CourtListener 10848641•In re A.A. CA3
Texto completo
Filed 4/27/26 In re A.A. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
In re A.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C103998
Law.
(Super. Ct. No. STK-JD-DP-
SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES 2025-0000131)
AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant A.W. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional orders
removing newborn Alex A. (the minor) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c))1 and
bypassing mother for reunification services (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)). She contends the
court erred in detaining the minor at the initial hearing and in finding mother waived her
right to contested hearing/trial on the jurisdiction/disposition through her nonappearance.
She also contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s removal findings or
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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the section 361.5 subdivision (b)(6) bypass. Disagreeing, we affirm the orders of the
juvenile court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 17, 2025, the minor was placed in protective custody by the San Joaquin
County Human Services Agency (Agency) pursuant to a warrant following his premature
birth the week before. Mother’s oldest child, I.H., was removed as an infant in 2018
following suspicious injuries and adopted by a relative. Mother’s next child, M.A., was
also removed as an infant in 2024. We describe those two cases in detail in our
Discussion, post. Mother reported having all necessary supplies to care for the minor,
and that she had not used marijuana for a year or methamphetamine for three years. She
and the minor tested negative for drugs, and the nurse had no concerns with mother’s
interactions with the minor; mother was breastfeeding and pumping and otherwise acted
appropriately.
Mother told the investigating social worker that she had completed a drug
program, parenting classes and therapy (in M.A.’s dependency case), but her services
were terminated when she was bypassed. Maternal great-grandmother offered to allow
mother and the minor to live with her if needed. While acknowledging the extensive
services completed by mother in M.A.’s case, the report identified mother as a high risk
because of her failure to acknowledge the severe injuries suffered by I.H. six years before
and her inconsistent explanations for those injuries. The Agency recommended out-of-
home placement.
The petition alleged the minor fell within the provisions of section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The failure to protect subdivision (b)(1) allegations were that
the minor had suffered or was at substantial risk of suffering “serious physical harm or
illness as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or legal guardian to
supervise or protect the child adequately” and/or “by the willful or negligent failure of the
parent or legal guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or
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medical treatment.” The facts supporting these allegations pertaining to mother were
based solely on I.H.’s and M.A.’s cases. The abuse of sibling (subdivision (j))
allegations stated that the minor’s “sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in
subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i)” and there was “a substantial risk” that the minor
would “be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.” The supporting factual
allegations relied upon I.H.’s and M.A.’s cases.
At the April 2025 initial hearing, mother objected to detention in light of the
undisputed “significant strides to change her life,” including sobriety and therapy. The
juvenile court referenced I.H.’s “absolutely life-threatening non-accidental injuries that
occurred previously” and mother’s only recent acceptance of how they occurred, and
detained the minor, finding probable cause that he would be at risk of substantial danger
and that no reasonable means could prevent his removal. But the court acknowledged
mother’s efforts and honesty, telling her that it was only the beginning of the case and
referred her to drug court, granting her liberal supervised visitation.
The Agency’s jurisdiction report filed May 1, 2025, attached records related to the
siblings’ previous dependency cases and recommended the juvenile court find the
allegations true based solely on those cases. Mother attended the originally scheduled
jurisdiction hearing on May 8, 2025. Her counsel requested the jurisdiction and
disposition hearings be held together, and the court continued the combined hearing to
June 3, 2025. The court ordered mother to appear, stating the date, time, and place of the
hearing three times, and warning her counsel to “make sure that she’s here” because “if
she’s not here, the hearing will go forward without her.”
