CourtListener 10850507•Briggs v. City of Los Angeles CA2/1
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Filed 4/29/26 Briggs v. City of Los Angeles CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
JEFFREY BRIGGS, B341919
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV08846)
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ACTING
BY AND THROUGH THE LOS
ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF
WATER AND POWER et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lia Martin, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Annette Harings and Annette Harings for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney; Benjamin F.
Chapman, General Counsel for Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power; and Jennifer Gregg, Assistant City Attorney for
Defendants and Respondents.
____________________________
Plaintiff and appellant Jeffrey Briggs sued his former
employer, defendant and respondent City of Los Angeles, acting
by and through the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(DWP), and his former supervisor, defendant and respondent
Daniel Figley (collectively, respondents), alleging multiple claims
under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA,
Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.),1 along with causes of action under
the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) and Labor Code
section 98.6. Briggs maintains, inter alia, that respondents
subjected him to adverse employment actions because of his
stutter and certain injuries for which he took leave, failed to
reasonably accommodate his disabilities, and retaliated against
him for complaining to DWP that it had not paid him and his
fellow coworkers all wages owed. Briggs appeals from the
judgment entered after the trial court granted respondents’
motion for summary judgment.
Briggs fails to overcome the presumption of correctness
accorded to the trial court’s entry of summary judgment. Of note,
Briggs omits from his opening brief a summary of the facts
relevant to this appeal, depriving many of his arguments of the
context necessary for us to review them. Further, Briggs does not
demonstrate the court abused its discretion in ruling on the
parties’ evidentiary objections. He also fails to show the court
erred in concluding (1) respondents met their initial burden on
summary judgment; and (2) his Labor Code section 98.6 and
FEHA disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Government
Code.
2
claims fail as a matter of law. Finally, Briggs forfeits his
appellate challenges as to the remaining causes of action. We
thus affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
The record is voluminous. We summarize only those facts
pertinent to our disposition of this appeal. We describe in greater
detail certain facts in our Discussion, post.
Briggs began working for DWP as a power shovel operator
(PSO) in 1987. PSOs operate heavy machinery in connection
with construction activities. At all relevant times, Briggs was
assigned to DWP’s Owens Valley Electrical System (OVES),
located in Lone Pine, California, a rural mountain area
approximately 270 miles outside of Los Angeles. Briggs has a
stuttering condition.
From August 2013 to May 29, 2016, Figley was a foreman
and one of Briggs’s supervisors at OVES. On May 30, 2016, DWP
promoted Figley to superintendent; Figley remained a supervisor
in Briggs’s chain of command at OVES until October 2020.
Briggs alleges Figley is “one of the main actors in DWP’s
discrimination and harassment against Briggs.” In his
declaration offered in opposition to summary judgment, Briggs
2 We derive our Factual and Procedural Background in
part from undisputed aspects of the trial court’s order granting
summary judgment, admissions made by the parties in their
appellate briefing, and respondents’ assertions that Briggs
does not contest in his reply. (See Association for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
764, 772, fn. 2, 773–774 (Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs) [employing this approach].)
3
maintains he retired in December 2021 because he suffered “too
much harassment and . . . couldn’t bear it anymore.”
On March 2, 2020, Briggs filed a complaint against DWP
and Figley, alleging nine causes of action: (1) disability
discrimination in violation of FEHA; (2) failure to engage in the
interactive process as required by FEHA; (3) failure to provide
reasonable accommodations under FEHA; (4) retaliation under
FEHA; (5) FEHA disability harassment; (6) failure to prevent
harassment and discrimination in violation of FEHA;
(7) interference with CFRA leave; (8) retaliation in violation of
Labor Code section 98.6; and (9) age discrimination in violation of
FEHA. Whereas Briggs asserted all nine causes of action against
DWP, Briggs named Figley as a defendant on only the fifth cause
of action for disability harassment.
Although Briggs raises many grievances against DWP and
Figley, relevant to this appeal are his complaints that DWP:
assigned Briggs electrical craft helper duties in 2017 (Discussion,
part E.4, post); refused to promote him on seven occasions from
2017 to 2019 (Discussion, parts E.1 & F, post); placed him on
workers’ compensation leave for approximately 33 days from July
to September 2017 (Discussion, part E.2, post); erroneously
placed him on two attendance improvement plans and medical
affidavit status in 2019 based in part on his absences in
November 2018 for a work-related injury (Discussion, part E.3,
post); issued him a notice to correct deficiencies in August 2019
(Discussion, part E.4, post); and placed him on paid
administrative leave in September 2019, at which time DWP
distributed a restriction notice barring Briggs from entering its
facilities (Discussion, part E.4, post). Briggs also avers that in
August 2019, Figley ordered Briggs to deliver personally a
4
doctor’s note shortly after Briggs had foot surgery. (Discussion,
part F, post.) Additionally, Briggs claims respondents retaliated
against him after he complained in March 2019 that he and his
coworkers had not been paid all wages owed. (Discussion, part G,
post.)
Respondents moved for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication on each of Briggs’s causes of
action. Briggs opposed the motion, and respondents filed a reply.
Each side filed written evidentiary objections.
On June 6, 2024, the trial court heard and granted
respondents’ motion for summary judgment. In its ruling, the
court sustained 31 of respondents’ evidentiary objections and
overruled most of Briggs’s objections. On August 21, 2024, the
court filed a judgment in favor of respondents in accordance with
its order granting summary judgment. On October 18, 2024,
Briggs timely appealed from the judgment.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Summary judgment motions are governed by a three-step
procedure. (See Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres
Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 492 (Los Angeles
Unified School Dist.).) “ ‘ “ ‘First, [a court] identif[ies] the issues
raised by the pleadings, since it is these allegations to which the
motion must respond; secondly, [the court] determine[s] whether
the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate
the opponent’s claims and justify a judgment in movant’s favor;
when a summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a
judgment, the third and final step is to determine whether the
opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material
factual issue.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (See ibid.; see also Laabs v. City of
Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1250 [holding that at the
5
second step, “the moving party bears the initial burden of
production to make a prima facie showing that no triable issue of
material fact exists”].)
“Under summary judgment law, ‘ “[t]here is a triable issue
of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the
party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable
standard of proof.” [Citation.] In making this determination,
“the court may not weigh the plaintiff’s evidence or inferences
against the defendants’ as though it were sitting as the trier of
fact, [but] it must nevertheless determine what any evidence or
inference could show or imply to a reasonable trier of fact.” ’
[Citation.]” (Lares v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 318, 331–332.)
“We review an order granting or denying summary
judgment or summary adjudication independently.” (Los Angeles
Unified School Dist., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 492.) “Only
admissible evidence is . . . [considered] in deciding whether there
is a triable issue.” (See Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 755, 761.) “We review the trial court’s rulings on
evidentiary objections for an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 762.)
“Additionally, ‘[w]hen the error is one of state law only, it
generally does not warrant reversal unless there is a reasonable
probability that in the absence of the error, a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached.’
[Citation.] An appellant bears the burden of satisfying this state
law prejudice standard.” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 777.)
