CourtListener 10847828•Dent v. City of Alameda Housing Authority CA1/5
Dent v. City of Alameda Housing Authority CA1/5
CourtListener 10847828Calctapp24 de abr. de 2026
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Filed 4/24/26 Dent v. City of Alameda Housing Authority CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
AMARRAH DENT,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A173084
v.
CITY OF ALAMEDA HOUSING (Alameda County
AUTHORITY, Super. Ct. No. 23CV032887)
Defendant and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Amarrah Dent appeals a judgment denying her petition for a writ of
mandate and a postjudgment order denying her motion to strike prejudgment
costs. We dismiss the appeal of the judgment because it is untimely.
Further, we affirm the costs order because Dent’s briefs do not mention it at
all, waiving any appeal.
BACKGROUND
1. Administrative Proceedings
In 2020 the City of Alameda Housing Authority notified Amarrah Dent
it intended to terminate her housing assistance based partly on alleged fraud.
1 Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; Ct. App., First Dist., Local Rules of Ct.,
rule 19.
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That notice began an administrative process that lasted two and a half years.
During that process, a hearing officer found Dent did engage in fraud and
Dent agreed to repay $30,945 per a written monthly installment agreement.
After Dent failed to make multiple payments, the housing authority notified
her on December 1, 2022, it intended to terminate her assistance based on
her breach of the agreement.
In 2023 the parties appeared at a hearing “to determine whether the
[housing authority] complied with applicable law . . . pertaining to its
decision dated December 1, 2022 to terminate [Dent’s assistance].” In a
thorough written decision, the hearing officer found Dent knowingly signed
the agreement, not under duress, and understood her agreed obligations
despite an asserted disability; Dent “actively avoided” her obligations under
the agreement, which she knowingly breached; the housing authority
exhausted adequate measures to avoid terminating Dent’s assistance; and
Dent was unlikely to comply with future repayment obligations. Based on
those findings, the hearing officer upheld the housing authority’s decision of
December 1, 2022.
2. Trial Court Proceedings
a. Dent’s Writ Petition and the Judgment
Representing herself, Dent petitioned the Alameda Superior Court for a
writ of mandate to set aside the housing authority’s decision, alleging
disability discrimination and “a range of due process violations.” After a
contested hearing, the court entered judgment on October 4, 2024, denying
the petition and awarding the housing authority “costs of suit as determined
by a Memorandum of Costs.” Dent then moved for reconsideration, which the
court denied partly as untimely. The housing authority served notice of entry
of judgment on Dent by mail on November 1, 2024.
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b. The Housing Authority’s Costs Memorandum
On October 18, 2024, the housing authority filed and served its costs
memorandum on Dent by mail. Thirty-eight days later, on November 25,
Dent filed a motion to strike costs, which the housing authority opposed as
untimely. The court agreed and denied the motion in a written order on
April 1, 2025 (costs order), adding: “Even if the court were to reach the
merits of Petitioner’s argument, the court would deny the motion because
Petitioner is simply re-arguing the issues concerning the original
petition. . . .” The court clerk served the costs order on Dent by mail the same
day.
3. The Notice of Appeal
Still representing herself, Dent appealed on April 14, 2025. The notice
of appeal identifies the appealed order as a “[j]udgment after an order
granting a summary judgment motion” that “directs payment of sanctions”
entered on “4/1/25,” and attaches the costs order. Dent’s opening brief,
however, unequivocally says, “This appeal is taken from the final judgment of
the Alameda County Superior Court in case no. 23CV032887,” and concludes,
“Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s
judgment . . . .” (Boldface omitted.) Her reply brief consistently urges “the
judgment must be reversed.” Neither of her briefs mentions the costs order
at all.
4. Appellate Court Proceedings
Before the appellate record was filed, the housing authority moved to
dismiss the appeal on two grounds: The appeal of the judgment is untimely;
and the appeal of the costs order is frivolous because Dent’s trial court motion
to strike was untimely. This court ordered: “Appellant’s appeal is untimely
to the extant [sic] it challenges the judgment entered on October 4, 2004 [sic].
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[Citations.] However, consideration of respondent’s motion to dismiss is
deferred to the decision of this appeal on its merits. [Citation.] [¶] In their
respective appellate briefs, the parties shall address whether the
April 1, 2025 order is appealable as a postjudgment order.”
Initially, Dent failed to file an opening brief, so the appeal was
dismissed. Dent swiftly moved to vacate the dismissal, emphasizing, “The
dismissal resulted from procedural error—specifically, the rejection of a
motion to extend time because it was unsigned. . . .” Granting the motion,
this court reinstated the appeal, including the housing authority’s motion to
dismiss, and again ordered the parties to brief whether the costs order is
appealable.
DISCUSSION
1. The appeal of the October 2024 judgment is untimely.
Per the Appellate Rules (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1 et seq.), to appeal
an appealable trial court judgment or order, a party must file a notice of
appeal within 60 days of service or 180 days of entry of the judgment or
order, whichever is earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.100(a)(1),
8.104(a)(1); see id., rules 8.104(e), 8.7, 1.5(b) [judgment is any appealable
order; must is mandatory].) In the absence of authorization by law or a
public emergency, no court can extend the deadline or relieve a party from
the failure to meet the deadline, “even for reasons of equity,” “ ‘ “mistake,
inadvertence, accident, or misfortune [citations].” ’ ” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 8.104(a)(1), (b), 8.60(d); In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 255, fn. 5.)
The consequence: “If a notice of appeal is filed late, the reviewing court must
dismiss the appeal.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(b); Van Beurden Ins.
Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15
Cal.4th 51, 56 [“once the deadline expires, the appellate court has no power to
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entertain the appeal”]; accord, K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020)
8 Cal.5th 875, 881–883.)
The housing authority’s service by mail of notice of entry of judgment
triggered the 60-day deadline to appeal the judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).) Service occurred on November 1, 2024; sixty days later
was Tuesday, December 31, 2024, which was not a holiday. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.60(a); Code Civ. Proc., § 12 [how to count the 60 days].) While
holidays extend the 60-day deadline, service by mail does not. (Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 12, 12a, subd. (a), 1013, subd. (a); see id., §§ 10, 12a, subd. (a), 12b,
135 [holidays defined].) Dent did not appeal until April 14, 2025. It follows
that dismissal of the appeal as to the judgment is mandatory because Dent
filed her notice of appeal 164 days after service of notice of entry of
judgment—104 days late.2
2. The costs order is an appealable postjudgment order.
Despite this court’s order to brief whether the costs order is appealable,
Dent does not address the issue at all. The housing authority argues the
costs order is not appealable, failing the test in Lakin v. Watkins Associated
Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644. The housing authority is wrong.
“A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there
is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment.” (Griset v. Fair
Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.) Because the right to
appeal is statutory, an order is appealable only when a statute makes it so.
2 Dent’s postjudgment motion for reconsideration did not affect the time
to appeal. Only a “valid” motion extends the time (Cal. Rules of Court, rules
8.104(a)(1), 8.108(e)), and Dent’s motion was not a valid one: “After entry of
judgment, the superior court [does] not have jurisdiction to entertain or
decide a motion for reconsideration.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 859, fn. 29.)
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(Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5;
Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com., at p. 696; see Code Civ. Proc., § 901
et seq.) Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 generally makes appealable an
order that itself follows a final, appealable judgment. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 904.1, subd. (a)(2).) But not every such order. “To be appealable, a
postjudgment order must satisfy two additional requirements”: (1) “the
issues [in] the appeal from the order must [differ] from those [in] an appeal
from the judgment”; and (2) “ ‘the order must either affect the judgment or
relate to it by enforcing it or staying its execution.’ ” (Lakin v. Watkins
Associated Industries, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 651–652 & fn. 3.)
We need not analyze whether the costs order passes the Lakin v.
Watkins Associated Industries test because it is settled that it does:
“A postjudgment order which awards or denies costs or attorney’s fees is
separately appealable.” (Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v.
Praszker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 35, 45–46 [order denying motion to tax costs];
accord, Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 654–
655 [dictum that the order in Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v.
Praszker “had a sufficient effect on the judgment or bore a sufficient
relationship to its enforcement to be appealable”]; see Segal v. ASICS
America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651 [reviewing a trial court order on motion
to tax costs].)
Though the costs order is appealable, Dent waives appeal of it because
her briefs do not mention it at all.
3. The appeal of the costs order is waived.
Generally, “a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover
costs in any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1021, 1032, subd. (b),
1033.5.) “[Costs must] be claimed and contested in accordance with rules
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adopted by the Judicial Council.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1034, subd. (a).) Per the
Civil Rules (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1 et seq.): “Any notice of motion to
strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost
memorandum. If the cost memorandum was served by mail, the period is
extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1013.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1700(b)(1); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013, subd. (a) [5 days when the
places of mailing and address are both in California].) The parties can agree
to further extend this time. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(3).) “After
the time has passed . . . , the clerk must immediately enter the costs on the
judgment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(4).)
A trial court’s order on a motion to strike or tax costs is reviewable for
abuse of discretion. (Segal v. ASICS America Corp., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p.
658.) However, a reviewing court presumes an appealed order is correct, and
it is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate the trial court committed
reversible error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) To meet
this burden, the Appellate Rules obligate the appellant to support each
contention in the opening brief by argument under a separate heading with
citations to legal authority and facts in the appellate record. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C).) “This burden remains the same whether or
not the respondent files a brief or provides argument or authority on an
issue.” (Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 655.) “When an
appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with
reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”
(Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785; accord, Riley
v. Alameda County Sheriff’s Office (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 492, 506, fn. 9.)
These rules apply equally to self-represented parties. (Tanguilig v. Valdez
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520.)
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The housing authority served its costs memorandum on Dent by mail
on October 18, 2024. The deadline to file a motion to strike costs was 20 days
later, Thursday, November 7, which was not a holiday; however, Dent did not
file her motion until November 25. The parties do not assert and the record
does not disclose either an agreement to extend the deadline or a motion for
relief from the late filing. Following the Civil Rules, the trial court denied
Dent’s motion to strike as untimely, in the costs order. Yet, while the notice
of appeal identifies the appealed order as entered on the same day as the
costs order and attaches the costs order, Dent’s briefs do not mention it at all;
instead, her contentions are solely against the judgment. Dent therefore
waives appeal of the costs order.
The housing authority urges dismissal of the appeal of the costs order
on the ground of frivolity. Though a reviewing court has the inherent power
to dismiss a frivolous appeal (In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
71, 79), “we deem it appropriate to affirm the [costs order] rather than to
dismiss the appeal as frivolous. Once the record has been reviewed
thoroughly, little appears to be gained by dismissing the appeal rather than
deciding it on its merits.” (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443.)
DISPOSITION
The housing authority’s motion to dismiss is granted in part; the appeal
of the judgment is dismissed. The costs order is affirmed. The housing
authority is entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1),
(2).)
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Burns, J.
Chou, J.
A173084/Dent v. City of Alameda Housing Authority
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