CourtListener 10850502•In re M.F. CA2/2
Texto completo
Filed 4/29/26 In re M.F. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re M.F., a Person Coming B344562
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP01169A
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
H.F. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Juan M. Valles, Commissioner. Affirmed with directions.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant H.F.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant N.S.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
H.F. (Father) and N.S. (Mother) both appeal dispositional
orders concerning minor daughter M.F.1 pursuant to a final
judgment, following a Welfare and Institutions Code section 364
review hearing. (Undesignated statutory references are to the
Welf. & Inst. Code.)
Father appeals the award of joint physical custody rather
than sole physical custody to him, and the order that Father pay
one-third of the transportation costs between his home in
Tennessee and Los Angeles, arguing he should pay nothing.
Mother appeals the order for joint legal custody to the
extent it granted Father tie-breaking authority, and also the
order requiring Father to pay one-third of the transportation
costs, arguing the juvenile court should have ordered Father to
bear all the costs or at most, that parents should equally bear
such expenses. Finally, Mother argues that at minimum, the
record should be corrected to accurately reflect the court’s oral
ruling.
Counsel for the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) and for M.F. informed this
court they are taking no position on this appeal.
We affirm, with instructions.
BACKGROUND
I. Jurisdiction
In April 2024, the juvenile court authorized DCFS to detain
M.F., then nine years old. DCFS filed a petition under section
300, subdivision (b)(1), seeking jurisdiction over both M.F. and
her younger half brother K.S., then four years old.2 The basis for
detention were allegations that on multiple occasions, Mother
1 Mother refers to the minor as M.S. and Father refers to her
as M.F. We use the initials M.F. to reflect a name change ordered
in 2020.
2 The children have different fathers. Only the orders as to
M.F. are at issue in this appeal.
2
had failed to provide appropriate supervision for K.S., resulting
in him being on the street alone. On one occasion, after Mother
had left K.S. in the sole care of M.F., K.S. nearly drowned and
required immediate medical attention. In addition, DCFS alleged
Mother had a history of substance abuse including cocaine and
was a current abuser of marijuana, rendering her incapable of
providing regular care and supervision, endangering the
children’s physical health and safety.
At a hearing the next day, the juvenile court found Father
the presumed father of M.F. The court released her to his care in
Tennessee, with monitored visits to Mother.
The juvenile court held an adjudication and dispositional
hearing in June 2024. The court sustained both counts with
minor modifications. The court noted the long history of referrals
based on Mother’s neglectful behavior and the evidence
supporting Mother’s marijuana use, much of which was credibly
described by M.F., which affected her ability to care for both
children.
The juvenile court continued the dispositional portion of the
hearing, in part because it wanted a fuller evaluation of Father’s
request to close his portion of the case with a juvenile custody
order.
At the continued dispositional hearing in July 2024, DCFS
recommended M.F. be released to Father, but that the case
remain open so DCFS could monitor M.F.’s safety in Tennessee.
M.F.’s counsel joined with the recommendation of DCFS that
M.F. remain with Father, and also informed the juvenile court it
was M.F.’s wish that the case remain open to give her the
opportunity to reunify with Mother. M.F.’s counsel agreed with
the request to keep the case open as “Father and [M.F.] have a
more limited relationship compared to her relationship with
Mother” and because of the information regarding a pending
criminal charge against Father for rape in Tennessee.
Mother requested M.F. be released back to her with safety
measures put in place or, in the alternative, that she be granted
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unmonitored visits or phone calls. Father requested the case be
closed with a juvenile court order granting him “full physical
custody and full legal custody.”
The juvenile court ordered M.F. removed from Mother’s
custody and placed with Father under the supervision of DCFS.
The court maintained jurisdiction due to lingering concerns as to
Father’s behavior that could bear on M.F.’s wellbeing and ordered
individual counseling for M.F. and conjoint counseling for M.F.
and Father, but struck parenting and individual counseling from
his case plan. The court ordered Mother to engage in a drug and
alcohol program, random drug and alcohol testing, a 12-step
program, parenting and individual counseling, and awarded her
monitored visits and unmonitored phone contact.
At an October 2024 progress hearing, DCFS recommended
terminating jurisdiction. Counsel for M.F. opposed, noting she
still wanted “the opportunity to reunify.” The juvenile court
denied the request to terminate the case but granted DCFS’s
request to terminate the requirement of a substance abuse and
12-step programs, as Mother “is not meeting clinical criteria.”
The court also ordered DCFS to provide Mother with housing and
travel assistance.