“ ‘ “Even when our review on appeal ‘is de novo, it is limited
to issues which have been adequately raised and supported in
6
[the appellant’s opening] brief. [Citations.] Issues not raised in
an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or abandoned.’ ”
[Citation.] To succeed[,] . . . [an appellant] must first establish
error. . . . “ ‘[T]he most fundamental rule of appellate review is
that an appealed judgment or order is presumed to be correct.’
[Citation.] . . . [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] To ‘rebut[ ] the
presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s decision,’
the appellant must ‘ “ ‘ “supply[ ] the reviewing court with some
cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the
record.” ’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Cruz v. Tapestry,
Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 943, 953–954 (Cruz).) Consequently,
“ ‘ “[d]e novo review does not[, for instance,] obligate us to cull the
record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to
uncover the requisite triable issues. . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (See
Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at
p. 492.)
“We are not bound by the issues actually decided by the
trial court. ‘The appellate court should affirm the judgment of
the trial court if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to
the case, including but not limited to the theory adopted by the
trial court, providing the facts are undisputed. [Citations.] Thus
we must affirm so long as any of the grounds urged by
[respondents], either here or in the trial court, entitle [them] to
summary judgment.’ [Citation.]” (See Schmidt v. Bank of
America, N.A. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498 (Schmidt).)
DISCUSSION
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude Briggs
does not show the trial court erred in finding that his FEHA
disability discrimination, FEHA reasonable accommodation, and
Labor Code section 98.6 causes of action fail as a matter of law.
7
(Discussion, parts E–G, post.) We also conclude Briggs forfeits
his claims of error concerning his remaining six causes of action.
(Discussion, part H, post.)
Before reaching those issues, we (1) disapprove of Briggs’s
attempts to incorporate by reference into his briefing arguments
he advanced during the trial court proceedings (Discussion,
part A, post); (2) reject his challenge to the court’s rulings on the
parties’ evidentiary objections (Discussion, part B, post);
(3) conclude Briggs has not shown the court erred in finding
respondents met their initial burden on summary judgment
(Discussion, part C, post); and (4) conclude Briggs has failed to
overcome the presumption of correctness accorded to the court’s
decision that all FEHA claims arising before August 30, 2016 are
time-barred (Discussion, part D, post).3
3 Briggs further contends, “The trial court abused its
discretion if it orally granted a motion for summary judgment at
the . . . hearing based on the length of Briggs’s responsive
separate statement of facts.” (Boldface & some capitalization
omitted, italics added.) We do not address this contention
because, assuming solely for the sake of argument that any such
oral ruling may be deemed to have been formally adopted into the
trial court’s final written decision on respondents’ motion, we
conclude for the reasons set forth in this opinion that Briggs fails
to establish the court erred in granting summary judgment. (See
Standards of Review, ante [noting that a reviewing court is not
bound by the trial court’s stated rationale for granting summary
judgment].)
8
A. Briggs May Not Incorporate by Reference into His
Briefing Arguments He Made During the Trial Court
Proceedings
In his opening and reply briefs, Briggs repeatedly purports
to incorporate by reference arguments he made in opposition to
respondents’ summary judgment motion. For instance, in his
reply brief, Briggs asks us to consider certain legal authorities
from his opposition brief he claims support his FEHA interactive
process cause of action. We reject as procedurally improper
Briggs’s attempts to incorporate into his appellate briefing
arguments he made below. (See York v. City of Los Angeles
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1188–1189, fn. 4 [“To the extent
plaintiffs purport to incorporate by reference the arguments they
made below but have not included in their appellate briefs, we
decline to consider them . . . .”].)
B. We Reject Briggs’s Claim the Trial Court
Prejudicially Erred In Ruling on the Parties’
Evidentiary Objections
Briggs contests the trial court’s rulings sustaining 11 of
respondents’ objections to evidence he offered in opposition to
their summary judgment motion, to wit, respondents’ objection
numbers 2, 3, 5, 11, 13, 18, 21, 22, 24, 26, and 28. In their
appellate brief, respondents correctly point out that with “[t]he
sole exception” of Briggs’s challenge to the court’s ruling
sustaining respondents’ objection number 2, Briggs fails to
support these claims of error with citation to legal authority.
Briggs thus forfeits his appellate claims concerning respondents’
objection numbers 3, 5, 11, 13, 18, 21, 22, 24, 26, and 28. (See
United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36
9
Cal.App.5th 142, 156 (United Grand Corp.) [holding that an
appellant forfeits a contention by “fail[ing] to adequately
support . . . [it] with cogent argument or appropriate legal or
factual citations”].)
In their objection number 2, respondents argued the
following excerpt from Briggs’s declaration was inadmissible:
“Around this time, [that is, in early 2016,] Figley . . . would call
me stupid to my face. Figley would also do these little things like
put a big smile on his face, and tell me to go house-to-house when
we were working in neighborhoods to tell the residents that we
were going to turn their power off, and that their power may be
interrupted. But when he found out that I actually enjoyed this
work, he stopped letting me do it and got someone else to do it.”
Respondents argued Briggs had not shown he was
competent to offer this testimony, this passage contained
hearsay, and the passage was irrelevant, lacked foundation, and
was speculative. In sustaining this objection, the trial court did
not specify which of respondents’ five grounds rendered this
passage from Briggs’s declaration inadmissible.
On appeal, Briggs maintains he was competent to offer this
testimony, and it was not speculative and did not lack
foundation, because he was a percipient witness to the events he
described. Briggs also intimates his testimony that Figley called
Briggs “stupid” was not hearsay because Briggs did not offer the
statement for its truth. Briggs further argues the trial court’s
exclusion of this “direct evidence of discriminatory conduct based
on Briggs’s stutter” “substantially prejudiced him” vis-à-vis his
efforts to show a triable issue on his FEHA disability
discrimination claim.
10
Briggs does not elaborate further on his assertion that his
stutter caused Figley to engage in the behavior described in the
above excerpt from Briggs’s declaration. Without a more detailed
description of the circumstances under which Figley called Briggs
“stupid” and ordered Briggs to inform personally residents that
their power would be turned off, it is not apparent this portion of
Briggs’s declaration has “any tendency in reason to prove” that
Figley possessed the requisite discriminatory animus. (See Evid.
Code, § 210 [defining “ ‘[r]elevant evidence’ ”]; Discussion, part E,
post [explaining that discriminatory animus is an essential
element of Briggs’s FEHA disability discrimination cause of
action].)
The paucity of Briggs’s briefing on this point underscores
that, even if Briggs’s testimony on this point were relevant, he
has not shown the trial court prejudicially erred in excluding it,
that is, that any rational factfinder could infer from this
testimony Figley did in fact subject Briggs to this purported
abuse because of Briggs’s stutter. (See Standards of Review, ante
[explaining that an appellant raising an error of state law
typically must show the alleged error was prejudicial, and
defining the term “triable issue of material fact”].) Briggs thus
fails to demonstrate the trial court reversibly erred in sustaining
respondents’ objection number 2.
