Kiroloss v. Torrance Housing Assistance etc. CA2/5

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Filed 5/1/26 Kiroloss v. Torrance Housing Assistance etc. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ANGIE KIROLOSS, B340532

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCP03238)

TORRANCE HOUSING
ASSISTANCE COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Judge. Affirmed.
Angie Kiroloss, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Best Best & Krieger, Alexander M. Brand, and Clarissa
Thurston for Defendant and Respondent.
This appeal is taken from a trial court ruling sustaining
defendant and respondent City of Torrance’s (the City’s)
demurrer to plaintiff and appellant Angie Kiroloss’s (Kiroloss’s)
petition challenging termination of her Section 8 housing
benefits.1 We consider whether the trial court erred in dismissing
the case as moot based on its finding that Kiroloss was evicted
from her apartment via an unlawful detainer proceeding after the
City terminated her benefits, which meant the City would still be
required to terminate her from its Section 8 program even if its
original termination decision was infirm.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Termination of Benefits and Unlawful Detainer
Kiroloss received Section 8 housing rental assistance
payments through the City’s Housing Choice Voucher Program
(the program). Between January and March 2023, Kiroloss
received a number of lease violation notices. Kiroloss met with
the housing authority and denied committing the violations.
Kiroloss was thereafter notified her housing assistance would be
terminated effective May 31, 2023, due to her failure to comply
with certain obligations, including her obligations to pay rent, to
allow the landlord to inspect the unit at reasonable times and
after reasonable notice, and to refrain from damaging the unit or
premises.

1
The City was sued as “Torrance Housing Assistance
Community Development Section 8 Voucher Assistance
Program.”

2
Kiroloss requested an informal hearing, which was held on
May 30, 2023. Following the hearing, the City reaffirmed its
decision to terminate Kiroloss from the program.
At the same time (May 2023), Kiroloss’s landlord filed an
unlawful detainer case against her. The matter proceeded to a
jury trial. Though the record does not include a copy of the
unlawful detainer complaint, it does include certain jury
instructions delivered at the unlawful detainer trial.2 As relevant
here, one of the instructions outlined the elements the landlord
was required to prove to prevail on a claim that Kiroloss no
longer had the right to occupy the property because she breached
the rental agreement. The jury was required to find that, under
the rental agreement, Kiroloss agreed to obtain the landlord’s
consent before making any alterations to the premises and
Kiroloss did not obtain consent before (among other things)
removing and disposing of a shower door and permanently gluing
tile to a sink. The jury was further instructed Kiroloss’s “failure
to perform the requirements of the rental agreement must not be
trivial but must be a substantial violation of important
obligations.”
The jury found Kiroloss breached an obligation of her
rental agreement, Kiroloss failed to comply with a three-day
notice to perform or quit, and the landlord provided Kiroloss with
written notice to perform or vacate the property at least three

2
The trial court took judicial notice of excerpts from the
unlawful detainer jury instructions on its own motion and
attached a copy of the excerpts to an order included in the
appellate record. On our own motion, we also take judicial notice
of the jury instructions. (Cal. Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1);
459.)

3
days before the specified date. The court entered an unlawful
detainer judgment for the landlord against Kiroloss, divested her
of possession, and declared the lease agreement forfeited.

B. Kiroloss’s Mandamus Petition and Subsequent Court
Proceedings
In September 2023, Kiroloss filed a petition for writ of
mandate.3 Approximately two months later, she filed an
amended petition (the operative petition), which was styled a
petition for a writ of administrative mandamus under sections
1094.5 and 1095.6. The allegations in the petition contested the
termination of Kiroloss’s Section 8 rental assistance and her
termination from the program. Kiroloss alleged, in the main,
that the hearing at which her participation was terminated was
unfair.
The City demurred to the operative petition and argued
Kiroloss’s contention that she should be given a new benefits
termination hearing failed because it was barred by the 90-day
statute of limitations applicable to judicial review of
administrative decisions.4 The City further argued that even if
the challenge was timely, the matter was moot because Kiroloss
had been evicted from her government-assisted housing,5 the City

3
The original petition is not in the appellate record.
4
The City also filed a motion to strike, seeking to strike two
portions of the petition on the ground that they were irrelevant or
improper.
5
In support of its demurrer, the City requested judicial
notice of the minute order memorializing the jury’s verdict in the
unlawful detainer case and the unlawful detainer judgment.

4
was therefore legally required to terminate her Section 8
benefits, and the court thus could not order the City to reinstate
Kiroloss’s benefits even if she were given a new hearing.
The trial court held two hearings on the demurrer in the
summer of 2024. After the second hearing, the court issued a
written order sustaining the demurrer and the motion for
judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend.6 In ruling,
the court took judicial notice of materials related to the unlawful
detainer case against Kiroloss, including, on its own motion, a
jury instruction given to the unlawful detainer jury. Having
noticed these materials, the court concluded the jury necessarily
found Kiroloss’s breach of her lease was not merely “trivial” but
instead a “substantial” violation of “important obligations” under
the lease. The court found that because a jury found Kiroloss
committed a serious violation of her lease and the judgment in
the unlawful detainer case was final, termination of Kiroloss’s
housing benefits would be mandatory pursuant to 24 Code of
Federal Regulations part 982.552(b)(2), a regulation that requires
a public housing agency to terminate Section 8 assistance for a
family evicted from housing for a serious violation of the lease.

