CourtListener 10850412•In re A.J. CA1/2
Texto completo
Filed 4/29/26 In re A.J. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.J., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY A174548
SERVICES BUREAU,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
No. J24-00122)
v.
ANTHONY J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Anthony J. (Father) appeals from orders terminating his reunification
services and limiting his right to make educational decisions, which the
juvenile court issued following a contested 18-month permanency review
hearing for his son, A.J. (Minor). Father argues he did not receive reasonable
services, he should receive services for an additional six months, and the
juvenile court abused its discretion in terminating his education rights.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Background
Father lives in Washington state. Minor was born in 2019 and has
never lived with Father. Before this dependency case, Minor’s mother
1
(Mother) was his custodial parent. Minor did not have any attachment to, or
bond with, Father and did not know him to be his father, and Father never
openly held Minor out as his own. In October 2020, Father was ordered to
pay child support by the Washington State Division of Child Support, and
Father contested the validity of the child support case for years.
Current Juvenile Dependency Proceedings
Dependency Petition Filed, March 2024
On March 1, 2024, the Contra Costa County Children and Family
Services Bureau (Bureau) filed a dependency petition on Minor’s behalf based
on Mother’s conduct.1 In a detention/jurisdiction report filed March 4, 2024,
the Bureau reported that Mother refused to provide information about
Minor’s father, and his whereabouts were unknown. The juvenile court
detained Minor and ordered services and visitation for Mother.
In a disposition report filed in May 2024, the Bureau reported that a
social worker learned Father’s name and date of birth (he was born in 1963)
from Minor’s birth certificate. Father had a criminal history in California
going back to 1982, including multiple convictions for vehicle theft, burglary,
and drug possession for transport or sale.
In April 2024, the Bureau social worker tried to contact Father at
addresses and telephone numbers in Washington state. In May, Lizzy
Deschane, a treatment coordinator at King County Drug Court (drug court)
in Seattle, Washington, contacted the social worker and facilitated a call with
Father. Father told the social worker he was not present at Minor’s birth,
and he believed his signature was forged on hospital documents. He did not
know whether he was the father of Minor but stated he was willing to take
1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
We discuss aspects of the case
involving Mother only as relevant to Father’s appeal.
2
responsibility for Minor if Minor turned out to be his son. Father admitted
he struggled with substance abuse in the past, and he last used drugs in
August 2022. Father graduated from a drug court program in Seattle in
2018. His treatment coordinator, Deschane, reported that Father had been
doing well until the pandemic in 2020, when he was laid off, causing him to
spiral back into criminal activity and addiction. Father was arrested in
November 2020 for possession with intent to deliver and returned to drug
court. He graduated from a drug court program in August 2022 but chose to
continue participating in the program. Deschane reported that Father never
missed a court hearing, his twice-weekly drug tests have been negative, and
he is very committed to recovery. Father believed he needed to stay focused,
remain on track, and obtain stable housing.
The Bureau reported that “[i]t has been assessed that although [Minor]
has no physical limitations, his mental health requires more insight on what
he needs to meet all of his development milestones.” Minor was described as
“present[ing] with impulsive behaviors where he will throw himself down to
the ground if he does not get what he wants, hit others, or throw things.”
Minor’s resource parent found it difficult to care for Minor “due to his unique
behavioral problems” and requested that he be removed from her home. The
resource parent observed that Minor broke things when upset, and, on one
occasion, he kicked another child in the face when that child no longer
wanted to play. Minor was placed in a different resource family home.
On May 20, 2024, Father appeared at a juvenile court hearing by Zoom
and requested a paternity test, which the court ordered. At a hearing on
jurisdiction held July 15, the juvenile court sustained the allegations in the
3
petition regarding Mother under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (a) (serious physical harm).2
Genetic Testing Confirms Paternity, July 2024
Father submitted to genetic testing in June 2024, and on July 17, the
Bureau received results showing a 99.9 percent probability he was Minor’s
father. Father told a Bureau social worker he would like to have the
opportunity to be a parent to Minor, and he requested to have his status
raised to presumed father.