Additionally, Briggs complains, “The trial court overruled
149 out of 153 of [his] objections, substantially prejudicing [him].”
He argues respondents “cited . . . a slew of testimony based not on
personal knowledge of the DWP-associated declarants, but based
only on hearsay or ‘upon information and belief.’ ” Briggs
provides no analysis regarding any particular objection he
believes should have been sustained. Instead, he purports to
11
incorporate by reference arguments he made below. This is
improper. (See Discussion, part A, ante.)
In sum, Briggs fails to demonstrate the trial court
prejudicially erred in ruling on the parties’ respective evidentiary
objections.
C. Briggs Does Not Show the Trial Court Erred In
Ruling that Respondents Met Their Initial Burden
on Summary Judgment
As to all nine of Briggs’s causes of action, the trial court
ruled that respondents had met their initial burden of showing no
triable issue of material fact exists.
In his opening brief, Briggs raises only two arguments
supporting his position respondents did not meet their initial
burden. First, he claims respondents failed to cite evidence
substantiating their separate statement of undisputed fact
number 77, which undisputed fact “concern[s] why Briggs was
returned to work after 52 workdays of administrative leave.”
Specifically, Briggs maintains, “Respondents’ evidence [they cited
in support of that fact] is based on DWP’s Person with the Most
Knowledge (‘PMK’) deposition wherein the PMK testified he ‘did
not know’ key facts, and would be ‘just guessing’ who led the
investigation into Briggs.” Second, Briggs insists, “Respondents
offered no evidence of ‘undue hardship.’ ”
Briggs fails to connect either of these two arguments to the
trial court’s rulings that respondents met their initial burden as
to his nine causes of action. As noted in our Standards of Review,
ante, Briggs has the burden to provide cogent argument to
support his claims of error. We do not cull the record to make
arguments for the parties. Further, by omitting a summary of
the pertinent facts from his opening brief, Briggs fails to provide
12
the context necessary for us to ascertain what relevance, if any,
these two arguments have on whether respondents met their
initial summary judgment burden. (See Discussion, part E, post
[explaining that no factual summary appears in Briggs’s opening
brief].) Accordingly, Briggs fails to rebut the presumption of
correctness accorded to the court’s finding that respondents
satisfied their initial burden as to each of his causes of action.
(See Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270,
277 (Hernandez) [“We may and do ‘disregard conclusory
arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or
fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the
conclusions he wants us to adopt.’ ”]; Standards of Review, ante
[discussing the presumption of correctness].)
D. Briggs Leaves Undisturbed the Trial Court’s Ruling
that All FEHA Claims Arising Prior to
August 30, 2016 Are Time-Barred
The trial court decided that all of Briggs’s FEHA claims
that “arose prior to August 30, 2016” are barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. Briggs does not mention this ruling in his
briefing. We thus presume the trial court’s conclusion on this
point was correct. (See Standards of Review, ante.)
E. Briggs Fails To Demonstrate There Is a Triable Issue
on His FEHA Disability Discrimination Cause of
Action
“[FEHA] makes it an unlawful employment practice to
discharge a person from employment or discriminate against the
person in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment,
because of physical or mental disability.” (See Claudio v. Regents
of University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 242.)
13
“California resolves employment discrimination claims by
applying a burden-shifting procedure. Under this test, the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of
discrimination by presenting evidence showing: (1) he was a
member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position
sought or was performing competently in the position held, (3) he
suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) some other
circumstance suggests a discriminatory motive.” (Foroudi v. The
Aerospace Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 992, 1007 (Foroudi).)
“Once the employee sets forth a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to present evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
[Citation.] If the employer does so, the burden then shifts back to
the employee to ‘offer substantial evidence that the employer’s
stated nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was
untrue or pretextual, or evidence the employer acted with a
discriminatory animus, or a combination of the two, such that a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer engaged in
intentional discrimination.’ [Citation.]” (Foroudi, supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1007.)4
Our high court has explained that an adverse employment
action is an act that is “reasonably likely to adversely and
4 An employee alleging a FEHA discrimination claim may
instead invoke a “ ‘disparate-impact’ ” theory of liability, which
‘ “ ‘involve[s] employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (See Foroudi, supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1004.) Briggs does not rely on a disparate-
impact theory.
14
materially affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity
for advancement in his or her career.” (See Yanowitz v. L’Oreal
USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1035–1036, 1054–1055
(Yanowitz) [defining this term for the purpose of FEHA
retaliation claims]; see also Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines
Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1168 [“[T]he [adverse]
employment actions that can give rise to a claim for retaliation
are identical to the actions that can give rise to a claim for
discrimination . . . .”].)
In concluding that Briggs’s FEHA disability discrimination
cause of action fails as a matter of law, the trial court ruled, inter
alia, that “none of the allegedly adverse employment actions the
Complaint describes constitute[s] an adverse employment action
for purposes of discrimination under the FEHA.”
Although this court granted Briggs leave to file a corrected
opening brief, entirely absent from that corrected brief is the
requisite “summary of significant facts limited to matters in the
record.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) In lieu of a
factual summary, Briggs’s opening brief has a section titled
“Questions To Be Answered by the Court of Appeal” that contains
two subheadings, (1) “Respondents Took Adverse Employment
Actions Against Briggs,” which section is comprised of a list of 16
events; and (2) “Given FEHA’s Prohibition on Disability
Discrimination, What Constitutes a Discriminatory or Adverse
Employment Action?”; 15 events appear under this subheading.
(Boldface & some capitalization omitted.) The lists under these
two subheadings fail to provide the reader with adequate context
to determine whether these events are adverse employment
actions under FEHA. For instance, the third item listed under
the second subheading avers, without any further detail:
15
“Respondents failed to provide Briggs with information about his
CFRA rights.”
Furthermore, in the argument section of his opening brief,
Briggs urges us to apply the definition of adverse employment
action for Title VII cases that the United States Supreme Court
announced in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri (2024)
601 U.S. 346. In particular, Briggs cites the syllabus of the
Muldrow decision for the following proposition: “ ‘An employee
challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the
transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable
term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be
significant.’ ”5 Briggs does not address whether Muldrow’s
definition of adverse employment action from the Title VII
context differs from that adopted by our state’s appellate courts
under FEHA, nor does he explain why he apparently believes the
wrongdoing alleged elsewhere in his opening brief satisfies either
the Title VII or FEHA definitions of that term.
Briggs thus fails to brief adequately whether the trial court
erred in concluding he did not show a reasonable jury could find
he suffered an adverse employment action. For that reason
alone, we may affirm the judgment as to his FEHA disability
discrimination cause of action. (See Standards of Review, ante
[noting that an appellant must provide some cogent argument to
overcome the presumption of correctness]; see also United Grand
Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 165, fn. 6 [“ ‘[A]n appellant is
5 (Quoting Muldrow, supra, 601 U.S. at p. 346 [excerpt
from the syllabus]; see also Muldrow, at p. 346, fn. * [explaining
that “[t]he syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court
but [was] prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader”].)
