CourtListener 10851791•People v. Bettencourt CA1/1
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Filed 5/1/26 P. v. Bettencourt CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171770
v.
CURTIS DANIEL BETTENCOURT, (Mendocino County
Super. Ct. No. 24CR04054)
Defendant and Appellant.
After a jury convicted defendant Curtis Daniel Bettencourt of one count
of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (a)(4)),1 the trial court sentenced him to the upper term of four years in
state prison. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the court abused
its discretion in sentencing by failing to consider his mental health and
substance abuse issues. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In the early afternoon hours, L.K. was on his daily walk in Ukiah,
when a shirtless man, who he later identified as defendant, blocked his way
and called him “bad words.” When L.K. attempted to go around defendant,
defendant once again blocked his way. Defendant then picked L.K. up and
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1
otherwise indicated.
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threw him to the ground. L.K. had kidney and pancreas transplants, and he
was unable to stop defendant. Once L.K. was on the ground, defendant
punched him in the face, “something really bad.” L.K. had never seen
defendant before. When some people came to help L.K., defendant ran away.
One witness, driving in his car, saw “a shirtless man,” who he
subsequently identified as defendant, “come out from where the Redwood
Trail is behind” some apartment buildings and confront an elderly man, L.K.
Defendant “had a serious face and his body indicated that the situation might
escalate to something violent or aggressive.” Defendant walked toward L.K.,
placing himself directly in L.K.’s path. When L.K. tried to go around
defendant, defendant pushed him to the ground and began kicking him. The
witness parked his car so he could help the victim.
City of Ukiah Police Sergeant August Kinney was on routine patrol
around 2:00 in the afternoon when he received a dispatch about an assault
that had just occurred near East Gobi Street. The witness flagged Kinney
down, and Kinney observed the victim, L.K., with “some traumatic conditions
to his head,” some “lacerations.” L.K. had a “contusion about half the size of
a baseball” on the top of his head, with a “pretty good size knot or lump
forming on the back” of his head, “and in the very center of that knot was a
laceration.” He had an additional laceration that was bruising and “looked to
be early stages of contusions.” Kinney called for medical assistance, and after
speaking to the victim and witnesses, he broadcast defendant’s description,
and a “short time later,” another officer responded that he had located a
possible suspect about three blocks away. Kinney also requested an officer
obtain the video footage from the nearby animal hospital, which Kinney knew
had multiple cameras facing the location.
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City of Ukiah Police Officer Saul Perez’s supervisor alerted Perez to the
suspect’s description: Black male, shirtless, last seen walking toward the
nearby Safeway grocery store. Perez was near the grocery store and saw a
subject who matched the description and who Perez recognized from prior
contacts. He parked his patrol car, activated his body-worn camera, and
walked toward defendant calling him by name. Perez was in uniform. When
defendant continued walking, Perez told him to stop, that he needed to talk
to him, and that he was being detained. Defendant ignored Perez’s
commands. Perez then jogged toward defendant, while alerting other officers
of his location. At that point, defendant “abruptly stopped” and faced Perez.
He had some clothing in his left hand and took a “bladed” stance, so he could
“fight or flight and to engage or run away from me.” Defendant said
“something to the effect, ‘I don’t have to fucking listen to you.’ ” Officer Perez
had his taser in his hand and warned defendant he “was utilizing” it. Perez
then tased and arrested him.
The Mendocino County District Attorney filed an information alleging
one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245,
subd. (a)(4)—count 1) and one count of resisting an officer (§ 69, subd. (a)—
count 2). The information further provided notice of several circumstances in
aggravation: the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1));2 the victim
was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)); defendant threatened the
witness, unlawfully prevented or dissuaded witnesses from testifying,
suborned perjury, or legally interfered with the judicial process
(rule 4.421(a)(6)); defendant has or will be convicted of other crimes for which
2 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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consecutive sentences could have been imposed but for which concurrent
sentences are being imposed (rule 4.421(a)(7)); defendant has engaged in
violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1));
defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions as a juvenile
are numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)); defendant has
served a prior term in state prison (rule 4.421(b)(3)); and defendant’s prior
performance on probation was unsatisfactory (rule 4.421(b)(5)).
