People v. Barton CA4/3

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Filed 4/21/26 P. v. Barton CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G065249

v. (Super. Ct. No. 08WF1575)

TRACY WILLIAM BARTON, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Larry Yellin, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Ksenia Gracheva, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
* * *
Tracy William Barton challenges the trial court’s order
resentencing him pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1 We conclude the
court did not abuse its discretion in resentencing Barton to a sentence five
years shorter than the original. Nor did it abuse its discretion in declining to
further reduce the sentence; Barton is a career criminal with a history of
reoffending who committed a serious, violent crime. We therefore affirm the
sentence.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
According to Barton’s recitation of facts in his motion for
resentencing, on the evening of February 12, 2008, he knocked on the front
door of a home. The woman who answered the door (the victim) was in her
60’s, and she recognized Barton as someone who washed her neighbor’s car.
When Barton expressed concern about her neighbor, the victim unlocked the
deadbolt and opened her door. Barton then pushed his way into her house
and grabbed her. He pushed her into the bathroom, hit her in the face, and
eventually pushed her into the bedroom. He tied her up using pantyhose he
found in her drawer and gagged her. He demanded money and told her the
neighbor told him to do this. He pulled her pants down and continued to hit
her. Her screams notified neighbors of the attack, and someone called the
police. When officers arrived, Barton tried to escape but he was caught and
detained.

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless

otherwise noted.

2
On April 1, 2010, a jury convicted Barton of assault with intent to
commit rape (§ 220, subd. (b), count 1); first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460,
subd. (a), count 2); assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury
(former § 245, subd. (a)(1), count 3); and sexual battery by restraint (§ 243.4,
subd. (a), count 4). As to counts 1 through 3, the jury found Barton inflicted
great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a).
On April 30, 2010, the trial court sentenced Barton to 40 years to
life calculated as follows: 25 years to life plus a two-year enhancement under
section 667.9, subdivision (b), (victim over the age of 65) and a three-year
enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), (great bodily injury), for
a total of 30 years to life on count 2. Barton also received a sentence of
five years for an enhancement based on a prior felony conviction under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and five one-year sentences for prior prison
terms under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court imposed and stayed a
sentence of 25 years to life for count 1. It imposed sentences of 25 years to life
each for counts 3 and 4, with a three-year enhancement under section
12022.7, subdivision (a), on count 3; these sentences were ordered to run
concurrently with the sentence on count 2.
On August 10, 2023, Barton filed a petition for recall and
resentencing under section 1172.75. The trial court held a resentencing
hearing on February 24, 2025. After reviewing all briefs and exhibits filed by
the parties, hearing a statement from Barton, and oral argument from
counsel, the court resentenced Barton, striking the five prior prison term
enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b), thereby reducing his
sentence to 35 years to life.
The trial court commended Barton’s rehabilitative effort and self-
improvement efforts. However, the court also noted Barton’s decades-long

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criminal career and the long-lasting impact of his attack on the victim, as
demonstrated by a new victim impact statement offered by the Attorney
General. The court noted Barton was in his 50’s when he attacked the victim:
“This is not the indiscretions of a young man.” The court further noted that
though Barton seemed to have taken positive steps toward rehabilitation
during this incarceration, his prior prison terms (for sexual assault and rape)
were not so self-reflective, and he quickly reoffended each time he was
released. The court believed Barton to be sincere but did not feel certain he
would not reoffend if he were to be released. Barton filed a timely notice of
appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for an abuse of
discretion, evaluating whether the court exercised its discretion ‘in a manner
that is not arbitrary and capricious, that is consistent with the letter and
spirit of the law, and that is based upon an “individualized consideration of
the offense, the offender, and the public interest.”’” (People v. Panozo (2021)
59 Cal.App.5th 825, 837.)
“An abuse of discretion is found where the court ‘relies upon
circumstances that are not relevant to the decision or that otherwise
constitute an improper basis for decision.’” (People v. Panozo, supra,
59 Cal.App.5th at p. 837.) “‘[A]n abuse of discretion [also] arises if the trial
court based its decision on impermissible factors . . . or on an incorrect legal
standard.’” (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225 (Gonzalez).)
“[G]etting the legal standard wrong means that a subsequent decision

