CourtListener 10847928•Gilmore v. Wilshire Quinn Capital CA1/5
Texto completo
Filed 4/24/26 Gilmore v. Wilshire Quinn Capital CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
KEVIN E. GILMORE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A171376
v.
WILSHIRE QUINN CAPITAL, INC., (Alameda County
Defendant and Respondent. Super. Ct. No. 23CV056995)
Plaintiff Kevin E. Gilmore, appearing in propria persona, appeals from
an order sustaining defendant Wilshire Quinn Capital, Inc.’s (Wilshire)
demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint without leave to amend.1
Gilmore sued Wilshire alleging breach of contract, fraud, and rescission,
among other claims, regarding a loan agreement entered into between the
parties secured by a deed of trust on two real properties in Berkeley,
1 The general rule is that an order sustaining a demurrer without leave
to amend is not appealable, but a party may appeal from the entry of
dismissal after such order. (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521,
527, fn. 1.) Here, no judgment of dismissal is in the record. However, “ ‘when
the trial court has sustained a demurrer [without leave to amend] to all of the
complaint’s causes of action, appellate courts may deem the order to
incorporate a judgment of dismissal, since all that is left to make the order
appealable is the formality of the entry of a dismissal order or judgment.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) This is the case here. We deem the order on the demurrer
to incorporate a judgment of dismissal and will review the order. (Ibid.)
1
California. We affirm the trial court’s order as to all claims except the
rescission cause of action. As to the rescission cause of action, we find
Gilmore is permitted leave to amend.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Complaint
On December 26, 2023, plaintiff filed a complaint against Wilshire
alleging causes of action for breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation,
rescission, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
complaint alleged Gilmore entered into a mortgage agreement with Wilshire
in 2019, secured by a deed of trust on two properties, on Virginia Street and
Fifth Street, in Berkeley. The parties entered into a loan modification
agreement in 2021. Wilshire allegedly assured Gilmore that it did not want
to foreclose on the properties. In June 2022, Wilshire notified Gilmore that
the mortgage agreement was in default, demanded payment in full, and
refused Gilmore’s requests to rescind the mortgage agreement. Gilmore
suffered damages caused by the foreclosure of both properties. The trial
court sustained Wilshire’s demurrer to each cause of action with leave to
amend. The trial court’s order stated, in part, that it was unclear what
agreement Gilmore alleged was breached and it did not appear that the
contract was attached to the complaint or its terms were recited, as required
to state a cause of action. Gilmore filed a first amended complaint.
II. First Amended Complaint
The first amended complaint asserts the same four causes of action as
well as a fifth cause of action for injunctive relief, and attaches additional
exhibits. We summarize the facts based on the operative complaint and the
attached documents.
2
A. General Allegations
On March 13, 2019, Wilshire presented Gilmore with an appraisal for
Gilmore’s property on Virginia Street in Berkeley in the amount of
$1.8 million. On March 22, 2019, Gilmore entered into a mortgage
agreement with Wilshire in the amount of $1.4 million.2 Matthew Mielke, of
Wilshire, promised Gilmore that the mortgage was easily cancelable and
assured him that he would not lose the Virgina Street property. This was a
false statement made to induce plaintiff to enter into the mortgage
agreement. Gilmore relied on this false statement when he entered into the
mortgage agreement.
In November 2019, the City of Berkeley canceled a restrictive covenant
on Gilmore’s Fifth Street property. Mielke requested a lien on the Fifth
Street property “in connection with the Mortgage Agreement.” The Fifth
Street property had an appraised value of $1.5 million. Mielke promised that
the mortgage agreement was “easily cancellable” and assured Gilmore he
would not lose the property. This statement was false and made with the
intent to induce Gilmore to add the Fifth Street property to the mortgage
agreement. Gilmore relied on the false statement and added the Fifth Street
property as collateral for the mortgage agreement. As a result of his reliance,
Gilmore was damaged. On December 10, 2019, Gilmore executed a deed of
trust with Wilshire for the Fifth Street property. The attached deed of trust
and security agreement lists the note amount as $1.35 million, which is
secured by both the Virginia Street property and the Fifth Street property.
