CourtListener 10851391•People v. Nguyen CA4/3
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Filed 4/30/26 P. v. Nguyen CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065301
v. (Super. Ct. No. 07WF1586)
ANH DUOC NGUYEN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Terri K. Flynn-Peister, Judge. Affirmed.
Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Michael J.
Patty, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Anh Duoc Nguyen was convicted by a jury on five counts of
attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187,
subd. (a)),1 and one count each of shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246) and
active participation in a criminal street gang/street terrorism (§ 186.22,
subd. (a)). Nguyen committed the crimes in June 2007, when he was 17 years
old. He received a total sentence of 40 years to life in prison. This court
affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. (People v. Nguyen (Mar. 18, 2013,
G046378) [nonpub. opn.].)
Under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), (section 1170(d)(1)(A)),
a defendant sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) may
seek recall and resentencing after being incarcerated for 15 years if they were
under 18 years of age at the time of the crime. Nguyen filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1170(d)(1)(A). The trial court denied the petition,
finding Nguyen was statutorily ineligible for relief because his sentence was
not the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence. For the first time on
appeal, Nguyen argues section 1170, subdivision (d), violates equal protection
principles as applied because the Legislature lacked a rational basis to
exclude all non-LWOP juvenile offenders from the recall and resentencing
procedure. Exercising our discretion to consider the issue despite it not
having been raised below, we affirm the trial court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarized the facts of the crime in our prior opinion and
need not recite them again here. (People v. Nguyen, supra, G046378.) Nguyen
was charged with and convicted of the following counts: attempted murder
with premeditation (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a); counts 1-5); shooting at
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 6); and street terrorism by engaging
in unlawful criminal gang activity (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 7). The jury also
found true sentencing enhancement allegations, including personal discharge
of firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and personal use
of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
The trial court sentenced Nguyen to a total of 40 years to life in
prison.
In January 2025, Nguyen filed a petition for recall and
resentencing under section 1170(d)(1)(A). Nguyen argued his sentence was
the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence and thus violated the United
States Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.
The trial court denied the petition, finding Nguyen would become
eligible for parole no later than at age 57, meaning his sentence was not the
functional equivalent of LWOP. Nguyen timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Nguyen argues the recall and resentencing procedure
under section 1170, subdivision (d), violates equal protection guarantees
under both the state and federal constitutions because there was no rational
basis for the Legislature to have given juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP
an avenue for resentencing that was not available to those given non-LWOP
sentences. The Attorney General notes this constitutional challenge was not
raised by Nguyen below and urges us to find it forfeited.
We exercise our discretion to consider Nguyen’s equal protection
challenge because it involves a pure question of law applied to undisputed
facts. (See People v. Carr (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 441, 444–445; People v. Heard
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 626–627 (Heard).)
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I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As Nguyen raises an issue of constitutional law and statutory
interpretation, we review his argument de novo. (See People v. Ortega (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1257, review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292070.)
“Where, as here, the challenged law is not based on a suspect classification
and does not burden fundamental rights, the law denies equal protection
‘only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and
some legitimate government purpose.’ [Citations.] Under rational basis
review, we presume a classification in a statute is rational until the party
challenging it establishes there is no conceivable rational basis for the
unequal treatment.” (People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 442.)
“[W]hen plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between
identifiable groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the distinctions
drawn are inconsistent with equal protection, courts no longer need to ask at
the threshold whether the two groups are similarly situated for purposes of
the law in question. The only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged
difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard
of review. The burden is on the party challenging the law to show that it is
not.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 850–851.)
II.
SECTION 1170(D)(1)(A) DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES
BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE HAD A RATIONAL BASIS FOR MAKING THE
PROCEDURE AVAILABLE ONLY TO JUVENILE OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO
LWOP OR ITS FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT
“[S]ection 1170 . . . provides a statutory procedure by which
defendants whose LWOP sentences were validly imposed may seek to recall
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such sentences by making the requisite statutory showing.” (In re Berg (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 418, 441, italics omitted.)
Nguyen argues there was no rational basis for the Legislature to
make the section 1170 procedure available only to juvenile offenders
explicitly sentenced to LWOP, excluding other juvenile offenders. He observes
that juvenile LWOP offenders may petition for relief under section 1170,
subdivision (d), after 15 years of incarceration, instead of having to wait
25 years for a youthful offender parole hearing under section 3051 as a
non-LWOP juvenile offender. He further argues that juvenile LWOP
offenders may have their sentences recalled, thus requiring the trial court to
consider all ameliorative changes in the law since the original sentencing;
this potential for a reduced sentence is not available to Nguyen. Finally, he
argues that the section 1170 recall procedure allows a juvenile LWOP
offender to obtain a transfer hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 707 since the sentence will no longer be final.2
The Attorney General argues in opposition that resentencing is
not guaranteed to LWOP offenders, so section 1170(d)(1)(A) does not
necessarily benefit them. Additionally, the Attorney General identifies
2 This could be significant to Nguyen because he was charged in
2007 in adult criminal court rather than juvenile court. “In November 2016
. . . the electorate passed Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation
Act of 2016 (Proposition 57). Proposition 57 prohibits prosecutors from
charging juveniles with crimes directly in adult court. Instead, they must
commence the action in juvenile court. If the prosecution wishes to try the
juvenile as an adult, the juvenile court must conduct . . . a ‘transfer hearing’
to determine whether the matter should remain in juvenile court or be
transferred to adult court. Only if the juvenile court transfers the matter to
adult court can the juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult. (See Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a).)” (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018)
4 Cal.5th 299, 303.)
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several differences between LWOP and non-LWOP offenders. LWOP
offenders cannot advance their parole date using conduct credits and may
experience differences in their terms of confinement. “[C]ourts have
concluded the Legislature may rationally provide a rehabilitative benefit to a
group of offenders who committed more serious crimes, while excluding those
convicted of lesser crimes, when the less culpable group may have other
avenues for relief.” (People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1080,
review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540 (Thompson); see People v. Chatman
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 294–295; In re Spencer S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1315,
1329.)
