People v. Saravia CA2/5

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Filed 4/23/26 P. v. Saravia CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B337430

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. TA154412)

JOHN EDWIN SARAVIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Carol J. Najera, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeralyn Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, and Marc A. Kohm and Theresa A.
Patterson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted John Edwin Saravia (defendant) of the
first degree murder of Jonathan Cabrera (Cabrera). The trial
court sentenced defendant to 60 years to life in prison. We are
asked to decide (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion
when it dismissed a juror mid-trial for expressing a view,
uninformed by evidence at trial, that video evidence had been
“doctored”; and (2) whether the court should have instructed the
jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter on a heat of
passion theory.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense Conduct
In late March 2021, Cabrera’s wife, Yvette Villalba
(Yvette), and his teenaged stepchildren, Yoel and Jade, were
unloading groceries from their car and bringing them into their
home in the Jasmine Garden apartment complex. J.M.,1 his
girlfriend Maryana Cibrian (Cibrian), and her younger sister
walked past the Cabrera family’s apartment, and Yoel told his
mother that he believed the three passersby were responsible for
shooting a paintball or BB pellet into the family’s backyard. Yoel
and J.M. exchanged glances and then words, with the latter
being “aggressive.” Before matters could escalate further, Yvette
directed Yoel to go inside their home; J.M. and his female
companions walked away.
Minutes later, as Yvette and her daughter were still
bringing in groceries, J.M. returned with defendant and a group

1
We refer to J.M. by his initials because the record contains
conflicting testimony about his age at the time of Cabrera’s
murder.

2
of other young men. In a manner that was “aggressive,”
defendant asked for Yoel. While standing on her apartment’s
covered front porch, Yvette, who believed her son was in danger,
talked with defendant, who was the group’s spokesman, and the
group ultimately left. In the aftermath of the confrontation,
however, Yvette repositioned the home’s security camera so that
it better covered the front porch area.
Two days later, as Cabrera, Yoel, and Jade were bringing
in laundry from their car to the apartment, another confrontation
involving defendant and the Cabrera family occurred. As J.M.,
Cibrian, and her sister walked past the Cabrera apartment, J.M.
made a comment that irked Cabrera and he told J.M. to respect
his elders. J.M. left the area but vowed “we’re gonna get you.”
Moments later, J.M. returned with defendant and a group
of other young men who closed in around the porch. As the men
approached, Yvette and Jade unsuccessfully tried to get Cabrera
off the front porch and into the apartment. Defendant did not
say anything as the group confronted Cabrera, and when one of
the young men threw a punch at Cabrera, Cabrera tossed a small
plastic dog gate in their direction, which landed without striking
anyone.2 Defendant then drew a firearm and shot Cabrera from a
distance of a few feet away.
The bullet defendant fired passed through Cabrera’s heart,
aorta, and left lung before exiting his back and penetrating the
apartment’s front window. After being shot, Cabrera clutched his

2
At trial, Yvette and Jade testified Cabrera did not throw
the gate at anyone in particular; rather, he threw the gate to
force the group as a whole to back away. In contrast, Cibrian
testified Cabrera threw the gate directly at defendant.

3
chest, staggered, and collapsed. Defendant “kind of froze” for a
moment after shooting Cabrera, and then he and the rest of his
group “scattered” and fled the scene.
When paramedics arrived minutes after Yvette and Jade
called 911, Cabrera was dead. Shortly after Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s deputies arrived at the scene, Yvette showed them video
footage from her home surveillance camera and provided them
with a copy of the video.

B. Defendant’s Conviction and Sentencing
The Los Angeles District Attorney charged defendant with
murdering Cabrera “willfully, deliberately[,] and with
premeditation.” (Pen. Code,3 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a).)
The information further alleged defendant personally used a
firearm in the commission of the murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a))
and had previously sustained a prior “strike” conviction within
the meaning of the Three Strikes Law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j),
1170.12).
At trial, four eyewitnesses identified defendant as the
shooter: Yvette, Jade, Cibrian, and Oscar Tavares (Tavares), a
neighbor in the apartment complex who was outside retrieving
his dog at the time of the shooting. The prosecution also
presented video footage from the surveillance camera that (as
discussed post) captured some of the confrontation that
ultimately led to Cabrera’s murder. The defense called one
witness during the defense case: a research psychologist whose
area of expertise was human memory in forensic settings.