On June 2, 2025, the Agency filed a disposition report recommending bypass
pursuant to section 361.5 subdivision (b)(6). Mother had failed to respond to the social
worker’s attempts to interview her and had texted the social worker stating verbatim in
pertinent part: “ ‘I have been completely open and upfront with CPS about everything in
my past how I struggled with addiction but got clean on my own so I could still be in my
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son’s life but it got twisted up into a bunch of dishonest false allegations and used to keep
me from him and now two siblings doctor said I would never have for no reason.... I
don’t trust anyone from the agency anymore really don’t understand I’m not guilty of
wrong doing I thought I did everything right that any good mom would do in best interest
of their children. I just have to step back and take a break it’s too hard I feel
overwhelmed with to much hurt and devastation.’ ”
Certificates of completion and progress notes showing mother had finished various
services in M.A.’s case were attached to the disposition report. But the social worker
opined the minor could not be safely maintained in mother’s home given the prior
dependency cases and lack of contact with the social worker, recent dismissal from drug
court for nonparticipation, and failure to contact the assigned service providers. She had
also missed two scheduled visits. The social worker noted “[i]t seems that [mother] may
have just given up, believing that this case would result in the same decision as the prior
case involving, [M.A.], and therefore made the decision to not participate in any services
in an effort to reunify. Thus, leaving the agency with no other option other than to have
to make that exact decision.” “[M]other’s continued denial and deflection causes the
undersigned to believe that the minor, … could be at risk of suffering harm if he were
returned to the care of his mother.”
Mother failed to appear at the June 3, 2025, jurisdiction/disposition hearing; her
counsel entered a general objection to jurisdiction and asked that disposition be continued
as counsel did not know mother’s position, given her absence. The juvenile court found
mother had received proper notice and had waived her right to trial and took jurisdiction
of the case based on the “factual basis contained within the jurisdiction report.” The
court continued the disposition hearing.
Mother did not appear at the continued hearing held on June 17, 2025. The
juvenile court found notice had been given; counsel for mother indicated when asked that
counsel “had an opportunity to speak with my client’s mother but not with my client.”
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Counsel later added that “in speaking with my client’s mother, she indicates that the
family would like for me to set the recommendation contested”; the court responded that
“mother needs to be here for me to do that. I’m not taking it from any family. … [T]oday
I am going to go forward because notice appears to be good.” The court adopted the
Agency’s proposed findings and orders, removing the minor from mother and bypassing
her for reunification services. Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother claims error in the minor’s detention in the form of incorrect factual
findings at the hearing; she also argues the juvenile court erred in holding the jurisdiction
and disposition hearings in her absence. She adds that the removal and bypass orders
were not supported by substantial evidence.
As we have already set forth, the Agency and the juvenile court considered the
previous dependency cases concerning the minor’s older siblings, I.H. and M.A., at
length when making decisions in the minor’s case. And mother’s briefing relies heavily
on the recent opinion of another panel of this court that reversed the order bypassing
reunification services to one of those siblings, M.A. (In re M.A. (Dec. 17, 2025,
C103159) [nonpub. opn.].) Accordingly, we begin with a brief discussion of the previous
dependency cases as well as the relevant conclusions of the M.A. opinion.
I
The Previous Cases
In re M.A. described the dependency of the minor’s older half sibling I.H. in
pertinent part as follows:
“I.H. was born to mother at 28 weeks and admitted to the neonatal intensive care
unit (NICU). In December 2018, when I.H. was approximately seven months old, mother
brought him to the emergency room with a fever, cough, and chest pain. X-rays revealed
broken ribs in various stages of healing. I.H. also had multiple crescent-shaped, deep
abrasions on both flanks, abdomen, and below the breastbone. Before mother was told
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about the broken ribs, she suggested I.H.’s injuries were caused by a puppy, which they
no longer had, and denied that he had been exposed to trauma. After learning of the
fractures, mother gave inconsistent reasons for the injuries, such as the puppy, an issue
with a car seat, and cosleeping with I.H. at her feet. She was unable to provide a date that
he was injured. According to a child abuse expert, these causes were inconsistent with
the nature of I.H.’s injuries, which indicated intentional physical abuse.... I.H.’s injuries
... had occurred over time, and were likely to reoccur and/or escalate without
intervention. I.H. was taken into protective custody, and a skeletal survey revealed a
fracture of the right femur and possible fracture of the left tibia ....
“The Sacramento County Juvenile Court declared I.H. a dependent in February
2019. Mother was offered reunification services through an exception to bypass;
however, those services were soon terminated due to mother’s nonparticipation.
Mother’s parental rights to I.H. were terminated in November 2019. I.H. was adopted by
his caregiver, maternal great-aunt L.H., and dependency jurisdiction terminated in 2020.
“In October 2019, mother was convicted of felony child endangerment (Pen.
Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) for which she received a grant of five years’ probation including
that she serve 300 days in jail. A five-year protective order issued prohibiting mother
from contacting I.H.” (In re M.A., supra, C103159.)