6
Kiroloss’s petition also named the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) as a defendant, though
HUD never appeared in the action. In the same order in which it
sustained the City’s demurrer, the trial court also granted its
own motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to HUD,
both because HUD had sovereign immunity and for the same
reason it sustained the City’s demurrer.

5
The court accordingly found there was no effective relief Kiroloss
could obtain and dismissed the case with prejudice.7

II. DISCUSSION
The demurrer to Kiroloss’s petition was properly sustained
because there is no effective relief a court could provide even if
she prevailed. Kiroloss was evicted from her apartment via an
unlawful detainer proceeding, and the trial court found, based on
judicially noticed materials, that she was evicted for a serious
violation of her lease. Reversing the City’s termination
decision—made before the unlawful detainer trial—would be an
idle act because the pertinent federal regulation would require
the City to terminate Kiroloss’s Section 8 benefits even if she
were given a new benefits termination hearing.
“California courts will decide only justiciable
controversies.” (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City
(2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1573.) “Justiciability . . . ‘involves
the intertwined criteria of ripeness and standing. A controversy
is “ripe” when it has reached, but has not passed, the point that
the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and

7
We previously granted the City’s motion to augment the
record with its demurrer, motion to strike, and related documents
it filed in the trial court, all of which were not included in the
appellate record.
Kiroloss also filed a motion to augment the appellate
record, which we now deny. Many of the documents Kiroloss
seeks to add to the record, including the order sustaining the
demurrer and the filings in the unlawful detainer matter, are
already included in the record. The remaining documents were
not (so far as Kiroloss’s motion reveals) before the trial court
when it ruled on the demurrer.

6
useful decision to be made.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “Moot cases, in
contrast, are ‘[t]hose in which an actual controversy did exist but,
by the passage of time or a change in circumstances, ceased to
exist.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid; see also Golden State Water Co. v.
Public Utilities Com. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 380, 393 [“A case becomes
moot when events ‘“render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it
should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any
effect[ive] relief whatever”’”].)
“Section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974 ([S]ection 8) (42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)) is a federally funded
and regulated program that provides housing assistance to
financially eligible families. The United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which funds the
[S]ection 8 program, has enacted regulations governing the
administration of the program by local public housing agencies.
The regulations provide both mandatory and discretionary
grounds for termination from the program. (24 C.F.R. § 982.552
(2019).) Termination is mandatory when a participant has been
evicted from subsidized housing for serious violations of the
participant’s lease. (24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b)(2) (2019).)” (Johnson
v. Housing Authority of City of Oakland (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th
603, 606.) 24 Code of Federal Regulations part 982.552 (2025)
does not define what conduct constitutes a “serious violation of
the lease.” A different regulation, 24 Code of Federal Regulations
part 982.310 (2025), which addresses the grounds on which an
owner may terminate housing provided under Section 8, provides
some additional guidance in stating a serious violation “includ[es]
but [is] not limited to failure to pay rent or other amounts due
under the lease . . . .” (24 C.F.R. § 982.310(a)(1) (2025).)

7
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, “[a] tenant of
real property, for a term less than life . . . is guilty of unlawful
detainer” in specified circumstances, including when the tenant
continues in possession of the property “after default in the
payment of rent” or “after a neglect or failure to perform other
conditions or covenants of the lease or agreement under which
the property is held . . . ” and a three-day notice to pay rent or
otherwise perform has been served on the tenant. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1161.)
Here, the unlawful detainer verdict, read in conjunction
with the jury instruction defining the elements the landlord was
required to prove, establishes not only that Kiroloss violated the
terms of her lease but also that her “failure to perform” a term of
the lease was not “trivial” and was instead “a substantial
violation of important obligations.” We agree with the trial court
that this constitutes a “serious” violation. This means that even
if we were to assume Kiroloss was entitled to remand based on
the allegations in her petition, the verdict and judgment in the
unlawful detainer case would require the City to terminate
Kiroloss from its Section 8 program. (24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b)(2)
(2025).) As it is thus impossible for a court to grant Kiroloss any
effective relief, her petition is moot and was properly dismissed.
(Kiroloss makes no argument suggesting any discretionary
exception to mootness applies.)
The arguments Kiroloss advances to dispute mootness are
all unavailing. She argues the City did not provide any evidence
supporting its assertion that she committed serious lease
violations. But the unlawful detainer verdict, when coupled with

8
the relevant jury instruction, sufficed.8 She asserts California’s
2019 Tenant Protection Act demonstrates the asserted lease
violations were not “serious.” The California statute, however,
does not bear on the meaning of a federal regulation, and, even if
it did, the act defines “just cause” (for terminating a tenancy) to
include a “breach of a material term of the lease, as described in
[the unlawful detainer statute], including, but not limited to,
violation of a provision of the lease after being issued a written
notice to correct the violation.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subds. (a)-
(b).) Kiroloss also references 24 Code of Federal Regulations part
982.354, which addresses situations in which a tenant may move
into a new unit with continued tenant-based assistance, but that
regulation is inapposite here because Kiroloss’s lease was
terminated for a “serious violation,” and thus her termination
from the housing assistance program was mandatory under 24
Code of Federal Regulations part 982.552.

8
Kiroloss, in the trial court and this court, relies on
documents that were not attached to her complaint but were
submitted in conjunction with her response to the City’s
demurrer. Kiroloss made no request to have those documents
judicially noticed, and, other than the filings from the unlawful
detainer matter (which are included in other portions of the
record), they do not appear to be judicially noticeable. The trial
court appropriately declined to rely upon those documents, and
we similarly do not consider them in our analysis.

9
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The City is awarded costs on
appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

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