Perez v. The State of Cal. CA4/3

CourtListener 10847274Calctapp23 de abr. de 2026

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 4/23/26 Perez v. The State of Cal. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JENNY PEREZ,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G065485

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01326651)
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Richard Y. Lee, Judge. Affirmed.
Jenny Perez, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Iveta Ovsepyan, Assistant
Attorney General, Quintin Lucas and Peter J. Lucca, Jr., Deputy Attorneys
General, for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Jenny Perez filed this action against defendant the State
1
of California (the State). Based on the limited record on appeal, which does
not include the operative second amended complaint (or the earlier
2
complaints), Perez appears to have asserted causes of action for negligence
and dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section
835 arising out of an alleged incident in July 2020 involving officers of the
3
California Highway Patrol that ended with the death of her son. The trial
court sustained a demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave
to amend because Perez failed to timely present a claim under the

1
In her opening brief on appeal, Perez says she filed her
complaint “against the State of California and its agents and employees in
the California Highway Patrol.” In the trial court, the Attorney General
identified its client as “Defendant State of California, by and through the
California Highway Patrol (erroneously sued as State of California Their
Agents and or Employees of the California Highway Patrol)” (italics omitted).
And in its respondent’s brief, the Attorney General refers to the respondent
and defendant as “State of California, by and through the California Highway
Patrol.” (Italics omitted.) On appeal, neither party directly addresses whether
the operative complaint erroneously named the defendant. For ease of
reference, this opinion refers to the defendant and respondent as the State.

2
After Perez designated the record for appeal, the clerk’s
transcript included a note that some of the items were not included in the
clerk’s transcript because Perez had failed to identify each specific document
she was designating by its title and filing date. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.122(a)(1) [“A notice designating documents to be included in a clerk’s
transcript must identify each designated document by its title and filing date
or, if the filing date is not available, the date it was signed”].) There is no
indication in the record Perez attempted to correct her defective designation
of the record or address the fact that the clerk’s transcript did not contain
either the second amended complaint or the demurrer to it.

3
All undesignated statutory references are to the Government
Code.

2
Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.). We conclude the trial court did not err
and therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 22, 2023, Perez filed her initial complaint in this action.
As discussed further below, the record on appeal does not contain any of
Perez’s complaints in this action. In her opening brief on appeal, Perez
asserts “[t]his case arises from the tragic and preventable death of Michael J.
Cordero on July 23, 2020, following a vehicle pursuit that ended on the
overpass of the I-5 Freeway at Euclid Street in Anaheim, California. Mr.
Cordero, pursued initially by the Buena Park Police Department, was
disoriented and injured after crashing his vehicle. Upon arrival at the scene,
California Highway Patrol . . . officers escalated the situation by approaching
the vehicle with weapons drawn, despite no indication of an immediate
threat. Mr. Cordero, confused and fearful, fled and tragically fell from the
overpass to his death.”
In April 2024, the trial court sustained the State’s demurrer to
the complaint with leave to amend. The court explained it was sustaining the
demurrer because, among other reasons, Perez’s complaint did not allege she
had presented a timely government claim. After Perez filed a first amended
complaint, the State again demurred. The court’s tentative ruling indicated
the demurrer would be sustained without leave to amend because Perez
failed to allege she had timely presented a government claim and had not
sufficiently alleged grounds for estoppel. After hearing oral argument,4
however, the court stated it “will give one last opportunity for [Perez] to fix