The jury found defendant guilty on count 1 (assault) and not guilty on
count 2 (resisting an officer).
Defendant waived jury trial on the aggravating factors. The district
attorney withdrew one alleged aggravating factor (rule 4.421(a)(7)), and the
court found true the remaining aggravating factors, except one
(rule 4.421(a)(6)).
In his sentencing memorandum, defendant asked that the court grant
probation for a two-year period. As factors in mitigation, he pointed to his
mental health history, which included diagnoses for Schizophrenia and
several substance use disorders. He asserted his mental health and disorder
conditions “contributed to his conduct in this case.” Additionally, he claimed
his substance use “aggravates his mental health disorders,” which also
contributed to his conduct. Defendant alternatively asked the court, if it
denied probation, to impose the low term, pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), in light of these mitigating factors.
Defendant attached to his sentencing memorandum a medical
evaluation report prepared by Dr. Kathryn Medici. Medici stated defendant
“did not know his diagnosis, but later reported he believes he has
schizophrenia,” which he thought was “caused by his drug use.” She
concluded he met the “criteria for schizophrenia and amphetamine, alcohol,
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and marijuana use disorder.” She further opined the “symptoms of
[defendant’s] mental disorder contributed to his criminal behavior.
Specifically, [defendant] was under the influence of substances at the time of
his arrest(s) and was experiencing symptoms of schizophrenia including
thought disorganization and hallucinations.”
In his interview with the probation officer, defendant had expressed a
desire to receive probation. Despite being confronted with his “extensive
criminal history and past poor performance on probation,” defendant had
been “adamant he would be successful.” He also stated he had been
“diagnosed with schizophrenia and ‘drug-induced psychotic disorder’ ” and
prescribed medication. However, he could not recall when he had been
diagnosed or what medication he had been prescribed. Defendant had stated
that from age 14 to around 33, he had smoked methamphetamines “a couple
of times per week,” but since 2023, he had not used the substance. He denied
any history of childhood abuse or neglect.
The probation report listed the factors in aggravation found true by the
trial court, and identified one factor in mitigation, “defendant was suffering
from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced culpability for
the crime.” (Rule 4.423(b)(2).) It did not identify as a mitigating factor that
“defendant experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,
including, but not limited to abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence
and it was a factor in the commission of the crime.” (Rule 4.423(b)(3).)
The probation officer commented, “The defendant suffers from poly-
substance addiction and mental health issues, which could have contributed
to the instant offense. However, he has been aware of these issues for years
and has been provided several opportunities to address them via court-
ordered supervision.” (Boldface omitted.) Thus, while his “criminality may
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be the result of his poly-substance abuse and mental health issues, there is
not a high likelihood that he would respond favorably to treatment; given his
history of non-compliance.” Probation therefore recommended the
aggravated term of four years, as a “prison sentence seems to be in the best
interest of the public” and would “provide an opportunity for the defendant to
address his issues in a more controlled environment.”
At the start of the sentencing hearing, the court noted it had read and
reviewed “not only the probation report but also the defense sentencing
memorandum, as well as the exhibits attached thereto, which did include
some of [defendant’s] psychological history.” The court then heard from
counsel and defendant.
Defense counsel began by “highlighting” defendant’s mental health and
“addiction history” as “definitely” being “a contributing cause to the incident
that occurred.” Counsel indicated this would “overcome the presumption of
ineligibility for probation” and submitted. Defendant subsequently told the
court he was “going through a hard time right now,” that his mother had just
passed away, and he was “battling, like, trying to stay, like, sane in, like,
prison. Well, in custody right now.” He was dealing with his “mental health
illnesses due to incarceration and stuff like that,” and he was “willing to
participate in whatever will help [him] out” and avoid prison. After
defendant spoke, his counsel acknowledged defendant’s “extensive” criminal
history but reiterated, “I think that’s more of an indication of the mental
health and addiction problems he’s been struggling with since he was a
teenager.”