In January 2025, the juvenile court held a review hearing
pursuant to section 364 as to M.F. DCFS recommended closing
the case as to M.F. with a juvenile custody order granting Father
“primary physical custody, joint legal custody,” and Mother to
have “unmonitored and overnight visits,” noting it was seeking
“joint-joint.” M.F.’s counsel noted M.F. still wanted to keep the
case open, hoping to return to the care of Mother. However,
M.F.’s counsel joined with DCFS in recommending primary
physical custody to Father and joint legal custody with
unmonitored overnight visits for Mother.
Mother submitted to the recommendation of closing the
case “with a custody order of joint, joint,” but sought primary
physical custody for herself so the siblings could remain together
and since M.F. wished to return to Mother. Mother’s counsel
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agreed mediation would be appropriate “since mother and father
do have some difficulties co-parenting.”
Father strongly objected to Mother’s request for “primary
care of [M.F.],” and asked for “sole physical and sole legal
custody,” with Mother to have unmonitored overnight visits.
The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and ordered joint
legal and joint physical custody, with Father to have primary
physical custody. The court ordered the parties to mediate a
shared custody schedule, but if they were not able to agree, the
court would hear argument on that issue; and the court stayed its
orders until a future hearing date. The court also awarded Father
“tie-breaking authority after a good-faith effort to address
[M.F.]’s needs collaboratively,” concluding “that should be
addressed as part of any mediation agreement.”
On February 20, 2025, the juvenile court held a further
custody order hearing for M.F. The court confirmed it had
ordered tie-breaking authority for Father and noted that, despite
the parties having attended mediation, and the existence of a
proposed mediated agreement (which does not appear in the
record), the parents were unable to agree on the terms of the
custody arrangements.
Mother objected to Father having tie-breaking authority,
arguing that would be tantamount to having sole legal custody
since they had difficulties in coparenting and thus Father would
just “leave her out.” Mother also argued she did not have
financial capacity to pay for all flights to and from California, as
she was already having difficulty with housing and other
financial problems. But Mother did not disagree with the
proposed schedule, with her counsel stating: “Mother is not
contesting the agreed-upon scheduling, summers, every other
winter, and things of that nature. At this point, it’s simply her
being responsible for the airfare is just overly burdensome.”
Father then objected “to paying for a return flight” as his
employment had changed, so his financial situation was “not
what it was initially” and paying for flights would also be a
5
burden for him. He argued that since he had been responsible for
all flights when M.F. lived in California, Mother should be
responsible for all flights now that M.F. lived with him in
Tennessee. He did not raise any objections to the custodial
schedule.
The juvenile court ordered Mother to bear two-thirds of the
costs of transportation between Tennessee and California, with
Father to bear one-third. The court maintained its order that
Father have tie-breaking authority as to legal custody, but
adopted the proposed mediation agreement with an amendment
that parents are to engage in good-faith discussions and
negotiations before Father may override Mother’s objections as to
legal custody-related issues. Mother’s counsel lodged her
continued objection to tie-breaking authority to Father and to
paying any more than one-half the airline costs. Father did not
object during this hearing to the court’s ordering joint physical
custody with primary residence to Father.
The February 27, 2025 juvenile custody order and final
judgment provided for joint legal and physical custody, with
primary residence to Father. The court awarded Father tie-
breaking authority. The court ordered M.F. to live primarily with
Father and go to school in Father’s school district; Mother would
have parenting time with M.F. every summer for two months,
and every other winter break for two weeks, with specific details
to be arranged by parents. Finally, the court ordered Mother to
bear two-thirds of the cost and Father one-third of the cost of
flights for M.F. to travel between Tennessee and California.
Father filed a timely notice of appeal of the juvenile court’s
judgment. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal thereafter.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
When terminating its jurisdiction over a child who has been
declared a dependent child of the court, the juvenile court may
issue “an order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the
child.” (§ 362.4, subd. (a).) The orders remain in effect until
6
modified or terminated by a subsequent order in the family court.
(In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513 (T.S.).)
When making an order under section 362.4, “ ‘the court’s
focus and primary consideration must always be the best
interests of the child.’ ” (T.S., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 513.)
Thus, certain statutory presumptions in the Family Code do not
apply. (In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 711 (Jennifer
R.).)
We review a juvenile court’s custody and visitation orders
for an abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 318.) A reviewing court should not disturb a custody
determination in a dependency proceeding “ ‘ “unless the trial
court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from
the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its
decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
An abuse of discretion may arise if the juvenile court bases
its decision on impermissible factors or an incorrect legal
standard. (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.)