4
The record on appeal does not contain a reporter’s transcript of
any of the hearings in the trial court.

3
and file an amended complaint.” In November 2024, Perez filed her second
amended complaint.
In January 2025, the trial court sustained the State’s demurrer
to the second amended complaint without further leave to amend. The court
stated the second amended complaint asserted a cause of action for
negligence and a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property
under section 835. The court noted Perez had attached to the second
amended complaint as exhibits a February 22, 2021 records request and an
undated government claim, but Perez still had not alleged when she
submitted her government claim to the State. Moreover, the court found
Perez “alleges no facts establishing that she filed a late-claim application
within one year after the accrual of the cause of action, which began on July
23, 2020,” and stated that “a late-claim application is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to a claim-relief petition and that government claims and late-
claim applications are to be treated differently.”
The trial court further found Perez “has not alleged facts that
establish that the State engaged in any affirmative acts to prevent or deter
[Perez] from timely filing a claim such that the State is estopped from
asserting its untimely Government claim defense. Likewise, [Perez] does not
allege the four elements of estoppel as set forth in Munoz v. State of
California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1785 or any ‘calculated conduct or
representations by the public entity or its agents that induced the plaintiff to
remain inactive and not to comply with the claims-presentation
requirements.’” The court noted Perez “only alleges that ‘the records were not
promptly release[d] as required by law,’ ‘special attention must be given to
the broader implications of the Defendants’ failure to release the requested
records in a timely manner,’ and ‘[t]his withholding of critical information

4
only [sic] violated the public’s rights to access records under . . . [s]ections
6250–6270, but it also severely prejudiced [Perez’s] ability to pursue her
claims within the statutory limitations period,’ and [Perez] ‘faced delays and
lack of cooperation.’” Noting that Perez’s allegations were similar to those
found insufficient in Munoz v. State of California, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 1767
(Munoz), the court found Perez’s allegations failed to state a basis for
estoppel.
The court entered judgment of dismissal and Perez appealed.
DISCUSSION
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial
court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) “‘[The
appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure
to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved
against [the appellant].’” (Id. at p. 609.) Moreover, “the California Rules of
Court expressly require appellate briefs to ‘[s]tate each point . . . and support
each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority’ and to
‘[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume
and page number of the record where the matter appears.’ (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).)” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616,
620 (L.O.).)
“‘It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to
undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness.’
[Citation.] Nor are we ‘required to search the record on [our] own seeking
error.’ [Citation.] Consequently, ‘[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, or

5
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to
authority, we treat the point as waived. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Likewise, ‘“[i]f
a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the
record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived. [Citation.]”
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] These rules apply both to parties represented by
counsel and self-represented parties. [Citation.] ‘A party proceeding in
propria persona “is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the
same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.”’”
(L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)
As an initial matter, Perez did not provide an adequate record on
appeal. Notably, the record on appeal contains neither the second amended
complaint nor the parties’ filings related to the State’s demurrer to it. Perez
also makes numerous assertions in her appellate briefs without adequate
record citations. For example, Perez’s statement of facts in her opening brief
5
contains no record citations. In any event, even if Perez did not forfeit her
arguments on appeal by failing to provide an adequate record, we conclude
the trial court did not err.
“‘The Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.) “establishes certain
conditions precedent to the filing of a lawsuit against a public entity. As
relevant here, a plaintiff must timely file a claim for money or damages with
the public entity. (§ 911.2.) The failure to do so bars the plaintiff from
bringing suit against that entity. (§ 945.4.)”’” (J.J. v. County of San Diego

5
At times in its respondent’s brief, the State also failed to include
adequate record citations. For example, the State includes a paragraph that
purports to recite the factual background of the case, but it cites only a single
page of the clerk’s transcript, which is simply the trial court’s register of
actions.