16
required to not only cite to valid legal authority, but also explain
how it applies in his case.’ ”].)
Notwithstanding these deficiencies in Briggs’s opening
brief, respondents discuss in their appellate brief whether the
following seven purported acts of discrimination supported
Briggs’s FEHA disability discrimination cause of action:
“(1) denying [Briggs] promotions between 2017 and October 2019;
(2) assigning him ECH [electrical craft helper] duties in 2017;
(3) placing him on paid leave in 2017; (4) including him in DWP’s
Attendance Improvement Program in 2019; (5) issuing him the
August 2019 NTCD [notice to correct deficiencies]; (6) placing
him on PAL [paid administrative leave] in September 2019; and
(7) issuing the Restriction Notice in September 2019.” Because
respondents provide context for these seven alleged instances of
discrimination that was lacking in Briggs’s opening brief, we
elect to address whether Briggs has shown that any of them
support his FEHA disability discrimination cause of action. (See
Discussion, parts E.1–E.4, post.)
1. Briggs does not show that DWP’s failure to promote
him between 2017 and 2019 gives rise to a viable
FEHA disability discrimination claim
Briggs does not rebut the presumption of correctness
accorded to the trial court’s conclusion that Briggs failed to
establish a triable issue as to his FEHA discrimination cause of
action insofar as it is based on DWP’s refusal to hire Briggs for
positions he sought between 2017 and 2019. As we describe
below, the trial court found that one of the jobs Briggs sought
required mathematical competency and oral communication
skills that Briggs did not possess. As for the other positions
Briggs pursued during that timeframe, the court found that he
17
attained low scores relative to other candidates under DWP’s
two-part examination system.
In the order granting summary judgment, the trial court
observed respondents presented evidence showing that “[t]he
City of Los Angeles and . . . DWP select candidates for Civil
Service Positions based on a two-part examination process,
consisting of a Civil Service Exam conducted by the Personnel
Department, and a ‘Department Selection Process’ conducted by
the [H]iring Division, wherein available positions are offered to
the applicants who achieve the highest final score(s).” The court
explained these scores were based on “oral interviews and testing
on specific knowledge, skills, and abilities critical to the job.” The
court also observed that according to respondents’ evidence, “An
applicant with a disability who passes a Civil Service
Examination, and thereafter qualifies for the Department
Selection Process[,] must request an accommodation from the
[H]iring Division, even if the applicant previously requested an
accommodation from the Personnel Department when taking the
Civil Service Exam.”
The trial court found respondents presented evidence that
Briggs had applied for the “Truck and Equipment Dispatcher”
position “in or around May 2017,” and that although “[t]he City
granted [Briggs] 50% extra time and rescheduled . . . his [oral]
interview . . . [as an] accommodation” for his stutter, “[Briggs]
achieved a total score of 77.6 on the Civil Service
Examination[,] . . . which was not high enough for [him] to
qualify to interview as part of the Department Selection Process.”
The court ruled this position “required clear oral communication
and, in some cases, mathematical computations . . . .”
18
The court also noted respondents had shown Briggs
“participated in six Department Selection Processes between
January 2018 and October 2019,” “[a]ll six Department Selection
Processes involved oral interviews[,] . . . [Briggs] did not request
any accommodations from the Hiring Division related to any of
the six Department Selection Processes,” and Briggs “did not
receive any of the jobs he applied for.” As for each of the six
positions, the court explained: (1) Briggs’s “final score on a
January 2018 Labor Supervisor Department Selection Process,
which consisted of an oral interview, was 71, and [Briggs] ranked
fifth out of five applicants who participated, while the applicant
who was hired scored 93”; (2) Briggs’s “final score on a
June 11, 2018 Labor Supervisor Department Selection Process,
which consisted of an oral interview and a written examination,
was 82, and [Briggs] ranked fourth out of six applicants who
participated, while the applicant who was hired scored 91”;
(3) Briggs’s “final score on a June 18, 2018 Labor Supervisor
Department Selection Process, which consisted of an oral
interview, was 74, and [Briggs] ranked fourth out of four
applicants who participated, while the applicant who was hired
scored 94”; (4) Briggs’s “final score on a February 2019 Truck and
Equipment Dispatcher Department Selection Process, which
consisted of an oral interview, was 77.5, and [Briggs] ranked
fourth out of six applicants who participated, while the applicant
who was hired scored 85.5”; (5) Briggs’s “final score on an
April 2019 PSO ‘A’ Department Selection Process,[6] which
6 According to the trial court, Briggs introduced evidence
that his position at DWP was “Power Shovel Operator-B” (PSO-
B). Briggs intimates in his opening brief the PSO-A position he
19
consisted of an oral interview and operating test, was 59.4, and
[Briggs] ranked second out of two applicants who participated,
while the applicant who was hired scored 94.8”; and (6) Briggs’s
“final score on an October 2019 Truck and Equipment Dispatcher
Department Selection Process, which consisted of an oral
interview, was 67.5, and [Briggs] ranked eighth out of nine
applicants who participated, while the three applicants who were
hired scored 84, 81.5, and 80.5.”
The trial court ruled that DWP’s refusal to hire Briggs for
the truck equipment and dispatcher position on three occasions
between 2017 and 2019 did not give rise to a viable FEHA
disability discrimination claim because Briggs’s “evidence
does not demonstrate that he possessed . . . the[ required]
qualifications” for the position, that is “clear oral communication”
and “the ability to perform ‘arithmetic or higher level
mathematical computations.’ ” As for all the positions Briggs
sought during that timeframe, the court found Briggs’s FEHA
disability discrimination claim failed because respondents had
“shown . . . there was a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
their decisions,” that is, Briggs “did not score high enough . . . to
be selected for the positions,” and Briggs did not “present[ ]
evidence raising a triable issue regarding whether there was
‘some other circumstance suggesting discriminatory motive.’ ”
Briggs does not contest the trial court’s ruling he was not
qualified for the truck and equipment dispatcher position because
he did not possess the clear oral communication skills and
mathematical competency required for the position. Briggs also
sought in 2019 was located “in a different area” than his PSO-B
position.
20
does not challenge the court’s rulings that (1) his examination
scores constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason not to
hire him for the positions for which he applied from 2017 to 2019,
and (2) Briggs did not offer evidence showing DWP’s failure to
promote him was nonetheless motivated by discriminatory
animus. Consequently, Briggs fails to demonstrate DWP’s
refusal to hire him for these positions during that timeframe
gives rise to liability for disability discrimination under FEHA.7
2. Briggs does not show a reasonable jury could find
that his placement on workers’ compensation leave in
2017 was an adverse employment action
The trial court found respondents proffered evidence that
on July 27, 2017, DWP “received a doctor’s note indicating that
[Briggs] had work restrictions that included ‘no repetitive lifting,
bending, and/or twisting.’ [Citation.]” The court noted a DWP
reasonable accommodations coordinator and a director at DWP
“determined that [Briggs’s] work restrictions could not be
accommodated in his position as a PSO because, as part of his
Duties Description Record, [Briggs] was supposed to inspect and
adjust heavy-duty construction equipment on an on-going basis,
which involves repetitive bending, lifting, and twisting.” The
court further noted the reasonable accommodations coordinator
“determined that [Briggs] could not be temporarily reassigned to
7 (See Discussion, part E, ante [explaining that being
qualified for the position sought and discriminatory animus are
essential elements of Briggs’s FEHA disability discrimination
cause of action].) In Discussion, part F, post, we address whether
DWP’s decision not to hire Briggs for these positions supports his
FEHA reasonable accommodation cause of action.