The opinion described the dependency of M.A. in pertinent part as follows:
“M.A. was born in April 2024 at 36 weeks and placed in the NICU due to
respiratory issues. Mother tested positive for marijuana and admitted to weekly
marijuana use throughout her pregnancy. She intended to breastfeed M.A. and promised
to stop smoking marijuana. M.A.’s initial drug test was negative. When asked about
[I.H.’s] 2018 case, mother explained that I.H. was injured from rolling on him during
cosleeping and during a car accident where he was not in his car seat. She did not take
I.H. to the doctor because he stopped crying after the accident and did not appear injured.
This accident had been her boyfriend R.Z.’s explanation for I.H.’s injuries back in 2018.
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Mother explained she failed to participate in previous services because she was homeless,
ashamed, and had lost familial support.
“On April 19, 2024, the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency)
filed the section 300 petition at issue in this case alleging M.A. had suffered or was at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. The petition alleged five
sets of facts supporting this allegation, four of which pertained to mother. These included
mother’s substance abuse, as well as detailed allegations concerning I.H.’s injuries from
the 2018 case and that mother’s parental rights to I.H. had been terminated.
“In April 2024, the juvenile court temporarily detained M.A. over mother’s
objection with services to be provided pending the jurisdiction and disposition hearings.
The court further approved mother’s assessment for drug court, granted mother
supervised visitation, and approved out-of-county placement with the maternal great-aunt
L.H.” (In re M.A., supra, C103159.)
Mother regularly visited M.A. and completed numerous services including
residential drug treatment, parenting classes and individual counseling prior to the
hearings on jurisdiction and disposition that did not occur until early 2025. (In re M.A.,
supra, C103159.) Mother submitted on jurisdiction but opposed the Agency’s request to
bypass her reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). (In re
M.A., supra, C103159.) The Agency acknowledged mother’s rehabilitative efforts but
argued her extreme reluctance to take responsibility for what happened to I.H. (including
“consistent denials despite the receipt of extensive services”), leading the Agency to
suspect that mother caused I.H.’s injuries, thus endangering M.A. (Ibid.) “[A]s a result,
the Agency argued, there was not clear and convincing evidence that it was in M.A.’s
best interests for mother to receive reunification services. M.A.’s counsel concurred with
the Agency, highlighting mother’s lack of insight as well as that I.H.’s injuries were
extreme and occurred over time.” (Ibid.) The juvenile court agreed with the Agency,
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bypassing mother’s reunification services and adopting the proposed findings and orders
of the Agency’s reports dated May 6, 2024, and June 7, 2024. (Ibid.)
As relevant here, In re M.A. upheld M.A.’s removal. (In re M.A., supra,
C103159.) While acknowledging mother’s successful completion of “residential and
outpatient drug treatment programs through drug court to combat her lengthy history of
using methamphetamine and marijuana,” M.A. noted that “serious questions raised by the
severity of I.H.’s injuries incurred over a period of time and mother’s continued denial of
accountability for the injuries, as well as M.A.’s tender age, supported the juvenile
court’s decision that there were no reasonable means other than removal to protect M.A.
from a substantial risk of physical harm.” (Ibid.) However, M.A. reversed the bypass
order. (Ibid.) In light of mother’s substantial compliance with and commitment to
reunification services, the Agency had not provided substantial evidence supporting the
required finding that M.A. would not benefit from receiving reunification services
(§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)). (In re M.A., supra, C103159.)
II
Detention Claim
Mother first argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in initially detaining the
minor because the court was operating under the mistaken belief that older sibling I.H.
had suffered “life threatening” (as opposed to merely severe) injuries. She argues this
“critical factual error” resulted in “fundamentally unfair” proceedings in violation of due
process. But the challenge to the initial detention order (§ 319) was rendered moot by the
juvenile court’s dispositional order removing the minor (In re Julian H. (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1088, fn. 7). It is also factually inaccurate, as we briefly explain.
Although mother argues the record directly refutes the juvenile court’s factual
determination that I.H.’s injuries were “absolutely life-threatening,” referencing evidence
attached to the jurisdiction report, this report/attachment was not before the court when it
detained the minor. Instead, the court was relying on the petition and detention report;
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those materials related that I.H. (then under age one) had been admitted to the hospital
with over 20 rib fractures in various stages of healing and at least one broken leg bone.