3
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

4
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and
found the firearm allegation true. After finding the prior “strike”
allegation true, the court sentenced defendant to a total of 60
years to life in prison.

II. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues we should reverse his murder conviction
because the trial court improperly dismissed a juror (Juror No.
1352) in the middle of the trial after he expressed doubts—based
on his professional experience—about the authenticity of the
video evidence from the home surveillance camera. Reversal is
not warranted, however, because the evidence the trial court
relied on to dismiss Juror No. 1352, i.e., a typewritten note from
the juror and the juror’s answers to questions from the court and
defense counsel, established a seemingly unalterable bias against
the video evidence that was untethered to the facts presented at
trial.
Defendant additionally argues reversal is required because
the trial court declined to instruct the jury on the lesser included
offense of heat of passion manslaughter. Lesser included offense
instructions are necessary, however, only where there is
substantial evidence to support the instruction. There was no
such evidence supporting a heat of passion manslaughter
instruction in this case when there was no testimony that
defendant was acting under the influence of an intense emotion
when he shot Cabrera.

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A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Excusing Juror No.
1352
1. Additional background
Shortly after Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputies arrived
at the scene of Cabrera’s murder, they observed a surveillance
camera in the area of the front doorstep near where Cabrera’s
body was lying. In the evening on the same day of the shooting,
Yvette showed the video from the camera to a deputy, who copied
and shared it with other deputies.
Yvette explained to the deputy, and later that same night
to detectives, that the video footage (less than three minutes in
length) “skipped” at certain points and suggested law
enforcement contact the camera company to obtain more
complete footage. The deputy who obtained the footage similarly
observed that the footage of the incident at times seemed to “skip
forward” several frames or seconds. Because of these “skips,” the
video did not show Cabrera tossing the pet gate at defendant’s
group, nor did it show defendant shooting Cabrera. Detectives
were thereafter unable to obtain a copy of the video that
seamlessly displayed the confrontation, the shooting, and its
aftermath.
During opening statements at defendant’s trial, the
prosecution informed the jury that there was video footage of the
incident leading up to Cabrera’s murder and its immediate
aftermath, but the video did not show the actual shooting because
the video “skips every little while.” The defense opening
statement did not attack the authenticity of the surveillance
video. Instead, the defense stressed the “power of suggestion” in
human memory and asked the jury to pay particular attention to

6
how the memories of the principal eyewitnesses were influenced
by viewing the footage from the surveillance camera.
Midway through the prosecution’s case-in-chief at trial, the
court discharged a juror and replaced that juror with an
alternate, Juror No. 1352. Three days later, before the
prosecution rested, Juror No. 1352 delivered a one-page,
typewritten “[n]ote” to the trial court expressing concern about
whether he should continue to serve in light of his feelings about
the “validity of the video evidence.”
In his note, Juror No. 1352 stated he had more than three
decades of experience in “how video is recorded, transported,
compressed[,] and stored.” Based on this experience, Juror No.
1352 said he found it incredible that the surveillance camera
failed to record the shooting: “Am I supposed to believe that [the]
video actually ‘skips’ as we have been told? . . . Is someone telling
me that this security camera (which has some type of motion
sensor) just happened to ‘skip’ (or malfunction) only during the
point where the suspect would have presumably pulled [out a]
gun and shot the victim?” (Emphasis in original.) Juror No. 1352
also expressed incredulity that the camera’s manufacturer, “one
of the top security companies in the country,” could not recover
the missing footage. Juror No. 1352 concluded his note by stating
“Video doesn’t skip” (emphasis in original) and by wondering
whether the court had “edit[ed]” the video or the prosecution or
the defense had “removed” footage of the shooting.
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court explained
to Juror No. 1352 that the evidence presented thus far did not
call into question the validity of the video and that the juror was
“not supposed to speculate on evidence that you haven’t gotten.”
In response, Juror No. 1352 explained, “It’s like if you said, here’s