21
light duty work under [ ]DWP’s Light Duty program because the
only assignment available was office work, which [Briggs] was
not trained for.” Respondents showed Briggs “was added to the
light duty waitlist” and DWP placed him on paid workers’
compensation leave for “a temporary period of about 33
workdays” from July to September 2017. The court found Briggs
failed to establish “a triable issue of material fact as to whether
[Briggs’s] placement on Workers’ Compensation Leave, in this
instance, was an adverse employment action,” and observed,
“[respondents’] evidence suggests the placement on workers’
compensation leave was a reasonable accommodation.”
In Discussion part B, ante, we rejected Briggs’s
undeveloped challenge to the trial court’s ruling sustaining an
objection to evidence related to his placement on workers’
compensation leave in 2017 (i.e., his challenge to respondents’
objection no. 5). Aside from that claim of error, Briggs does not
contest the court’s ruling that his placement on workers’
compensation leave falls short of establishing an adverse
employment action.8 He thus fails to undermine the court’s
ruling on that point. We address whether Briggs demonstrates
his placement on workers’ compensation leave in 2017 gives rise
to a FEHA reasonable accommodation claim in Discussion,
part F, post.
8 Instead, Briggs claims on appeal that respondents placed
him on two “improper” Attendance Improvement Plans, “which
relied on absences protected by . . . workers’ compensation.” We
address this argument in Discussion, part E.3, post.
22
3. Briggs fails to show a rational jury could find the
AIPs and MAS he received in 2019 were adverse
employment actions
The trial court explained that respondents had presented
evidence showing: “Under [ ]DWP’s attendance policy, any
employee who has accrued more than six total ‘instances’ of
absences (including ‘sick time’), totaling ninety-six hours or more
has ‘excessive absences,’ and is placed on an Attendance
Improvement Plan (AIP). . . . When an employee on an AIP has a
new absence[ ] instance, the employee is placed on Medical
Affidavit Status (MAS) and must provide a doctor’s note upon
returning to work. [Citation.] AIP/MAS is not disciplinary.”
The trial court observed, “[Briggs] claims that he was
subjected to an adverse employment action because he was
incorrectly placed on Attendance Improvement Plans/Medical
Affidavit Status.” The court noted respondents’ evidence showed
that Briggs “sustained a work[-]related injury on
November 14, 2018, for which he was off-work between
November 15, 2018 and November 29, 2018 (the ‘November 2018
Absences’).”
The trial court found respondents’ evidence showed the
following: “In February 2019, [Briggs] was placed on AIP
because [ ]DWP’s payroll system reflected that [Briggs] had
excessive absences, in part based on the November 2018 absences
arising from [Briggs’s] workers’ compensation claim. [Citation.]
[Briggs] was placed on AIP in May 2019 because . . . the
City/[ ]DWP’s payroll system [still] reflected that [Briggs] had
excessive absences[, based in part on the November 2018
Absences]. [Citation.] [Briggs] was placed on MAS on
August 27, 2019, in part because, . . . the City/[ ]DWP’s payroll
23
system reflected that [Briggs] was already on AIP, and [he] had
accrued at least one additional absence.” The court, however,
also found Briggs presented evidence that “DWP’s Medical
Certification Policy specifically excludes from counting towards
an AIP . . . work[-]related illnesses or injuries.”
In rejecting Briggs’s FEHA discrimination cause of action
to the extent it was predicated on his placement on AIP and
MAS, the trial court remarked, “While [Briggs’s] evidence
demonstrates he was improperly placed on an AIP/MAS, the
evidence fails to show a triable issue of material fact as to
whether [Briggs’s] placement on an AIP/MAS was an adverse
employment action.”
On appeal, Briggs seems to argue the two AIPs and one
MAS were adverse employment actions because they amounted
to employee discipline. As an initial matter, Briggs claims
repeatedly that DWP “relied on [its] ‘Guide to Employee
Discipline” to “plac[e him] on the improper AIPs/MAS.” In
advancing this contention, Briggs intimates a rational factfinder
could infer, based solely on the title of a DWP policy governing
AIPs and MASs, that placement thereon is “reasonably likely to
adversely and materially affect an employee’s job performance or
opportunity for advancement in his . . . career.” (See Yanowitz,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 1035–1036, 1054–1055 [defining adverse
employment action].) We reject this contention as speculation.
(See Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162–163
[“[E]vidence that gives rise to no more than mere speculation
cannot be regarded as substantial, and is insufficient to establish
a triable issue of material fact.”].)
24
Briggs also misrepresents the contents of certain DWP
documents relating to the two AIPs and one MAS he received in
2019.
First, Briggs asserts, “Both of the AIPs issued to Briggs
state that they have ‘possible effects . . . on promotional
opportunities and the schedule of subsequent reviews.’
[Citation.]” (Ellipsis inserted by Briggs.) Yet, the two
memoranda Briggs cites indicate Figley discussed with Briggs,
inter alia, “The elements of the Attendance Improvement
Program (AIP), including how the AIP operates, the goals of the
AIP, the possible effects of poor attendance on promotional
opportunities, and the schedule of subsequent reviews.” (Italics
added.) The documents do not state that mere placement on an
AIP (as opposed to poor attendance generally) impacts Briggs’s
promotional opportunities, and there is no indication that the
“subsequent reviews” described therein refer to anything other
than further discussions concerning Briggs’s placement on an
AIP. The only consequence of being on an AIP specified in these
memoranda is possible “place[ment] on Medical Affidavit Status
which would require [Briggs] to provide a physician’s certificate
for each instance of illness.”
Second, Briggs claims, “The MAS threatened that Briggs
may be subjected to ‘disciplinary action up to and including
discharge.’ [Citation.]” In fact, the memorandum cited by Briggs
states, “[F]or any absence due to illness, [Briggs is] required to
furnish written verification from a licensed physician” containing
certain information, including “[a] description of the illness . . . .”
The document admonishes Briggs that failure to adhere to that
doctor’s note requirement “may subject [him] to disciplinary
action,” and that “[c]ontinued excessive absenteeism may also
25
lead to disciplinary action up to and including discharge.” Briggs
does not argue that this obligation to submit a doctor’s note for
illness-related absences, as such, is a form of discipline.