On January 27, 2021, the parties entered into a modification of deed of
trust, under which Wilshire loaned Gilmore an additional $195,000 and
2 The mortgage agreement is not attached to the complaint; nor are its
terms quoted verbatim in the complaint.
3
extended the loan maturity date. The new principal balance increased to
$1.545 million, and the loan maturity date was extended to October 1, 2021.
On September 20, 2021, Wilshire offered Gilmore a second loan
modification deal to include both the Virginia Street and the Fifth Street
properties “with no cash out to Plaintiff . . . .” The values of the properties
exceeded $3.5 million. Mielke and Wilshire assured plaintiff that Wilshire
did not want to foreclose on the properties and would work with plaintiff to
arrange for another lender to “take out the Mortgage Agreement” and release
the properties back to plaintiff. Wilshire loaned Gilmore an additional
$210,000, which increased the principal balance to $1.755 million. The
maturity date of the loan modification was October 1, 2022.
On June 12, 2022, Wilshire notified Gilmore that the mortgage
agreement was in default, “even though there was more than adequate equity
to pay the amount borrowed from Wilshire.” On June 16, 2022, Wilshire
notified Gilmore it was placing insurance on the properties. However,
Gilmore already had insurance on the properties. Wilshire sent Gilmore
correspondence “ ‘demanding payoff of our loan . . . .’ ” On July 20, 2022,
Wilshire filed a declaration of default and demand for sale of the properties.
The attached exhibits include the trustee’s July 20, 2022, declaration of
default and demand for sale notifying Gilmore that he was in default for
nonpayment of installment payments of $247,451.19 due on May 1 2022.
On July 27, 2022, plaintiff located alternative financing to pay off the
mortgage agreement with Wilshire, but Wilshire refused to allow the new
lender to pay off the loan. Wilshire refused to state that the loan was current
and demanded payment in full. Chris Garcia, Wilshire’s chief executive
officer, sent plaintiff an email stating: “ ‘At this time we are requesting the
full amount for the loan. As we already told you, we will not be accepting
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partial payment. If your new lender shows us in writing that they are
seriously considering paying us off, we will consider dropping the exit fee.’ ”
Gilmore then realized Wilshire had defrauded him and its true intent
was to foreclose on the properties, despite the facts that plaintiff only owed
$1.8 million and the properties were worth $4 million. In September 2022
and October 2022, Gilmore orally requested to rescind the loan agreement,
and in March 2023, he requested rescission in writing. Wilshire refused to
rescind the mortgage agreement. The first amended complaint attaches a
notice of default and election to sell under deed of trust, recorded on
August 5, 2022; a notice of trustee’s sale recorded on December 5, 2022,
stating the properties will be sold at public auction; and a trustee deed upon
sale stating that the properties were sold on March 8, 2023.
The foreclosure of the properties caused Gilmore to lose monthly rental
income; over $600,000 in equity; disruption of his family’s living
arrangements; emotional distress; and pain and suffering.
B. Causes of Action
Gilmore’s breach of contract cause of action alleges defendant breached
the mortgage contract by (1) demanding payment of the loan in June 2022,
when the new loan maturity date was October 1, 2022; (2) by initiating
foreclosure proceedings prior to the loan maturity date; (3) by adding a
$150,000 exit fee on June 21, 2022, when the loan contract did not contain an
exit fee; and (4) by force-placing insurance on the properties when the loan
contract provided for plaintiff to carry his own insurance. Gilmore further
contends that Wilshire breached the September 17, 2021, second modification
of deed of trust by failing to advance $210,000 to him and instead applying
the funds to some of the mortgage payments and that he was harmed by
losing access to the funds.
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Gilmore’s fraud cause of action alleges that in August and September
2021, Chris Garcia of Wilshire orally told Gilmore that “there was $0 equity
available for cash out on Plaintiff’s properties.” Wilshire told Gilmore that
based on its appraisals it could not offer more than the $1.4 million already
paid out on the loan. Wilshire knew its statement about the property values
was false. Gilmore did not know the statement was false, and he relied on
the appraisal values. Gilmore was harmed because he did not receive “cash
out” on the Fifth Street property. Gilmore later learned that “Zillow
estimated each house to be worth $1,800,000 each [sic] in September of
2021.” Mielke of Wilshire also promised plaintiff that the mortgage was easy
to cancel and that Gilmore would not lose the properties. This statement was
false and “was made with the intent to induce Plaintiff to enter into the
Mortgage Agreement and modification with Wilshire.” Gilmore relied on the
false statement and entered into the mortgage agreement.
