Sabahat v. Parvaneh CA4/3

CourtListener 10849299Calctapp28 de abr. de 2026

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Filed 4/28/26 Sabahat v. Parvaneh CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ANN THUY SABAHAT,

Cross-complainant and G064541
Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-
v. 01161171)

RITA PARVANEH, OPINION

Cross-defendant and
Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Nathan R. Scott, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
By the Law, Tanzeel Hak and Brian Ostler for Cross-complainant
and Appellant.
Madison Law, Brett K. Wiseman and Susanna F. Wiseman for
Cross-defendant and Respondent.
Ann Thuy Sabahat appeals from a June 14, 2024, order (June
2024 order), which, inter alia, confirmed Rita Parvaneh purchased Sabahat’s
membership interest in Royer Mansion, LLC (Royer) and directed the
transfer of Sabahat’s 50 percent interest in Royer to Parvaneh. On appeal,
Sabahat challenges the valuation of her membership interest in Royer.
Parvaneh argues Sabahat appealed from the incorrect order and should have
appealed from the alternative decree issued in a March 8, 2024, minute order
(March 2024 alternative decree) pursuant to Corporations Code section
17707.3, subdivision (c)(3) (all undesignated statutory references are to this
code). We agree with Parvaneh and dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A dispute arose between Parvaneh and Sabahat, who each held a
50 percent membership interest in Royer. Sabahat filed a cross-complaint
against Parvaneh and others, seeking, inter alia, the dissolution of Royer
under section 17707.03. Parvaneh sought to avoid dissolution by purchasing
Sabahat’s membership interest in Royer. But as the parties were unable to
agree on the fair market value of Sabahat’s membership interest, Parvaneh
moved to stay the dissolution proceedings under section 17707.03,
subdivision (c)(2). Parvaneh requested the trial court to appoint disinterested
appraisers to ascertain the fair market value of Sabahat’s membership
interest under section 17707.03, subdivision (c)(3).
After the appointment of appraisers and consideration of the
parties’ arguments, the trial court issued the March 2024 alternative decree
under section 17707.03, subdivision (c)(3). The court ascertained the value of
Sabahat’s membership interest, gave Parvaneh the opportunity to purchase
Sabahat’s interest no later than May 31, 2024, and ordered the dissolution of
Royer if Parvaneh failed to make a timely purchase. The court ordered

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Parvaneh to provide proof of payment or a proposed order or judgment by
June 7, 2024. It set the deadline for any objections to the proposed order or
judgment as June 17, 2024.
Parvaneh filed a proposed order. The trial court adopted the
proposed order in its June 2024 order. The court confirmed it received proof
of payment in May 2024 and ordered, inter alia, Sabahat’s 50 percent interest
in Royer to be transferred to Parvaneh. A few days later, on June 17, 2024,
Sabahat filed an objection to the proposed order, asking the court to include a
provision to remove Sabahat “as a borrower and guarantor on the loan for”
Royer’s property.
In August 2024, Sabahat filed a notice of appeal from the June
2024 order.
DISCUSSION
I.
APPLICABLE LAW
“Section 17707.03, subdivision (a), authorizes any member of a
limited liability company to file an action to dissolve the limited liability
company in certain specified circumstances. The statutory grounds for
dissolution include ‘[t]he management of the limited liability company is
deadlocked or subject to internal dissension’ (§ 17707.03, subd. (b)(4)).”
(Cheng v. Coastal L.B. Associates, LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 112, 119
(Cheng).)
“In any action for judicial dissolution, the other members of the
limited liability company may avoid the dissolution by purchasing for cash
the fair market value of the interests owned by the members initiating the
dissolution proceeding. (§ 17707.03, subd. (c)(1).)” (Cheng, supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 119.) If the parties are unable to agree on the fair market

