristband or other symbol that would identify her
as under 21. Inside, although Plaintiff was “visibly intoxicated,”
a bartender served Plaintiff alcohol, without checking her ID.
During the party, Hwang (who was sober) forced Plaintiff
into the Chapter House’s gymnasium, where he raped her.
Plaintiff sustained injuries, including vaginal tearing and
2 Plaintiff attached the event services agreement to her
complaint, incorporated it therein by reference, and alleged that
TPE provided services as required by the agreement. SAM Inc.
also submitted the agreement as an exhibit in support of its
separate motion for summary judgment.
7
bleeding, a black eye, bruising, and scratches. After Hwang left,
Plaintiff exited the gym and, with her friend’s assistance, walked
back to her friend’s housing.
Plaintiff sought medical treatment at a rape treatment
center and reported the rape to police. She also filed a complaint
against Hwang with USC, which determined that Hwang
violated USC’s policy against sexual assault. USC expelled
Hwang. Plaintiff does not allege, and the record contains no
evidence, that Hwang was criminally charged.
D. Plaintiff sued Defendants for negligence, alleging
they had a duty to implement certain security
measures at Mu Theta’s party. The trial court
granted Defendants summary judgment, concluding
they did not owe Plaintiff the alleged duty.
In December 2021, Plaintiff sued Defendants (as well as
Hwang, Mu Theta, TPE, and SAM Inc.). Her operative, second
amended complaint alleged that Defendants were alter egos of
each other and of SAM Inc. (but not of Mu Theta). The complaint
asserted causes of action against Defendants for negligence;
premises liability; negligent hiring, retention, and supervision;
and negligent infliction of emotional distress.3
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants owed her a duty, based on
a special relationship arising from their ownership or alleged
3 The complaint’s caption identified Plaintiff’s second cause
of action as a claim for premises liability. In contrast, the body of
the complaint identified the second cause of action as a claim for
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision (which would appear
redundant of the fifth cause of action for negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision). The trial court treated the second
cause of action as a premises liability claim. We do the same.
8
control over the Chapter House, to protect her from third-party
sexual assault at any event hosted by Mu Theta on the premises.
She further alleged that Defendants’ duty encompassed
obligations to (1) hire and train security guards for any events at
the Chapter House, in a manner “adequate” to prevent attendees
from using illegal drugs and from entering the house gym; (2)
implement a “system” to ensure that alcohol was not served to
attendees below the legal drinking age (e.g., by hiring and
training bartenders to check IDs before serving alcohol); and (3)
implement an unspecified “safety system.” Plaintiff alleged that
Defendants breached their duty of care by failing to implement
those proposed security measures.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. As relevant,
Defendants argued that all of Plaintiff’s claims against them
failed as a matter of law because they did not owe Plaintiff a duty
to implement her proposed security measures at Mu Theta’s
party. Defendants supported the motion with declarations from
Wright (SAM PM’s president) and Huston (SAM Inc.’s executive
director). Plaintiff filed 20 evidentiary objections (each stating
multiple legal grounds) to Wright’s and Huston’s declarations.
In addition to other evidence, Plaintiff produced an expert
declaration from real estate agent Luis Oliver. As relevant,
Oliver’s declaration stated multiple, materially identical opinions
to the effect that Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of care to
protect her from a known risk of sexual assault at the Chapter
House, including by providing “security.” Oliver did not define
“security” or expressly address whether Defendants had a duty to
hire security guards.
