People v. Zavaleta CA2/8

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Filed 4/30/26 P. v. Zavaleta CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B341711

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA160579
v.

JULIO ZAVALETA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Affirmed.
Keilana Truong, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
After the trial court denied mental health diversion,
defendant and appellant Julio Zavaleta pleaded no contest to one
count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm. Zavaleta
contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying
diversion. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
I.
A. Facts Underlying Zavaleta’s Conviction
We summarize the facts supporting Zavaleta’s conviction,
as reflected in the preliminary hearing transcript and documents
that formed the factual basis of Zavaleta’s plea, including the
probation report.
On the evening of June 23, 2023, 31-year-old Zavaleta
arrived at the home of his father, Julio Zavaleta, Sr., and
paternal grandmother, Elva Mercado. When Zavaleta’s father
opened the front door, Zavaleta grabbed him by the neck, placed
a firearm to his neck, and said “I’m going to kill you.” Zavaleta
then struck him on the top of the head with the firearm, resulting
in a head wound. Both Zavaleta’s father and his grandmother,
who heard the altercation from inside the home, later informed
responding officers they had felt afraid due to Zavaleta’s conduct.
Zavaleta left his father’s home and called his mother,
Gabriela Valdez, telling her he was on his way to her home.
Valdez met Zavaleta outside her residence, later reporting to
police that Zavaleta was upset because his family “didn’t visit
him while he was in jail.” Zavaleta told Valdez he had “shot his
father in the head.” Zavaleta withdrew a firearm from the front
of his waistband, pointed it toward the ground, and told Valdez
he was going to kill her. Valdez “told him if he was going to do it,
do it.” She turned away. Zavaleta then fired two to three rounds

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in the air. Officers recovered three bullet casings at the scene,
“approximately 20 to 25 feet from the residence of Ms. Valdez.”
One month later, officers spotted Zavaleta outside his
father’s residence and arrested him without incident.
B. Trial Court Proceedings
The People charged Zavaleta with assault with a
semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)); two counts of
criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a)); and discharging a
firearm with gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 246.3, subd. (a)).
(Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.) Zavaleta filed a motion for mental health diversion
pursuant to section 1001.36, which the trial court denied.
Zavaleta then pleaded no contest to the assault count. The trial
court dismissed the other counts and sentenced Zavaleta to the
middle term of six years in state prison with credit for 804 days of
time served and good behavior. Zavaleta appealed, challenging
only the trial court’s denial of diversion.
II.
A. Mental Health Diversion Framework
The Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 in
2018 “to create a pretrial diversion program for defendants with
certain mental health disorders.” (See Vaughn v. Superior
Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133 (Vaughn).) This diversion
program “allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and
potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of
mental health treatment.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890 (Sarmiento).) The program aims for
“[i]ncreased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to
mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal

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justice system while protecting public safety.” (§ 1001.35, subd.
(a).)
To obtain mental health diversion, a defendant must be
both eligible and suitable. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) Eligibility
requires (1) a diagnosis with a specified mental health disorder
that (2) “was a significant factor in the commission of the charged
offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)–(2).) A defendant is suitable if
(1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the
defendant’s disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the
defendant consents to diversion and waives his speedy trial
rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment
requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an
“unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)–
(4).)
“An unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined
in section 1170.18, subdivision (c), means ‘an unreasonable risk
that the [defendant] will commit a new violent felony’ within the
meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), which felonies
are ‘colloquially referred to as “super strikes.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Those
super strikes are murder, attempted murder, solicitation to
commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer,
possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent
felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, or any sexually
violent offenses or sexual offense committed against minors
under the age of 14.’ [Citation.] In making the unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety determination, the court ‘may consider
the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified
mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s
treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the

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current charged offense, and any other factors that the court
deems appropriate.’ ” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 671, 679; accord, People v. Moine (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 440, 449–450 (Moine).)
Even if a defendant meets all statutory requirements for
mental health diversion, the ultimate grant of diversion is
discretionary. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a) [“[T]he court may, in its
discretion, . . . grant pretrial diversion to a defendant” if the
defendant is both eligible and suitable]; Assem. Com. on Public
Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Jan 25, 2018, p. 7 [“If a judge feels that a defendant’s
participation in a diversion program is not appropriate from the
standpoint of public safety, or any other reason, the judge can
prohibit the defendant from participating in diversion”].) But
this residual discretion must be exercised “ ‘consistent with the
principles and purpose of the governing law.’ ” (People v.
Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 891; see People v.
Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1001 (Williams) [“[t]he scope
of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied”].)
“Where the court chooses to exercise this residual discretion to
deny diversion, its statement of reasons should reflect
consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and
explain why diversion would not meet those goals.” (Sarmiento,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.)
We review the court’s denial of a motion for mental health
diversion for abuse of discretion. (Vaughn, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 135; People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1138, 1147 (Whitmill).) “A court abuses its discretion when it
makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong
legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or

