CourtListener 10847926•In re E.E. CA2/5
Texto completo
Filed 4/24/26 In re E.E. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re E.E. et al., Persons Coming B348649
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, No. 18CCJP02401C-D)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.B. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, George A. Turner, Judge. Affirmed.
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant C.B.
Janette Cochran, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.E.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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C.E. (mother) and C.B. (father) separately appeal from the
juvenile court’s orders that denied their petitions under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 3881 and terminated parental
rights over their two children, E.E. (born November 2014) and
J.E. (born March 2017) (collectively, minors). In separate briefs,
both parents contend the court abused its discretion when it
denied mother’s and father’s respective section 388 petitions after
a hearing with testimony and denied application of the parental
relationship exception to termination of parental rights under
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (Department)
contends that neither parent has shown that the juvenile court
abused its discretion. We affirm the August 18, 2025 orders
denying both parents’ section 388 petitions and terminating
parental rights.
The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for
publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We therefore
resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to
Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration and
consistent with constitutional principles. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 14 [“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; Lewis
v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1263, fn. omitted
[three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies
constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in
reply to counsel’s arguments. [Citation.] In order to state the
reasons, grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based,
[an appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by
counsel in support of the parties’ positions”].)
DISCUSSION
A. Section 388 Petitions
“Section 388 allows a parent or other person with an
interest in a dependent child to petition the juvenile court to
change, modify, or set aside any previous order . . . . The
petitioner has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of
circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be in
the best interests of the child.” (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 586, 615.) Where reunification services are
terminated, “the parents’ interest in the care, custody[,] and
companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at
this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for
permanency and stability’ [citation] . . . .” (In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) A court considering a child’s best
interests in the context of a section 388 petition “must recognize
this shift of focus . . . .” (Ibid.)
“[B]est interests is a complex idea” that requires
consideration of a variety of factors. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56
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Cal.App.4th 519, 530.) In determining whether a section 388
petitioner has made the requisite showing, the juvenile court may
consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case
including “factors such as the seriousness of the reason leading to
the child’s removal, the reason the problem was not resolved, the
passage of time since the child's removal, the relative strength of
the bonds with the child, the nature of the change of
circumstance, and the reason the change was not made sooner.”
(In re Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.) We review a
juvenile court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. (In re Jasmon O.
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415 [the decision on a section 388 petition
“is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and its
decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear
abuse of discretion”].)
In the current case, the juvenile court found that mother
and father had shown enough to support a finding of changed
circumstances. For both parents, however, the court found it was
not in minors’ best interests to reinstate reunification services,
particularly where both children were refusing to participate in
visits with the parents.
We recognize that a determination of a child’s best
interests requires consideration of multiple factors. (In re
Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 530.) Here, however,
neither parent has shown that the juvenile court abused its
discretion in deciding it was not in minors’ best interests to
reinstate reunification services or permit unmonitored visits.
Mother’s opening brief simply attempts to recast the facts in a
light favorable to mother, while ignoring the evidence that both
parents had consistently demonstrated a negative tendency to
push the boundaries of the rules, falsely stating they had custody
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of the children in order to obtain subsidized housing, discussing
case issues with the children, and encouraging the children to
overstate their connection to parents. We are unconvinced by
mother’s conclusory statement at the end of her argument about
the section 388 petition, that “[g]ranting Mother’s request for
further reunification services was in Minors’ best interests.”
Father’s brief attempts to show an abuse of discretion
through an inapposite comparison to In re J.C. (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 503, arguing that, while the mother in J.C. filed a
section 388 petition seeking to have her child returned to her
custody, which would disrupt the child’s bond with her caregiver,
here, father was not seeking to have minors removed from
maternal aunt, but rather seeking additional reunification
services in order to advance minors’ need for permanency and
stability. Father’s argument is flawed because it does not
account for the severity of the trauma minors suffered, and how
that trauma resulted in ongoing anxiety for E.E., and J.E., who
felt unsafe even to visit parents. Further, both parents had
already received 18 months of reunification services by the time
of the hearing on the section 388 petitions, and parents’ visits
over the course of the case had resulted in increasing distress for
the children, rather than providing them with any comfort or
confidence in parents’ ability to meet the minors’ needs.