9
Defendants filed objections to 18 paragraphs in Oliver’s
declaration, 11 of which included his opinions about duty.4
Defendants objected to Oliver’s opinions under Evidence Code
sections 702, 801, and 803, on the grounds that they lacked
adequate foundation and constituted impermissible legal
opinions.5
After a hearing, the trial court sustained Defendants’
objections to Oliver’s declaration, overruled Plaintiff’s objections
to Wright’s and Huston’s declarations, and granted Defendants’
motion for summary judgment. For purposes of its duty analysis,
the trial court treated both SAM USC (the owner of the Chapter
House and Mu Theta’s landlord) and SAM PM (the property
manager) as landlords. Applying the framework our Supreme
Court adopted in Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205,
1213-1214 (Castaneda), for determining the scope of a landlord’s
duty to protect tenants and invitees from third-party crime, the
trial court identified the specific security measures that Plaintiff
4 Defendants’ remaining seven objections targeted Oliver’s
opinions that Defendants did not function independently, that
they conducted business in California without proper
registration, and that they created a risk at the Chapter House
by purportedly “making it clear” to unspecified people that
Defendants would not take measures to reduce risks there.
5 Presumably due to a drafting error, Defendants’ objection
to paragraph 18 of Oliver’s declaration failed to state any grounds
for the objection. In paragraph 18, Oliver opined: “The fact that
SAM National Properties was so involved in . . . the Subject
Property, and that this was part of an investment scheme as a
whole, means that it has a duty of care as to how the Subject
Property is managed and maintained, including . . . the duty to
protect against known risks . . . .”
10
proposed in her complaint and concluded that those measures
would be “highly burdensome” for Defendants to implement. The
trial court concluded that Defendants had no duty to implement
such burdensome measures because Defendants’ evidence
indicated that sexual assault at the Chapter House was not
“highly” foreseeable, and because Plaintiff’s evidence failed to
raise a triable issue to the contrary.
Regarding SAM National, the trial court observed that
Plaintiff identified no basis for imposing a duty on SAM National
other than her allegation that it was an alter ago of the other
Defendants. The trial court concluded that “the question of alter
ego is moot and irrelevant” based on its conclusion that no
Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to implement the burdensome
security measures she proposed. Accordingly, the trial court
granted Defendants summary judgment on the ground that they
did not owe Plaintiff the alleged duty underlying all of Plaintiff’s
claims against them.
The trial court entered judgment for Defendants. Plaintiff
filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Standards of review
We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and
opposition papers except that to which objections have been made
and sustained. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th
317, 334.)
As for a trial court’s evidentiary rulings in connection with
a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he weight of
authority . . . supports application of the abuse of discretion
11
standard [citations], but courts have concluded that de novo
review is appropriate where written evidentiary objections on
summary judgment are based on questions of law.” (640 Octavia,
LLC v. Pieper (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1190.) Here, we need
not determine which standard applies because, as explained
below, we conclude that Plaintiff fails to show reversible error
under either standard. (See ibid.)
“No judgment shall be set aside . . . on the ground of . . . the
improper admission or rejection of evidence, . . . unless, after an
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court
shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted
in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; see also
Evid. Code, §§ 353, 354.) “ ‘[A] “miscarriage of justice” should be
declared only when . . . it is reasonably probable that a result
more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached
in the absence of the error.’ ” (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004)
33 Cal.4th 780, 800.) The appellant bears the burden to show
such a probability. (Citizens for Open Government v. City of Lodi
(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 296, 308.)
B. Plaintiff fails to show prejudicial evidentiary error.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by
overruling her objections to portions of Wright’s and Huston’s
declarations and by sustaining Defendants’ objections to the
declaration of her expert witness, Oliver. As explained below, we
conclude that she forfeited her challenge to the admission of the
objected-to portions of Wright’s and Huston’s declarations, and
that the trial court properly sustained Defendants’ objections to
the relevant portions of Oliver’s declaration.
12
1. Plaintiff forfeited her challenge to the admission
of evidence by failing to present a reasoned
argument regarding prejudice.
As noted, “ ‘ “[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, or
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and
citations to authority, we treat the point as [forfeited].” ’ ” (Lee,
supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 721, italics added.) “ ‘[An appellant’s
burden] requires more than simply stating a bare assertion that
the judgment, or part of it, is erroneous and leaving it to the
appellate court to figure out why; it is not the appellate court’s
role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the
judgment . . . .’ ” (Ibid.)