In August 2024, Father began having telephone/video calls with Minor
one or two times a week. The calls did not last long because Minor did “not
have the capacity to remain on a telephone call for a long period of time” and
had “limited communication skills.” In October, it was reported that Father
had not had phone calls with Minor for a few weeks “because he ‘has been
busy’ trying to get his housing together.” Father was living in transitional
housing, and children were not allowed to reside at the facility. Father
“stated that he had a bad life in California, and he is not interested in
relocating to the area,” but he was not “opposed to visiting [Minor] once a
month.” He also “stated that he would like to have custody of the child once
he is able to obtain stable housing.” The Bureau reported that, if the court
elevated Father to presumed father status, it would provide family
reunification services “and request that he engage in a Parenting class to
address [Minor]’s mental and emotional health, and educational
circumstances, and submit to on-demand drug testing.”
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
4
Services Ordered for Father, October 2024
At a contested hearing on disposition held October 21, 2024 (contested
by Mother), the juvenile court adjudged Minor a dependent of the court. The
court ordered appropriate services for “the child and parents in order to help
the child return home” and informed the parents that if they were unable to
take custody of Minor within 12 months, the court could make a permanent
plan for Minor.3
In a status review report filed in April 2025, the Bureau recommended
the court order an additional six months of family reunification services for
Mother and Father. Father was living in transitional housing in Seattle
similar to a sober living environment. He volunteered at “a clean and sober
facility” and worked in janitorial maintenance in the afternoons and
evenings. Father was “diligent in responding promptly to th[e Bureau] social
worker,” he completed an early childhood parenting class in January 2025,
and he reported that he sees a therapist weekly. Father also drug tested
twice a week through the drug court, and his results were always negative.
Video visits between Father and Minor resumed in December 2024, and
Father attended 11 of 15 possible visits.4 In recent visits, Father ended the
call after 30 minutes due to time constraints with his job, although the visits
were scheduled for an hour. The video visits were “generally characterized by
loving, playful interaction between [F]ather and son.” The Bureau offered to
cover the cost of airfare for Father to visit Minor in person once a month, and
3 Although the court ordered services for Father, it did not designate
him a presumed father at this hearing.
4 Two additional scheduled visits did not occur because the foster
caregiver was unprepared. As to these missed visits, makeup sessions were
offered to Father, but he did not follow up.
5
a social worker “strongly encouraged [Father] take advantage of this
privilege.” Father told the social worker he was coordinating a visit to Minor
with his (Father’s) sister, who lived in Los Angeles.
The Bureau noted that Father had “not yet obtained housing that can
accommodate having his son in his care, nor has he established a meaningful
enough relationship with [Minor] to this point,” and concluded, “At the
current time it would be inappropriate to return [Minor] to the care of either
of his parents.” It was evident “that [Father] is genuine in his intention to be
a responsible, caring father for his son,” and the Bureau was “hopeful that he
will be more consistent with video visits and take advantage of his
opportunity to have in-person visits with [Minor] on a monthly basis.”5
At a combined six-month and 12-month review hearing on April 21,
2025, the juvenile court found Father had made substantial progress and
ordered continuation of his reunification services. Services for Mother were
terminated.
18-Month Status Report and Memo, August and October 2025
In a status report prepared in August 2025 for the 18-month
permanency review hearing, the Bureau recommended the court terminate
Father’s services and order that Minor “remain in foster care with a goal of
5 As to Minor, the Bureau reported that he had an Individual
Education Plan (IEP), and he had been diagnosed with autism spectrum
disorder in March 2024, but a doctor who evaluated him in March 2025
suggested he did not have autism but may have attention deficit/
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The foster caregiver reported that Minor
could be disrespectful and fussy and his “peculiar symptoms” included pacing,
walking in circles, and talking to imaginary friends.
6
placement with a fit and willing relative.”6 The Bureau also requested a
transfer of educational rights to the caregiver, explaining this would ensure
Minor’s IEP and “developmental related services are attended to in a prompt
manner,” given Father’s “geographic distance, struggles with technology (i.e.,
completing electronic signatures without the help of his Case Manager), and
recent decline in timely correspondence.”
It was reported that Father continued to live in transitional sober
living housing and to work with his Seattle-based case manager Deschane.