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value of the membership interests, then “[t]he court shall appoint three
disinterested appraisers to appraise the fair market value of the membership
interests owned by the moving parties, and shall make an order referring the
matter to the appraisers so appointed for the purpose of ascertaining that
value. . . . The award of the appraisers or a majority of them, when confirmed
by the court, shall be final and conclusive upon all parties. The court shall
enter a decree that shall provide in the alternative for winding up and
dissolution of the limited liability company, unless payment is made for the
membership interests within the time specified by the decree. If the
purchasing parties do not make payment for the membership interests within
the time specified, judgment shall be entered against them and the surety or
sureties on the bond for the amount of the expenses, including attorney’s fees,
of the [parties moving for dissolution]. Any member aggrieved by the action of
the court may appeal therefrom.” (§ 17707.03, subd. (c)(3).)
II.
APPEALABILITY
Parvaneh argues Sabahat appealed from the incorrect order, the
June 2024 order, and that Sabahat should have appealed from the March
2024 alternative decree. Sabahat contends the June 2024 order was the
proper order from which to appeal, as the valuation and buyout process was
not completed until the entry of this order. Sabahat argues, even if she
appealed from the incorrect order, the notice of appeal indicated she intended
to appeal from the March 2024 alternative decree.
“‘A trial court’s order is appealable when it is made so by
statute.’” (Doe v. United States Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424,
1432.) “‘An attempt to appeal from a nonappealable order does not give this
court jurisdiction or authority to review it.’ [Citation.] Consequently, it is the

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duty of the court to dismiss an appeal from an order that is not appealable.”
(Ibid.)
Section 17707.03, subdivision (c)(3) provides, “Any member
aggrieved by the action of the court may appeal therefrom.” The phrase, “the
action of the court,” refers to the court’s issuance of an alternative decree
(also known as a valuation order). (Ibid.; Cheng, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at
p. 119; see Dickson v. Rehmke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 469, 476 (Dickson)
[interpreting former § 17351, subd. (b)(3)].) Therefore, “the alternative decree
is the pertinent action from which a party dissatisfied with the valuation
process should take an appeal.” (Dickson, at p. 477.)
Dickson is instructive. It involved a buyout motion, pursuant to
former section 17351, analogous to Parvaneh’s motion here. (See Dickson,
supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 473.) In Dickson, the trial court issued an
alternative decree, which ascertained the value of the membership interests
in a limited liability company. (Ibid.) It also provided the defendant an
opportunity to purchase the plaintiff’s interest by a date certain or allow the
commencement of winding up or dissolution if the defendant did not tender
payment of the determined amount in the decree. (Ibid.) After the defendant
timely tendered, the court entered a judgment on plaintiff’s underlying
dissolution complaint. (Ibid.) The concurrence described the judgment
entered as “incorporating the findings of fact of the [decree] and directing the
transfer of [the plaintiff]’s membership interests to [the defendant].” (Id. at
p. 479 (conc. opn. of Blease, Acting P. J.).) The defendant appealed from the
judgment, rather than the alternative decree, challenging the valuation of
the membership interests. (Id. at p. 473.)
The appellate court held the defendant should have appealed
from the alternative decree, not the subsequent judgment, and dismissed the

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appeal. (Dickson, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 473.) It explained: “The riddle
in this appeal arises from the imprecise use of language in [former] section
17351, subdivision (b)(3). It provides for any number of juristic activities: the
court’s appointment of appraisers, the order of reference to them for the
purpose of ascertaining the dissenting share and setting the procedures for
producing necessary evidence, the court’s confirmation of the unanimous or
majority appraisal award (or determination de novo of the matter), the
alternative decree that directs the winding up and dissolution of the company
unless the purchasing parties tender their payment in a timely manner, and
a judgment on their bond for costs if they fail to act. Yet the concluding
provision for appellate review employs an entirely different term with a
specific determinative: ‘Any member aggrieved by the action of the court may
appeal therefrom.’ [Citation.] Considering that all the other juristic activities
in [former] section 17351, subdivision (b)(3) are preliminary to the issuance of
the alternative decree [citation], it is logical to conclude that the issuance of
the decree is ‘the’ action to which the provision for appeal refers.” (Id. at
pp. 475–476.)
Here, the March 2024 alternative decree was appealable under
section 17707.03, subdivision (c)(3), a statutory provision identical to former
section 17351, subdivision (b)(3) at issue in Dickson. Section 17707.03,
subdivision (c)(3) does not permit appeals from an order, subsequent to the
alternative decree, confirming the membership interest was purchased,
assigning the membership interest to the purchasing party, and effectively
denying relief for the underlying dissolution claim. (See Dickson, supra,
164 Cal.App.4th at p. 476; id. at p. 479 (conc. opn. of Blease, Acting P. J.).)
That an order or “judgment will follow the alternative decree upon a tender
does not mean the party making or accepting the tender who is dissatisfied