Nonetheless, at the section 388 hearing in August 2025, more
than two years after minors were removed from parental custody
based on domestic violence and abuse, father testified that it
made no sense to him that his son was saying he didn’t want
visits because he needed time to heal. As the court pointed out, it
believed the children’s statements and testimony that they were
no longer willing to have visits with parents, and so it would not
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be in their best interests to require visits or provide services
absent such visits. Father too, has failed to show that the
juvenile court abused its discretion in determining that it was not
in the children’s best interests for parents to receive additional
reunification services.
B. Parental Relationship Exception
The express purpose of section 366.26 is “to provide stable,
permanent homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).)
If the juvenile court has decided to end reunification services,
adoption is the legislative preference. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).)
“ ‘Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the
child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a
responsible caretaker.’ ” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45,
53.) Guardianship is a less preferable option, because it “ ‘falls
short of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in
mind for the dependent child.’ ” (Ibid.)
Once it has been determined that a minor is adoptable, “the
court must order adoption and its necessary consequence,
termination of parental rights,” unless a parent can demonstrate
one of the exceptions set forth in section 366.26 applies. (In re
Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In
re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 615, 625 (Caden C.).) The specified
circumstances in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) are
“actually, exceptions to the general rule that the court must
choose adoption where possible.” (In re Celine R., at p. 53.) They
“ ‘must be considered in view of the legislative preference for
adoption when reunification efforts have failed.’ [Citation.] At
this stage of the dependency proceedings, ‘it becomes inimical to
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the interests of the minor to heavily burden efforts to place the
child in a permanent alternative home.’ [Citation.] The
statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm,
which remains adoption.” (Ibid.; see In re A.L. (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1131, 1150.)
Parents seek to show that it was an abuse of discretion to
deny application of the parental relationship exception, which
permits the selection of another permanent plan if the “parents
have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child
and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The parent has the burden of
establishing this exception. (In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1153.) The exception requires a parent to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) the parent has maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child, “taking into account
the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent such that the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship; and
(3) terminating the relationship “would be detrimental to the
child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a
new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
The “language of this exception, along with its history and place
in the larger dependency scheme, show that the exception applies
in situations where a child cannot be in a parent’s custody but
where severing the child’s relationship with the parent, even
when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home,
would be harmful for the child.” (Id. at p. 630.) When the
benefits of a stable, adoptive, permanent home outweigh the
harm the child would experience from the loss of a continued
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parent-child relationship, the court should order adoption. (Id. at
pp. 633–634.) However, if “ ‘severing the natural parent/child
relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive
emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of
a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the
court should not terminate parental rights.” (Id. at p. 633.)
We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the
parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the
child and the existence of a parental relationship for substantial
evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) We
review the third step—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship
with his or her parent—for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.)
In the case before us, the juvenile court found that parents
had maintained visits as regularly as permitted, even accounting
for minors’ more recent refusal to attend visits after April 2025.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Considering whether the
minors had a substantial emotional attachment with parents, the
court found evidence of such a bond, and that at least to some
extent, that attachment was positive. The court acknowledged
the complexity of the relationship between parents and minors,
in light of the history of domestic violence, and the extent to
which E.E. showed symptoms of PTSD based on his exposure to
violence when the family was living together. Nonetheless,
because there was some level of a positive bond, the court found
in favor of parents on the second Caden C. factor. (Ibid.)
Parents contend that the court abused its discretion when
it found against them on the third Caden C. factor. The juvenile
court found that the benefits of adoption outweighed any
detriment that the children might suffer from ending the
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parental relationship. The Department’s reports and testimony
by both minors demonstrated that their relationship with
maternal aunt, who was their prospective adoptive parent, was
positive and beneficial. Minors testified that even understanding
that adoption could result in no contact with their parents, they
still wanted to be adopted by maternal aunt. Under the
circumstances, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the benefits of permanency through
adoption would outweigh the benefit of preserving minors’
relationship with mother or father.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s August 18, 2025 orders denying the
Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions filed by
mother and father, as well as its order terminating parental
rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 on the
same date, are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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