7
a photograph, but to me it’s obviously an oil painting. It’s hard
for me to say, here’s a video. It’s obviously more than one clip to
me.” Using the juror’s analogy, the court asked whether Juror
No. 1352 could accept that the video was a photograph and not an
oil painting; Juror No. 1352 advised that he could “try to live with
what I promised to do in terms of evidence, but it’s very hard.”
When the court pressed him on whether he could accept the
video’s authenticity in the absence of contrary evidence, Juror
No. 1352 stated, “I can’t imagine I could go in the jury room and
not tell these other people that someone’s telling me something
that I don’t believe to be true. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I really have a hard
problem—hard time getting past that.”
When the court reminded Juror No. 1352 that he “can only
use information received here in court” and asked again if he
could follow that rule, Juror No. 1352 returned to points made in
his letter: “I’m questioning who edited this video though. Is it
the Court? Is it the prosecution? Defense? Police?” The court
replied, “See, you can’t be questioning that because there’s no
evidence about that. That’s the problem. Now, there might be
evidence, and then you could. But there isn’t any
evidence. [¶] Do you see the problem?” Instead of directly
answering the court’s question, Juror No. 1352 returned to his
earlier analogy of being told an oil painting was a photograph
and advised that the distinction in his mind was “fundamental.”
Under further questioning from the court, Juror No. 1352
explained that in view of his experience—“I’m in the top one
percent of how video is stored and produced”—it was “so
fundamental” that the video is “not the pure evidence that is
being presented. It’s not pure. Someone’s doctored it.”

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In response to defense counsel’s query about whether Juror
No. 1352 could follow the law if no evidence was presented
showing the video had been altered, Juror No. 1352 stated: “Oh,
this is a hard question. I want to say I will follow the law,
certainly.” When the trial court immediately asked whether he
would in fact follow the law, Juror No. 1352 declined to give a
direct answer and returned to his own video-related experience:
“It’s the word ‘skip.’ It’s like, is that a technological term that
means something malfunctioned with ADT’s video? Because that
would not result in a single skip.”
After the colloquy with Juror No. 1352, the trial court
excused the juror over the defense’s objection. The court
explained that its decision was based on Juror No. 1352’s
statement he would feel compelled to share his non-evidence-
based conclusions about the video’s authenticity with the other
jurors.4
In its closing argument, the prosecution urged the jury to
find defendant guilty based on the “incredibly consistent”
testimony of the eyewitnesses (Yvette, Jade, Cibrian, and
Tavares) and how it was corroborated by the surveillance video.
The defense, in its closing argument, did not call into question
the video’s authenticity; to the contrary, the defense urged the

4
At one point during its colloquy with counsel following the
examination of Juror No. 1352, the trial court expressed an
initial concern that the juror needed to be removed because
receipt of his note “destroyed the sanctity of the jury
deliberations.” After further discussion, the court agreed
“completely” with defense counsel that the sanctity of jury
deliberations had not been violated because “[d]eliberations
haven’t started.”

9
jury to “[g]ive [the video] the time that it deserves.” Instead,
drawing on the defense expert’s testimony about how people
reconstruct events, the defense argued the incomplete
surveillance video “unintentionally contaminated” Yvette and
Jade’s memories of the shooting. The defense also argued that
neither Cibrian’s nor Tavares’s testimony was credible.

2. Applicable law
“Under section 1089, a trial court may discharge a juror
any time during trial, . . . if the court concludes the juror in
question is ‘unable to perform his or her duty.’” (People v.
McGhee (2025) 17 Cal.5th 612, 627.) One ground for discharge is
bias, an issue which turns on “whether the juror’s judgment or
beliefs about an issue are untethered to the facts presented at
trial. . . . The question is not simply whether a juror’s views
derive from a personal leaning or inclination for or against one
side, but rather whether the juror’s views and conclusions are
based on specific evidence presented in the case.” (Id. at 636.)
“It is not improper for a juror, regardless of his or her
educational or employment background, to express an opinion on
a technical subject, so long as the opinion is based on the
evidence at trial. . . . A juror, however, should not discuss an
opinion explicitly based on specialized information obtained from
outside sources.” (In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 963;
accord, People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1266 [“[a] fine line
exists between using one’s background in analyzing the evidence,
which is appropriate, even inevitable, and injecting ‘an opinion
explicitly based on specialized information obtained from outside
sources,’ which we have described as misconduct”]; People v. San
Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 650 [holding a juror may not