In June 2025, Deschane reported that Father “ ‘is connected to a program
that helps single-parent families gain stability, including housing.’ ” (Italics
omitted.) In August, Father mentioned that he had begun working with a
case manager at a local Catholic Community Services (the program Deschane
referred him to) to find independent housing. Since June, he was employed
full time doing custodial work.
During the reporting period, Father was much less communicative with
the Bureau social worker than previously. Father “rarely responded [to]
attempts to reach him.” In May 2025, the social worker provided Father and
Deschane information on parenting classes in Seattle that were tailored to
parenting children with special needs. In July, Father stated he would not be
6 During the reporting period, Minor had changed foster homes twice,
first due to “the marginal quality of care [he] was receiving in the home” and
later “due to [Minor]’s behaviors both in the home and in public,” including
“multiple incidents of physical contact with other youth [that] proved to be
too much for the caregiver to handle.” It was reported that Minor “exhibited
various tantrum behaviors and was sent home from school multiple times,”
including an incident during which Minor scratched a teacher, threw chairs,
and flipped tables. However, after Minor started taking medication in June
2025, his “focus and behavior improved dramatically.” Minor had weekly
sessions with an in-home behavioral support counselor and with a mental
health clinician and mental health specialist.
7
able to attend class because of scheduling issues. The Bureau social worker
spoke with a supervisor and Catholic Community Services to help arrange a
parenting class for Father. As of August 2025, Father had completed
orientation for a class and was planning to take 16 weeks of the class.
In April 2025, Father traveled to visit Minor in person, and Father’s
sister and her daughter also attended. Father and his relatives had a four-
hour visit with Minor, which the Bureau described as generally “a positive
experience for all involved.” The next day, they had a six-hour visit, after
which the social worker emphasized to Father “the importance of coming
down to visit his son and spending time with him” as “bonding with his son
and getting acclimated to dealing with his energy and tantrums is crucial.”
(Italics omitted.)
Father attended 13 of 19 scheduled video visits. Minor’s in-home
behavioral support counselor reported that Father “ ‘gets frustrated doing
visits, and gives up quickly.’ ” (Italics omitted.) Social workers suggested
multiple times that Father incorporate reading books and activities in the
video visits, but he had not followed these suggestions, and it was observed
that there was a “decline in the quality of [Father]’s visits.”
The Bureau noted Father had not secured stable housing where Minor
would be allowed to reside with him, and he had “not spent more than a total
of 10 hours in [Minor]’s presence, nor had [Minor] in his care overnight.”
Father “has no actual experience caring for the young boy,” who “requires a
great deal of focused, trauma-informed care and attention.” “At various
times during the latter part of the reporting period, [Father] . . . reported
feeling overwhelmed by his situation, expressing stress over his housing,
employment, and the Bureau urging him to see his son.” In August 2025,
Father “spoke at length about his frustration related to ‘this whole thing,’
8
and referencing that he did not know he was a father until after his son was
born, th[e] fact that his son has been in foster care, and his belief that he has
not been given enough time to get his affairs in order to reunify with his son.”
(Italics omitted.)
The Bureau “regret[ted] that [Father] has not been able to make more
substantial progress toward reunifying with [Minor].” Father “has not
prioritized [either] visiting his son . . . [or] establishing independent housing.”
Father has “not explored local financial resources to support housing, as
discussed with him by his [Seattle-based] Case Manager and [the Bureau]
Social Worker.”
On August 25, 2025, Father requested a contested hearing.
In a memo prepared on October 1, 2025, the Bureau continued to
recommend termination of Father’s reunification services. Minor’s behavior
continued to be a concern; Minor had been suspended from school for a total
of eight days for incidents of hitting and kicking students, biting teachers,
spitting on others, and general emotional dysregulation; and he had moved to
a new foster caregiver at the previous caregiver’s request.