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err
A. The Order for Joint Physical Custody and
Primary Residence With Father
Father argues the juvenile court’s order granting joint
physical custody to the parents, with primary residence with
Father, was an abuse of discretion. Father first argues that since
the court did not explain its reasoning, it failed to apply the best
interests of the child standard. Father next argues the court
misstated the law by ordering joint physical custody with
primary custody to Father instead of sole physical custody, since
the law does not recognize “primary physical custody.”
Finally, Father argues the juvenile court erred in granting
joint physical custody because it was not in M.F.’s best interests
to “shuttl[e] between Tennessee and California,” and Mother
7
posed a danger to M.F. Rather, he contends, the court should
have granted Father “sole physical custody with a visitation
plan.”
As to Father’s first argument, the juvenile court was not
required to set forth its reasoning for the custodial orders on the
record. (Jennifer R., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 713.) “The
juvenile court’s orders are ‘presumed to be correct, and it is
appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error.’ ” (In re J.F.
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79 (J.F.); accord In re Sade C. (1996)
13 Cal.4th 952, 994 [“An appealed-from judgment or order is
presumed correct.”].)
In any event, the juvenile court did provide its reasoning
why joint custody with primary residence with Father was in
M.F.’s best interests: “Despite [M.F.]’s resistance to residing with
Father . . . by all accounts, she is thriving and doing well and
healing from many of the issues that had plagued her at the
outset of this case. [¶] Mother has made sufficient progress for
the court to find that all of these orders are in [M.F.]’s best
interest.” The court then ordered the parties to work out a shared
custody schedule. We discern no abuse of discretion.
As to the second argument, Father points out that while
the term “primary physical custody” is often used, it has no legal
meaning and is not found in the Family Code and the juvenile
court should have ordered sole physical custody.
Courts have often noted “the term ‘primary physical
custody’ has no legal meaning.” (In re Marriage of Biallas (1998)
65 Cal.App.4th 755, 759; see also In re Marriage of LaMusga
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1081, fn. 1; In re Marriage of Richardson
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 941, 945, fn. 2.) Rather, under the Family
Code a parent may be awarded joint physical custody (Fam.
Code, § 3004) or sole physical custody (Fam. Code, § 3007). Sole
physical custody is defined as meaning “a child shall reside with
and be under the supervision of one parent, subject to the power
of the court to order visitation.” (Fam. Code, § 3007.)
8
Nonetheless, the term “primary physical custody” is often
used colloquially in family and dependency courts and indeed, the
JV-200 form used for juvenile judgments expressly asks the
juvenile court not only to note which parents have physical
custody, but also which parent does the child have a “primary
residence with.”
Here, we need not address the question of whether the
schedule ordered by the juvenile court should have been more
properly deemed “sole physical custody” because Father never
objected on this basis in the juvenile court. He requested sole
physical custody at the January 2025 review hearing, where he
objected to Mother’s requested for “primary” custody, and
requested Mother be given unmonitored “overnight visits.” The
court granted joint physical custody and awarded Father with
“primary physical custody” at that hearing, but that order was
stayed, as the court sent the parties to mediate the actual
schedule.
When the parties returned in February 2025 with a
proposed mediation agreement, Father’s only argument to the
juvenile court was that Mother should pay for airfare and
Mother’s addresses should be provided to Father while M.F. was
visiting Mother. He not only did not object to the schedule, but
did not raise the issue of whether the proper term for the
schedule the parties had agreed to in mediation was really “sole”
as opposed to “joint” physical custody. Thus, the court was not
able to address that concern. We conclude Father has forfeited
that point. (In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502.)
Even if the issue was not forfeited, Father does not argue
on appeal with citation to authorities and argument that the
actual schedule ordered by the juvenile court amounted to sole
physical custody rather than joint custody. (See Hernandez v.
First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 (Hernandez)
[“ ‘When an appellant raises an issue “but fails to support it with
reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point
as waived.” ’ ”].)
9
Finally, we reject Father’s contention the juvenile court
erred in granting joint physical custody as it was not in M.F.’s
best interests. He argues it was not in M.F.’s best interests to
shuttle back and forth between Tennessee and California, and
there was “substantial evidence that mother posed a danger to
[M.F.].” He argues that when the case began, Mother was not
able to appropriately supervise the children, and that as of the
time of the judgment, Mother was unemployed and homeless.