6
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1219 (J.J.).) “‘“The policy underlying the claims
presentation requirements is to afford prompt notice to public entities. This
permits early investigation and evaluation of the claim and informed fiscal
planning in light of prospective liabilities.”’” (Ibid.)
Under section 911.2, subdivision (a), “[a] claim relating to a cause
of action for death or for injury to person . . . shall be presented as provided in
Article 2 (commencing with [s]ection 915) not later than six months after the
6
accrual of the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “‘Timely claim presentation is not
merely a procedural requirement, but is a condition precedent to the
claimant’s ability to maintain an action against the public entity. [Citation.]
“Only after the public entity’s board has acted upon or is deemed to have
rejected the claim may the injured person bring a lawsuit alleging a cause of
action in tort against the public entity.”’” (J.J., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1219.) “‘The failure to timely present a claim to the public entity bars the
claimant from filing a lawsuit against that public entity. [Citation.]
Moreover, because the purpose of the claims is not “to prevent surprise [but
rather] is to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to
adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the
expense of litigation . . . [citations][,] . . . [i]t is well-settled that claims

6
“A claim relating to any other cause of action shall be presented
as provided in Article 2 (commencing with [s]ection 915) not later than one
year after the accrual of the cause of action.” (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) “For the
purpose of computing the time limits prescribed by [s]ections 911.2, 911.4,
945.6, and 946.6, the date of the accrual of a cause of action to which a claim
relates is the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have
accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations which would be
applicable thereto if there were no requirement that a claim be presented to
and be acted upon by the public entity before an action could be commenced
thereon.” (§ 901.)

7
statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public entity’s actual knowledge
of the circumstances surrounding the claim. Such knowledge—standing
alone—constitutes neither substantial compliance nor basis for estoppel.”’”
(Ibid.)
“When a claim that is required by [s]ection 911.2 to be presented
not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action is not
presented within that time, a written application may be made to the public
entity for leave to present that claim.” (§ 911.4, subd. (a).) “The application
must be presented to the public entity no later than one year after the
accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.4, subd. (b).) Unless the one-year period
is tolled (see § 911.4, subd. (c)), the public entity is ‘powerless to grant relief’
if an application for leave to file a late claim was presented after the one-year
deadline.” (Coble v. Ventura County Health Care Agency (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 417, 421.)7
We conclude the trial court did not err in determining that
Perez’s second amended complaint was deficient because she failed to allege

7
“‘“If the public entity denies the application [for leave to present
a late claim], . . . section 946.6 authorizes the injured party to petition the
court for relief from the claim requirements.”’ [Citation.] ‘The court shall
relieve the petitioner from the [claim] requirements . . . if the court finds that
the application to the [public entity for leave to present a late claim] under
[s]ection 911.4 was made within a reasonable time not to exceed [one year
after the accrual of the cause of action] . . . and that one or more [of four
criteria] is applicable . . . .’ (§ 946.6, subd. (c).)” (Coble v. Ventura County
Health Care Agency, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 421–422.) “However,
‘[f]iling a late-claim application within one year after the accrual of a cause of
action is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a claim-relief petition.’” (J.J., supra,
223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1221.)

8
8
she timely presented a claim under the Government Claims Act. Perez has
not demonstrated the court erred in concluding that her claims accrued on
July 23, 2020, which is when she asserts her son died. Moreover, Perez does
not argue she filed a claim under the Government Claims Act within six
months of July 23, 2020; nor does she contend she filed a late-claim
9
application within one year of that date.
Instead, Perez argues her claims did not accrue on July 23, 2020,
because the discovery rule delaying accrual of a cause of action should apply.
Perez asserts “she made numerous good-faith attempts to obtain police
records and learn the circumstances surrounding his death,” including
submitting “a formal Public Records Act request to the California Highway
Patrol on February 22, 2021.” According to Perez, she was not provided a
report until August 2021, she “had no reason to suspect wrongful conduct at

8
Given our conclusion, we need not address the State’s other
arguments regarding the statute of limitations and whether Perez
sufficiently pleaded all the elements of her causes of action.

