CourtListener 10849112•Engel v. Engel CA2/2
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Filed 4/28/26 Engel v. Engel CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ROBERTA MARK ENGEL, B346269
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 24STCV16929)
v.
GARY ENGEL,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel M. Crowley, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Lawrence P. House and Lawrence P. House
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lewitt, Hackman, Shapiro, Marshall & Harlan and
Thomas M. Morrow for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant (appellant) Roberta Mark Engel
appeals from the judgment of dismissal following defendant and
respondent Gary Engel’s (respondent) successful demurrer.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in concluding the statute
of limitations bars her claims, finding her prior declaration
showed she knew respondent had exploited his patent for income
and profits. We conclude appellant’s causes of action are time-
barred based on her prior declaration showing she had then
known the facts constituting her claims. Thus, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The divorce
Appellant and respondent were married on August 17,
1975, and divorced on December 17, 2013. During their marriage,
respondent was a collector and renowned expert of Japanese
baseball cards. Respondent also developed an invention in the
field of orthodontics, which became the subject of a U.S. Patent,
No. 5,278,756 (issued Jan. 11, 1994) (’756 patent).
In February 2019, appellant brought further court
proceedings against respondent, filing a request for order
regarding undisclosed assets and attorney’s fees and costs.
Appellant asserted she became aware in November 2018 of
additional assets not disclosed and divided during the dissolution
of marriage. The undisclosed assets included respondent’s
Japanese baseball cards and patents. The petition raised theories
of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, asserting respondent had
duties of disclosing any transaction concerning community
property.
Appellant submitted a declaration to support her petition,
attesting to several facts regarding respondent’s allegedly
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undisclosed businesses and patents, including respondent and
Marc Lemchen’s 1985 cofounding of Dolphin Imaging Systems
(Dolphin Imaging) and their creation of new technology. Before
Dolphin Imaging was formed, respondent had a company called
Sonrisa Systems Inc., which became Dolphin Imaging.
Respondent hid his involvement in Dolphin Imaging during his
marriage with appellant. While at Dolphin Imaging, respondent
helped co-author domestic and international patents, 3D
technologies, and software that helped in all areas of dental
specialty practice. By 1995, respondent was president of Dolphin
Imaging and worked to form a limited liability company for the
business. In 1998, Dolphin Imaging was dissolved and assumed
by Dolphin LLC. Dolphin LLC operated until 2009 when
Patterson Dental acquired it as a standalone subsidiary and
designated Chester Wang as subsidiary president. At that time
Dolphin LLC already had its manufacturing at Patterson
Dental’s facility. Wang told a private investigator hired by
appellant that he offered to buy Dolphin LLC and respondent
accepted. Wang claimed, however, he did not pay to acquire the
company and instead agreed to reimburse respondent for money
“he ‘borrowed from his mother.’” Respondent told appellant this
money “never changed hands” when he left the company.
After appellant discovered the sale of Dolphin LLC, she
investigated how respondent could hide large sums of money and
discovered various trusts and a real property disposition that had
not been disclosed in the divorce proceedings. Appellant found
Wang never purchased Dolphin LLC, and respondent remained a
major stakeholder. Appellant averred respondent likely received
substantial income from the software and patents he helped
develop and from Dolphin LLC being sold to Patterson Dental for
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approximately $42 million. Appellant’s declaration also
referenced and attached a letter from her attorney to
respondent’s then-attorney that discussed undisclosed assets and
stressed that appellant did not waive respondent’s fiduciary
obligation. Appellant’s counsel thanked respondent’s counsel in
the letter for providing “the Dolphin paperwork” and asked, “Is
Mr. Engel willing to put under oath that he never received a dime
beyond that Asset Purchase Agreement for Dolphin, patents,
etc?”
Following a hearing held on appellant’s petition in April
2019, the trial court issued a stipulated findings and order
dismissing appellant’s petition with prejudice. The order
indicated appellant shall not request the relief set forth in her
petition, and the parties were to bear their own associated
attorney’s fees and costs. Each party stipulated to the dismissal.
