People v. Spellman CA5

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Filed 4/21/26 P. v. Spellman CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088968
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF119528A)
v.

TIMOTHY EDWARD SPELLMAN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. David R. Zulfa,
Judge.
James Bisnow, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and
Jessica A. Eros, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Harrell, J.
Defendant Timothy Edward Spellman was resentenced pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.751 on November 6, 2024. On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by declining to dismiss his prior “strike” convictions within the meaning of
the “Three Strikes” law pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th
497. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant’s criminal sentence stems from a series of robberies he committed on
May 15, 27, and 28, and June 12, 2007. Following the final robbery on June 12, 2007,
defendant fled the scene in a vehicle and was pursued by responding officers from the
Bakersfield Police Department. Defendant crashed the vehicle he was driving into a car
driven by a woman who was transporting eight minor children. As the woman exited her
vehicle, defendant entered the driver’s side door and struggled with the woman.
Defendant abandoned his effort to enter the vehicle. When responding officers appeared
on the scene, defendant pointed a firearm at the officers and then fled on foot. While
pursuing defendant, officers observed that he had a semiautomatic handgun in his left
hand. Officers later apprehended defendant in the backyard of a nearby residence.
Officers seized cash found underneath defendant and found a loaded .22-caliber
semiautomatic pistol in the yard near where he was apprehended. The victims in each of
the aforementioned robberies and the attempted carjacking identified defendant as the
perpetrator.
On April 14, 2008, a jury found defendant guilty of eight felonies: second degree
robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (c); counts 1–4), exhibiting a firearm or deadly weapon with
intent to resist arrest (§ 417.8; count 5), attempted carjacking (§§ 664/215, subd. (a);
count 6), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 7) and

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

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obstructing or resisting an executive officer (§ 69; count 8). As to count 1, the jury found
true that defendant was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and personally used
a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). As to all counts, the trial court found true that
defendant had suffered six prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d)) which also qualified as prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)).
On June 24, 2008, defendant was sentenced to 76 years plus 151 years to life in
prison. On September 7, 2010, defendant was resentenced to 52 years plus 175 years to
life.2
On November 6, 2024, the trial court resentenced defendant pursuant to
section 1172.75, to 10 years plus 150 years to life.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on November 18, 2024.
DISCUSSION
A. Parties’ Arguments
i. Defendant’s Arguments
Defendant contends that due to the length of his incarceration (18 years), his
current age (65), his physical limitations (he walks with a walker, cannot stand for long
periods of time, and has circulatory problems in his toes and feet due to diabetes), and his
rehabilitation in prison (he conducts religious services for terminally-ill patients), he no
longer represents the same risk to the community that he once did. As a result, defendant
argues that in resentencing him, the trial court should have dismissed his prior strike

2 Defendant was originally sentenced to 25 years to life on count 8, which was
stayed under section 654. The record on appeal of the trial court’s September 7, 2010
resentencing includes only the abstract of judgment, which is silent regarding whether the
sentence for count 8—six years plus 25 years to life—was to be served concurrently or
consecutively. Assuming the trial court did not specify whether the sentence for count 8
was to be served concurrently or consecutively, by operation of law, it was to be served
concurrently. (§ 669, subd. (b).) If on the other hand, the trial court pronounced that the
sentence for count 8 was to be served consecutively, then the sentence was 58 years plus
200 years to life.

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convictions sufficient to either result in a sentence of 31 years four months, or a single
sentence of 25 years to life, such that he would have a chance to be released from prison
in his old age. Defendant argues that the 160-year-to-life sentence imposed by the court
rendered “[section] 1172.75 relief meaningless,” and as such, the court acted arbitrarily
and abused its sentencing discretion. Defendant requests that this court vacate his
sentence, remand the matter to the court to dismiss his prior strike convictions for
purposes of sentencing, and “consider whether continued indefinite incarceration serves
any purpose in light of [his] age and disability.”
ii. The People’s Arguments
The People respond that in resentencing defendant, the trial court fully complied
with the requirements of section 1172.75: (1) it dismissed the prior prison term
enhancements, as required, (2) exercised its discretion to dismiss the prior serious felony
conviction enhancements, and (3) while considering evidence of defendant’s age, health,
criminal history, remoteness of prior strikes, and his rehabilitation efforts, properly
exercised its discretion in declining to dismiss the prior strikes convictions. The People
contend that while section 1172.75 generally requires that an offender’s new sentence be
less than his prior sentence, it does not require that defendant be released from custody
earlier. The People maintain that the court did not abuse its discretion, and request that
this court affirm the trial court’s judgment.
B. Section 1172.75 Proceedings
At the November 6, 2024 sentencing hearing, the trial court considered evidence
and arguments submitted by defense counsel and the prosecution.
i. Evidence and Arguments Submitted by Defense
Prior to the November 6, 2024 sentencing hearing, counsel for defendant filed a
sentencing statement supported by exhibits, which the trial court said it reviewed multiple
times in advance of the hearing. Attached to the sentencing statement were five exhibits,
A through E. Defense counsel stated that defendant was a 64-year-old medically disabled