9
The trial court found Perez attached her government claim to
the second amended complaint but failed to allege when she submitted it. In
her opening brief on appeal, Perez asserts “[d]efendants were placed on notice
of [her] potential claims through her timely submission of a government
claim,” but she does not assert the specific date on which she purportedly
submitted her claim and she provides no record citation for her assertion that
she submitted it timely. To the extent Perez is suggesting she filed a claim
within six months of July 23, 2020, the record does not support such an
assertion. The State asserts, albeit without citation to the record, that Perez
submitted her government claim on December 27, 2021, and Perez’s appellate
briefing does not dispute that she submitted her government claim on that
date. (Indeed, at oral argument, Perez said she filed her claim in December
2021.) Even if Perez submitted her government claim in December 2021, it
would be untimely, as it was submitted more than 17 months after her son’s
death.

9
the time of death,” and “[o]nly after obtaining the delayed [California
Highway Patrol] report could she identify the role of officer misconduct and
assert claims for wrongful death, negligence, excessive force, and dangerous
10
condition of public property.”
“Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at ‘the time when
the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’ [Citations.] An
important exception to the general rule of accrual is the ‘discovery rule,’
which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or
has reason to discover, the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery,
Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806–807.) “A plaintiff has reason to discover a
cause of action when he or she ‘has reason at least to suspect a factual basis
for its elements.’” (Id. at p. 807; see also Estill v. County of Shasta (2018) 25
Cal.App.5th 702, 708 [“It is enough if an individual has notice or information
of circumstances that would put a reasonable person on inquiry”].) “In order
to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, ‘[a]
plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred
without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show
(1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made
earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’ [Citation.] In assessing the
sufficiency of the allegations of delayed discovery, the court places the burden

10
In her reply brief, Perez says “[t]he [California Highway
Patrol’s] report, withheld for more than a year, reveals that officers
approached the vehicle believing they were investigating a hit-and-run. One
officer stated he feared for his life solely because of tinted vehicle windows.
Both officers exited their marked SUV with weapons drawn. When the
motorist opened the door, he appeared disoriented and attempted to run. He
fell over a freeway barrier and was struck by an oncoming vehicle.”

10
on the plaintiff to ‘show diligence’; ‘conclusory allegations will not withstand
demurrer.’” (Fox, at p. 808.)
Here, Perez has not shown she alleged sufficient facts to show the
discovery rule applies to delay the accrual of her causes of action. As
discussed, Perez did not provide an adequate record on appeal, and the
assertions in her appellate briefs regarding delayed discovery lack adequate
record citations. But even if we were to consider the assertions made in
Perez’s appellate briefs, they are insufficient. Perez does not argue she was
unaware of her son’s death on July 23, 2020; nor does she argue she was
unaware of the location of her son’s death or that it occurred during an
encounter with law enforcement. Moreover, Perez does not assert sufficient
facts showing she could not have discovered the alleged wrongdoing by the
California Highway Patrol earlier using reasonable diligence. She does not
explain why she could not have earlier discovered purported wrongful
conduct by the California Highway Patrol before receiving the report.
Additionally, other than referring to the Covid-19 pandemic, she does not
explain why she waited approximately seven months after her son’s death to
even request the report.11
Perez also asserts “equitable tolling” should apply. This
argument is unavailing because “the doctrine of equitable tolling cannot be
invoked to suspend section 911.2’s six-month deadline for filing a prerequisite

11
Perez references various statutes, including citing Vehicle Code
section 20012 and generally citing the California Public Records Act (Gov.
Code, § 7920.000 et seq.), and she appears to assert the State failed to timely
provide her with information and assist her in making her request for the
report. But even if the State should have produced the report sooner, that
does not support application of the discovery rule to delay accrual of her
causes of action for the reasons discussed.