Given the severity of these injuries and I.H.’s tender age, the court’s statement that the
injuries were life-threatening was supported by the evidence before it at the time. The
subsequent decision to remove the minor, which moots this claim, was based on the later
evidence, which also signals there was no due process violation in the minor’s detention.
III
Waiver of Trial on Disposition
Mother next argues the juvenile court erred in finding her nonappearance at the
jurisdiction and disposition hearings operated to waive her right to trial. She observes the
court failed to explicitly find her nonappearance was willful and cursorily argues, without
supportive authority, that the court was not permitted to proceed in her absence. The
authority is to the contrary; no error appears.
“ ‘When a parent is absent without good cause at a properly noticed hearing,’ ...,
‘the court is entitled to proceed in the parent’s absence.’ [Citation.] Ordinarily, a
parent’s failure to appear will not constitute the good cause necessary to justify a
continuance because substantial importance is attached to the child’s need to promptly
resolve the dependency matter. [Citations.] Thus, ‘[a]n unjustified failure to appear at a
duly noticed hearing reflects a parent’s choice not to attend,’ and the juvenile court ‘may
properly treat this choice as a waiver of the right to be present at that hearing and of the
benefits of being present.’ ” (In re A.V. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 949, 957.)
There appears no dispute that mother was present at the original jurisdiction
hearing held on May 8, 2025, and at its conclusion was ordered to attend the June 3,
2025, hearing. She was given the date and time and location three times and warned that
the court would proceed in her absence if she failed to appear. When she nonetheless
failed to appear, her attorney did not offer an excuse and did not know her position.
Regardless, the disposition was continued and mother again failed to communicate with
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her attorney or appear at the June 17, 2025, disposition hearing. It is undisputed that
notice for all hearings was properly given and no excuses were advanced for mother’s
absence. The juvenile court did not err when it determined that mother’s nonappearance
had waived her right to trial on the subsequent findings.
IV
The Removal Order
Mother next contends the juvenile court’s removal order is unsupported by
substantial evidence. We disagree.
A child may be properly removed from a parent’s home if the child protective
agency establishes by clear and convincing evidence that (1) “[t]here is or would be a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home” and (2) “there are no
reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without
removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” In cases such as
this one, a juvenile court considers the current risk to the child given the parent’s past
conduct and present circumstances. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); see In re Cole C. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917.) It is not necessary to show prior harm to the child; rather, the
statute focuses on averting that harm. (In re Cole, at p. 917.)
We review the juvenile court’s findings for substantial evidence keeping in mind
the clear and convincing evidence standard of review. (In re Zoe H. (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 58, 71.) This has been described as “ ‘whether the record as a whole
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true.’ ” (In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 960.)
In conducting this review, we consider “the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn
reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th
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989, 1011-1012.) “ ‘ “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent
judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the
trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “ ‘ “The ultimate test is whether it
is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole
record.” ’ ” (In re Yolanda. L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.)
The juvenile court removed the minor “based on the facts in paragraph 5A on page
25 of the [disposition] report.” Paragraph 5A states: “There is a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being of the child or
would be if the child was returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the
child’s physical health, safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being can be
protected without removing the child from his parents’ physical custody.” Although
mother argues the removal order “was based [on] an erroneous and uncorrected finding
that I.H.’s injuries were life threatening,” this argument is not supported by the record
and mother’s briefing does not cite a source.
Mother also contends the court’s finding of risk is “irreconcilable with the
evidence.” We disagree. The evidence of the abuse of I.H. and the inconsistent
explanations offered by mother therefor were compelling. There were: “24 rib and two
leg fractures in various stages of healing (some acute, some old). These injuries were
consistent with nonaccidental trauma. [The doctor] opined the rib fractures were from
compression squeezing, associated with abuse, and unlikely to stop and could even
escalate without intervention. The leg fractures were likely from pulling and twisting and
thus associated with abuse. Neither mother’s nor her boyfriend’s explanations were
consistent with I.H.’s injuries. Although mother was initially offered reunification
services pursuant to an exception to bypass (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2), (3)) those services
were terminated following mother’s failure to visit I.H. or stay in contact with the
Agency.” (In re M.A., supra, C103159.)