It is unclear whether Father is arguing the juvenile court
erred in awarding the specific visitation schedule it did
(two months every summer and two weeks in the winter every
other year), and what alternative schedule Father believes should
have been ordered. After the court ordered the parties to mediate
a joint custody schedule with primary residence to Father, Father
reached an agreement with Mother as to this very schedule. Even
if the issue was not thereby waived below, it has been forfeited as
he does not articulate on appeal what the court should have done
differently, conceding that even with sole custody, Mother would
have had visitation rights.
Even if the issue had not been waived or forfeited, Father
misunderstands his burden on appeal. The question is not
whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support
his request for sole physical custody or a specific schedule he may
have wanted, but whether there was substantial evidence to
support the juvenile court’s ruling.
“ ‘[E]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion
is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the
ruling. . . . Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge. The
reviewing court should interfere only “ ‘if [it] find[s] that under
all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial
court’s action, no judge could reasonably have made the order
that he did.’ ” ’ ” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339,
1351, disapproved on other grounds by In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614.)
10
Father’s opening brief omits much of the evidence before
the juvenile court. At the January 2025 hearing, the court
entered into evidence a status review report, filed December 17,
2024. Father omits from his opening brief anything favorable to
Mother in that report, but we note the following facts as of its
filing date.
Mother was employed at Rent-A-Center and resided with
Maternal Grandfather. She did not have stable housing but had
been approved for the Bringing Families Home program and had
been provided with additional housing resources. She had been
compliant with juvenile court orders and understood the
importance of supervision. She had completed a 10-week
parenting program and individual counseling as of the prior
progress report in October 2024. These classes had taught her
how to communicate, and she was open to participating in
services to enhance her parenting skills. From October 9, 2024, to
December 6, 2024, Mother had tested negative in six drug and
alcohol tests and no positive tests were reported. The juvenile
court terminated the substance abuse program and 12-step
requirements, but authorized DCFS to continue with Mother’s
random drug testing. DCFS was providing substantial assistance
and support to Mother, including hotel vouchers, transportation
vouchers, and parent partners.
Father also omits any mention of M.F.’s considerable ties to
Mother, including M.F.’s own desire to visit her and K.S. and
hopes to reunify with her. While the desires of a nine-year-old are
not and should not be dispositive as they do not necessarily
reflect the child’s best interests, the evidence reflects M.F. had
always lived with her Mother and had a strong attachment to
her.
The parents lived some 2,000 miles apart and both claimed
financial issues, making a more traditional schedule, such as
weekend visits, impossible. (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996)
13 Cal.4th 25, 40 (Burgess) [“[A] noncustodial parent’s relocation
11
far enough away to preclude the exercise of existing visitation
rights can be ground for modifying a visitation order to allow for
a different schedule for contact with the minor children, e.g.,
longer, but less frequent, visitation periods.”].)
It was not an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to
adopt the parties’ own proposed schedule that allowed M.F. to
retain a close relationship with Mother by visiting her in the
summer months, even though there were challenges with
Mother’s housing. (In re G.S.R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1202,
1213.)
As with all custodial orders upon termination of
jurisdiction in dependency, Father remains free to ask a family
law court to modify this or any other part of the juvenile
judgment. (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123.)
B. The Order that Mother Pay Two-thirds and
Father Pay One-third of Transportation Costs
As noted, both parties challenge the juvenile court order as
to payment of transportation costs. Mother argues the court
should have ordered Father to bear the entire cost or, at most,
the parties to share the cost equally.
Father on the other hand argues there was “no basis” to
have him pay for any transportation costs as he did not owe
Mother child support once M.F. was in his custody, and he had
previously paid the entire costs of transportation when M.F. lived
in California.
The record reflects Mother was having difficulties in
obtaining stable housing due to her financial situation. Father
contended at oral argument he was having financial difficulties
due to changed employment. Significant to our resolution here,
neither party presented any supporting documentation regarding
their respective economic positions.
We reject both parties’ arguments as to transportation
costs. Father cites no statute or case law to support his argument
12
on this issue and we may treat the argument as forfeited.
(Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)
Mother cites two cases arising from hearings authorizing a
move-away during divorce proceedings. In Burgess, the court
held a trial court has broad discretion to minimize the minor’s
loss of contact with the noncustodial parent by, among other
things, allocating transportation expenses to the custodial
parent. (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 40.) The other case, In re
Marriage of Whealon (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 132, 139, does not
mention who was ordered to pay transportation costs. We have
found no case and the parties cite none, involving the parameters
of a juvenile court’s decision for orders regarding payment of
transportation costs of a minor.