On September 17, 2021, Wilshire fraudulently stated that the new loan
maturity date in the second modification deed of trust would be October 1,
2022. Wilshire knew the representation was false because Garcia began
foreclosure proceedings before October 1, 2022. Gilmore relied upon the false
representation and was damaged when Wilshire began foreclosure
proceedings, which prevented him from refinancing or selling the properties.
The final instance of alleged fraud is based on Mielke’s response to
Gilmore’s October 7, 2019, oral request that Wilshire report his loan to three
credit reporting bureaus. Mielke told Gilmore he had to direct his request to
the loan servicer. The loan servicer then told Gilmore that Wilshire’s
statement was false and that the loan could only be reported to credit
bureaus if Wilshire provided a form to Gilmore. Gilmore relied on Wilshire’s
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false statement and was harmed because his payments were not reported and
his credit score did not improve.
Gilmore’s third cause of action is for rescission of the loan agreements.
He alleges Wilshire violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) (15 U.S.C.
§ 1601 et seq.) by not allowing plaintiff to cancel the September 20, 2021,
loan modification and by failing to provide him with the TILA disclosure
regarding the right to rescission.
Gilmore’s cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing asserts he entered into contracts with Wilshire on December 6,
2019, and September 17, 2021, and that Wilshire interfered with plaintiff’s
ability to receive rights under the September 17, 2021 contract and failed to
advance $210,000 to plaintiff as agreed upon in the contract. Wilshire also
prevented plaintiff from selling the Fifth Street property in December 2022 to
pay off the loan. Plaintiff performed all covenants, conditions, and promises
required except for those he was prevented or excused from performing.3
3 The first amended complaint also includes a fifth cause of action, for
injunctive relief. However, plaintiff’s opening brief does not mention this
cause of action or include any argument as to why the trial court’s ruling
sustaining the demurrer to the injunctive relief cause of action was improper.
Accordingly, we do not address the fifth cause of action. (Jameson v. Desta
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 [“it is a fundamental principle of appellate
procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct
and the burden is on [the] appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an
error that justifies reversal of the judgment”]; Mansell v. Board of
Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545–546 [appellant’s brief must
contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made; if
none is furnished, the court may pass on the contention without further
consideration].)
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III. Demurrer to First Amended Complaint
The record does not contain Wilshire’s demurrer, memorandum of
points and authorities in support of its demurrer, or reply papers. It is
unclear whether the parties presented any oral argument at a hearing on the
demurrer. There is no reporter’s transcript in the appellate record, and the
order does not state that the parties appeared and presented argument. Our
review is impeded by the inadequate record. (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5
Cal.5th at p. 609 [appellant has burden of providing an adequate record for
review].) The record contains Gilmore’s opposition to the demurrer, in which
he argued inapplicable case law regarding demurrers to answers. He also
made limited, conclusory arguments contending that each cause of action was
sufficiently pleaded; however, he failed to identify the elements of each cause
of action or support his arguments with legal authority. Nor did Gilmore
explain how he could further amend the complaint to cure any pleading
deficiencies. Instead, he simply stated that if the demurrer were sustained,
he should be granted leave to amend.
Although our review is impeded by the inadequate record, the trial
court’s order, which summarizes some of Wilshire’s arguments and Gilmore’s
responses, or lack thereof, assists us in understanding the issues raised. The
trial court’s order states Wilshire argued that the first amended complaint
failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and that each
cause of action pleaded is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible. The
order sustains Wilshire’s demurrer to each cause of action on the grounds the
first amended complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. It
further concludes that based on plaintiff’s failure to cure the prior pleading
deficiencies and the lack of a meaningful opposition, further leave to amend
would be futile.
