Doe v. Doe 1 CA2/4

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Filed 4/21/26 Doe v. Doe #1 CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

JOHN DOE, B339965

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22BBCV00600
DOE #1, a Public Entity,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, John J. Kralik, Judge. Reversed.
Slater Slater Schulman, James W. Lewis, Babak Shirdel;
Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy, Holly N. Boyer, and Kiran R.
Iyer for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Marlon C.
Wadlington, and Scott D. Danforth for Defendant and
Respondent.
We agree with three published cases that hold Assembly
Bill No. 218 does not violate the gift clause of the California
Constitution by retroactively eliminating the Government Claims
Act’s claims presentation requirement for childhood sexual
assault claims against public entities.
A plaintiff using the pseudonym “John Doe” sued Burbank
Unified School District (District) for damages arising from
alleged sexual abuse by a teacher in the 1970s. Doe relied on
Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2019, ch.
871, § 1) (AB 218), which temporarily revived otherwise untimely
claims for childhood sexual assault and retroactively exempted
them from the Government Claims Act’s claims presentation
requirement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q); Gov. Code,
§ 905, subds. (m) & (p).)
The District successfully moved for judgment on the
pleadings on the basis that retroactively applying AB 218 violates
the California Constitution’s gift clause. (Cal. Const., art. XVI,
§ 6.) In opinions issued after the trial court entered judgment,
appellate courts have unanimously held AB 218 does not violate
the gift clause. (R.L. v. Merced City School Dist. (2025) 114
Cal.App.5th 89, 98 (R.L.); O.B. v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 930, 933 (O.B.); West Contra Costa
Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
1243, 1252 (West Contra Costa).) We join our colleagues and
therefore reverse the judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges a teacher at Luther Burbank Junior High
School sexually abused him repeatedly in 1977 and 1978. His
complaint alleges the District negligently hired, supervised, and
retained the teacher who abused him, negligently supervised

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plaintiff, and failed to report suspected child abuse. Plaintiff
does not allege he complied with the Government Claims Act by
presenting a timely claim to the District. He instead relies on the
retroactive waiver of this requirement under AB 218.
The District moved for judgment on the pleadings. It
argued AB 218 is an unconstitutional gift of public funds because
it retroactively imposed liability on public entities for claims that
were not enforceable when they accrued. The trial court agreed.
The court granted the motion and entered judgment of dismissal
for the District. Plaintiff timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Framework
This appeal presents questions of law and constitutionality,
which we review de novo. (O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p.
935; see also People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation,
Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777 [review of judgment on the
pleadings].)
A. The Government Claims Act
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, public entities
are only liable as provided by statute. (Quigley v. Garden Valley
Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803.) In 1963, the
Legislature enacted the Government Claims Act and made public
entities liable for their employees’ torts committed in the scope of
employment. (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a); O.B., supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at p. 937.) Though sexual assault is “ ‘not within the
scope of employment,’ ” a public employer may be liable for
negligently hiring and supervising an employee who committed
sexual assault. (O.B., at p. 937.) Generally, plaintiffs suing a
public entity must present a timely claim to that entity (Gov.

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Code, § 905) and must rely on a statute abrogating sovereign
immunity for their causes of action (Gov. Code, § 905.8 [“Nothing
in this part imposes liability upon a public entity unless such
liability otherwise exists”]; R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp.
105–106).
B. The Gift Clause
Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution
provides, “The Legislature shall have no power . . . to make any
gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or
thing of value to any individual.” In applying this provision, “the
primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a public
or a private purpose.” (County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942)
20 Cal.2d 870, 877.) “If the money is for a public purpose, the
appropriation is not a gift even though private persons are
benefited by the expenditure.” (Ibid.)
The gift clause prohibits appropriations “for the relief of
one who has no legal claim,” regardless of any “moral or equitable
obligation” the government has to that person. (Conlin v. Board
of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, 22 (Conlin); accord Jordan v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450
[payment for “a wholly invalid claim . . . serves no public purpose
and violates the gift clause”].) In analyzing whether a statute
effectively provides payment for an unenforceable or wholly
invalid claim under the gift clause, the California Supreme Court
has distinguished prospective liability from retroactive liability.
A statute that permits retroactive liability violates the gift
clause, while a statute that permits prospective liability does not.
This principle was established in Chapman v. State (1894)
104 Cal. 690, 693–694 (Chapman). There, the court held a
statute permitting suits against the state for earlier injuries did