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becomes itself a per se abuse of discretion.” (Conservatorship of Bower (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 495, 506.)
II.
BARTON DID NOT FORFEIT HIS CLAIMS
The Attorney General argues that the basis of Barton’s appeal
was not argued or stated before the trial court and it is therefore waived on
appeal. Specifically, Barton did not object or point out to the trial court that it
“failed to consider that his ultimate release would be contingent upon parole
review.” We disagree.
“‘“‘The purpose of the general doctrine of waiver is to encourage a
defendant to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may
be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had . . . .’”’” (People v. Simon (2001)
25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103.) As long as an objection “fairly apprises the trial court
of the issue it is being called upon to decide,” the argument is not waived on
appeal. (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 290.)
The basis of Barton’s appeal is broader than that articulated by
the Attorney General. Barton argues on appeal that the trial court
misunderstood the standard of dangerousness and therefore misapplied the
standard in two ways: (1) the court did not use a “forward-looking inquiry”
when evaluating Barton’s danger to society as set forth in Gonzalez, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 229; and (2) the court failed to consider that the Board
of Parole Hearings is a safeguard that will further protect against release of a
dangerous individual.
These arguments, and the case law on which Barton relies, were
adequately raised before the trial court. Specifically, Barton requested a
reduction to a seven-years-to-life sentence, with the understanding he is
currently 71 years old, and in poor health. He also currently has mobility

5
issues and uses a walker. Barton argued by the time he would be up for
parole, he would be older and not likely any healthier. Moreover, his release
would be contingent upon the discretion of the Board of Parole Hearings. In
making these arguments at the hearing, Barton’s counsel specifically cited
the Gonzalez case, the same case on which Barton relies on appeal.
At the hearing, the trial court acknowledged and addressed
Barton’s arguments and the law on which they were based. Barton’s age was
a factor the court considered, but the court still felt it was likely Barton could
reoffend, because he had reoffended every time he had been released from
prison in the past, including the instant crime which was committed when he
was in his 50’s. Although the trial court acknowledged Barton would be
subject to a parole hearing, it concluded Barton could still reoffend regardless
of when he was released.
Barton did not forfeit his arguments on appeal.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE BARTON’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN
RESENTENCING HIM UNDER SECTION 1172.75
Barton applied for resentencing under section 1172.75,
subdivision (a), arguing the sentencing enhancements for prior convictions
were invalid. Section 1172.75 entitles defendants to full reconsideration of
their sentences if their current judgment includes prior prison term
enhancements imposed under section 667.5. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a)–(c); People
v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054–1055.) Enhancements under section
667.5, subdivision (b), are “legally invalid.” (§1172.75, subd. (a).)
Section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing hearing. (See People
v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.) In resentencing a defendant, the
trial court must use current sentencing guidelines and apply all changes in

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the sentencing laws since the initial sentence was imposed. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2).) The court is not obligated to reduce the defendant’s sentence
beyond vacating the invalid enhancements, but it may do so under section
1172.75 subdivision (d)(3), if there are postconviction factors showing
continued incarceration is no longer “in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(3).) This determination is separate and apart from any analysis
under subdivision (d)(1), which permits a court to resentence a defendant
without any reduction in time if it “finds by clear and convincing evidence
that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(1); People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855–856 [trial
court’s public safety analysis to refuse any reduction in sentence was
upheld].)
The trial court’s resentencing order reduced Barton’s sentence to
35 years to life, which is a lesser sentence than the previously imposed
sentence of 40 years to life. Accordingly, there was no need for a public safety
analysis under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), to justify the refusal to
further reduce the sentence. Barton concedes the court was not required to
consider Barton’s dangerousness because his sentence was reduced. The court
did, however, base its new sentence on its determination Barton could likely
reoffend. Barton argues this is the same as a determination Barton currently
poses a danger to public safety. He further argues the court misunderstood
and incorrectly applied the standard of dangerousness, in coming to this
conclusion. Barton asserts the court thereby violated his due process rights.
To establish he is not a danger to public safety, Barton offered
evidence of programs he completed in prison, a change in his mindset, and
work he has done to rehabilitate himself during his incarceration. The
exhibits to his motion included an “accountability packet” in which Barton

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took accountability for his past actions, a letter of remorse addressed to the
victim, a statement of how he intends to prevent relapse, and his plans
should he be paroled. Additionally, Barton argued he is advanced in age
(71 years old), has been diagnosed with bone and prostate cancer, and has
mobility issues necessitating use of a walker. Barton implies he is no longer
in a physical or mental condition to reoffend.
The trial court did not make an express finding about the danger
Barton might pose to public safety. It did not mention danger at all and did
not refer to any particular code section or subdivision. The trial court’s
analysis is more in line with the postconviction factors listed in
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3), rather than an analysis of Barton’s
dangerousness. Under subdivision (d)(3), when resentencing, the court may
consider Barton’s record and rehabilitation during incarceration, the impact
of his age and health on the risk for future violence, and whether
circumstances have changed in such a way “that continued incarceration is
no longer in the interest of justice.” In considering Barton’s evidence, the
court stated it believed Barton to be sincere in his change of heart and
intentions but declined to further reduce the sentence. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in doing so.
Barton argues the trial court incorrectly concluded Barton is
currently a danger to public safety because it did not understand the
standard for dangerousness which is a future-based inquiry rather than a
present evaluation. Barton further argues the trial court failed to consider
the fact that because his sentence is indeterminate, Barton cannot be
released without review and approval by the Board of Parole Hearings, which
will also consider his dangerousness at that time.