In September 2025, Father told the social worker “he had been looking
into potential studio or one-bedroom apartments, but also said, ‘I’m not trying
to make a move too fast.’ ” (Italics omitted.) Father attended two of four
offered video visits, and he had one in-person visit in September which
occurred only after Father was “admonished by his sister on the matter.”7 At
7 The Bureau reported that, in a phone call in September 2025, Father’s
sister asked the social worker if Father had talked about seeing Minor again
after the April visit. When the social worker told her that Father had been
encouraged repeatedly to come for another in-person visit but had not done
so, Father’s sister “stated that she would immediately contact [Father] after
the call and would make sure he contacts this Social Worker about visiting
9
the in-person visit, Minor “sprinted into his dad’s arms,” and an observer
noted that Minor “formed long sentences with his father and engaged in
lengthy talks, smiling each time.” Father had attended eight weeks of
parenting class, and the class facilitator reported that Father was “working
hard and making steady progress.” (Italics deleted.)
The Bureau was “pleased that [Father] has been positively and actively
involved in his parenting class” but “regret[ted] that [Father] had not
prioritized visiting his son.” It further noted that “the quality of engagement
of virtual visits has declined since the initial reporting period despite the
Bureau’s efforts to support [Father] in this regard.”
Contested 18-Month Review Hearing, October 2025
At the contested 18-month permanency review hearing on October 6,
2025, there was no witness testimony, and the juvenile court heard counsels’
arguments.
Minor’s counsel supported the Bureau’s recommendations. Counsel
appreciated Father’s efforts and described him as “steady and present
throughout the case,” but, she said, Minor “is a child with exceptional special
needs,” and, “I’m sad to say that I don’t think more time is going to help us to
reunify Father and [Minor].” She observed that, if the Bureau’s offer to pay
for airfare “doesn’t get the father in person with his son, then I don’t see how
we could even contemplate . . . placing [Minor] with Father, given the limited
in-person contact they’ve had.”
[Minor] again.” In the August 2025 status report, the Bureau noted that
Father’s sister “has in fact been more proactive in communicating with this
Social Worker and asking about [Minor] than [Father] has been during the
reporting period.”
10
Father’s counsel acknowledged that it is “very rare” to extend services
beyond 18 months, but she argued it was warranted in this case because the
matter was not being set for a permanent placement hearing and because
Father only received services for a year (from disposition on October 21, 2024,
to October 6, 2025). She argued that Minor “has extraordinary needs and
would benefit from any possible support” and an “additional six months of
services for father could really change [Minor]’s life.” Father’s counsel did not
argue that additional services were required or warranted on the ground that
the Bureau’s services thus far had been inadequate.
County counsel responded that extending services for 24 months
requires “exceptional circumstances” and a finding “by clear and convincing
evidence that some very specific characteristics apply to the case, none of
which apply to Father . . . .” County counsel noted this was not a case where
reasonable services were not provided. She argued the Bureau “made every
effort to assist the Father, indicating that we would pay for a ticket once a
month, that the social worker would personally pick the father up from the
airport and drop him off so there would [be] no additional cost to him,” and
the Bureau “social worker has worked with father’s case manager up in
Washington,” “[b]ut the father has not been consistent in responding to the
social worker to set up the visits.”
Court Ruling
The juvenile court followed the Bureau’s recommendations and
terminated Father’s reunification services. The court observed that the
Bureau “really went to extreme measures by . . . agreeing to pay for airfare to
get Dad down here once a month to visit with this son. And for whatever
reason, Father did not take full advantage of that offer.” It further noted
that Minor “has extreme needs,” Father “was a noncustodial parent for
11
almost the entirety of [Minor]’s life,” and “much of the quality of th[e video]
visits, in the Court’s view, is rather poor or minimal.”
The court explained: “[I]t does not appear to the Court appropriate to
extend services to 24 months. [¶] And even if the Court were to do so, it does
not appear to the Court that there’s a substantial probability that [Minor]
would be placed in the care of [Father] if the Court were to extend services
. . . to 24 months. [¶] And I also don’t think that the Court could say there’s
been consistent progress in court-ordered services. There’s been some, but
not a good deal of progress. Much of that is [Minor]’s very special needs and
Dad just being unable to meet those needs . . . .”
The court recognized that Father “expressed a commitment to [Minor]
through this process and these court proceedings” and that Minor calls him
dad and has affection for him. The court believed it was “really important for
[Minor] to have [Father] in his life at some level” and expressed hope that
Minor could be placed with Father at some point.8 The court ordered weekly
video visits and allowed Father in-person visits.