The district attorney urged the court to follow the probation
department’s recommendation and impose the aggravated term of four years
in prison.
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The court then stated, “I was the judge for [his] trial, and I saw the
video of the assault. [¶] And as I said, I read the probation report, and I
heard from [defense counsel] just this morning, and I still can’t determine
why that assault occurred. I have no idea. [¶] All I know is that someone, an
old man who couldn’t defend himself, was walking down the street and was
attacked repeatedly, and the old man couldn’t defend himself and didn’t even
try. He was down on the ground while the assault continued, and I still don’t
know why that happened. [¶] . . . [¶] So that’s where I’m at, Mr. Bettencourt.
I just don’t know why it happened. And afterwards, we had a court trial on
the aggravators.” The court observed it had found there was great harm, the
victim was “absolutely vulnerable,” the conduct presented a danger to the
victim or “quite frankly, . . . any person unlucky enough to be in that area,”
there were prior convictions, dating back to 2005, defendant “never
successfully completed probation, not once,” defendant had been “sent to
prison in 2021, only released in 2023,” and there “is no dual use of these facts,
as the defense correctly points out.” The court continued, leading up to the
instant case and starting in February 2024, defendant’s record showed “every
few days [defendant] was arrested,” from “using methamphetamine, refusing
to leave a store, stealing from a store,” just a “regular pattern, . . .
culminating in this instance.”
The court denied probation, “because I don’t think that he’s going to
complete it because he never has before. I think that the aggravating factors
are more than enough to merit the upper term. I am going to select the upper
term. [¶] I can’t see any other alternative, Mr. Bettencourt. Because I think
probation had it right when they wrote the community safety outweighs your
needs, and that’s all you wanted to talk about at sentencing, how stressful
this is for you. . . . [¶] . . . I’ve only heard you talk about yourself at
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sentencing today and not once about the old man who was beaten by the
railroad tracks.” The court thus imposed the upper term and addressed
various fines and fees.
DISCUSSION
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A)
Defendant maintains the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by
failing to consider his mental health and substance use disorders as “factors
in mitigation” under “the statutory presumption for a low term” set forth in
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A).
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) provides in relevant part: “[U]nless
the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the
interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of
the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense:
[¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual
violence.” Defendant maintains “[m]ental illness falls within the ambit” of
“psychological trauma” and therefore evidence of mental illness, such as
schizophrenia, triggers this mitigating factor.
While mental illness may be a factor in the circumstances that trigger
the lower term sentencing presumption under section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6), mental illness, alone, is not enough to do so. (People v. Tilley (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 772, 777 (Tilley); People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226,
241 (Banner) [“psychological trauma based on mental illness may be a
circumstance qualifying for the lower term presumption in section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6),” but “mental illness alone” does not “qualif[y] for the lower
term presumption”], italics added.) Rather, “[p]sychological trauma must
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attend the [mental] illness, and that trauma must contribute to the crime
under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).”3 (Banner, at p. 241.)
As indicated by the language of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A),
“psychological trauma” is something experienced by the defendant akin to
“abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.” The American Psychological
Association Dictionary of Psychology defines trauma as “any disturbing
experience that results in significant fear, helplessness, dissociation,
confusion, or other disruptive feelings intense enough to have a long-lasting
negative effect on a person’s attitudes, behavior, and other aspects of
functioning.” (<https://dictionary.apa.org/trauma> [as of Apr. 30, 2026],
italics added; see <https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/trauma> [as of
Apr. 30, 2026] [Psychological trauma is a person’s experience of emotional
distress resulting from an event—a one-time occurrence or a series of
occurrences—that overwhelms the capacity to emotionally digest it].) Noting
that “the statute’s plain language states trauma is ‘not limited to abuse,
neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence,’ ” the court in Banner rejected the
People’s argument that the statute applies only “to ‘experiences’ other than
mental illness.” (Banner, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 241.) Nonetheless, as
set forth above, the court confirmed the statute requires more than a showing
of mental illness or, as the case here, a mental illness and substance use
disorder, namely a showing that the defendant suffered psychological trauma
as a result of his mental illness or disorder that contributed to his
3 We note the rules of court separately identify as mitigating factors
that the “defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that
significantly reduced culpability for the crime” (rule 4.423(b)(2)) and that the
“defendant experienced psychological physical, or childhood trauma,
including but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence
and it was a factor in the commission of the crime” (rule 4.423(b)(3)).