The lawsuit
In July 2024, appellant filed a lawsuit against respondent
asserting three causes of action for extrinsic fraud, breach of
fiduciary duties, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Appellant alleged respondent defrauded her and breached his
fiduciary duties throughout their marriage by actively concealing
the scope of his baseball card business, his development of the
invention in orthodontics and the associated ’756 patent, and his
business of purchasing and selling real estate. Respondent
allegedly kept secret his involvement in and the assignments of
the ’756 patent until late 2023 when appellant learned of the
invention and its potentially high value.
Appellant alleged she discovered the fraud in December
2023 when she learned her dentist used Patterson Dental Unit
equipment. Appellant became more intrigued by this discovery
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when she later saw an advertisement by Lemchen on the Web
site LinkedIn discussing an application he and Wang created on
behalf of Dolphin LLC. Appellant alleged she was jarred by the
advertisement due to respondent’s representation he received no
money from Wang for Dolphin LLC, which was supposedly a
“gift.” Appellant realized respondent could not simply have given
the company to Wang because he co-owned it with Lemchen.
Respondent allegedly represented to appellant there were no
businesses in which he was involved that were not disclosed
during their marriage. Appellant alleged respondent represented
he was not involved in Dolphin LLC or its patents.
Appellant further alleged, despite respondent’s
representations, he was critical to forming Dolphin Imaging and
its operation and patents because he cofounded and was an
officer of the company. Appellant alleged she realized respondent
was part of Patterson Dental and a coholder of the patent with
Lemchen.
In August 2024, respondent filed a demurrer to the
complaint. Before the trial court ruled on the demurrer, appellant
filed an amended complaint (FAC) in October 2024.
The demurrer to the FAC
In November 2024, respondent filed a demurrer to the
FAC. Respondent contended the statute of limitations bars all of
appellant’s three causes of action. Respondent argued the one-
year statute of limitations under Family Code section 2122 bars
appellant’s first and second causes of action for extrinsic fraud
and breach of fiduciary duties. Respondent argued the documents
appellant filed in the 2019 proceeding show she knew as of
February 21, 2019, the alleged facts constituting her claims for
fraud and failure to comply with the applicable disclosure
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requirements. In particular, respondent noted appellant’s
February 2019 declaration demonstrates she knew respondent
cofounded Dolphin Imaging and co-authored its patents, that
Patterson Dental acquired Dolphin Imaging, and respondent
likely received substantial income due to the patents he helped
develop. Respondent asserted appellant’s lawsuit was over five
years late given she knew these facts underlying her claims in
February 2019.
As to the third cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, respondent argued it is barred by the two-
year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section
335.1 because there were no facts alleged showing the parties
have even been in each other’s presence within two years of the
action.
Respondent also posited the doctrine of res judicata bars
appellant’s claims, arguing the 2013 judgment of dissolution and
the 2019 stipulated findings and order constitute a final
judgment on the merits barring further litigation of the same
causes of action.
In opposition, appellant contended her 2019 declaration
includes only general facts and does not demonstrate her
knowledge of the ’756 patent at the time. Appellant maintained
the declaration shows only she knew the company respondent
cofounded, was aware Dolphin Imaging created new technology,
and later learned more information about Dolphin Imaging.
Appellant claims it cannot be concluded from her declaration that
she was well informed of the ’756 patent, the manner and extent
of the patent’s exploitation, or the revenue the patent generated
throughout its existence. As to res judicata, appellant argued it
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does not apply because the parties did not previously litigate
respondent’s fraudulent concealment of the ’756 patent.
The demurrer was heard in February 2025. The trial court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to all three
causes of action of the FAC, finding them barred by the statute of
limitations. As to the first and second causes of action for
extrinsic fraud and breach of fiduciary duties, the court found
appellant’s February 2019 declaration shows she knew of the
facts constituting her claims. Namely, the court indicated
appellant knew respondent developed the invention for which a
patent was granted and Patterson Dental held the patent in
2019. As to the third cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the court found appellant knew or should
have known of respondent’s alleged conduct as early as nine
years earlier based on her prior declarations.