The court limited Father’s (and Mother’s) right to make education
decisions for Minor, and designated Minor’s current caregiver as the
educational rights holder. But it also ordered the Bureau to “keep [Father]
apprised in a timely fashion [of IEP meetings] so he can make arrangements
to participate in those meetings.”
The court did not set a section 366.26 hearing.
8 After adopting the Bureau’s recommendation to continue Minor in
foster care with the goal of placement with a fit and willing relative, the court
stated, “Hopefully, at some point, that would be [Father].”
12
DISCUSSION
A. Reasonable Services
“For children over the age of three on the date of initial removal, the
presumptive period of [family reunification] services is 12 months.” (B.D. v.
Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1150, citing § 361.5, subd.
(a)(1)(A), (3).) Generally, court-ordered services may be extended only up to a
period not exceeding 18 months after the date the child was originally
removed. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A).)
When a dependency case has been continued for additional services, a
“permanency review hearing shall occur within 18 months after the date the
child was originally removed from the physical custody of their parent or
legal guardian.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) At the 18-month permanency review
hearing, “if the child is not returned to a parent . . . and the court finds that
reasonable services have not been provided . . ., the court shall extend
reunification services for an additional six months. (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(2).)
Father contends the juvenile court erred in denying his request for
additional services because he did not receive reasonable services.
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“The ‘adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the
[Bureau’s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.’
[Citation.] To support a finding reasonable services were offered or provided,
‘the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems
leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those
problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course
of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas
where compliance proved difficult. . . .’ [Citation.] ‘The standard is not
whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an
13
ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the
circumstances.’ ” (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415,
1426.)
“When we review a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we may look
only at whether there is any evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which
supports the trial court’s determination. We must resolve all conflicts in
support of the determination, and indulge in all legitimate inferences to
uphold the court’s order. Additionally, we may not substitute our deductions
for those of the trier of fact. [Citations.] And, in reviewing the
reasonableness of the reunification services provided by the Department, we
must also recognize that in most cases more services might have been
provided, and the services which are provided are often imperfect. The
standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have
been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances.”
(Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)
2. Analysis
Father contends the Bureau did not provide reasonable services
because it “did nothing to help him gain [proper] housing.”
As a preliminary matter, Father asserts the juvenile court made no
“express finding on the record” that reasonable services were provided. As
respondent points out, however, the court signed written “findings and orders
after 18-month permanency hearing,” which specified that the court found
“by clear and convincing evidence that the county agency has complied with
the case plan by making reasonable efforts to return the child to a safe home
through the provision of reasonable services . . . .” In juvenile dependency
proceedings, “the written order controls.” (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221
Cal.App.3d 752, 756, fn. 1.) To the extent Father claims either that the
14
juvenile court was required to make a finding of reasonable services orally or
that it was required to identify evidence in support of its finding, such a claim
is forfeited both because he has not provided any supporting argument or
legal authority and because he failed to raise such objection at the 18-month
permanency hearing and, indeed, counsel “waive[d] further reading [of the
Bureau’s recommendations] and any irregularities as [the court] adopt[ed]
and incorporate[d] the recommended findings.” (See In re A.C. (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 661, 672–673 [mother forfeited arguments by failing to cite any
cases or other authority; “ ‘[a]ppellate briefs must provide argument and legal
authority for the positions taken’ ”]; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
212, 222 [forfeiture “applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended
to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the
proceedings”].)
Father’s case plan called for Father to complete parenting class,
“demonstrate the ability to meet the emotional needs of the child,” “[s]upport
[Minor]’s educational success,” and submit to drug testing. As respondent
notes, Father never argued to the juvenile court that the Bureau failed to
provide him reasonable services. Nor does the record indicate that Father
ever asked the Bureau to help him find housing.
If Father “felt during the reunification period that the services offered
. . . were inadequate, [he] had the assistance of counsel to seek guidance from
the juvenile court in formulating a better plan: [¶] ‘ “The law casts upon the
party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s
attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the
party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections until it
would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few
15
judgments would stand the test of an appeal.” ’ ” (In re Christina L. (1992) 3
Cal.App.4th 404, 416.)