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not violate the gift clause as applied to the state’s preexisting
liability for breach of contract. Because “[t]he state was always
liable upon its contracts,” permitting suits against the state
“merely gave an additional remedy for the enforcement of such
liability. . . even as applied to prior contracts.” (Id. at p. 696.)
But as to negligence claims against the state (which were not
permitted until decades later), the court stated, “[T]he legislature
has no power to create a liability against the state for any such
past act of negligence upon the part of its officers.” (Id. at p. 693.)
The California Supreme Court applied this principle and
found retroactive liability violated the gift clause in Powell v.
Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271 (Powell). The Legislature enacted a
law to pay people retroactively for jury service occurring years
earlier. (Id. at p. 271–272.) Powell held that retroactively paying
jurors was an unconstitutional gift because there was “no legal
liability in any manner upon the part of the” government to pay
jurors whose service was “gratuitous when rendered.” (Id. at p.
274.)
The California Supreme Court has restated this principle
in cases holding the gift clause did not prohibit payments for
liability incurred after a statute took effect. Patrick v. Riley
(1930) 209 Cal. 350, 352 (Patrick) held the gift clause did not bar
a statute compensating people who slaughtered their contagious
livestock. The court noted a challenge based on the gift clause
might have merit if “the Legislature had undertaken to vote
compensation retrospectively to the owners of diseased cattle
destroyed prior to the enactment of the statute.” (Id. at p. 359.)
Similarly, Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507 (Heron) held the gift
clause did not prohibit paying judgments (or paying for liability
insurance) arising from a statute making public entities liable for

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their employees’ negligent driving. (Id. at p. 517.) The court
stated that, as opposed to incidents occurring after the statute’s
enactment, making the state liable “for any past acts of
negligence” would violate the gift clause. (Ibid.)
II. AB 218 Does Not Violate the Gift Clause
A. The Statute Is Subject to the Gift Clause
Plaintiff first argues that the gift clause does not apply
because the statute does not specifically appropriate public funds
or allocate money to an identified person. Instead, it allows a
category of people (victims of childhood sexual assault) to sue the
government, which may result in spending public funds to pay
individuals via judgments or settlements. We reject this
argument.
It is true the gift clause prohibits legislative actions
authorizing specific payments to an identified recipient. (See,
e.g., Conlin, supra, 99 Cal. at p. 19 [$54,015.37 payment to Mr.
Conlin]; Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, 326 [$10,000 payment
to Mr. Bourn].) The gift clause, however, has also been applied to
statutes creating a category of liability without expressly
appropriating funds, stating any amount, or specifically naming
any recipients. (See, e.g., Heron, supra, 209 Cal. at pp. 514–517
[gift clause did not prohibit statute making government
prospectively liable for damages caused by employees’ negligent
driving]; Patrick, supra, 209 Cal. at p. 352 [gift clause did not
prohibit statute prospectively compensating people who slaughter
their contagious livestock]; Powell, supra, 138 Cal. at pp. 271–276
[statute paying jurors $2 per day of service performed years
earlier was unconstitutional gift]; Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at
pp. 693–694 [statute authorizing suits against government was