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“Moreover, mother was convicted in October 2019 of felony child endangerment
(Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) and a court issued a five-year protective order prohibiting
mother from contacting I.H.” (In re M.A., supra, C103159.)
As for the more recent dependency case, our record does reflect mother’s
successful completion of services related to M.A.’s case, including a 90-day drug
treatment program, parenting classes, anger management, and counseling. But here, in
sharp contrast, mother was nonresponsive to the social worker, failed to begin any of her
referred services, was dismissed from drug court for nonparticipation, and missed visits.
Mother’s arguments that the current risk and minimal progress findings were
unsupported are not well taken. These arguments ignore that mother was not
participating in any services in the minor’s case; they also ignore that this court upheld
M.A.’s removal from mother despite her completion of services in M.A.’s case. (In re
M.A., supra, C103159.) Mother’s current refusal to participate in services combined with
the nature of the injuries in I.H.’s case underscores the risk she presented to the minor.
Under these circumstances, even a low risk of reoccurrence supported an order removing
the minor. (See, e.g., In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 331-332 [“ ‘ “Some risks
may be substantial even if they carry a low degree of probability because the magnitude
of the harm is potentially great” ’ ”].) Further, given the extensive documentation of
I.H.’s numerous injuries inflicted at different times, the record supports a finding of
future harm, distinguishing mother’s authorities. (See, e.g., In re Yolanda L., supra,
7 Cal.App.5th at p. 993 [future danger cannot be inferred from a single previous act]; In
re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1433-1440 [a single instance of rape (six years
prior) and a single incident of serious physical abuse (two years prior) supported risk of
future harm for purposes of removal].)
Finally, mother asserts that reasonable means existed to prevent removal. Without
citing the record, her brief explains that “mother would be willing to participate in
random drug testing, complete DDC [drug dependency court], attend counseling, and
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agency oversight through family maintenance.” But the record is to the contrary as
mother refused to attend hearings and communicate with the Agency social worker
beyond the text set forth above describing her need to “step back” and “take a break,”
which she apparently did. The reasonable means claim is specious.
V
The Bypass Order
Finally, mother contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
bypass order and that the court’s ruling failed to adhere to procedural requirements. We
remain unpersuaded.
“[W]hen a child is removed from the custody of their parent, the juvenile court
must provide the parent with reunification services unless it finds by clear and convincing
evidence the case falls within one of the 17 enumerated exceptions in section 361.5,
subdivision (b), commonly called ‘bypass provisions.’ (See § 361.5, subd. (a).) If the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a bypass provision applies, it must deny
services unless the parent proves that services would be in the child’s best interests.
(§ 361.5, subd. (c).)” (In re T.R. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140, 1148.) While the parent
bears the burden of proof on the last issue, the child protective agency bears the burden of
proving the threshold issue of whether a bypass provision applies. (Ibid.)
We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for substantial evidence and must
account for the heightened standard of proof by asking “whether ‘the record as a whole
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable the fact was true.’ ” (In re T.R., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1150.)
Section 361.5 subdivision (b)(6) applies where “the child has been adjudicated a
dependent pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of ... the infliction of
severe physical harm to the child, a sibling, or a half sibling by a parent or guardian, as
defined in this subdivision, and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit
the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian.”
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(§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(A).) Thus, as relevant here, subdivision (b)(6) requires a child
protective agency to establish by clear and convincing evidence both the infliction of
severe physical harm and that the child will not benefit from reunification services. (In re
T.R., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1148-1149.)
As relevant here, “[a] finding of the infliction of severe physical harm, for the
purposes of ... subdivision [(b)(6)], may be based on, but is not limited to, deliberate and
serious injury inflicted to or on ... the body of a ... half sibling of the child by an act or
omission of the parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(C).) This statute requires the
juvenile court to consider certain enumerated factors as well as “any information it deems
relevant” in determining whether a child would benefit from reunification services under
subdivision (b)(6).2 (§ 361.5, subd. (i).) The juvenile court must “read into the record
the basis for a finding of ... the infliction of severe physical harm under paragraph (6) of
subdivision (b), and shall also specify the factual findings used to determine that the
provision of reunification services to the offending parent or guardian would not benefit
the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (k).)