11
government claim.” (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104,
1121.) “[T]he six-month period of section 911.2 is not a statute of limitations
[citation] to which tolling rules might apply.” (Ibid.) The two cases Perez cites
for her equitable tolling argument do not concern the deadline to submit a
government claim under section 911.2. (See Saint Francis Memorial Hospital
v. State Dept. of Public Health (2020) 9 Cal.5th 710, 717 [addressing “whether
equitable tolling can ever lessen the otherwise strict time limit on the
availability of writs of administrative mandate under section 11523, and if so,
whether the doctrine applies in this case”]; Addison v. State of California
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 315 [“conclud[ing] that the filing of an action in the
United States District Court suspends the running of the six-month
limitations period (Gov. Code, § 945.6 . . .) within which suits must be
brought against public entities in state courts”].)12

12
Although Perez’s appellate briefs do not mention equitable
estoppel, we note equitable estoppel may apply to the government claims
requirement. “A public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations
of the tort claims statutes where its agents or employees have prevented or
deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act. The required
elements for an equitable estoppel are: (1) the party to be estopped must be
apprised of the facts; (2) the party to be estopped must intend his or her
conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the
estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be
ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) the other party must rely upon the
conduct to his or her injury.” (Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1785; see
also J.J., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227.) The trial court determined
Perez’s allegations were insufficient for estoppel. In her appellate briefs,
Perez does not assert developed argument with applicable case authority
regarding estoppel, and she therefore has waived the argument. (See L.O.,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.) In any event, Perez has not alleged
sufficient facts to state an estoppel based on the purportedly belatedly-
released incident report. (See Munoz, at p. 1785 [concluding the “plaintiff’s
assertions on appeal fail to satisfy the required elements for an estoppel”
where the plaintiff alleged “‘[t]he State of California failed to provide

12
Relying on California Rules of Court, appendix I, Emergency rule
9 (Emergency rule 9), Perez also argues “the COVID-19 pandemic triggered
California Emergency [r]ule 9, which tolled the statute of limitations for civil
13
causes of action between April 6, 2020, and October 1, 2020.” According to
Perez, “[t]his temporary suspension further extends the time available to file
suit and should be factored into the analysis.” Perez further argues “[c]ourts
were operating with reduced hours and staffing, and [her] efforts to file her
government claim in December 2021 were impeded by those restrictions,” and
“[t]hese conditions extend the limitations period and protect [her] claim.” To
the extent Perez is asserting Emergency rule 9 tolled the time for her to
submit a government claim, she has failed to assert developed argument with
applicable case authority that Emergency rule 9 applies to the time to submit
a government claim, as compared to the statute of limitations governing the
filing of a complaint in the trial court. (See L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 620.) Moreover, even assuming Emergency rule 9 applies to the time to

petitioner’s attorney with the requested medical records until December 6,
1993,’ and made other statements to that effect”]; J.J., at p. 1228 [concluding
the police report provided “no basis for estoppel against the County as a
result of when J.J. (through counsel) obtained this report, inasmuch as we
already have concluded the report does not have a material bearing on the
accrual issue”].)

13
Under Emergency rule 9, “the statutes of limitations and
repose for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days are tolled from April 6,
2020, until October 1, 2020” and “the statutes of limitations and repose for
civil causes of action that are 180 days or less are tolled from April 6, 2020,
until August 3, 2020.” (Emergency rule 9(a) & (b).) Emergency rule 9
remained in effect until June 30, 2022, but “[t]his sunset does not nullify the
effect of the tolling of the statutes of limitation and repose under the rule.”
(Emergency rule 9(c).)

13
submit government claims, Perez still has not demonstrated she submitted a
14
timely government claim.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on
appeal.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

14
As discussed, the trial court found Perez failed to allege when
she submitted her government claim. If Perez submitted her claim on
December 27, 2021 (as the State asserts), it still would be untimely even if
one of the tolling provisions of Emergency rule 9 applied.

We note Perez’s appellate briefing does not discuss Executive
Order N-35-20, which was mentioned by the trial court. Under certain
executive orders, the time for presenting a government claim was extended
by 120 days for claims that accrued before June 30, 2021. (Coble v. Ventura
County Health Care Agency, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 422.) Similarly,
however, even if Perez had presented a government claim in December 2021,
it still would have been untimely even with the benefit of a 120 day
extension.

14

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.