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not a gift as to preexisting contract claim].) AB 218 falls within
the latter category of legislative actions.
B. AB 218 Does Not Retroactively Impose Liability for
Unenforceable Claims
The District argues retroactively applying AB 218 violates
the gift clause because it creates liability for previously invalid
claims. We are unpersuaded.
AB 218 did not create retroactive liability in this case; it
merely cleared a procedural hurdle for plaintiff’s lawsuit. When
plaintiff was allegedly abused, he could have asserted his current
negligence causes of action. The Government Claims Act
required plaintiff to present a claim to the District within 100
days of accrual of his causes of action. (R.L., supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at p. 105, citing former Gov. Code, § 911.2, added by
Stats. 1963, ch. 1715, § 1, pp. 3372–3376.) AB 218 retroactively
removed the claims presentation requirement for actions alleging
childhood sexual assault. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q);
Gov. Code, § 905, subds. (m) & (p); O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th
at p. 936.)
The District acknowledges the gift clause does not prohibit
reviving claims barred by the statute of limitations. (See
Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681, 692 [gift clause did not
apply because a “statute of limitations does not . . . go to the
substance of the right, but only to the remedy”].) But the District
contends that the Government Claims Act is not analogous to a
statute of limitations. The District relies on authority stating
that, unlike the procedural defense of the statute of limitations,
“the claim presentation requirement is a ‘state substantive
limitation[ ] couched in procedural language.’ ” (State of
California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240

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(Bodde); accord Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42
Cal.4th 201, 208 (Shirk) [“Timely claim presentation is not
merely a procedural requirement, but is . . . ‘ “ ‘a condition
precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action against
defendant’ ” ’ . . . and thus an element of the plaintiff's cause of
action”].)
This argument depends on an overly broad reading of the
California Supreme Court’s opinions describing the claims
presentation requirement as substantive. Portions of an opinion
must be “viewed in the context of the entire opinion.”
(International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v.
Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 276;
accord Caliber Paving Company, Inc. v. Rexford Industrial Realty
and Management, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 175, 181.) The
United States Supreme Court has cautioned that no bright line
divides substantive from procedural rules. (Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman (1988) 486 U.S. 717, 726–727.) Drawing the line “in a
particular context is largely determined by the purposes for
which the dichotomy is drawn.” (Id. at p. 726.) The California
Supreme Court has similarly noted the difficulty in
distinguishing substance from procedure. (Williams v. Horvath
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 841, fn. 3 (Williams).)1

1 Even statutes of limitations, which the District concedes
are procedural in the context of the gift clause, are frequently
described as substantive. (See, e.g., Granny Purps, Inc. v. County
of Santa Cruz (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 [“application of a
statute of limitations is a substantive defense, not a procedural
matter”]; Tabarrejo v. Superior Court (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 849,
863 [“The statute of limitations is regarded as a substantive
defense”]; Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners v. American
Medical Internat., Inc. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1542

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In the pertinent context, the claims presentation
requirement is procedural, not substantive. The principle that
this requirement is substantive originated in Williams. (16
Cal.3d at pp. 841–842; see Bodde, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1240.)
There, our Supreme Court held that under the United States
Constitution’s supremacy clause, the claims presentation
requirement does not apply to a cause of action for violation of 42
United States Code section 1983. (Williams, at pp. 837–842.)
The Court described compliance with the requirement as an
“ ‘element[ ] of the plaintiff’s cause of action.’ ” (Id. at p. 839.) It
reasoned that compliance “ ‘is more than a procedural
requirement, it is a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining
an action against defendants, in short, an integral part of
plaintiff's cause of action.’ ” (Id. at p. 842.) In doing so, it
considered “[t]he purposes underlying section 1983,” which “must
still be served, and may not be frustrated by state substantive
limitations couched in procedural language.” (Id. at p. 841.)
Following Williams, the California Supreme Court has
described the claims presentation requirement as “substantive”
in contexts that are different than the present case. For example,
in Bodde, the court answered a narrow procedural question:
“whether failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing
compliance with [the] claim presentation requirement subjects a
complaint to a general demurrer.” (Bodde, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p.
1237.) Bodde held a defendant may demur on that basis. (Ibid.)
This holding does not support the District’s position because
which party bears the burden of pleading and proof has no
bearing on the present issue.