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commission of the crime before the lower term presumption is triggered.
(Ibid.)
Here, defendant made a sufficient showing that he suffers from
schizophrenia and amphetamine, alcohol, and marijuana use disorders. But
he made no showing that his mental illness and/or substance use disorders
caused “psychological trauma” that “contributed to the crime” of which he
was convicted. In other words, while the evidence may have established, as
suggested in the probation report, “defendant was suffering from a mental or
physical condition that significantly reduced culpability for the crime”
(rule 4.423(b)(2)), it did not establish that his mental illness and substance
use disorders caused “psychological trauma” that was a “contributing factor”
to his crime—the something more required under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)(A) to trigger presumptive entitlement to the low term.
Accordingly, on this record, it cannot be said the trial court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to the high term. (See People v. Fredrickson
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 994 [on review of “the probation reports,
appellant’s sentencing memorandum, the letters submitted on her behalf,
and the arguments at the sentencing hearing” appellate court “found no clear
indication appellant’s youth was a contributing factor in the 2016 offense”;
and while “it is possible facts or arguments could have been developed that
would have constituted such an initial showing, . . . there is no basis for this
court to conclude the trial court’s failure to expressly consider the lower term
presumption requires a remand”].)
For the first time in his reply brief on appeal, defendant “contends that
his mental health issues, compounded by the stressors of his substance
abuse, living circumstances, history of conflicts with others and the law, his
childhood without a father and schooling of special education through
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juvenile camp facilities, explained in the assessment provided to the
sentencing court, [citation], reflect the very ‘psychological trauma’
contemplated by the Legislature in enacting section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
as amended by Assembly Bill [No.] 124 (Stats 2021, ch. 695) and Senate Bill
[No.] 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.).”
Defendant did not advance this fact-laden argument in the trial court.
Rather, while he cited section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) in his sentencing
memorandum, he pointed only to the evidence that he suffers from a mental
illness and several substance use disorders and argued that evidence was
sufficient to trigger a presumptive low term. However, as we have discussed,
that evidence and the argument based on it were not sufficient, as they did
not establish that defendant’s mental illness and substance use disorders
caused “psychological trauma” that contributed to the crime he committed.
Defendant cannot now, for the first time on appeal, advance a different
factually-based theory or argument. (See Tilley, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at
p. 778 [where defendant “did not seek the lower term based on section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6); object to the imposition of the middle term; or argue that
[he] suffered any psychological trauma as a result of mental illness” his claim
based on section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) was forfeited].)
Nor did defendant raise his recrafted argument in his opening brief on
appeal; instead, he advanced it for the first time in his reply brief. He has
therefore waived the argument, as well. (See People v. Gonzalez (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 960, 978 [it is “well established that arguments may not
ordinarily be raised for the first time in a reply brief”]; People v. Taylor (2020)
43 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1114 [“In his reply brief, Taylor raises other arguments
for the first time. Taylor has forfeited these tardy arguments.”]; 9 Witkin,
Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2026) Appeal, § 751 [“points raised in the reply brief
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for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for
failure to present them before”].)
In short, because defendant has failed to address the distinction and
identify evidence in the record that he experienced “psychological trauma”
based on his mental illness, he has not demonstrated any abuse of discretion
under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A).
Rule 4.423(b)
Defendant alternatively argues, citing to rule 4.423(b)(2), that “even if
[his] supporting data does not support a finding of ‘psychological trauma,’ the
mental health and substance abuse issues he suffers . . . should have been
adequately weighed and considered in mitigation before imposing an
aggravating term.” He asserts that “where trauma otherwise would not
mandate a low term, the Legislature directed that the middle term should be
the presumption,” and the sentencing court “may only depart from this
presumption if it finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances so that imposition of the presumptive term would
be contrary to the interest of justice.”