2 The enumerated factors are: “(1) The specific act or omission comprising the ... the
severe physical harm inflicted on the child or the child’s sibling or half sibling. [¶] (2)
The circumstances under which the abuse or harm was inflicted on the child or the child’s
sibling or half sibling. [¶] (3) The severity of the emotional trauma suffered by the child
or the child’s sibling or half sibling. [¶] (4) Any history of abuse of other children by the
offending parent or guardian. [¶] (5) The likelihood that the child may be safely returned
to the care of the offending parent or guardian within 12 months with no continuing
supervision. [¶] (6) Whether or not the child desires to be reunified with the offending
parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (i).) Mother’s assertion that the trial court failed to
consider the “facts” outlined in section 361.5, subdivision (i) is unsupported by the
record. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume the juvenile court
followed the law and considered appropriate factors when making its determination.
(Evid. Code, § 664; In re Julian R. (2007) 47 Cal.4th 487, 498-499; Ross v. Superior
Court of Sacramento County (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913-914.) Subdivision (i) required
the juvenile court to consider factors but did not require the court to articulate its
consideration of them on the record.
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Although mother argues the juvenile court failed to comply with the requirements
of section 361.5, subdivision (k) when determining no reunification services would be
provided pursuant to section 361.5 subdivision (b)(6), the court did provide that “[t]he
other recommendations of the social worker are incorporated and made part of today’s
orders and findings.” Reviewing those recommendations and findings, it is clear that the
court incorporated by reference the required findings and facts supporting them. That the
minor would not benefit from reunification services with mother is also supported by the
Agency’s disposition report, as we next explain.
Juvenile court finding number 13 states: “The Court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that [I.H.], the half-sibling of the child, has been adjudicated a dependent of the
Juvenile Court as a result of the infliction of severe physical harm by mother [], and it
would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with [mother].” This finding
set forth supporting facts detailing I.H.’s 24 rib fractures in various stages of healing and
two broken legs. Finding number 14 reiterated that reunification services would not
benefit the minor and concluded: “Therefore, no reunification services are to be provided
... pursuant to [§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)].”
The Agency’s disposition report provides additional information highlighting the
injuries sustained by I.H. and that mother “maintained throughout [I.H.’s] case as well as
[M.A.’s] case that she does not know how [I.H.] incurred multiple fractured bones,
bruises and other significant injuries.” Further, mother failed to maintain contact with the
social worker, did not engage in referred services, was terminated from drug court for
failing to appear, and missed visits with the minor. Mother’s decision to decline to
participate in the reunification process left the Agency no choice but to recommend
bypass. Thus, we are easily able to discern the multiple bases for the court’s ruling
applying section 361.5 subdivision (b)(6).
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Upon examination of those bases, we conclude they are supported by substantial
evidence. As to the first requirement that “the child has been adjudicated a dependent
pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of ... the infliction of severe
physical harm to the child, a sibling, or a half sibling by a parent or guardian, as defined
in this subdivision” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(A)), the juvenile court took jurisdiction
pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), and I.H.’s severe physical injuries--24
broken rib bones in various stages of healing and two broken legs--came to light when he
was approximately seven months old. These injuries were nonaccidentally inflicted
while mother was I.H.’s sole caregiver either through mother’s direct action or omission
by failing to protect I.H. from her boyfriend. Either way, this constitutes “severe physical
harm” to a half sibling. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(6)(A), (C).) Accordingly, we find it highly
probable that a reasonable fact finder would find jurisdiction warranted due to severe
physical injuries inflicted upon the minor’s half sibling I.H. (In re T.R., supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1150.)
We also have no difficulty concluding that a reasonable trier of fact could have
found it highly probable that the minor would not benefit from reunification services with
mother. (In re T.R., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1150.) Unlike M.A.’s case (In re M.A.,
supra, C103159), here, mother informed the social worker via text message of her
intention “to step back and take a break” and completely failed to engage in drug court,
counseling, or parenting classes. Further, mother failed to consistently visit the minor,
attend court, or communicate with the social worker. These facts abundantly support the
juvenile court’s finding that the minor would not benefit from reunification services with
mother.
16
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
17
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