Third, Briggs cites what appears to be a DWP policy for the
following proposition: “The consequences of an AIP/MAS may
include ‘disdplinary action.’ (sic.) [Citation.]” (First alteration
supplied by Briggs.) The page from the clerk’s transcript upon
which Briggs relies, however, directs DWP supervisors to
“[d]iscuss . . . with [an] employee” who has excessive absences
certain “points,” including “[t]he consequences of lack of
improvement which may include being placed on Medical
Affidavit Status or disdplinary [sic] action.” (Italics added.)
Briggs thus conflates placement on MAS with the excessive
absenteeism that may lead to discipline.
Lastly, Briggs avers a DWP official attested, “ ‘[A]ny time
off work without a valid leave of absence (e.g. sick note, approved
vacation, etc.) may be posted as “unauthorized time,” which can
lead to discipline,’ ” and that she told Briggs “ ‘he needed to
communicate with his supervisor regarding his whereabouts,
and . . . that he could be subject to discipline for failing to do so.’
[Citation.]” (Boldface & underscoring omitted.) This testimony
has no apparent bearing on whether placement on an AIP or
MAS is a form of discipline.
In sum, Briggs fails to show the trial court erred in
concluding that no reasonable jury could find the AIPs and MAS
he received were adverse employment actions.
26
4. Briggs does not establish a triable issue on
discriminatory animus vis-à-vis his assignment to
ECH duties in 2017, the August 27, 2019 NTCD, his
placement on paid administrative leave in
September 2019, and the issuance of the restriction
notice in September 2019
In its summary judgment order, the trial court observed,
[Briggs] alleges that he was harassed and discriminated against
because [ ]DWP intermittently asked him to work as an Electrical
Craft Helper (ECH), an entry level assistant to Linemen” “at an
unspecified time in 2017.” The court also noted respondents
introduced evidence showing DWP issued an NTCD (notice to
correct deficiencies) to Briggs on August 27, 2019 that accused
him of “ ‘driving around Lone Pine approximately three blocks
from [his] work location without authorization’ ” on
October 31, 2018. Further, the court found respondents
presented evidence that DWP placed Briggs on paid
administrative leave effective September 10, 2019 to “give
[ ]DWP the opportunity to investigate and review allegations that
[Briggs] had failed to adequately carry out assigned
responsibilities on multiple occasions . . . and failed to cooperate
with others and/or used abusive language at work”; DWP shortly
thereafter distributed a restriction notice prohibiting Briggs from
entering all DWP facilities; and Briggs returned from this
temporary paid administrative leave to “his usual position as a
PSO in the Owens Valley Electrical System” “[o]n or about
November 25, 2019.” As for all of these alleged adverse
employment actions, the court concluded Briggs failed to
demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact that
27
respondents had undertaken them “because of” his asserted
disabilities.
In his appellate briefing, Briggs does not direct us to any
evidence giving rise to a triable issue of material fact as to
whether DWP or Figley assigned him to ECH duties, provided
the NTCD to him, placed him on paid administrative leave, or
issued the restriction notice because of his stutter, work-related
injury, or foot surgery. Rather, Briggs levels vague and
unsupported averments concerning respondents’ purported
discriminatory animus. For instance, on page 41 of his opening
brief, Briggs alleges, without any accompanying record citation,
“Figley called Briggs ‘stupid’ and Figley’s harassment increased
precipitously after Briggs engaged in protected activities such as
when Briggs took time off of work for workers’ compensation
leave; when Briggs took medical leave for his foot surgery; and
when Briggs opposed [r]espondents’ discriminatory use of medical
leave and workers’ compensation leaves to place Briggs on two
improper AIPs, and then on one improper MAS.” By not
providing cogent argument or citation to the evidentiary record
demonstrating that these purported adverse employment actions
were the product of one or more of Briggs’s asserted disabilities,
Briggs forfeits his contention that they were. (See United Grand
Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 156 [deeming an argument
forfeited because the appellant failed to support it with cogent
argument and citations to the record and legal authority].)
F. Briggs Fails To Show There Is a Triable Issue as to
His FEHA Reasonable Accommodation Cause of
Action
“To establish a failure to accommodate claim [under
FEHA], [an employee] must show (1) [the employee] has a
28
disability covered by FEHA; (2) [the employee] can perform the
essential functions of the position; and (3) [the employer] failed
reasonably to accommodate [the employee’s] disability.” (See
Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
1092, 1107 (Brown).) “A ‘reasonable accommodation’ means a
modification or adjustment to the workplace that enables the
employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or
desired. [Citation.] . . . [A]n accommodation is not reasonable if it
produces an undue hardship to the employer . . . .” (See id. at
pp. 1107–1108.)
In his opening brief, Briggs appears to argue respondents
failed to reasonably accommodate his alleged disabilities when:
(1) DWP “refus[ed] to allow him to write out his job interview
answers instead of orally answering the questions” for the
positions he sought between 2017 and 2019;9 (2) DWP placed him
on paid workers’ compensation leave in 2017; (3) “even though
Figley knew DWP policies did not require it, Figley demanded [in
August 2019 that] Briggs personally deliver a doctor’s note
shortly after Briggs had foot surgery”; and (4) DWP improperly
placed him on two AIPs and one MAS in 2019 based in part on
his absences for a work-related injury in 2018. As we explain
9 Briggs argues for the first time in his reply brief that
“[r]espondents [also] failed to accommodate him in job
interviews” in 2020 and 2021. Briggs forfeits this contention by
belatedly raising it. (See County of Los Angeles v. Niblett (2025)
116 Cal.App.5th 454, 477–478 (Niblett) [holding that an appellant
forfeited a point by “asserting [it] for the first time in his reply”].)
29
below, Briggs fails to demonstrate that these incidents give rise
to a viable FEHA reasonable accommodation cause of action.10
Turning to DWP’s alleged failure to allow Briggs to write
out his answers to interview questions during the civil service
hiring process, Briggs does not contest the trial court’s ruling
that no rational factfinder could conclude he was qualified for the
truck and equipment dispatcher position he sought on three
occasions between 2017 and 2019. (See Discussion, part E.1,
ante.) DWP’s refusal to hire him for that position thus cannot
support his reasonable accommodation cause of action. (See
Brown, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107 [noting that the
employee’s ability to “perform the essential functions of the
position” is an essential element of this cause of action].)
As for the other positions Briggs pursued (i.e., his three
applications for labor supervisor and one application for PSO-A),
Briggs does not challenge the trial court’s ruling he did not
request an accommodation from the hiring division for those
positions.11 Briggs also does not dispute, and thus tacitly agrees
10 Briggs also complains, “DWP did not address the fact
that Briggs emailed Figley he would be out of work for a foot
surgery, and yet Figley subsequently told DWP he had ‘not heard’
from Briggs ‘at all.’ ” We held in Discussion, part E, ante, that
Briggs violated California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) by
failing to include a summary of relevant facts in his opening
brief. Without further context, it is not apparent that Figley’s
purported feigned ignorance of Briggs’s foot surgery gives rise to
liability for failure to accommodate Briggs’s disabilities.