Rule 4.423(b)(2), lists as a mitigating factor “relating to the defendant”
that “[t]he defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that
significantly reduced culpability for the crime.” (Rule 4.423(b)(2).)
Defendant acknowledges that, on a silent record, a trial court is
presumed to have understood and properly applied its sentencing discretion,
but contends the record is not silent here. He asserts the record in this case
affirmatively demonstrates the court failed to adequately consider his mental
health and substance abuse issues. As proof, he maintains that while there
was an abundance of evidence (his sentencing memorandum, the
psychological evaluation, and the probation report) that his “mental health
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issues, exacerbated by substance abuse, contributed to the assault in this
case,” the trial court nevertheless stated it “ ‘still [did not] know why [the
assault] happened.’ ” According to defendant, this comment by the court
“reflects an implicit disregard and failure to consider [his]” mental health and
substance abuse issues “as factors contributing to the offense and/or in
mitigation for purposes of sentencing.”
“To prove an abuse of discretion, ‘ “[t]he burden is on the party
attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was
irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial
court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives,
and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not
be set aside on review.” ’ [Citation.] To meet this burden, the defendant
must ‘affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its
sentencing discretion.’ ” (People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.)
Contrary to defendant’s take on the record, it does not reflect any
disregard by the trial court of defendant’s mental health condition and
substance use disorders. At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the trial
court stated it had read and reviewed the probation report, defendant’s
sentencing memorandum, and the attachments, which included defendant’s
psychological evaluation. It then heard from defense counsel who
emphasized defendant’s mental health condition and substance use disorders.
That the court pondered as to the “why” of defendant’s beating of a
hapless victim unknown to defendant, hardly suggests it discounted
defendant’s mental health condition and substance use disorders as reducing
his “culpability for the crime” (rule 4.43(b)(2)). Rather, it reasonably reflects
the lack of any evidence that defendant’s mental health condition and
substance use disorders “was a contributing factor in the commission of [his]
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offense,” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)) let alone that psychological trauma attended
those conditions and that that trauma contributed to the offense. (Id.,
subd. (b)(6)(A).) Although Dr. Medici opined defendant was experiencing
“thought disorganization and hallucinations,” neither she nor counsel
explained how defendant’s schizophrenia-related hallucinations contributed
to his commitment of the offense. For example, we do not know if the
hallucinations caused defendant to perceive the victim as an attacker, or if
auditory delusions prompted defendant to attack the victim. And although
defendant spoke at the sentencing hearing, he did not provide any insight
whatsoever as to his offense.
In short, the trial court was well-aware of defendant’s diagnosed
mental health and substance use disorders but was provided no evidence that
these caused defendant to commit the crime of which he was convicted. We
therefore reject defendant’s assertion that the trial court’s musing as to “why”
defendant committed the brutal attack demonstrates the court disregarded
and failed to consider his mental health and substance use disorders “as
factors . . . in mitigation for purposes of sentencing.”
Defendant also points out the record “did not reflect the sentencing
court made a finding that [his] mental health and substance abuse issues
were inapplicable or applicable to the acts underlying his conviction.”
However, “ ‘[s]entencing courts have wide discretion in weighing aggravating
and mitigating factors [citations], and may balance them against each other
in “qualitative as well as quantitative terms.” ’ ” (People v. Avalos (1996)
47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1583.) And, the court need not state reasons for
minimizing or disregarding circumstances in mitigation. (Ibid. [“trial court
need not explain its reasons for rejecting mitigating factors”]; People v.
Salazar (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 799, 813.)
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Furthermore, the record amply demonstrates the trial court paid
attention to the asserted mitigating and aggravating circumstances identified
in the defendant’s sentencing memorandum and probation report, and by
counsel during argument. It found, however, that aggravating factors far
outweighed any asserted mitigating factors. Indeed, the court expressly
found “aggravating factors are more than enough to merit the upper term.”
In sum, the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that the trial
court misunderstood its sentencing discretion or abused it. To the contrary,
the record demonstrates a sound exercise of its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________
Banke, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
A171770, People v. Bettencourt
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