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implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial
evidence.” (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.)
B. Zavaleta’s Motion
In his motion for mental health diversion, Zavaleta argued
he met the statutory eligibility and suitability requirements. To
do so, he included the psychological evaluation of Dr. Ann L.
Walker. Dr. Walker determined Zavaleta met the diagnostic
criteria for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic
stress disorder, as well as “severe opioid, cannabis, alcohol,
stimulant and sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic use disorders.”
Zavaleta’s reports of “auditory hallucinations and paranoid
delusional ideation” and his “pressured speech and confused,
tangential, and disorganized thinking” supported a schizophrenia
diagnosis. Zavaleta also reported experiencing both depression
and extended manic episodes symptomatic of bipolar disorder.
He demonstrated “a strong startle response,” hypervigilance, and
“a restricted range of affect,” and reported experiencing “frequent
intrusive memories” and flashbacks since being shot in 2022, all
characteristic of post-traumatic stress disorder. Dr. Walker also
found Zavaleta displayed evidence of various substance use
disorders, noting Zavaleta’s “drug and alcohol abuse has caused
relationship issues and conflict with others” and Zavaleta “has
given up other activities to abuse alcohol and drugs.”
Dr. Walker opined Zavaleta’s mental disorders “played a
significant role in Mr. Zavaleta’s commission of the instant
offenses.” Zavaleta reported he “had used methamphetamine and
Xanax and was drinking alcohol prior to” committing the instant
offenses. Zavaleta further reported that, at the time of the
offenses, he “was experiencing prominent and intense auditory
hallucinations and paranoid delusional ideation,” “felt like his

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family wanted to harm him,” “could not think,” and “felt
compelled to fight in what he perceived as a dangerous situation.”
Dr. Walker noted these experiences are typical of a post-
traumatic stress flashback in which someone who, like Zavaleta,
previously experienced a trauma, is “thrust back into the
experience of the original trauma” and “react[s] without being
able to think through what they are doing.”
In Dr. Walker’s opinion, “Zavaleta’s symptoms motivating
the criminal behavior [of the instant offenses] would respond to
mental health treatment.” She further stated Zavaleta “would be
very appropriate for a dual diagnosis program that could provide
psychiatric treatment and psychotherapy . . . and substance
abuse treatment” concurrently. She believed “Mr. Zavaleta has a
good prognosis for treatment since he is motivated, and able to
learn from his mistakes.”
Upon conducting a violence risk appraisal, Dr. Walker
concluded: “Mr. Zavaleta shows a medium risk for future violent
behavior. Mr. Zavaleta presents with medium risk for future
dangerousness to the community. M[r.] Zavaleta’s history of
prior arrests and prior incarcerations is the primary reason that
he tested in the medium risk range.” Nevertheless, Dr. Walker
declared, in her opinion, “Mr. Zavaleta does not present an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” under section
1170.18.
Dr. Walker’s report recommended a treatment plan for
Zavaleta with these components: (1) residential treatment,
which is “more secure” than other options; (2) meetings with a
psychiatrist every two to three months “to stabilize [Zavaleta’s]
moods and ameliorate or eliminate the hallucinations or
paranoia”; (3) individual or group psychotherapy “to help

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[Zavaleta] learn to modulate his moods and help him develop
ways to cope with the hallucinations and paranoia”; and (4)
weekly “group substance abuse treatment” and “self-help groups
such as [Narcotics Anonymous] or [Alcoholics Anonymous].” Dr.
Walker concluded such a plan would “meet the specialized needs
of Mr. Zavaleta.”
Zavaleta also accompanied his motion with a letter of
admission from the Gift of Life Sober Living Foundation, a
residential treatment program. After the People raised concerns
the letter did not make sufficiently clear whether the treatment
program met Dr. Walker’s requirements, Zavaleta submitted a
second, amended letter.
According to the amended letter, Zavaleta “me[t] the
eligibility criteria for admission into the substance abuse disorder
(SUD) treatment program provided by Gift of Life Sober Living.”
The letter continued: “Gift of Life Sober Living is a 6-month to 1-
year residential treatment program. The program provides dual-
diagnosis treatment, offering psychotherapy and psychiatric
services in addition to substance abuse treatment. The program
provides one-on-one and group counseling weekly and . . . mental
health services to the residents on site. The program also
provides outpatient psychiatric services. . . . The client will be
required to take all prescribed psychiatric medications. The
client will also attend relapse prevention classes, rehabilitation
issues education, anger management classes, and will be required
to obtain a 12-step sponsor and actively work a 12-step program.
Clients are required to attend groups or meetings every day
except Sunday. Individuals breathalyze daily and submit to
random urinalysis screening every month and as required.”