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DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review and Gilmore’s Burden
On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order sustaining a
demurrer, we exercise our independent judgment about whether the
complaint states a cause of action. (Stearn v. County of San Bernardino
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 434, 439.) In making this determination, we assume
the truth of “(1) all facts properly pleaded by the plaintiff, (2) all facts
contained in exhibits to the complaint, (3) all facts that are properly the
subject of judicial notice, and (4) all facts that reasonably may be inferred
from the foregoing facts.” (Neilson v. City of California City (2005) 133
Cal.App.4th 1296, 1305.)
“ ‘[T]he plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are
sufficient to establish every element of the cause of action and overcoming all
of the legal grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer, and if
the defendant negates any essential element, we will affirm the order
sustaining the demurrer as to the cause of action. [Citation.] We will affirm
if there is any ground on which the demurrer can properly be sustained,
whether or not the trial court relied on proper grounds or the defendant
asserted a proper ground in the trial court proceedings. [Citation.]’
[Citations.]” (Rossberg v. Bank of America, N. A. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th
1481, 1490–1491 (Rossberg).)
We review the decision to deny leave to amend for abuse of discretion.
(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In applying this standard, “we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured
by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we
reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Ibid.)
The “burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the
9
plaintiff.” (Ibid.) “ ‘To satisfy that burden on appeal, a plaintiff “must show
in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will
change the legal effect of his pleading.” [Citation.] The assertion of an
abstract right to amend does not satisfy this burden. [Citation.] The plaintiff
must clearly and specifically set forth the “applicable substantive law”
[citation] and the legal basis for amendment, i.e., the elements of the cause of
action and authority for it. Further, the plaintiff must set forth factual
allegations that sufficiently state all required elements of that cause of
action. [Citations.] Allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or
conclusionary. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Rossberg, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1491.)
II. Wilshire’s Demurrer Was Properly Sustained
As noted, the record is incomplete in that it does not contain Wilshire’s
moving or reply papers. However, the trial court’s detailed order provides
further background as to the arguments asserted by Wilshire sufficient for us
to review the ruling. As we explain, Gilmore fails to state facts sufficient to
establish the elements of each cause of action pleaded in the first amended
complaint.
A. Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing
As to the breach of contract cause of action, the trial court’s order
states: “The FAC [first amended complaint] alleges that the parties entered
into a mortgage contract as to the Subject Properties in September 2021.
[Citation.] Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached the contract by
(1) demanding payment of the mortgage note before the loan maturity date of
October 1, 2022; (2) adding an exit fee; (3) ‘force placing insurance;’ and
(4) failing to advance $210,000 to Plaintiff and instead applying the funds to
mortgage payments. Plaintiff refers to Exhibit 5 [second modification of deed
10
of trust] as the contract at issue. However, Plaintiff does not indicate which
terms within Exhibit 5 were breached. As correctly noted by Defendant,
sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 provide that the agreement incorporates other
agreements that are not referenced, attached, or stated verbatim in the FAC.
[¶] Plaintiff provides no clarification in his Opposition; he only argues that he
has sufficiently stated a cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiff fails
to identify which contract terms were allegedly breached by Defendant.”
Neither in his opposition filed in the trial court nor in his appellate
opening brief does Gilmore identify the elements of a cause of action for
breach of contract. “[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract
are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for
nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the
plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
If the complaint alleges breach of a written contract, “the terms must be set
out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement
must be attached and incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin,
Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) As the trial court
correctly found, Gilmore’s breach of contract cause of action refers to attached
exhibit 5, which is the second modification of deed of trust recorded
September 20, 2021. However, Gilmore did not identify which terms of the
attached document were breached. Further, the second modification of deed
of trust refers to other loan documents that are not attached to the first
amended complaint or stated verbatim. As the trial court stated, Gilmore’s
opposition to the demurrer provided no clarification as to the terms of the
contract that were breached. The opposition refers to the addition of a
$150,000 exit fee, which allegedly breached the contract, and states that
Wilshire changed the loan maturity date. It does not cite to any terms of the
11
contract that were breached. The trial court correctly concluded that
Gilmore’s pleading failed to state a claim for breach of contract.