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Barton’s arguments rely heavily on the Gonzalez case, in which a
trial court specifically determined the defendant to be a danger to public
safety at the time of resentencing, believing that to be the standard for a
dangerousness analysis under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). (Gonzalez,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 227.) The Gonzalez court found “[t]he plain
words of the statute do not support the trial court’s singular focus on whether
the defendant currently poses a danger.” (Id. at p. 228, italics in original.) The
current dangerousness of the defendant matters only if reduction of the
sentence would result in release “within a short time frame.” (Ibid.) If the
reduced sentence were to result in continued incarceration, then the relevant
consideration is whether the defendant is likely to still be dangerous in the
future. (Ibid.) The Gonzalez court took instruction from the case of People v.
Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057, which dealt with the dangerousness
inquiry under yet another statute–section 1170.126. (Gonzalez, at p. 229.)
The Williams court held the inquiry must be “forward-looking,” in that the
court should evaluate the defendant’s dangerousness at the time of his
release, not at the time of his resentencing. (Williams, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1063.) The court’s dangerousness analysis must include consideration of
when, if ever, the defendant would be released if he were resentenced. (Ibid.)
The Gonzalez court also found the resentencing court should take
into account whether a defendant’s release will be contingent on review by
the Board of Parole Hearings which will have the ability to reassess the
defendant’s danger at the time he is being considered for release. (Gonzalez,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.) However, that future review is not meant
to be a delegation of the trial court’s judgment, but more like a “safety valve”
to further protect the public. (Id. at p. 228, fn. 10.)

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The Gonzalez court found the trial court applied an erroneous
legal standard when it only considered the defendant’s dangerousness at the
time of resentencing and did not consider when he might be released if the
relevant enhancement was dropped and whether he would likely be
dangerous at that time. (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 230–231.)
Barton urges us to make the same finding. We decline to do so.
Neither Gonzalez nor Williams are directly applicable, since they
each deal with interpretation of a statute other than section 1172.75. To the
extent that these cases are instructive here, they are still distinguishable.
Unlike Gonzalez, the trial court here did not expressly couch its analysis in
terms of Barton’s current dangerousness. In fact, the court did not specifically
find Barton to be a danger to public safety. A propensity to reoffend could
give rise to an inference of “dangerousness,” but the court did not use that
language. Nor did the court state Barton’s propensity to reoffend might
lessen over time. The court concluded despite all Barton’s efforts and his
change of heart, it was still likely he could reoffend–even at the age of 71 or
later, and even in his poor state of health based on his prior history.
Even if the trial court’s analysis could be interpreted as a
consideration of Barton’s dangerousness, and even if it could be found that
the court considered his dangerousness only at the time of resentencing and
not in perpetuity, we find that it did not abuse its discretion in declining a
further sentence reduction. The court did not apply the wrong standard,
based on the timing of Barton’s potential release.
Before resentencing, Barton was eligible for parole beginning in
February of 2033, approximately eight years after the resentencing hearing,
and that eligibility will likely be sooner since his sentence has been reduced
by five years. The difference in the analysis of Barton’s dangerousness

10
between 2025 (the date of resentencing) and his new parole date based on his
reduced sentence is not likely to be significant, even considering Barton’s age
and current health condition. Moreover, Barton requested his sentence be
reduced to seven years to life, though he had already served more than
14 years at the time of his request. If that sentence were imposed, Barton
would likely be immediately eligible for parole. At the very least, he would
likely be released “within a short time frame.” (Gonzalez, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.) Thus, under Gonzalez, the court would be
permitted to consider his current level of dangerousness. It is disingenuous
for Barton to request a reduction in sentence which would result in his near-
immediate release and then claim the court’s analysis was flawed because it
was not “forward-looking” enough.
The trial court reached a conclusion Barton finds unsatisfactory,
but that does not mean the court did not understand the standard of
dangerousness inquiry or its level of discretion. Indeed, the court appears to
have used its discretion under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3), to evaluate
factors which might justify a reduced sentence. Declining to further reduce
the sentence was the result of that evaluation, not evidence of a lack thereof.2

2 Because we do not find any error in the trial court’s actions, we

need not address the Attorney General’s arguments that any error is
harmless.

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DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order resentencing Barton to 35 years to life is
affirmed.

BANCROFT, J.*

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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