“Nor will this court act as counsel for appellant by
furnishing a legal argument as to how the trial court’s ruling was
prejudicial.” (Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 922, 963.) “It is an appellant’s duty to spell out in
the briefing exactly how a claimed error caused prejudice; put
another way, we do not presume prejudice. Accordingly, the
failure to explain with particularity how a claimed error caused
prejudice forfeits the claim.” (People v. Reardon (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 727, 740; accord, Adams v. MHC Colony Park, L.P.
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 601, 614-615 (Adams); Oswald v.
Landmark Builders, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 240, 247, fn. 4.)
Here, Plaintiff’s opening brief restates her “20 evidentiary
objections with 188 subparts” to Wright’s and Huston’s
declarations, and asserts that the trial court prejudicially erred
by overruling each objection. In discussing prejudice, however,
Plaintiff makes no attempt to explain how excluding the
challenged evidence from the record would establish error in the
judgment. Her opening brief merely asserts that the trial court
13
relied on unspecified challenged evidence in an unspecified
manner—she does not cite specific evidence or specific portions of
the trial court’s summary judgment ruling. Her reply brief
specifies only that the trial court relied on Wright’s and Huston’s
assertions that Defendants functioned as separate entities (i.e.,
not as alter egos).
However, the trial court concluded that “the question of
alter ego is moot and irrelevant” based on its conclusion that no
Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to implement her proposed
security measures at Mu Theta’s party. As explained below, we
agree with the trial court’s dispositive conclusion regarding duty.
Thus, Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the admission of the
challenged evidence that Defendants were not alter egos.
Plaintiff does not attempt to explain how the admission of
any other challenged evidence prejudiced her. Because Plaintiff
did not support her assertion of prejudice with reasoned
argument and citation to the record, we conclude that she
forfeited her claim of prejudicial evidentiary error. (Lee, supra,
41 Cal.App.5th at p. 721; Adams, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp.
614-615.)
Moreover, we have reviewed the objected-to portions of
Wright’s and Huston’s declarations and concluded that they are
immaterial to our duty analysis, with one exception. Specifically,
the trial court overruled Plaintiff’s foundation and hearsay
objections to the following portion of Wright’s declaration: “Prior
to the alleged incident, SAM PM did not have any information
that Hwang was dangerous or had a history of sexually
assaulting females. SAM PM also did not have any knowledge
that Mu Theta had any reputation at USC for sexually assaulting
14
females, or that anyone had ever accused a Mu Theta member in
the past of sexually assaulting them.”
Wright worked for SAM PM as a property manager from
the time it first started managing the Chapter House to the time
Hwang allegedly assaulted Plaintiff. At the time of her
declaration, she was SAM PM’s president and one of only two
SAM PM employees (the second being her successor as property
manager). Plaintiff does not address Wright’s experience and
position with SAM PM, much less cite authority indicating that it
supplied an insufficient foundation for her representations that
SAM PM was unaware of any prior accusations against Hwang or
Mu Theta. Nor does Plaintiff explain why the challenged portion
of Wright’s declaration, which did not mention any statement by
another person, allegedly violated the hearsay rule.
For these additional reasons, we conclude that Plaintiff
forfeited her assertion that the trial court prejudicially erred by
admitting the challenged portion of Wright’s declaration. (See
Lake Lindero Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Barone (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 834, 838, fn. 2 [appellant waived claim that trial
court erroneously excluded evidence, because he failed to support
it with reasoned argument and citation to authority and “fail[ed]
to address, let alone satisfy, his burden to demonstrate a
miscarriage of justice occurred”].)
2. The trial court properly sustained Defendants’
objections to Oliver’s opinions that Defendants
owed Plaintiff a duty of care. In any event, the
exclusion of Oliver’s opinions was harmless.
“ ‘A party cannot rely upon an expert’s opinion to establish
duty, which is a question of law for the court.’ [Citation.] Nor
can a party create a triable issue of fact on the issue of duty
15
through expert opinions, because again, the existence of a duty in
a given factual situation is an issue of law for the court to
resolve.” (Harding v. Lifetime Financial, Inc. (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 753, 763 (Harding); accord, Vulk v. State Farm
General Ins. Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 243, 259, fn. 6; Swigart v.