On appeal, Gilmore does not argue that he sufficiently pleaded facts
sufficient to allege breach of contract based on Wilshire’s alleged (1) payment
demand before the loan maturity date of October 1, 2022; (2) initiation of
foreclosure proceedings prior to the loan maturity date; (3) the addition of a
$150,000 exit fee; or (4) the forced placement of insurance. Thus, he has
conceded he has failed to state a claim as to these alleged breaches.
(Rossberg, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.) He argues only that his first
amended complaint adequately alleged that Wilshire breached the second
loan modification by failing to pay him the $210,000. Notably, he did not
make this argument to the trial court. (Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11
Cal.App.5th 1180, 1192 [arguments not raised below in opposition to
demurrer are forfeited].) Even if we were to overlook the forfeiture, we would
conclude Gilmore has not shown error because the facts alleged do not state a
breach of contract claim relating to the second loan modification. Gilmore
alleges in both his original complaint and his first amended complaint that
Wilshire offered him a loan modification in September 2021, “with no cash
out to [him] . . . .” The first amended complaint further alleges that Wilshire
“applied the funds [$210,000] to some of the mortgage payments.” Thus,
Gilmore alleges he received the benefit of the additional loan amount by
having it applied to mortgage payments he owed. Gilmore failed to allege
facts sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract. (People ex. rel. Gallegos
v. Pacific Lumber Co. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 950, 957 [“ ‘ “[A] plaintiff may
not . . . avoid [factual assertions of a prior complaint] by contradictory
averments, in a superseding, amended pleading” ’ ” (2d bracketed insertion
added)].)
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Gilmore argues that Wilshire’s alleged failure to pay him the $210,000
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. He does not
argue that any other conduct by Wilshire constitutes a breach of the implied
covenant. This claim fails for the same reasons Gilmore’s breach of contract
cause of action fails to state a claim. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 352–353 [claim for breach of the covenant that realleges same
allegations as companion claim for breach of contract is properly dismissed as
superfluous].)
B. Fraud
The first amended complaint alleges fraud and misrepresentation
based on Wilshire’s alleged false statements about the property values, the
ability to cancel the mortgage, and the maturity date of the loan. It also
alleged Wilshire falsely told Gilmore that he had to report his loan to the loan
servicer in order for the loan to be reported to credit reporting bureaus. The
trial court found that Gilmore failed to allege one or more elements of fraud
as to each of the alleged instances of fraud or misrepresentation.
The elements of fraud are (1) the defendant made a false
representation as to a past or existing material fact; (2) the defendant knew
the representation was false at the time it was made; (3) in making the
representation, the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff; (4) the
plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation; and (5) the plaintiff suffered
resulting damages. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)
Fraud must be pleaded with specificity, which means the plaintiff must
allege how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations
were made. (Id. at p. 645.) In actions against a corporate defendant, the
plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations,
13
their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke,
what they said, and when it was said. (Ibid.)
Notably, although the first amended complaint asserts Wilshire’s
alleged failure to advance $210,000 to Gilmore was a breach of the second
modification deed of trust, it does not allege this conduct as one of the bases
for Gilmore’s fraud cause of action. On appeal, Gilmore does not address the
sufficiency of the fraud allegations pleaded in the first amended complaint or
how the trial court’s analysis of their inadequacy was incorrect. Thus, he
fails to meet his burden to show that he alleged facts sufficient to state a
cause of action. (Rossberg, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.) He argues for
the first time on appeal that Wilshire committed fraud by “swindling him out
of the $210,000 promised in the loan contract” and that Wilshire
misrepresented that it would give Gilmore $210,000. Even if we were to
consider Gilmore’s assertions in his appellate brief to be an effort to
demonstrate the possibility of amending the first amended complaint to state
a claim for fraud, his assertions would still be conclusory, lack the required
specificity, and be inconsistent with his allegations that Wilshire offered him
a loan modification in September 2021 “with no cash out to [him],” and that
Wilshire “applied the funds [$210,000] to some of the mortgage payments.”
The trial court did not err in sustaining Wilshire’s demurrer to the fraud
cause of action.