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with the valuation may await its entry to appeal that issue.” (Dickson, supra,
164 Cal.App.4th at p. 476.) We view the June 2024 order, following the March
2024 alternative decree, as addressing the underlying dissolution claim “for
the purpose of terminating that proceeding through denying the requested
relief.” (Ibid.) This subsequent June 2024 order “is not a vehicle for raising
the issues of valuation on appeal, because the dissolution proceeding itself
never embraced them.” (Ibid.) Therefore, as Sabahat appealed from the June
2024 order and is challenging the valuation of her membership interest on
appeal, she appealed from the incorrect order.
Sabahat asks us to construe the notice of appeal liberally,
asserting “it was reasonably clear” she intended to appeal from the March
2024 alternative decree. “‘[N]otices of appeal are to be liberally construed so
as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what appellant was
trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been
misled or prejudiced.’” (Verceles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 776, 783; accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) “But
there are limits to our ability to liberally construe a notice of appeal. ‘The
policy of liberally construing a notice of appeal in favor of its sufficiency
[citation] does not apply if the notice is so specific it cannot be read as
reaching a judgment or order not mentioned at all.’ [Citations.] ‘[I]t is well
“beyond liberal construction” to view an appeal from one order as an appeal
from a “further and different order.” [Citation.] “Despite the rule favoring
liberal interpretation of notices of appeal, a notice of appeal will not be
considered adequate if it completely omits any reference to the judgment
being appealed.” [Citation.] “The rule favoring appealability in cases of
ambiguity cannot apply where there is a clear intention to appeal from only
. . . one of two separate appealable judgments or orders.”’ [Citation.]

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Therefore, when a notice of appeal manifests a ‘“clear and unmistakable”’
intent to appeal only from one order, we cannot liberally construe the notice
to apply to a different, omitted order.” (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70,
76.)
Here, in her notice of appeal, Sabahat specified a single order, the
June 2024 order. She stated the title of the June 2024 order, “Order re:
Buyout and Ownership of Royer,” and she attached a copy of that order. She
also noted section 17707.03 as the statutory provision authorizing the appeal.
The notice of appeal contained no reference to any other order, despite her
knowledge of the March 2024 alternative decree at the time of the appeal.
Contrary to Sabahat’s assertions, these facts show only she was trying to
appeal from the June 2024 order. And the June 2024 order “did not embrace
the special proceeding or its valuation issues.” (Dickson, supra,
164 Cal.App.4th at p. 477.) “To repeat, the policy of liberal construction ‘does
not apply if the notice is so specific it cannot be read as reaching a judgment
or order not mentioned at all.’” (In re J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 78.) 1
As we cannot liberally construe the notice of appeal to encompass
the March 2024 alternative decree, we lack jurisdiction to review it and
therefore the valuation issues in this case.2

1 As we are unable to construe the notice of appeal liberally, we

need not consider Sabahat’s argument that an appeal from the March 2024
alternative decree was timely.

2 On appeal, Sabahat also argues the trial court erred by issuing

its June 2024 order before the June 17, 2024, deadline to object to the
proposed order. We seriously question whether the June 2024 order is
appealable under section 17707.03. Sabahat offers no argument showing why
the June 2024 order is appealable on this issue. Section 17707.03, subdivision
(c)(3) does not specify such an order is appealable. Nor is the June 2024 order

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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Respondent is entitled to costs on
appeal.

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, J.

SANCHEZ, J.

a final judgment in the case. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the June
2024 order, to the extent Sabahat challenges it, and dismiss the appeal.

Even if the June 2024 order were appealable, we would conclude
Sabahat provided an inadequate record on appeal and would decline to
address this issue. “‘“[A] record is inadequate . . . if the appellant predicates
error only on the part of the record he [or she] provides the trial court, but
ignores or does not present to the appellate court portions of the proceedings
below which may provide grounds upon which the decision of the trial court
could be affirmed.”’” (Jade Fashion & Co., Inc. v. Harkham Industries, Inc.
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 635, 644.) According to Parvaneh, on June 20, 2024,
the court held a conference with the parties, discussed Sabahat’s June 17,
2024, objection to the proposed order, and overruled the objection without
prejudice. Sabahat omitted the minutes of this conference in her appendix,
failing to present a portion of the proceedings below that could provide
grounds to affirm.

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