10
discuss new facts that offer other jurors “any basis for deciding
the case other than the evidence and testimony presented at
trial”].)
McDonald v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. (1999) 71
Cal.App.4th 256 illustrates how these principles apply. In that
case, a juror offered an opinion during deliberations, based on his
expertise as a professional transportation consultant, that
crossing arms or gates were not placed at the location of the train
tracks where the plaintiff was injured because the sensors on the
arms would have reacted negatively to other adjacent trains in
the railyard. (Id. at 262.) The Court of Appeal found that the
juror had committed misconduct because he “went far beyond the
evidence in the case,” his “comments to the jury, in the nature of
an expert opinion,” interjected a subject “on which there had been
no evidence at trial,” and contradicted the testimony of the
defendant’s own expert on the feasibility of using crossing arms
or gates at that location. (Id. at 263-264; see also Nodal v.
CalWest Rain, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 607, 611-612
[misconduct where, contrary to the evidence admitted at trial, the
juror “vouched for the design and construction” of the defendant’s
irrigation system “based on his expertise as a pipefitter and
farmer”]; San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 648-650 [a juror, who
was a registered nurse, did not commit misconduct when she
relied on her professional expertise to explain a number of
medical concepts relating to blood pressure and circulation
during deliberation because her remarks were “consistent with
the trial testimony of the pathologist”].)

11
3. Standard of review
A trial court’s decision to discharge a juror pursuant to
section 1089 is reviewed for abuse of discretion under a
“‘heightened standard [that] more fully reflects an appellate
court’s obligation to protect a defendant's fundamental rights to
due process and to a fair trial by an unbiased jury.’” (People v.
Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 450.) “[T]he juror’s ‘inability to
perform’ his or her duty ‘must appear in the record as a
demonstrable reality.’” (Ibid.) This standard is “‘more
comprehensive and less deferential’” than the substantial
evidence standard of review. (Ibid.) Instead of examining the
record to determine whether there was reasonable, credible
evidence of solid value upon which the trial court could have
relied, we look at the evidence upon which the trial court actually
did rely to determine whether it supports the trial court’s
conclusion in light of the entire record. (Id. at 450-451; accord,
McGhee, supra, 17 Cal.5th at 637.)

4. Juror No. 1352 was correctly excused
The trial court’s decision to discharge Juror No. 1352 was
based on the juror’s written and oral statements to the trial
court. Those forthright statements—including the view he had
formed that the surveillance video footage had been “doctored”—
establish as a demonstrable reality that the juror would not be
able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented.
In his typed note and during his extended colloquy with the
court, Juror No. 1352 expressed a firm belief that the video as
presented at trial was “not pure” and that it was “obviously more
than one clip” spliced together. In his opinion, the video had been
“edited” or “doctored” by someone, either the court or one of the

12
parties. Juror No. 1352 expressed these beliefs even though at
that point in the trial there had been no evidence or argument to
that effect (nor would there be evidence or argument to that effect
throughout the remainder of the trial).
Moreover, Juror No. 1352 based his beliefs solely on
specialized information obtained from outside sources: his
asserted technical training and experience. In his answers to
questions from both the court and defense counsel, Juror No.
1352 steadfastly refused to say unequivocally that he would
follow the law and rely only on the evidence presented. Juror No.
1352 also stated he would feel compelled to share his opinions
with his fellow jurors regardless of the state of the evidence,
because in his mind the footage was not an unaltered video but
something else entirely—an “oil painting,” to borrow from his
analogy. In light of Juror No. 1352’s statements, the trial court
did not err in dismissing him from jury service.

B. The Trial Court Had No Duty to Instruct on Heat of
Passion Voluntary Manslaughter
1. Additional background
Toward the end of trial, the court asked defense counsel if
she intended to ask for jury instructions on any lesser included
offenses. Defense counsel advised she wanted the court to
instruct the jury on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter as a
lesser included offense to murder. The prosecution objected and
maintained there was no evidence to support such an instruction
(Cabrera’s act of throwing a small pet gate that did not hit
anyone, in the prosecution’s view, could not constitute
provocation giving rise to a heat of passion). Defense counsel
countered that whether Cabrera’s act of throwing the pet gate

13
constituted provocation was a “question for the jury.” The court
took the issue under submission and ultimately ruled a heat of
passion voluntary manslaughter instruction was not warranted
because defendant and his accomplices were the initial
aggressors.