Judgment was entered on March 18, 2025. Appellant
timely appealed.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Appellant asserts two main arguments. First, appellant
contends the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of her prior
declarations in the divorce proceedings to conclude the statute of
limitations bars her claims. Appellant argues the court
erroneously interpreted her declaration statements to find she
had knowledge respondent concealed his exploitation of the
patent. Second, appellant asserts the court erred in denying leave
to amend and not allowing her to plead more specific facts
showing she was not truly aware of respondent’s concealment of
the profits from his patent.
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DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review and applicable law
“On review from an order sustaining a demurrer, ‘we
examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory,
such facts being assumed true for this purpose.’” (Committee for
Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010)
48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) “We may also consider matters that have been
judicially noticed.” (Ibid.)
“A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged
pleading.” (Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 1092, 1103.) “We assume the truth of the properly
pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred
from those expressly pleaded, and matters of which judicial
notice has been taken.” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont
General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 111.) “The question of a
plaintiff’s ability to prove the allegations, or the possible
difficulty in making such proof, does not concern the reviewing
court and plaintiffs need only plead facts showing that they may
be entitled to some relief.” (Brown, supra, at p. 1103.)
“When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect
can be cured by amendment.” (Adams v. Bank of America, N.A.
(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 666, 670.) “If we find that an amendment
could cure the defect, we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion and we reverse; if not, no abuse of discretion has
occurred.” (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1074, 1081.) “[T]he plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that
‘there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect
with an amendment.’” (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer
8
Rights v. Nextel Communications, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
131, 135 (Foundation).)
II. The trial court did not err in sustaining the
demurrer on the ground the statute of limitations
bars appellant’s claims
A. It was not error to take judicial notice of
appellant’s prior declaration
Appellant contends the trial court erroneously took judicial
notice of appellant’s prior declarations in the divorce proceedings
to conclude the statute of limitations bars her causes of action.
Appellant argues the court erred in concluding her causes of
action for extrinsic fraud and breach of fiduciary duties accrued
in 2019 by interpreting her statements to mean she knew
respondent concealed his exploitation of the ’756 patent.1 We
disagree.
“As a general rule in testing a pleading against a demurrer
the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however
improbable they may be.” (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural
Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 (Del E. Webb).)
“The courts, however, will not close their eyes to situations where
a complaint contains allegations of fact inconsistent with
attached documents, or allegations contrary to facts which are
1 Appellant’s appellate briefs do not include discussion of the
order sustaining the demurrer as to her third cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thus, we conclude
appellant waived this issue. (See Benach v. County of Los Angeles
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“When an appellant fails to
raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived.”].)
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judicially noticed.” (Ibid.) “Thus, a pleading valid on its face may
nevertheless be subject to demurrer when matters judicially
noticed by the court render the complaint meritless. In this
regard the court passing upon the question of the demurrer may
look to affidavits filed on behalf of plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s
answers to interrogatories [citation], as well as to the plaintiff’s
response to request for admissions.” (Ibid.)
“The court will take judicial notice of records such as
admissions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and the like,
when considering a demurrer, only where they contain
statements of the plaintiff or his agent which are inconsistent
with the allegations of the pleading before the court.” (Del E.
Webb, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at pp. 604–605; see Bockrath v.
Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 83 [“It is true, as the
Court of Appeal observed, that a complaint’s allegations may be
disregarded when they conflict with judicially noticed discovery
responses.”].) “[T]he plaintiff may not plead facts that contradict
the facts or positions that the plaintiff pleaded in earlier actions
or suppress facts that prove the pleaded facts false.” (Cantu v.
Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877.)