11(See Discussion, part E.1, ante.) Briggs does not argue
he requested a reasonable accommodation from the personnel
department in connection with those positions (i.e., at the first
30
with, respondents’ assertion that as to these positions, “there is
no evidence that Briggs had previously interacted with anyone in
the relevant DWP hiring divisions such that they would have
been aware of Briggs’[s] stutter much less its resulting
limitations on his ability to participate in oral interviews.”12
Although Briggs intimates in his opening brief that his stutter is
an “open and obvious medical condition [that] . . . interferes with
his ability to speak” such that the hiring division should have
offered to allow him to write his answers to interview questions
in the absence of a request, he does not elaborate further on that
point or support it with any citation to the record or legal
authority. (Italics added.) Accordingly, Briggs does not show a
reasonable factfinder could conclude DWP failed to reasonably
accommodate Briggs when he sought the labor supervisor and
PSO-A positions.13
part of the two-part civil service exam process) or clarify whether
he is maintaining that DWP failed to reasonably accommodate
him at that stage for those positions.
12 (See Niblett, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 467 & fn. 11
[noting that appellants may “ ‘tacitly concede[ ]’ a point raised in
the respondents’ brief by ‘failing to dispute it in their reply’ ”].)
13 (See King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 426, 443 [“ ‘ “[T]he employee can’t expect the
employer to read his mind and know he secretly wanted a
particular accommodation and sue the employer for not providing
it. . . . ” ’ [Citation.] ‘It is an employee’s responsibility to
understand his or her own physical or mental condition well
enough to present the employer at the earliest opportunity with a
concise list of restrictions which must be met to accommodate the
employee.’ ”].)
31
Regarding DWP’s decision to place Briggs on workers’
compensation leave in 2017, Briggs argues, without any record
citation or further discussion, that “DWP relied entirely on
vague, conclusory statements to support its contention that
Briggs could not perform his Power Shovel Operator (‘PSO’)
duties, and that no other positions existed he could perform with
or without accommodation.” Yet, the trial court found
respondents’ evidence showed that the restrictions identified in
Briggs’s doctor’s note (i.e., no repetitive lifting, bending and/or
twisting) were incompatible with the duties set forth in the job
description for PSOs. (See Discussion, part E.2, ante.) The court
also found respondents’ evidence showed a DWP reasonable
accommodations coordinator determined Briggs could not be
temporarily assigned to light duty work because only office work
was available, and Briggs lacked the necessary training for that
office work. (See ibid.) Briggs does not contest these rulings or
otherwise explain why his placement on workers’ compensation
leave in 2017 supports his cause of action for reasonable
accommodation.
In connection with his assertion that “Figley demanded
Briggs personally deliver a doctor’s note shortly after Briggs had
foot surgery,” Briggs directs us to an excerpt from his declaration
in which he attested that on August 6, 2019, he “received text
messages and a phone call from [OVES timekeeper Eloina]
Gonzalez” in which “she sounded panicked and frantic” and “said
something like Figley was demanding that I bring in a doctor’s
note immediately.” Yet, Briggs acknowledges on page 21 of his
reply brief that the next day, that is, on August 7, 2019, Gonzalez
sent Briggs a text message informing him “he could turn the note
in ‘electronically.’ ” Notwithstanding this text message from
32
Gonzalez, Briggs claims on page 25 of his reply that he “hand-
delivered Gonzalez his doctor’s note on August 8, 2019 . . . .”
Given he apparently could have provided the doctor’s note
electronically, we fail to discern why requiring Briggs to provide a
doctor’s note constitutes a failure to reasonably accommodate his
disability.
Lastly, Briggs seems to argue the two AIPs and one MAS
he received in 2019 based in part on his November 2018 absences
for a work-related injury give rise to liability for failure to
reasonably accommodate that injury. As discussed earlier,
Briggs does not show the trial court erred in ruling that no
reasonable factfinder could conclude placement on an AIP or
MAS is an adverse employment action, that is, these actions are
not reasonably likely to adversely and materially affect an
employee’s job performance or opportunity for advancement in
the employee’s career. (See Discussion, part E.3, ante.) Indeed,
although an AIP could lead to an MAS, it seems that the latter
status simply requires the employee to submit a doctor’s note
substantiating illness-related absences. (See ibid.) On appeal,
Briggs fails to link these employment actions to a failure to
reasonably accommodate, and, therefore, we do not address this
issue further.
In sum, we reject Briggs’s challenge to the trial court’s
ruling that his FEHA failure to accommodate cause of action fails
as a matter of law.
G. Briggs Does Not Establish There Exists a Triable
Issue on His Cause of Action for Retaliation Under
Labor Code Section 98.6
“[Labor Code s]ection 98.6 prohibits an employer from
retaliating against an applicant or employee because the
33
applicant or employee exercised a right afforded him or her under
the Labor Code.” (See Garcia-Brower v. Premier Automotive
Imports of CA, LLC (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 961, 965, fn. 1, 972.)
In his opening brief, Briggs argues respondents violated
Labor Code section 98.6 by taking “a significant number of
actions . . . against Briggs” after he “complained [on
March 8, 2019] to DWP’s Human Resources and to Figley that
[Briggs’s] and other coworkers’ paychecks had been shorted.”
(Boldface & some capitalization omitted from the first quotation.)
He further argues, “Under Labor Code § 98.6, a rebuttable
presumption of retaliation is created if within 90 days of the
complaint of unpaid wages, an employer takes any discriminatory
or retaliatory action against an employee.” Although he does not
direct us to any specific provision of Labor Code section 98.6 that
creates this presumption, Briggs appears to be referring to the
following sentence from the current version of subdivision (b)(1)
of the statute: “If an employer engages in any action prohibited
by this section within 90 days of the protected activity specified
in this section, there shall be a rebuttable presumption in favor of
the employee’s claim.” (See Lab. Code, § 98.6, subd. (b)(1).)
Briggs claims to have triggered the presumption by
providing “undisputed evidence of [r]espondents’ disciplinary and
hostile actions taken within 90-days of his March 2019 protected
wage complaint . . . .” Briggs then lists in this section of his
opening brief fourteen “presumptively discriminatory and/or
retaliatory actions[ ] or adverse employment actions” he claims
respondents took within 90 days of “Briggs’s March 8, 2019
protected report of unpaid wages” (e.g., “[ ]forty-five days after
34
Briggs’s wage complaint[, r]espondents wrote up Briggs for
kicking a sage brush five months prior to the write up”).14
In their appellate brief, respondents correctly note that the
amendment adding the language to Labor Code section 98.6,
subdivision (b)(1) setting forth the 90-day rebuttable presumption
did not become effective until January 1, 2024. (See Stats. 2023,
ch. 612, § 1 [filed with Sec’y of State on Oct. 8, 2023, and adding
this text to Lab. Code, § 98.6, subd. (b)(1)]; Cal. Const., art. IV,
§ 8, subd. (c)(2) [providing the effective date for this
amendment].) Respondents also invoke the “ ‘basic canon of
statutory interpretation . . . that statutes do not operate
retrospectively unless the Legislature plainly intended them to
do so. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (See Bullard v. California State
Automobile Assn. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 211, 217 (Bullard).)