Even deciding both parties’ arguments on the merits, we
find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s decision to
require the parties to share the transportation costs, with Mother
paying two-thirds and Father paying one-third. Where both
parents contend they face economic difficulties and Father had
previously paid for transportation, no ideal option exists. Taking
all of the facts in the record into consideration, we cannot say the
court’s order was an abuse of discretion.
Again, either party is free at any time to file a request to
modify the juvenile court’s judgment in the family court division
by filing a request for order.
C. The Order for Joint Legal Custody With Tie-
breaking Authority to Father
“ ‘Joint legal custody’ means that both parents shall share
the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to
the health, education, and welfare of a child.” (Fam. Code,
§ 3003.) As with other custodial orders under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 362.4, a determination as to legal
custody is committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court.
(Jennifer R., supra, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 712.)
13
While not specified in any statutory provision, it is not
uncommon for parents to seek, and family and juvenile courts to
grant, tie-breaking authority to one parent even when granting
joint legal custody. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of published
case law on the subject to guide the parties.
Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by
awarding Father tie-breaking authority when it granted joint
legal custody. Mother argues: DCFS had recommended the
parents share legal custody without mentioning tie-breaking
authority; Father did not request it (although he did request sole
legal custody); and there was no reasonable basis for it.
Citing In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1095, Mother
contends that because the juvenile court gave no reason for the
order, granting tie-breaking authority was reversible error. But
as we have already noted, the juvenile court was not required to
set forth its reasoning for the custodial orders on the record.
(Jennifer R., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 713.) “The juvenile
court’s orders are ‘presumed to be correct, and it is appellant’s
burden to affirmatively show error.’ ” (J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th
at p. 79.) Thus, N.M. is inapposite; there, the court indicated on
the record the reason it was giving the mother sole legal custody
was a prohibited reason—to punish the father. (N.M., at p. 1095.)
Thus the usual presumption of correctness was rebutted by the
record. Here, there is no evidence in the record the court relied on
any improper consideration.
Mother’s sole substantive argument is the same one she
made to the juvenile court; namely, given the parties’ difficulties
in coparenting, granting tie-breaking authority to Father “would
be tantamount to him pretty much having sole legal custody,” as
he “will, in essence, leave her out.”
We conclude the juvenile court could reasonably have found
the orders to be in M.F.’s best interests. Contrary to Mother’s
argument, the fact the parents had difficulty coparenting tends to
support an order granting one parent tie-breaking authority.
14
When parents who share joint legal custody cannot coparent,
decisions cannot be made. Decisions ranging from medical care,
what school to go to, and even what sports to play, get delayed or
end in a stand-off.
Moreover, it is often reasonable to award tie-breaking
authority to the parent who is the primary custodial parent.
Particularly when the parties admit they cannot effectively
coparent, it would make little sense to award Mother tie-breaking
authority about what school or doctor M.F. should go to, when
M.F. lives with Father on the other side of the country for
10 months out of the year.
Here, the juvenile court reasonably responded to Mother’s
stated concern with an amendment to the orders requiring “the
parents . . . to engage in good-faith discussions and negotiations
before Father does proceed to override any possible objections
Mother may lodge as to legal custody-related issues.” We cannot
find an abuse of discretion here.
As stated previously, these orders too remain subject to
modification. If circumstances change, either parent can file a
request in family court to modify these orders as well.
D. The JV-200 Judgment Form Should Be
Corrected
Mother asks, in the alternative, that the JV-200 judgment
form be corrected to conform to the order made by the juvenile
court referenced above; specifically, “to amend the mediation
agreement or provide supplemental information in the JV-200”
that the parents are to engage in good-faith discussions and
negotiations before Father proceeds to override any possible
objections Mother may lodge as to legal custody-related issues.
The JV-200 in the record does not contain that language in the
order for tie-breaking authority for Father (although it does refer
to an attached mediation agreement, which is not in the record).
Father did not file a responsive brief to Mother’s opening
brief, and did not address this issue in his opening brief.
15
A court, including an appellate court, has inherent power to
correct clerical errors in its records to make the records reflect
the true facts, including the oral judgments of judicial officers.
(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186–187.) We agree
such correction of the record is appropriate here to accurately
reflect the juvenile court’s oral orders. (In re Maribel T. (2002)
96 Cal.App.4th 82, 86.)
DISPOSITION
The custody orders of February 27, 2025, are affirmed. The
cause is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to correct
the JV-200 judgment form filed February 27, 2025, to insert the
following language on page 3, paragraph 13: “The parents are to
engage in good-faith discussions and negotiations before Father
overrides any objections Mother may lodge as to legal custody-
related issues.”
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.*
* Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
16
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