We conclude the trial court properly took judicial notice of
appellant’s February 2019 declaration and the facts therein are
inconsistent with the allegations in the operative complaint in
this case. Appellant alleges in this lawsuit she only discovered
the relationship between Patterson Dental and Dolphin Imaging
in December 2023. The FAC indicates appellant learned of the
nexus between respondent’s invention, Patterson Dental, Dolphin
Imaging, Lemchen, and Wang from Lemchen’s advertisement on
Linkedin regarding an application he and Wang created on behalf
of Dolphin LLC. Appellant was allegedly jarred by the
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advertisement because respondent had represented to appellant
he gifted Dolphin Imaging to Wang, receiving no money in
return. Appellant alleges she realized respondent could not
simply gift the company to Wang because he did not own it in its
entirety.
Appellant stated in her February 2019 declaration that
Dolphin LLC operated until 2009 when Patterson Dental
acquired it as a standalone subsidiary, with Wang becoming
subsidiary president. Appellant attested Dolphin LLC already
had its manufacturing at Patterson Dental’s facility. Appellant
averred Wang never purchased Dolphin LLC, and respondent
remained a major stakeholder. Appellant stated respondent
likely received substantial income from the software and patents
he helped develop and the sale of Dolphin LLC to Patterson
Dental. Appellant attested the acquisition of Dolphin LLC totaled
approximately $42 million. Appellant’s declaration also included
her attorney’s letter to respondent’s attorney at the time, which
contained language suggesting appellant was aware respondent
had financially gained from the acquisition and patents.
Appellant maintained the foregoing facts were all within
her personal knowledge. Accordingly, appellant’s declaration
shows, contrary to her allegations in this lawsuit, she knew of the
relationship involving Patterson Dental, Dolphin Imaging,
patents respondent co-authored, and the abovementioned
individuals. Appellant now claims she was unaware Wang did
not purchase Dolphin LLC, despite her directly attesting in
February 2019 that Wang did not purchase the company, and
respondent remained a major stakeholder. Further, appellant’s
declaration shows she knew Patterson Dental acquired Dolphin
LLC, the approximate value of the acquisition, and that Dolphin
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LLC’s manufacturing was already at Patterson Dental’s facility.
Therefore it was entirely proper to take judicial notice of the facts
in the declaration as they are entirely at odds with the FAC’s
allegations regarding appellant’s discovery of the fraud or
perjury.
B. The statute of limitations bars appellant’s
claims because she knew of the facts
constituting the claims
Under Family Code section 2122, subdivision (a), “[a]n
action or motion based on fraud shall be brought within one year
after the date on which the complaining party either did discover,
or should have discovered, the fraud.” Under section 2122,
subdivision (f), “[a]n action or motion based on failure to comply
with the disclosure requirements shall be brought within one
year after the date on which the complaining party either
discovered, or should have discovered, the failure to comply.”
“[Family Code] [s]ection 2122 is analogous to Code of Civil
Procedure 338, subdivision (d), pertaining to the statute of
limitations for fraud.” (Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 1131, 1149 (Rubenstein).) “[Code of Civil Procedure]
[s]ection 338, subdivision (d), provides: ‘The cause of action ... is
not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the
aggrieved party [or his or her agent], of the facts constituting the
fraud … .’” (Ibid.) “[U]nder [Family Code] section 2122, as under
Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d), it is the
discovery of the facts constituting the fraud or perjury that
triggers the running of the statute of limitations.” (Ibid.)
The pleadings and judicially noticeable facts show the
statute of limitations bars appellant’s claims because she knew of
the facts constituting the fraud or perjury no later than February
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21, 2019.2 Appellant’s February 2019 declaration shows she knew
respondent cofounded Dolphin Imaging and co-authored domestic
and international patents for the company. Further, appellant’s
statements demonstrate she was aware Wang did not purchase
Dolphin LLC, and respondent remained a major stakeholder of
the company. Appellant’s declaration shows she knew of
Patterson Dental’s acquisition of Dolphin LLC and the
approximate value thereof. Appellant attested respondent hid his
involvement with Dolphin Imaging during the marriage and did
not disclose the foregoing facts regarding his businesses during
the divorce proceedings. Appellant also attested to various trusts
respondent formed, which she believed helped him hide the
money he received from the acquisition and patents. Appellant’s
declaration demonstrates her knowledge respondent gained
income or profited from his patents with Dolphin Imaging and
did not disclose such facts in the divorce proceedings.