Bruno (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 529, 540, fn. 14; see also Castaneda,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1213 [existence and scope of property
owner’s duty to protect against third-party crime are questions of
law for the court].)
Here, in relevant part, Oliver’s declaration stated multiple,
materially identical opinions to the effect that Defendants owed
Plaintiff a duty of care to protect her from a known risk of sexual
assault at the Chapter House, including by providing unspecified
“security.” Defendants objected to the paragraphs of Oliver’s
declaration containing his duty opinions, on the grounds that
they set forth legal conclusions that were not proper subjects of
expert opinion. Based on the authority cited above, we conclude
that the trial court properly sustained those objections. (E.g.,
Harding, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 763.)
Plaintiff argues that Oliver’s opinions were admissible
under authority permitting experts to testify about the standard
of care. However, the standard of care is an issue of breach,
which becomes relevant only if a duty of care supports the
plaintiff’s claim. (See Fitzpatrick v. Hayes (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th
916, 929 [“the responsibility of defining duty in a tort case
reposes with the court [citation] and we neither know of nor have
been cited to any authority permitting us to rely on [a declaration
about the standard of care] to redefine an insurance agent’s duty
of care”]; Mosca v. Lichtenwalter (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 551, 554
[“the standard of care . . . is reached only if the threshold
16
question of duty is resolved against the defendant”].) To the
extent the excluded portions of Oliver’s declaration concerned the
standard of care or other issues distinct from duty (e.g., alter ego
liability), the exclusion was harmless in light of our conclusion
below that the scope of Defendants’ alleged duty to protect guests
at the Chapter House from third-party sexual assault did not
require Defendants to implement Plaintiff’s proposed security
measures at Mu Theta’s party.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ objections violated
the Rules of Court by failing to quote the objectionable material.
However, in lieu of quotation, the Rules of Court allow the
objecting party to “set forth” the objectionable material. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b)(3).) Here, for each objection,
Defendants identified a challenged paragraph of Oliver’s
declaration and set forth a description of the objectionable
material therein (e.g., “In this paragraph, Mr. Oliver provides
‘expert’ opinions on the standards of care for the various
Defendants”). Plaintiff does not acknowledge those descriptions,
much less argue that they failed to satisfy the Rules. Even
assuming, arguendo, Defendants failed to adequately set forth
Oliver’s duty opinions as the objectionable material, Plaintiff
cites no authority—and we are aware of none—holding that such
a procedural error compels a trial court to overrule otherwise
meritorious objections and to admit improper expert opinions into
evidence.
We acknowledge that one of the sustained objections
erroneously failed to state any substantive grounds. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b)(4).) That objection targeted
paragraph 18 of Oliver’s declaration, in which he opined: “The
fact that SAM National Properties was so involved in . . . the
17
Subject Property, and that this was part of an investment scheme
as a whole, means that it has a duty of care as to how the Subject
Property is managed and maintained, including . . . the duty to
protect against known risks . . . .” (Italics added.)
As noted, an expert’s opinion that a duty exists is a legal
conclusion and cannot create a triable issue of fact as to the
existence of a duty. (Harding, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 763.)
Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred by
excluding paragraph 18 of Oliver’s declaration from evidence, the
error was harmless. (See Marin v. Department of Transportation
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 529, 536 [erroneous sustaining of
objections was harmless because even considering the excluded
evidence, no triable issue of material fact existed]; Serri v. Santa
Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 857-858 [same];
Twenty-Nine Palms Enterprises Corp. v. Bardos (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 1435, 1449 [same].)
C. The trial court properly granted Defendants
summary judgment.
Duty is an element of each of Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132,
1158 [“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises
liability claim are the same,” and include “a legal duty of care”];
C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53
Cal.4th 861, 876-877 [duty is an element of a claim for negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision]; Belen v. Ryan Seacrest
Productions, LLC (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1165 [“there is no
independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
[Citation.] ‘The tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a
duty to the plaintiff is an essential element’ ”].) The parties
address all four claims together. We do the same.