According to respondents, because “Briggs cannot show” the
Legislature intended for the amendment to Labor
14 Briggs thereafter enumerates 20 plus additional alleged
“adverse actions” occurring more than 90 days after
March 8, 2019. Briggs also claims to have “raised triable issues
of fact as to whether he was treated differently, and less
favorably, than his coworkers who did not complain about
wages,” and asserts one coworker was “ ‘verbally counselled’ ” for
“threaten[ing] to shoot Briggs” and another was not suspended
even though the police “arrested [that coworker] . . . for driving
under the influence.” Although these arguments appear under
headings that refer to Labor Code section 98.6’s 90-day
presumption, Briggs does not clarify what connection, if any,
these contentions have to the applicability of that presumption.
Accordingly, we disregard these additional arguments. (See
United Grand Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153 [“ ‘Failure to
provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in
the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading.’ ”].)
35
Code section 98.6 to operate retroactively, “the [90-day]
presumption does not apply to Briggs’[s] Labor Code section 98.6
claim based on alleged retaliatory acts occurring in 2019.”
In his reply brief, Briggs does not contend the Legislature
intended for Labor Code section 98.6, subdivision (b)(1)’s 90-day
presumption to have retroactive application. Instead, Briggs
argues we should “disregard” respondents’ assertion the
rebuttable presumption applies only to conduct occurring on or
after January 1, 2024 because they failed to raise that argument
during the trial court proceedings.
Assuming without deciding that respondents failed to
preserve for appeal their challenge to Briggs’s invocation of the
statutory 90-day presumption, we exercise our discretion to
decide whether Briggs has discharged his burden of showing the
presumption operates retroactively. “Retroactivity of a statute is
a question of law subject to our de novo review.” (Bullard, supra,
129 Cal.App.4th at p. 217.) We ordinarily affirm the entry of
summary judgment if the undisputed facts establish the ruling
“ ‘is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case,’ ”
regardless of whether the respondent raised that particular legal
theory below. (See Schmidt, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498.)
In sum, we excuse any forfeiture on respondents’ part because
they raise a pure question of law that both sides have had an
opportunity to brief on appeal. (See In re D’Anthony D. (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 292, 298, fn. 2 [“[A]pplication of the forfeiture
rule ‘is not automatic. [Citation.] When [a party] raises a
question of law, for example, the appellate court can exercise its
discretion to address the issue.’ ”].)
The legislation that added the 90-day presumption to Labor
Code section 98.6 does not contain any language demonstrating
36
the Legislature intended for the presumption to apply to alleged
retaliatory acts occurring before the effective date of the
amendment, that is, January 1, 2024. Rather, the amendment
simply added the statutory 90-day presumption without
comment. (See Stats. 2023, ch. 612, § 1 [amending Lab. Code,
§ 98.6, subd. (b)(1)].) Briggs, moreover, does not provide any
legislative history or legal authority showing that the amended
statute applies retroactively to conduct predating
January 1, 2024. He thus fails to demonstrate that the 90-day
presumption applies. (See Bullard, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at
p. 217 [holding there is a “presumption against retroactive
application” of statutes]; Inyo Citizens for Better Planning v. Inyo
County Bd. of Supervisors (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 [“We
do not serve as ‘backup appellate counsel,’ or make the parties’
arguments for them.”].)
In his reply brief, Briggs also contends, with no supporting
analysis or citation to authority, that “[e]ven if this Court
determine[s] there is no rebuttable presumption, Briggs
absolutely raised an avalanche of adverse employment actions
taken against him shortly after . . . his report of unpaid wages,”
thereby “preclud[ing] the granting of” respondents’ motion as to
his cause of action under Labor Code section 98.6. We disregard
this contention because Briggs fails to offer any cogent argument
or legal analysis to support it. (See Hernandez, supra,
37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277 [“ ‘We are not bound to develop
appellants’ arguments for them.’ ”].)
37
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Briggs fails to show
there exists a triable issue of material fact as to his cause of
action under Labor Code section 98.6.15
H. Briggs Forfeits His Claims of Error as to His
Remaining Causes of Action
In Discussion, parts E, F, and G, ante, we rejected Briggs’s
claims of error concerning three out of his nine causes of action.
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude Briggs forfeits his
appellate claims as to his remaining six causes of action.
In his opening brief, Briggs does not contest the trial court’s
disposition of his causes of action for FEHA age discrimination
and interference with his CFRA rights. He also makes only
passing references to his FEHA causes of action for retaliation
15 In Briggs’s reply brief, he argues, “[O]nly five days after
Briggs’[s] wage complaint[,] . . . Figley decided to ‘reopen the
investigation’ into” Briggs concerning an incident that occurred
on October 31, 2018. This assertion appears under the following
heading: “Briggs Adequately Pled that He Was Subjected to
Retaliation for Reporting Discrimination, and Opposing
Discrimination.” (Boldface omitted, italics added.) He also avers
the following under the heading “respondents citations [sic] to the
record which do not support the respondents’ representations of
facts” (boldface & capitalization omitted): “[Briggs] has pointed
out innumerable weaknesses, inconsistencies, and incoherencies,
in [r]espondents’ claims of ‘legitimate reasons’ it [sic] decided to
take an avalanche of adverse employment actions against Briggs,
most of which took place after he made a wage complaint in
March 2019.” Inasmuch as Briggs offers these arguments to
support his Labor Code section 98.6 cause of action, he forfeits
those contentions by failing to provide proper headings for them.
(See United Grand Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.)
38
and failure to prevent discrimination and harassment. In the
section of his opening brief in which he discusses his cause of
action for failure to engage in the interactive process under
FEHA, Briggs recites generally applicable legal principles and
closes with the following bare assertion, unaccompanied by any
record citation or supporting analysis: “Respondents entirely
failed to meet their burden, providing only conclusory
statements.” Likewise, the section addressing his FEHA
harassment cause of action consists of a description of the law
and the following assertion: “As discussed throughout this brief,
[r]espondents subjected Briggs to a regular pattern of abuse,
failure to accommodate, and failure to engage in a good faith
interactive process, for years.”
As we noted earlier, “ ‘ “Even when our review on appeal ‘is
de novo, it is limited to issues which have been adequately raised
and supported in [the appellant’s opening] brief.
[Citations.] . . .’ ” [Citation.]’ . . . [Citation.]” (Cruz, supra,
113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 953–954.) Briggs forfeits his claims of
error regarding his six remaining causes of action by failing to
brief adequately those issues. (See United Grand Corp., supra,
36 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.)
In his reply brief, Briggs raises new arguments as to his
CFRA cause of action and his FEHA causes of action for failure to
engage in the interactive process, failure to prevent harassment
and discrimination, and retaliation. Briggs forfeits these points
by depriving respondents of a fair opportunity to respond to
them. (See Niblett, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 475 [“ ‘ “ ‘ “To
withhold a point until the closing brief would deprive the
respondent of his opportunity to answer it or require the effort
and delay of an additional brief by permission.” ’ ” ’ ”].)
39
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Defendants and respondents are
awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
40
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