C. Rescission
Gilmore’s cause of action for rescission alleges he was entitled to
rescind the second loan modification because Wilshire violated the TILA by
failing to provide him with disclosure documents regarding the right to
rescind. Under the TILA, a lender is required to disclose a borrower’s right to
rescind in a consumer credit transaction in which a security interest is
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acquired “in any property which is used as a principal dwelling of the person
to whom credit is extended . . . .” (15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23
(2017).) The trial court found Gilmore failed to allege that the second loan
modification was secured by his principal dwelling. Instead, the first
amended complaint alleged damages including loss of rental income,
indicating that the loan was secured by rental property. The trial court’s
order noted that Gilmore’s opposition to the demurrer provided no facts to
show that the TILA applied to the loan. Regarding his rescission claim,
Gilmore’s opposition brief stated only that: “Plaintiff states a cause of action
under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Plaintiff had the ability to fund a
rescission by selling [the Virginia Street property].”
On appeal, Gilmore argues that Wilshire’s failure to provide the
required disclosures extended his time to request rescission of the loan to
three years from the date of the loan. However, in the argument section of
his brief he does not state that either property was his principal dwelling
unit, which is required for the TILA to apply to the transaction. (15 U.S.C.
§ 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23 (2017).) In his “Statement of Facts,” he states
that the Virginia Street property was his primary residence and suggests the
trial court should have inferred as much because he used that address on his
court paperwork. (Italics omitted.) As noted, nothing in the record indicates
that he alleged either property was his primary dwelling unit, and the trial
court’s contrary inference was reasonable based on Gilmore’s allegations.
(Buller v. Sutter Health (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 981, 985–986 [court assumes
truth of facts properly pleaded or reasonably inferred].)
D. Denial of Leave to Amend
We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion, and
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion by showing in
15
what manner the complaint could be amended and how the amendment
would cure the defective pleading to state a cause of action. (Buller v. Sutter
Health, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) Gilmore’s opposition to the
demurrer in the trial court offered no reasoned argument as to how the first
amended complaint could be further amended and merely concluded by
asking for leave to amend as an alternative to denying the demurrer.
However, a party may make a showing that he or she could validly amend his
or her complaint for the first time on appeal. (Gomes v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153–1154.) As to the causes of
action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and fraud, Gilmore’s appellate brief does not argue that his
complaint can be amended to state valid claims and does not set forth any
factual allegations to sufficiently state the required elements of the causes of
action. (Rossberg, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.) The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend as to the causes of action for
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
fraud.
However, as to the rescission cause of action, Gilmore’s appellate brief
states that the Virginia Street property was his primary residence. Thus, it
appears reasonably probable that he could amend his rescission cause of
action to allege this requisite fact for stating a rescission claim under the
TILA.
Wilshire argues that even if Gilmore were permitted another
opportunity to amend his complaint to allege that the loan modification was
secured by his primary residence, the TILA claim would still fail as a matter
of law because the September 2021 loan modification “appears to be an
exempt transaction” under title 12 Code of Federal Regulations part
16
12023.23(f)(2). We disagree that Wilshire has established the September
2021 loan modification is an exempt transaction under the cited regulation as
a matter of law based upon the current state of the pleadings. The regulation
states: “The right to rescind does not apply to . . . : [¶] . . . [¶] . . . A
refinancing or consolidation by the same creditor of an extension of credit
already secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling. The right of rescission
shall apply, however, to the extent the new amount financed exceeds the
unpaid principal balance, any earned unpaid finance charge on the existing
debt, and amounts attributed solely to the costs of the refinancing or
consolidation.” (12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(f)(2) (2017).) Wilshire’s argument that
the exemption applies does not address the second sentence of
subdivision (f)(2), and based on the current state of the pleadings, we cannot
determine that the exemption applies. Gilmore should be permitted to the
opportunity to amend his rescission claim.
DISPOSITION
Treating the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend as
a judgment of dismissal, the judgment is affirmed as to the causes of action
for breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation, breach of the implied
covenant of fair dealing, and injunctive relief. As to the rescission cause of
action, the judgment is reversed and remanded with directions for the trial
court to sustain the demurrer to the rescission cause of action with leave to
amend. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Burns, J.
Chou, J.
A171376/Gilmore v. Wilshire Quinn Capital, Inc.
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