18
We will assume, arguendo, that SAM National and SAM
PM were alter egos of SAM USC or otherwise had duties
coextensive with SAM USC’s duty as the Chapter House’s owner
and Mu Theta’s landlord. For the reasons explained below,
however, we conclude that the scope of Defendants’ duty to
protect guests at the Chapter House from third-party sexual
assault did not require Defendants to implement Plaintiff’s
proposed security measures at Mu Theta’s party. Thus, the trial
court properly granted Defendants summary judgment.
1. To determine the scope of a landlord’s duty to
protect tenants and guests from third-party crime,
courts balance the foreseeability of such crime
against the burdens of the plaintiff’s proposed
security measures.
“A landlord generally owes a tenant the duty, arising out of
their special relationship, to take reasonable measures to secure
areas under the landlord’s control against foreseeable criminal
acts of third parties.” (Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1213.)
The duty extends to the landlord’s other invitees. (See id. at p.
1220, fn. 5; Rest.3d Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm, § 40 (2012), com.
m [describing “a trend toward recognizing an affirmative duty of
reasonable care owed by landlords to their tenants and to their
tenants’ guests with respect to common areas under the
landlord’s control”].) “In each case, however, the existence and
scope of a property owner’s duty to protect against third party
crime is a question of law for the court to resolve.” (Castaneda, at
p. 1213.)
“ ‘First, the court must determine the specific measures the
plaintiff asserts the defendant should have taken to prevent the
harm. This frames the issue for the court’s determination by
19
defining the scope of the duty under consideration.’ ” (Castaneda,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1214.) To determine whether those
specific measures fall within the scope of the defendant’s duty,
the court applies a “ ‘sliding-scale balancing formula.’ ” (Ibid.)
Pursuant to that formula, “ ‘ “ ‘[i]n cases where the burden of
preventing future harm is great, a high degree of foreseeability
may be required. [Citation.] On the other hand, in cases where
there are strong policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the
harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser degree of
foreseeability may be required.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1213.)
The sliding-scale balancing formula addresses two of the
factors—burden and foreseeability—set forth in Rowland v.
Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland) for limiting a duty of
care.6 (See Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1213-1214.)
“[O]ther Rowland factors may come into play in a given case, but
the balance of burdens and foreseeability is generally primary to
the analysis.” (Id. at p. 1214.)
6 The Rowland factors are “the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,
the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the
extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.” (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at
p. 113.)
20
2. The trial court properly concluded that
Defendants did not owe Plaintiff a duty to
implement her proposed security measures at Mu
Theta’s party.
Before applying the foregoing principles, we reject
Plaintiff’s assertions that the trial court “did not address [her]
special relationship argument” and “did not conduct a Rowland
factors analysis.” The trial court analyzed Defendants’ alleged
duty pursuant to the framework adopted in Castaneda for
determining the scope of a landlord’s special-relationship-based
duty to protect tenants and other invitees from third-party crime.
(Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1213.) That was the precise
type of special-relationship-based duty alleged in Plaintiff’s
complaint. Moreover, the trial court analyzed the foreseeability
and burden Rowland factors pursuant to Castaneda, in which the
Supreme Court stated that the remaining Rowland factors may
be immaterial in a given case. (Id. at pp. 1213-1214; see also
Hanouchian v. Steele (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 99, 113 (Hanouchian)
[declining to address other Rowland factors because balance of
burdens and foreseeability was dispositive].)
Plaintiff does not argue that the Castaneda framework is
inapplicable to her claims or that another Rowland factor
supports reversal of the judgment. We conclude that she forfeited
any such argument. (Lee, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 721.)
Accordingly, we will address the balance of burdens and
foreseeability pursuant to the Castaneda framework.
We begin by determining the specific measures Plaintiff
asserts Defendants should have taken to protect her from sexual
assault at Mu Theta’s party. (See Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th
at p. 1214.) Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court’s
21
identification of the specific measures proposed by her complaint.