Appellant contends it cannot be concluded from her
February 2019 declaration that she knew respondent exploited
and derived income from the ’756 patent. Appellant’s claim
accrued, however, when she discovered the facts constituting the
fraud or perjury. (See Rubenstein, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1149.) As discussed above, appellant knew respondent
cofounded and was significantly involved in Dolphin Imaging,
2 Appellant maintains the trial court never specifically found
she had knowledge of respondent’s exploitation of the ’756 patent.
Such factor is not determinative, however, because the February
2019 declaration appellant filed conflicts with her allegations in
the FAC and show she had knowledge that respondent did not
disclose his financial gain from his patents with Dolphin
Imaging.
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developed patents for the company, was a major stakeholder in
the later formed Dolphin LLC when it was acquired by Patterson
Dental, and never disclosed any assets from these endeavors
during the divorce proceedings. Appellant had determined
respondent likely received substantial income from the patents
he helped develop and his company being sold to Patterson
Dental. These same general set of facts underlie appellant’s
causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary. While the FAC
focuses on the ’756 patent, it does not identify any new facts
appellant only later discovered that are essential for her claims.
Appellant fails to demonstrate why she could not have brought
her causes of action several years earlier based on the facts she
knew in February 2019. Indeed, appellant asserted the same
theories of fraud and breach of fiduciary duties to bring her
February 2019 petition regarding undisclosed assets. Even if
appellant had not yet pieced together all of the facts and was
unaware she had a cause of action, it does not establish appellant
had no knowledge of the facts constituting her claims.
Thus, appellant’s causes of action accrued no later than the
date of her prior declaration, February 21, 2019. Appellant had
one year under Family Code section 2122, subdivisions (a) and (f),
to bring her causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty. Appellant filed this action over five years later on July 9,
2024. The statute of limitations had long expired when appellant
brought this lawsuit.
In short, appellant’s pleadings and prior declaration show
the statute of limitations bars her causes of action.3 Appellant’s
3 Respondent also contends the doctrine of res judicata bars
appellant’s claims because the 2013 judgment of dissolution and
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February 2019 declaration makes clear she knew several years
prior to filing her action, the general set of facts constituting the
fraud or perjury upon which her claims are based. Appellant
knew as early as 2019 about respondent’s involvement in Dolphin
Imaging and its patents and that he likely gained substantial
income from such endeavors, facts that were never disclosed
during the divorce proceedings. While the instant action focuses
on the ’756 patent, there are no allegations establishing why
appellant could not have brought her causes of action sooner. By
the time appellant filed her action, the one-year limitations
period under Family Code section 2122, subdivisions (a) and (f),
had long expired. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
sustaining the demurrer on the ground appellant’s claims are
time-barred.
C. Appellant fails to show her pleadings can be
sufficiently amended
Appellant asserts she should have been given leave to
amend her pleadings to allow her to plead more specific facts that
would show why she was not truly aware of respondent’s
concealment of the profits from the patent. Appellant fails to
present here any facts demonstrating she has a reasonable
possibility of curing the defect with an amendment. As discussed
above, the claimant has the burden to show if there is a
reasonable possibility the pleading defect can be cured. (See
Foundation, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) Appellant does
the 2019 stipulated findings and order constitute a final
judgment on the merits barring further litigation of the same
causes of action. Since we conclude appellant’s claims are time-
barred and the demurrer was properly sustained, we need not
delve into the issue of res judicata here.
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not meet this burden because she has presented no amendments
or facts she can allege to establish she has a reasonable
possibility of curing the pleading defect. Thus, appellant has
failed to show it was error to deny leave to amend.
DISPOSITION
The March 18, 2025 judgment is affirmed. Respondent is
awarded his costs on appeal.
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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