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At the hearing on his motion for mental health diversion,
Zavaleta argued the Gift of Life Sober Living program “fits all of
the criteria that [Dr. Walker] recommended.” He further argued
his criminal record did not provide “sufficient evidence that he
would pose a danger of committing a superstrike.”
The trial court denied Zavaleta’s motion, explaining its
reasoning at length. The court focused its analysis on suitability
and observed “[t]he question the court has to ask itself is whether
or not Mr. Zavaleta presents an unreasonable risk [to] public
safety to the community.” The court noted “[t]he facts in this
particular case are particularly violent,” stating that making “[a]
threat against a family member, going to their home” and
threatening “ ‘I’m going to kill you’ ” “elevates” the gravity of a
threat crime to a “significant degree.” The court further declared
the crime was “aggravated by the presence of a weapon, a gun,”
which Zavaleta fired.
The court laid out Zavaleta’s criminal history, identifying
the following convictions and sentences: (1) in 2014, misdemeanor
vandalism, with a grant of summary probation and three days in
jail; (2) in 2014, felony arson and possession of a controlled
substance, with a sentence of 16 months in state prison; (3) in
2015, felony vandalism at a place of worship, with a 32-month
state prison commitment; (4) in 2018, assault with a gang
enhancement, with a two-year sentence in state prison; and (5) in
2020, felony evading a peace officer, with a 32-month state prison
commitment. From this history, the court concluded “that the
level of violence and potential for harm has not abated despite
[Zavaleta’s] prison commitments. If anything, based on the
allegations in this case, . . . the potential for harm to other
individuals has increased.”

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The trial court considered the underlying purpose of the
mental health diversion statute, declaring: “I have to look at the
spirit of the mental health diversion, which is to give individuals
that have legitimate mental health concerns — and I think Mr.
Zavaleta does — the opportunity to work with treatment
providers and potentially earn a dismissal.” Yet the court
continued: “In this particular case I don’t feel Mr. Zavaleta is a
suitable candidate for mental health diversion for the reasons
that I stated. His extensive criminal history, the fact that he’s
been committed to state prison on several occasions, the criminal
conduct and potential for harm has increased over time.” The
court concluded: “A defendant can meet the criteria for mental
health diversion but ultimately the court has the discretion, and
it details its reasons. And in this case, I think I’ve made a
sufficient record for such.”
C. Denial of Diversion Not an Abuse of Discretion
Zavaleta argues “it is unclear whether the trial court found
[Zavaleta] posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety
or whether the court exercised its residual discretion when it
denied diversion.” The court did both, specifically finding
Zavaleta unsuitable while invoking the suitability criteria that a
defendant not present an unreasonable risk to public safety and,
separately, invoking its residual discretion. Zavaleta argues the
court abused its discretion regardless, “because substantial
evidence does not support a finding that [Zavaleta] poses an
unreasonable risk of danger such that he is likely to commit a
super strike and denial of diversion based on the court’s residual
discretion is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the
mental health diversion statute.”

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We first examine whether substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s finding that Zavaleta is unsuitable for mental
health diversion because he poses an unreasonable risk to public
safety if treated in the community. (See § 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
“[A] defendant is not suitable for diversion if the defendant is ‘too
dangerous to be treated in the community because he would
commit a new violent super strike.’ ” (People v. Graham (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 787, 799.)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
unreasonable risk finding. As the trial court observed, Zavaleta
has an extensive criminal history, with prior felony sentences
totaling more than eight and a half years in less than a decade.
Both Zavaleta’s criminal record and his current offenses include
acts of violence. His instant offenses are his most violent yet and
demonstrate an escalation in violence and criminality. Zavaleta
visited the homes of each of his parents without provocation to
terrorize them with a firearm. Zavaleta grabbed his father by the
neck, placed the firearm to his neck while threatening to kill him,
and struck an injurious blow to the head with the firearm. He
then went to his mother’s home and threatened to kill her as
well, pulling out the firearm and telling her he had just shot his
father in the head before discharging the firearm three times in
her presence. Accordingly, there was a bridgeable gap from
Zavaleta’s charged offenses to murder or attempted murder, each
a super strike. (See People v. Hall (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1255,
1266 [“[w]e cannot limit the trial court’s discretion to offenders
who have already committed a super strike offense without
construing subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 1170.18 as
meaningless surplusage”]; People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
840, 861–862 [a court may properly find a defendant unsuitable