2. Applicable law and standard of review
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on a
lesser included offense “whenever evidence that the defendant is
guilty only of the lesser offense is ‘substantial enough to merit
consideration’ by the jury.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19
Cal.4th 142, 162, disapproved on other grounds by People v.
Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 254-260 & fn. 7; see also
Breverman, supra, at 154 [trial court must provide “‘instructions
on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as
to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present
[citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was
less than that charged’”].) “This substantial evidence
requirement is not satisfied by ‘“any evidence . . . no matter how
weak,”’ but rather by evidence from which a jury composed of
reasonable persons could conclude ‘that the lesser offense, but not
the greater, was committed.’” (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th
680, 705; accord People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 96.) We
independently review a claim the trial court erred by failing to
instruct on a lesser included offense, and we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the defendant. (People v. Licas (2007)
41 Cal.4th 362, 366; People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24,
30.)

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3. There was no substantial evidence of heat of
passion manslaughter’s subjective element
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with
malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) “Voluntary
‘[m]anslaughter, a lesser included offense of murder, is an
unlawful killing without malice. . . . Two factors may preclude the
formation of malice and reduce murder to voluntary
manslaughter: heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense.’”
(People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 974.) “The heat of passion
requirement for manslaughter has both an objective and a
subjective component.” (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230,
1252; accord, People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549.)
“‘“To satisfy the objective or ‘reasonable person’ element of
th[e heat of passion] form of voluntary manslaughter, the
accused’s heat of passion must be due to ‘sufficient
provocation.’”’” (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at 549.) “‘The
provocative conduct by the victim may be physical or verbal, but
the conduct must be sufficiently provocative that it would cause
an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without
due deliberation and reflection.’” (Id. at 550; accord, People v.
Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 949-950 [“To be adequate, the
provocation must be one that would cause an emotion so intense
that an ordinary person would simply react, without reflection”].)
In other words, the test is whether “an average, sober person
would be so inflamed that he or she would lose reason and
judgment.” (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 60.)
To prove the subjective element of heat of passion
voluntary manslaughter, the defendant him or herself “must be
shown to have killed while under ‘the actual influence of a strong
passion’ induced by such provocation.” (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th

15
at 550; accord, People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 539.) “No
specific type of provocation is required, and ‘the passion aroused
need not be anger or rage, but can be any “‘“[v]iolent, intense,
high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion”’” [citations] other than
revenge.’” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 108; see also
People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826 [“voluntary
manslaughter instruction is not warranted where the act that
allegedly provoked the killing was no more than taunting words,
a technical battery, or slight touching”]; People v. Wells (1938) 10
Cal.2d 610, 623 [“‘A provocation of slight and trifling character,
such as words of reproach, however grievous they may be, or
gestures, or an assault, or even a blow, is not recognized as
sufficient to arouse, in a reasonable man, such passion as reduces
an unlawful killing with a deadly weapon to manslaughter’”].)
Defendant maintains Cabrera’s act of tossing the small
plastic pet gate in his direction suffices as a legally adequate
provocation. Even if he were right that this act (which occurred
only after one in defendant’s group threw a punch at Cabrera)
was so provocative that it would cause a reasonable person to lose
reason and judgment, there is still no substantial evidence of the
requisite subjective element: that defendant himself was then
under the influence of any intense emotion at the time of the
killing. (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 585.)
Defendant did not testify at trial and there was no other evidence
regarding his state of mind other than Yvette’s testimony that
defendant said nothing on the night of the shooting. A heat of
passion instruction is not required where, as here, “the only
evidence of [heat of passion] is the circumstance that a defendant

16
is attacked and consequently fears for his life.”5 (Moye, supra, 47
Cal.4th at 555.)

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:

MOOR, J. KIM (D.), J.

5
Because there was no substantial evidence of the subjective
element of heat of passion manslaughter, we need not analyze
whether a heat of passion instruction also would have been
unwarranted because it would have been inconsistent with the
principal theory of the defense, i.e., mistaken identity. (See, e.g.,
People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1052 [“‘A trial court’s
duty to instruct, sua sponte, on particular defenses arises “‘only if
it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if
there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the
defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the
case’”’”].)

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