Here, the record supports a finding the Bureau made “made a ‘good
faith effort to develop and implement a family reunification plan’ [citation]
and thereby satisfied its statutory duty.” (In re Christina L., supra, 3
Cal.App.4th at pp. 417–418.) The Bureau offered services and maintained
contact with both Father and his Seattle-based case manager, and made
reasonable efforts to assist Father in developing a relationship with Minor—a
child Father never acknowledged was his son until after this dependency case
began. The Bureau offered to pay for Father to fly from Seattle to visit Minor
every month, and the social worker strongly encouraged Father to do so. The
social worker pointed out to Father on multiple occasions that the visit could
be done in one day, and offered to personally transport Father to and from
the airport, eliminating another expense. After April 2025, Father became
much less responsive to the Bureau social worker, “rarely respond[ing to]
attempts to reach him.” The social worker continued to try to contact Father
and maintained communication with his case manager. The social worker
provided information on classes for parenting children with special needs in
Seattle; he also confirmed with both Father and his Seattle-based case
manager that Father was connected to, and working with, a program that
helped single-parent families with housing.
On appeal, Father suggests the only reason he was unable to take
custody of Minor was that the Bureau failed to provide reasonable services by
not helping him obtain suitable housing, ignoring the facts that he had no
experience caring for Minor and that Minor has exceptional special needs.
The record belies Father’s portrayal of the circumstances of this case.
Instead, the record shows the Bureau and Minor’s counsel were concerned
16
that Father had not spent enough time with Minor to establish a bond.
(Recall that the social worker repeatedly encouraged Father to visit Minor in
person because “bonding with his son and getting acclimated to dealing with
his energy and tantrums [was] crucial,” and Minor’s counsel could not
contemplate placing Minor with Father, “given the limited in-person contact
they’ve had.” (Italics omitted.))
As for help with obtaining suitable housing, the Bureau was aware that
Father was working with a program intended to help single parents with
housing, but, in September 2025—more than 13 months after paternity was
confirmed—Father told the Bureau social worker he was “not trying to make
a move too fast” in connection with moving from sober living transitional
housing to an apartment where Minor could live with him. Respondent
argues Father “demonstrated no urgency regarding reunification with his
son,” and the record supports this conclusion. “The requirement that
reunification services be made available to help a parent overcome those
problems which led to the dependency of his or her minor children is not a
requirement that a social worker take the parent by the hand and escort him
or her to and through classes or counseling sessions.” (In re Michael S. (1987)
188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1463, fn. 5.) In the present case, we do not believe the
Bureau social worker was required to take Father by the hand and escort him
through the process of moving from sober living to an apartment.
“Reunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or
indifferent parent.” (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.)
In sum, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable
services were provided under the circumstances.
17
B. The Decision Not to Exercise Discretion to Continue Services
Father also asserts the juvenile court should have continued services as
a matter of discretion under section 352. However, he fails to demonstrate
the juvenile court abused its discretion in declining to do so. (See In re D.N.
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 756 [denial of a request for continuance of a
hearing under section 352 is reviewed for abuse of discretion; “ ‘ “[d]iscretion
is abused when a decision is arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd and
results in a manifest miscarriage of justice” ’ ”].)
As we have just discussed, this is not a case where the parties agree
that the lack of suitable housing was the only barrier to placing a dependent
child with a non-offending parent. Father’s reliance on In re D.N., supra, 56
Cal.App.5th 741, is therefore unavailing. In D.N., the father did not have
suitable housing because he was indigent, the parties agreed that lack of
housing was the only barrier to placing the child with the father, and the
juvenile court found the “father made ‘sincere’ efforts to find suitable housing
and otherwise substantially complied with his case plan.” (Id. at pp. 763–
766.) Here, in contrast, the juvenile court did not mention the lack of
suitable housing in denying Father continued services. Rather, the court
cited Father’s lack of consistent progress in court-ordered services, finding
that Father failed to have consistent and regular visitation (either video or in
person) and that Father did not “demonstrate he’s able to meet [Minor]’s
extraordinary needs.” The court found Father’s progress over the reporting
period “minimal,” not substantial.
Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s factual findings that he
failed to have consistent visitation with Minor and failed to demonstrate he is
able to meet Minor’s extraordinary needs. On this record, Father has not
18
shown the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his request for
continued services.
C. Termination of Education Rights
Finally, Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in
limiting his education rights.
In its October 2025 memo described above, the Bureau wrote that
transferring educational rights to the caregiver would avoid “delay in
attending to IEP and other school related matters for” Minor. The Bureau
reported that Father’s “work schedule and lack of proficiency with technology
have led to delayed school-related documents being signed and services
implemented.” School staff reported that obtaining Father’s signature
contributed to delays in formalizing Minor’s IEP in January 2025; in the
current school year, school staff were unable to hold “an immediate
emergency school meeting to address [Minor]’s behavior” because of the need
for a signature from the educational rights holder; and there were similar
issues in August 2025.
At the contested hearing, Father’s counsel asked the court to “allow
[Father] to share educational rights.” Minor’s counsel supported changing
the educational rights holder as recommended by the Bureau but requested
that Father “be kept in the loop” in case “Father gets himself a stable place to
live and visits more frequently in person.” The court followed the Bureau’s
recommendation and Minor’s counsel’s request.
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in directing
their children’s education. [Citations.] However, when a child is a dependent
child, a court may limit a parent’s ability to make educational decisions on
19
the child’s behalf by appointing a responsible adult to make educational
decisions.” (In re R.W. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1276.)
“If the parent or guardian is unwilling or unable to participate in
making an educational decision for their child, or if other circumstances exist
that compromise the ability of the parent or guardian to make educational
decisions for the child, the county welfare department or social worker shall
consider whether the right of the parent or guardian to make educational
decisions for the child should be limited.” (§ 366.1, subd. (e).) “The
limitations may not exceed those necessary to protect the child. If the court
specifically limits the right of the parent . . . to make educational or
developmental services decisions for the child, . . . the court shall at the same
time appoint a responsible adult to make educational or developmental
services decisions for the child . . . .” (§ 361, subd. (a)(1).)
“All educational decisions must be based on the best interests of the
child.” (In re Samuel G. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 502, 510.) “The educational
representative’s responsibilities include participating in and making
decisions regarding all matters affecting the child’s educational needs in a
manner consistent with the child’s best interests.” (Id. at p. 510.)
“We review the juvenile court’s order limiting parents’ educational
rights under an abuse of discretion standard [citation], bearing in mind ‘[t]he
focus of dependency proceedings is on the child, not the parent.’ ” (In re R.W.,
supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.) “ ‘The appropriate test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When
two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial
court.’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)
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2. Analysis
Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion because there
was no reason he could not share rights with the caregiver.
Here, over the course of the dependency, the Bureau documented
Minor’s extensive difficulties at school, including episodes of “various
tantrum behaviors” that resulted in him being “sent home from school
multiple times.” Minor had multiple diagnoses and an IEP. The record
further shows that, by May 2025, Father was “rarely respond[ing]” to the
Bureau’s attempts to reach him. Father’s inability to timely sign school-
related documents caused delays in Minor’s services and delays in the school
responding to Minor’s behavior. On this record, we cannot say the juvenile
court’s decision to limit Father’s educational rights and appoint a responsible
adult to make educational decisions for Minor exceeds the bounds of reason.9
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s findings and orders are affirmed.
9 Father suggests the juvenile court could and should have assigned
educational rights to a third party without limiting his own educational
rights, so that the rights would be shared between him and a foster caregiver.
Respondent responds that no provision of the Welfare and Institutions Code
or the California Rules of Court authorizes a joint decisionmaker on
educational issues in this manner. We need not resolve this issue because
regardless of whether it might be permissible to have joint educational rights
held by a parent and an unrelated responsible adult, we see no abuse of
discretion in this case. The court acted within its discretion because there
was evidence Father appeared to be “unwilling or unable” to make
educational decisions in a timely manner. (See In re Samuel G., supra, 174
Cal.App.4th at p. 510 [“The court has the authority to limit the right of a
parent to make educational decisions for a dependent child of the court if it
appears the parent is unwilling or unable to do so”].)
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_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Stewart, P. J.
_________________________
Desautels, J.
A174548, Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau v.
Anthony J.
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