Consistent with the trial court’s analysis, we conclude that
Plaintiff alleges Defendants had a duty to (1) hire and train
security guards, in a manner “adequate” to prevent attendees
from using illegal drugs and from entering the Chapter House’s
gym; and (2) implement a “system” to ensure that alcohol was not
served to attendees below the legal drinking age (e.g., by hiring
and training bartenders to check IDs before serving alcohol).7
Next, we apply the “ ‘sliding-scale balancing formula’ ” to
determine whether the balance of burdens and foreseeability
supports including Plaintiff’s proposed security measures within
the scope of Defendants’ duty. (Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
p. 1214.) Plaintiff does not address the burden factor. She does
not argue that the trial court erred in concluding that her
proposed measures are sufficiently burdensome to require
heightened foreseeability of third-party crime to support a duty.
We conclude that she forfeited the argument. (Lee, supra, 41
Cal.App.5th at p. 721.)
7 The trial court identified two proposed measures
concerning security guards; we have consolidated them for
simplicity’s sake. As an additional proposed measure, the trial
court identified the complaint’s allegation that Defendants failed
to implement a “safety system.” However, the complaint did not
specify—and Plaintiff did not clarify in the trial court or on
appeal—what such a “safety system” might entail, or how
Defendants could implement one. Because Plaintiff’s proposal for
a safety system is too vague for meaningful analysis, we conclude
it is not the type of “specific” measure that courts must identify to
define the scope of a landlord’s duty to protect against third-party
crime. (Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1214.)
22
In any event, we find no error. Our Supreme Court has
long held that because hiring security guards carries significant
monetary and social costs, “a high degree of foreseeability is
required in order to find that the scope of a landlord’s duty of care
includes the hiring of security guards.” (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza
Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 679 (Ann M.), italics
added, disapproved on another ground by Reid v. Google, Inc.
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 512; accord, Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p.
1222; Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 109.) For the
reasons explained below, we conclude that a high degree of
foreseeability is likewise required to support a duty to implement
Plaintiff’s other proposed measure, i.e., hiring and training
bartenders to check IDs, or otherwise implementing a system to
prevent service of alcohol to underage attendees. (Castaneda, at
p. 1222.)
We will assume, arguendo, that Defendants would not
incur significant burdens in requiring Mu Theta or its live-in
advisor to provide Defendants advance notice of all parties that
Mu Theta intended to host at the Chapter House. However,
Defendants would incur monetary costs in hiring bartenders for
all such parties. To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendants also
had a duty to provide bartenders “adequate training” in refusing
service to underage attendees (presumably supplementing the
bartenders’ existing training by addressing the specific context of
a fraternity party not involving paying customers), providing
such training would increase Defendants’ costs. Moreover, it is
questionable whether doing so would effectively protect attendees
from sexual assault. Although people may be more vulnerable to
assault when intoxicated, implementing Plaintiff’s proposed
measure could not eliminate intoxication among partygoers.
23
Bartenders could still serve alcohol to attendees of legal drinking
age, and potentially to underage attendees who presented fake
IDs that evaded detection. Underage attendees could also bring
their own alcohol into the party, obtain alcohol at the party from
other attendees, or—as Plaintiff alleges she did—arrive to the
party already intoxicated.8
For these reasons, we conclude that Plaintiff’s proposed
measure concerning service of alcohol, like her proposed measure
concerning security guards, falls within the scope of a landlord’s
duty to protect against third-party assault only if such assault is
highly foreseeable. (See Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 678-679
[“the scope of a landlord’s duty to provide protection from
foreseeable third party crime . . . is determined by a balancing of
‘foreseeability’ of the criminal acts against the ‘burdensomeness,
vagueness, and efficacy’ of the proposed security measures”
(italics added)]; Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1181,
1196 [concluding owners of commercial parking garage did not
have duty to implement plaintiff’s proposed security measures to
protect her from sexual assault, in part because “it is
questionable whether plaintiff’s proposed measures would have
been effective”], disapproved on other grounds by Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, and Reid v. Google,
Inc., supra, 50 Cal.4th 512.) Accordingly, we assess whether
8 In opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, Plaintiff asserted that she “has not alleged that she
sustained injuries which were proximately caused by being
served alcohol [at the Chapter House].”