[“statutes of limitations may be viewed as procedural rather than
substantive in some contexts”].)

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Likewise, Shirk involved a distinguishable fact pattern.
There, the court held former Code of Civil Procedure section
340.1, subdivision (c) did not apply to the Government Claims
Act.2 The former statute “revived” for the year 2003 sexual abuse
causes of action that were barred “solely” because the applicable
statute of limitations had expired. (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p.
208.) The court reached its decision by applying the statute’s
“plain language,” i.e., the word “solely.” (Id. at p. 211.) This
holding is not applicable in the present context because
regardless of whether the claims presentation requirement is
procedural or substantive, it is not identical to the statute of
limitations.
We agree with O.B. in concluding that Bodde and Shirk do
not apply here. (O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 940.) Though
satisfying the Government Claims Act may be described as a
substantive element of the claim in other contexts, “it is not an
element of a public entity’s substantive liability.” (O.B., at p.
941.)
AB 218 is categorically different from laws creating new
bases of liability that never existed before the operative statute,
like payments for jury service in Powell, payments for
slaughtering contagious cattle in Patrick, or the government’s
liability for its employees’ negligent driving in Heron. For 100
days after each alleged incident, the District could have been held
liable if plaintiff had submitted a government claim.
Retroactively applying AB 218 therefore “does not ‘create any
liability or cause of action against the state where none existed

2 In response, the Legislature amended the statute, thereby
overruling Shirk. (Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903,
914.)

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before.’ ” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp.
1259–1260.)
The differences between the claims presentation
requirement and the statute of limitations are not “material for
purposes of the gift clause.” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 1262.) If plaintiff had sent the District a letter
asserting his claim in 1977, the gift clause would not limit the
Legislature’s power to revive his untimely action. In this context,
not sending the District a letter within 100 days is a procedural
hurdle that can be retroactively waived, not a substantive defect
such that the gift clause prohibits retroactive waiver.
C. AB 218 Serves a Public Purpose
Because we conclude AB 218 does not constitute a gift
within the meaning of Article XVI, section 6 of the California
Constitution, we “need not consider whether it serves a public
purpose.” (O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 935.) In our
discretion, we nonetheless address the issue.
Assuming the gift clause would otherwise prohibit
retroactively waiving the claims presentation requirement, we
would find the statute constitutional because it serves a public
purpose. “The determination of what constitutes a public
purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature, and its
discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that
determination has a reasonable basis.” (County of Alameda v.
Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 746.)
The Legislature had a reasonable basis for deciding that
AB 218 serves a public purpose. The statute’s purpose is “ ‘ “to
expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to hold to
account individuals and entities responsible for their injuries.” ’ ”
(West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1265, quoting

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Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2023) 14
Cal.5th 758, 777.) “[T]he Legislature sought to provide relief to a
disadvantaged group,” which courts have often found is a valid
public purpose. (West Contra Costa, at p. 1267–1268; accord R.L.,
supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 118.) Despite the “legitimate policy
concerns” regarding AB 218, we “ ‘ “do not sit as super-
legislatures to determine the wisdom, desirability or propriety of
statutes enacted by the Legislature.” ’ ” (R.L., at p. 118.) The
Legislature did not act unreasonably in choosing to retroactively
waive the claims presentation requirement for actions alleging
childhood sexual abuse.
III. Requests for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff requested judicial notice of documents in AB 218’s
legislative history. The District requested judicial notice of three
statutes. These materials may be cited as legal authority, and
judicial notice is unnecessary. (Sharon S. v. Superior Court
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 417, 440, fn. 18; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title
Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46, fn. 9.) We therefore deny
both requests for judicial notice.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the
trial court with directions to deny the District’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff shall recover his costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

MORI, J.

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