11
for diversion relying primarily on the circumstances of the
charged offense]; People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207,
213–214 [courts look to anticipated future conduct].) Zavaleta
himself appears to have believed he had committed a homicide
offense, telling his mother he had shot his father in the head
when he had instead struck him with the firearm.
Further, Dr. Walker understood Zavaleta to present a
medium risk of future violence, and the letter from Gift of Life
Sober Living outlining Zavaleta’s proffered treatment program
gives no assurance that there would be safety barriers to protect
the community from Zavaleta were he to enroll in the program.
Although Dr. Walker ultimately concluded, in language mirroring
the diversion statute, that Zavaleta was not an unreasonable risk
of future harm — despite her assessment of medium risk of
violence — the trial court could reject that ultimate conclusion.
(People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 933, fn. 4; People v. Nelson
(2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1109.)
Zavaleta compares his case to Whitmill, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th 1138, and Williams, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th 990, in
which appellate courts reversed orders denying mental health
diversion. They are distinguishable.
In Whitmill, the defendant, a 61-year-old veteran
experiencing PTSD from sexual violence suffered during his
military career, took out a firearm during an incident with his
girlfriend and her friend. When the friend approached the
defendant, who appeared unwell, the defendant verbally warned
the friend to back off and then “negligently fired a single shot in
the air away from those nearby and then threw the gun away and
turned himself in” to law enforcement without incident. There
was conflicting evidence that defendant, after firing the shot, said

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to his girlfriend, “[b]itch, I’ll kill you.” (Whitmill, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1142–1143, 1155.) After the trial court denied
defendant’s motion for diversion, he pleaded no contest to
discharge of a firearm with gross negligence and all other
charges, including a criminal threats charge, were dismissed.
(Id. at p. 1147.) “This unusual scenario,” we said, was “a far cry
from indicating that appellant is likely to commit a super-strike
offense in the future.” (Id. at p. 1151.) In contrast to Zavaleta,
the defendant in Whitmill had no violence in his criminal history,
which “consist[ed] of possession and sales of drugs and theft.”
(Id. at p. 1151.) Further, Zavaleta’s charged conduct was
significantly more concerning. He went out of his way to target
family members. Again, Zavaleta grabbed his father by the neck,
placed his firearm to his neck, threatened to kill him, and then
used the firearm to strike him in the head. Zavaleta later used
the firearm to threaten his mother’s life before discharging the
firearm three times immediately adjacent to her home. Zavaleta
ultimately pleaded to an intentional assault, not the negligent
discharge of a weapon. In short, both Zavaleta’s criminal record
and his current offenses demonstrated a significantly greater
likelihood Zavaleta’s future actions posed an unreasonable risk of
violence if treated in the community.
Similarly distinguishable is Williams, supra, 63
Cal.App.5th 990, a felony stalking case, where the appellate court
reversed a denial of diversion in part because there was no
evidence the defendant possessed or had access to any weapons
and because defendant had previously been released on bond
without incident. (Id. at pp. 993–994, 1003–1004.) The
defendant in Williams had no prior criminal record and, though
he made “horrific threats” by email and other writings, “he never

13
actually assaulted anyone or engaged in any violence” and a
mental health expert opined his “ ‘long-term risk of violence fell
within the lowest category.’ ” (Id. at pp. 997, 1003.) Here,
Zavaleta has a more extensive criminal history, including several
felony convictions — one being for assault — and Dr. Walker
found he poses a medium risk of future violence. Additionally,
Zavaleta’s instant offenses were more violent.
While reasonable minds could differ in this case regarding
the risk Zavaleta poses if treated in the community, the trial
court’s finding of unreasonable risk based on the evidence before
it is neither outside the bounds of reason nor otherwise arbitrary
or capricious. Accordingly, Zavaleta has not shown an abuse of
discretion.
Because we conclude the trial court did not err in finding
Zavaleta unsuitable for mental health diversion under 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4), we need not consider Zavaleta’s claim that the court
abused its residual discretion under 1001.36, subd. (a).
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.

SCHERB. J.

We concur:

WILEY, Acting P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.

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