24
sexual assault at the Chapter House was highly foreseeable.9
(See Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1214.)
“To establish the heightened foreseeability necessary to
impose a heavily burdensome duty such as hiring security
guards, . . . the plaintiff must show the existence of prior similar
incidents on the premises or other sufficiently serious ‘indications
9 Plaintiff argues that we must allow a jury to assess
foreseeability. She relies on the Supreme Court’s statement in
Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112
that “[f]oreseeability of harm should ordinarily be determined by
a jury.” (Id. at p. 135.) However, as Defendants point out, the
Supreme Court subsequently rejected Plaintiff’s reading of
Isaacs, explaining: “[B]road language used in Isaacs has tended
to confuse duty analysis generally in that the opinion can be read
to hold that foreseeability in the context of determining duty is
normally a question of fact reserved for the jury. [Citation.] Any
such reading of Isaacs is in error. Foreseeability, when analyzed
to determine the existence or scope of a duty, is a question of law
to be decided by the court.” (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 678.)
Plaintiff nevertheless adheres to her misreading of Isaacs in her
reply brief, without addressing Ann M.
Ann M. also found unpersuasive dicta in Isaacs, on which
Plaintiff relies, regarding the relevance of prior similar incidents
of violent crime in assessing foreseeability. (Ann M., supra, 6
Cal.4th at p. 678 [“Upon further reflection and in light of the
increase in violent crime, refinement of the rule enunciated in
Isaacs . . . is required. We are not reluctant to revisit the rule
announced in Isaacs because it was unnecessary for this court to
consider the viability of the ‘prior similar incidents’ rule in order
to decide the Isaacs case”]; see also Ann M., at p. 679 [“the
requisite degree of foreseeability [to find that hiring security
guards falls within the scope of a landlord’s duty] rarely, if ever,
can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent
crime on the landowner’s premises”].)
25
of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent criminal assaults.’ ”
(Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1222; see also id. at p. 1221
[“ ‘our precedents have focused on whether there were prior
similar incidents from which the property owner could have
predicted the third party crime would likely occur, though we
have recognized the possibility that ‘other indications of a
reasonably foreseeable risk of violent criminal assaults’ could
play the same role”]; Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 679.)
Consistent with the foregoing principle, we agree with
Plaintiff that heightened foreseeability does not require evidence
that Defendants knew Hwang had a propensity to commit sexual
assault. However, Defendants produced uncontradicted evidence
that they had no prior knowledge of any sexual assault
accusation against Hwang or any other member of Mu Theta. We
conclude that Defendants’ evidence shifted the burden to Plaintiff
to “show the existence of prior similar incidents on the premises
or other sufficiently serious ‘indications of a reasonably
foreseeable risk of violent criminal assaults.’ ” (Castaneda,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1222, italics added.) We conclude that she
failed to meet that burden.
The record contains no evidence of prior incidents of sexual
assault or other violent crime at the Chapter House, or by Mu
Theta members elsewhere. Plaintiff relies on evidence that SAM
USC hired one of its investors, Blake Newman, as a live-in
residential advisor at the Chapter House. However, the record
contains no evidence that Newman observed or reported any
violations of fraternity rules, much less rule violations or other
26
conduct of a nature that would seriously indicate a risk of sexual
assault.10
Plaintiff also relies on the following evidence that
Defendants knew of a general risk of sexual assault at fraternity
parties: (1) SAM Inc. (the national fraternal organization)
procured an insurance policy that applied to Defendants and
insured them against risks of sexual assault; (2) SAM Inc.
maintained a risk management policy that prohibited sexual
assault, and warned local chapters and fraternity members that
violations of the risk management policy could result in loss of
membership in the fraternity; and (3) Huston (SAM Inc.’s
executive director) testified that sexual assault is a known risk at
fraternity parties. The trial court rejected Plaintiff’s reliance on
that evidence, explaining: “Plaintiff is attempting to impose a
duty on Defendants to protect against third party criminal
conduct through highly burdensome measures. In such cases, a
duty will not be imposed merely because there was a ‘known’
risk.”