We begin by acknowledging that “rational basis review is a
deferential standard. . . . [and] ‘“‘[w]hen conducting rational basis review, we
must accept any gross generalizations and rough accommodations that the
Legislature seems to have made.’ [Citation.] ‘A classification is not arbitrary
or irrational simply because there is an “‘imperfect fit between means and
ends’” [citations], or “because it may be ‘to some extent both underinclusive
and overinclusive.’”’” [Citation.]’” (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1077–1078, rev. granted.)
In Thompson, the offender committed murder at the age of 17
and was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison. (Thompson, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062, rev. granted.) In People v. Baldwin (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 978 (Baldwin), the offender was sentenced to 44 years to life
for aggravated sexual assault committed when he was 16 years old. (Id. at
p. 983.) Both Thompson and Baldwin appealed the denial of their section
1170 petitions on equal protection grounds, and in both cases, the appellate
court affirmed, concluding there was a rational basis for the Legislature to
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restrict the procedure to those sentenced to LWOP. (Thompson, at p. 1062;
Baldwin, at p. 985.)
The appellants in Thompson and Baldwin both asserted that
their sentences were the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Thompson, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071, rev. granted; Baldwin, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
p. 986.) The issue of whether offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent
of LWOP may petition under section 1170 is currently under review by the
California Supreme Court. (See People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499,
review granted June 25, 2025, S290828 (Munoz).) The high court granted
review in Thompson based on the issue presented in Munoz.
Here, Nguyen concedes that, at least for Eighth Amendment
purposes, his sentence does not constitute the functional equivalent of LWOP
under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261. Pursuant to section 3051,
Nguyen will be eligible for a youthful offender parole hearing after 25 years
of incarceration. Thus, the crux of Nguyen’s appeal is that section 1170
unfairly excludes him even though his offense was less egregious than an
LWOP offender’s, and his prison term is shorter .
Pending any guidance from the California Supreme Court, we
conclude, as did Thompson and Baldwin, that the limitation of section
1170(d)(1)(A) to juvenile LWOP offenders survives rational basis review.
“[T]he legislative history of [the legislation enacting the procedure] indicates
that while Graham [v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48] violations and cruel or
disproportionate sentences imposed on juveniles were the Legislature’s
general considerations in enacting section 1170[, subdivision ](d), it was
expressly concerned about juveniles being sentenced to die in prison.”
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(Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075, rev. granted.)3 After
conducting a lengthy analysis of this history, the Thompson court concluded
“the Legislature’s concern” in enacting the section 1170 procedure, “was not
merely excessive punishment of juveniles that failed to take into
consideration their capacity for change, or even lengthy sentences. Instead, a
specific goal was to provide an opportunity for juvenile offenders whose
sentences ensured they would die in prison.” (Thompson, at p. 1076.)
Additionally, the Thompson court stated, “[a]t the time of
enactment, the Legislature could reasonably consider life without parole to be
the most severe and unjust punishment imposed on juvenile offenders,” and
“could rationally conclude that providing the relatively small number of
juvenile offenders otherwise certain to die in prison an opportunity to obtain
a lesser sentence was the most pressing priority.” (Id. at p. 1077.) “Thompson
also found the legislative history established the Legislature intended to
proceed incrementally with respect to addressing the larger problem of
excessive punishment for juveniles.” (Baldwin, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
p. 997.)
We agree. The Legislature could reasonably have decided to start
its incremental approach to sentencing changes by first addressing those
juvenile offenders guaranteed to die in prison absent a release mechanism.
Section 1170, subdivision (d)’s implementing legislation was passed in
August 2012, contemporaneous with the California Supreme Court’s decision
in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, in which the court found that
3 In Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 74, the United States
Supreme Court held that an LWOP sentence for a juvenile nonhomicide
offender constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.
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functional LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders violated the
Eighth Amendment. (See Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1064, rev.
granted.) Only one year after implementing the section 1170 procedure for
LWOP offenders, the Legislature enacted section 3051, creating the youthful
offender parole hearing scheme. (Thompson, at p. 1065.)4
As Nguyen points out, LWOP offenders were originally excluded
from the youthful offender parole hearing procedure. The statutory timeline
“demonstrates the resentencing provision was intended for juvenile offenders
sentenced to explicitly designated [LWOP] terms, with section 3051 initially
serving as a complementary provision that provided relief only to other
juvenile offenders.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 625.) However,
section 3051 was amended in 2017 to include most juvenile LWOP offenders.
(Ibid.) If the Legislature had desired to expand the scope of the section 1170
procedure beyond the LWOP context, it could easily have done so then. The
fact it did not suggests that the Legislature remained especially concerned
about the possibility of juvenile offenders being sentenced to die in prison.
4 Nguyen will be eligible for a youthful offender parole hearing in
2032, six years from now, when he will be 43 years old.
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DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
BANCROFT, J.*
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, ACTING P. J.
SCOTT, J.
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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