10 Mu Theta was on probation with USC and SAM Inc.
when SAM USC purchased the Chapter House in July 2019,
indicating that Mu Theta violated unspecified university and
fraternity rules sometime before the 2019-2020 academic year.
However, the only pertinent evidence in the record indicates that
Mu Theta’s probation concerned “hazing” allegations of an
unspecified nature. Mu Theta’s probation ended in December
2019 (the month before its party on January 25, 2020). Plaintiff
does not argue that Mu Theta’s probation rendered sexual
assault at its party highly foreseeable.
27
As the trial court observed, Hanouchian rejected an
argument similar to Plaintiff’s.11 In Hanouchian, the plaintiff
attended a sorority party hosted by the defendant sorority
members at their off-campus residence, where two uninvited men
suddenly punched the plaintiff and struck his face with a glass
bottle. (Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 104-105.) The
defendant hosts were aware of past violent incidents at their
university’s fraternal events. (Id. at p. 105.) “[The university]
and its fraternal organizations [had] jointly developed rules and
guidelines governing fraternity and sorority events to respond to
past incidents of violent physical brawls, assaults, and sexual
misconduct at events that had open guest lists, unlimited alcohol,
and no security. Those rules require[d] sororities hosting an off-
campus event to: . . . screen people entering the event, including
attendees who are visibly intoxicated; limit the amount and type
of alcohol provided; [and] provide adequate security
arrangements, including spot-checks by university police . . . .”
(Id. at pp. 103-104, italics added.) The hosts violated those safety
protocols because, among other reasons, “ ‘there was no security
present’ ” at their party and they “ ‘gave guests, including minors,
unlimited access to alcohol . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 104.)
The plaintiff sued the hosts for negligence, alleging that
they owed him a duty to protect him from assault at their party
by complying with the aforementioned safety protocols.
(Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 105, 109.) The trial
court sustained the hosts’ demurrers to the complaint without
leave to amend and entered judgment in their favor. (Id. at p.
106.) Division Three of this Appellate District affirmed, holding
11 Plaintiff does not address Hanouchian, despite the trial
court’s and Defendants’ reliance on it.
28
that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to “establish the
high degree of foreseeability necessary to charge [the hosts] with
a legal duty to take highly burdensome measures to prevent the
type of sudden and unprovoked third party criminal attack that
allegedly occurred” at their residence. (Id. at p. 113.) The court
reasoned, in relevant part: “[The hosts’] alleged knowledge of
prior incidents at other fraternity parties establishes only
‘general knowledge of the possibility of violent criminal conduct’
[citation]; it does not suffice to make it highly foreseeable that a
criminal assault would occur at [the hosts’] party. [Citation.]
This sort of ‘constructive knowledge’ or imputation of
foreseeability by ‘common sense’ is not sufficient to impose, as a
legal duty, the burdensome measures Plaintiff proposes.” (Ibid.,
original italics.)
Here, Plaintiff’s evidence “establishes only ‘general
knowledge of the possibility of violent criminal conduct’ ” and is
insufficient to make such conduct highly foreseeable.
(Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 113.)
In short, because no evidence shows the heightened
foreseeability of violent crime necessary to support a duty to
implement the burdensome security measures that Plaintiff
proposes, we conclude that Defendants did not owe Plaintiff a
duty to implement those measures at Mu Theta’s party. Because
that alleged duty was essential to all of Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants, the trial court properly granted Defendants
summary judgment. We need not address the other Rowland
factors. (See Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 113.) Nor
need we address Plaintiff’s arguments concerning alter ego
liability and punitive damages.
29
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Defendants are entitled to
their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
WEINGART, J.
30
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