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individual. His disability stemmed primarily from diabetes and its secondary physical
complications. Defense counsel also stated that defendant had a seizure disorder for
which he took medication. Defendant also received mental health treatment in prison.
Defendant’s disabilities required that he sleep on the bottom bunk, limited him to lifting
no more than 20 pounds, and prevented him from walking up steps.
Defendant worked as a porter for inmates in palliative care and assisted them with
their basic needs. Defendant was an imam in the Muslim faith and in that role led
religious services for other inmates and provided spiritual comfort for inmates receiving
palliative care.
Given his medical condition and work with other inmates, defense counsel
requested that the trial court dismiss (1) “invalid priors” which we understand to be a
reference to the one-year sentence enhancements imposed pursuant to section 667.5,
former subdivision (b), (2) enhancements for prior serious felonies imposed pursuant to
section 667, subdivision (a), and (3) all but one of defendant’s prior strike convictions for
sentencing purposes, which would have resulted in an aggregate sentence of 31 years
four months.
Exhibit A of the sentencing statement consisted of a handwritten personal
statement from defendant describing his childhood and the trauma he suffered in his
youth. Exhibit B consisted of classification chronological reports from the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Exhibit C included medical records pertaining
to defendant. Exhibit D contained defendant’s educational records. Finally, Exhibit E
detailed accommodations made for defendant’s religious practices.
ii. Evidence and Arguments Submitted by Prosecution
The prosecution did not file an opposition in advance of the hearing. At the
hearing, the prosecution offered, and the court admitted without objection from defense
counsel, five exhibits. Exhibit 1 was a document entitled “Mugshot Profile” from the
Kern County Sheriff’s Office that included a photograph and identifying information

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about defendant. Exhibit 2 was a document entitled “IMAGE RECORD FOR:”
defendant from the Department of Motor Vehicles, which included his photograph and
identifying information. Exhibit 3 was a certified copy of a California Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System (CLETS) printout regarding defendant. Exhibit 4 was
out-of-state criminal history report for defendant. Exhibit 5 was an addendum to the
document included as Exhibit 4.
At the resentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that the trial court should
follow the recommendation of the probation officer (summarized below) because of
defendant’s history of serious criminal misconduct, including the use of firearms to
threaten violence in his commission of multiple robberies. While the prosecutor
acknowledged that defendant had done “good work in prison,” when he was out of prison
defendant was a danger to the community. The prosecutor argued that defendant’s
repeated criminal conduct made defendant a “poster child for the Three Strikes” law.
iii. Probation Officer’s Reports
The record includes probation officer’s reports filed in 2008, 2010, 2022, and
2023. According to the 2008 report, defendant had prior convictions for larceny (1980),
burglary and larceny (1980), burglary (1981), robbery (1982), and federal convictions for
theft (1987) and bank robbery (1989). The report also indicated that he had multiple
parole violations in the 1980’s. On his 1989 bank robbery conviction, defendant was
sentenced to 210 months in custody (17.5 years) and three years’ probation.3 Defendant

3 Generally speaking, federal criminal defendants cannot be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment and probation for the same non-petty offense. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Forbes
(9th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3d 675, 676 [holding that “[t]he statute [18 U.S.C. § 3561,
subdivision (a)(3)] precludes the imposition of both probation and straight
imprisonment.”] We presume then, that the probation officer’s reference to violation of
federal probation was a violation of his supervised release, which may be combined with
a term of imprisonment. (See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583, which authorizes courts to
sentence a defendant to a term of supervised release after imprisonment.)

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was placed in custody for 90 days for violating his conditional release in 2005 and
11 months for violating his probation in 2006.
For his resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, the probation officer
recommended that the trial court sentence defendant as a third-strike defendant on each
count, to wit: to 25 years to life on counts 1 through 6, with counts 2 through 6 to be
served consecutively, plus a determinate term of 40 years. On count 7, the probation
officer recommended that defendant be sentenced to 25 years to life, to be served
concurrently. On count 8, the probation officer recommended that defendant be
sentenced to 25 years to life, stayed pursuant to section 654. In addition, the probation
officer recommended that the trial court impose various restitution fines and statutory
fees.
iv. The Trial Court’s Comments Prior to Imposing Sentence
After receiving the foregoing evidence and argument from the parties and the
recommendation of the probation officer, the trial court explained its assessment of
defendant’s suitability for a reduced sentence:

“THE COURT: This case poses to this court an odd and unusual
juxtaposition. [Defendant’s] criminal history is substantial and significant
and he is, as [the prosecutor] put it at the time of his conviction [and]
certainly I agreed[,] he was the poster child for the Three-Strikes law.
However, [defendant] has demonstrated over the course of the last 17 years
that there has been [a] change in his circumstances and most likely in who
he is as a person and that’s not lost on the court and in that respect he is
quite frankly the poster child for the reh[a]bilitative process that can occur
while in CDCR custody and so we have those competing influences
presented in front of this court. The court is not able to simply I don’t want
to say ignore because, [defense counsel], I don’t think that’s what you’re
asking me to do. I don’t think you’re asking me to ignore his prior criminal
history.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No.

“THE COURT: So I don’t like that term but I cannot disregard the
substantial criminal history and the fact that many of these crimes appear to

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be somewhat similar in nature; robberies, firearms, burglaries, things of that
nature. But I also can’t disregard what he has done to improve his lot and
to be a productive member of his current community, which also does carry
weight. So with that in mind, I am prepared to exercise the discretion that I
have been provided under numerous statutes including [sections] 1172.75
and 1385 … and I am prepared to … resentence … [defendant].”
With these thoughts in mind, the trial court declined to strike defendant’s prior
strike convictions and resentenced defendant to 10 years plus 150 years to life.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion at the Section 1172.75
Resentencing Hearing
i. Applicable Law
Section 1172.75 makes any sentence enhancement imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 667.5, legally invalid unless it was imposed
for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of
section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
In a resentencing conducted pursuant to section 1172.75, the court (1) must ensure
that the resulting sentence is less than the original sentence “unless the court finds by
clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety,” (2) shall apply the Judicial Council’s sentencing rules and any other changes in
law “that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing,” and (3) where applicable, “[u]nless
the court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have
been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1), (d)(2),
& (d)(4).) In addition, the resentencing court may consider postconviction evidence, if
any, such as the defendant’s disciplinary record, rehabilitation record, whether the
defendant’s age, time served, or diminished physical condition have reduced the risk of

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future violence, and evidence that circumstances have changed since the defendant was
originally sentenced “so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
An eligible defendant under section 1172.75 is entitled to a full resentencing.
(People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1067, fn. 3 [“where § 1172.75 applies, it
requires full resentencing, not simply striking the now-invalidated priors”]; People v.
Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 401–402 [“[b]y its plain terms, section 1172.75
requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’
enhancements”]).
“[S]ection 1172.75, subdivision (d), vests the superior court with broad discretion
based on an inherently factual inquiry” in resentencing a defendant, and we review the
resentencing order for an abuse of that discretion. (People v. Garcia (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 848, 856−857.) When reviewing a decision for abuse of discretion, the
appellate court does not reweigh the evidence. (People v. Johnson & Johnson (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 295, 352; People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1250.)

ii. Romero Motion
In Romero, our Supreme Court “explained that the ‘power to dismiss an action,’
… ‘in furtherance of justice’ pursuant to … section 1385[, subdivision ](a), ‘includes the
lesser power to strike … allegations’ or vacate findings ‘relevant to sentencing, such as
the allegation’ or finding ‘that a defendant has prior felony convictions.’ ” (People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 151 (Williams).)
In ruling on a motion to dismiss a prior strike conviction under the Three Strikes
law, the trial court must consider the “nature and circumstances” of the present felonies
and prior convictions, as well as the defendant’s “background, character, and prospects.”
(Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) The court must then determine whether the
defendant should be considered outside of the spirit of the Three Strikes sentencing

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scheme, in whole or in part, and thus should be treated as though he had not previously
been convicted of one or more strike offenses. (Ibid.)
We review an order on a Romero motion for an abuse of discretion. (Williams,
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 162.) This review is “guided by two fundamental precepts.”
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376.) First, the party challenging the
sentence has the burden to clearly demonstrate the sentencing decision was arbitrary or
irrational. (Ibid.) Otherwise, we presume the trial court acted to achieve legitimate
sentencing objectives and will not set aside its discretionary determination to impose a
particular sentence. (Id. at pp. 376–377.) Second, we will not reverse a sentencing
decision merely because reasonable people may disagree. (Id. at p. 377.) “Taken
together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its
decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Ibid.)
Because “extraordinary circumstances” must be present for a career criminal to be
deemed outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law, even more extraordinary
circumstances must be present for a reviewing court to find that no reasonable people
could disagree that such a person is outside the spirit of the law. (Id. at p. 378.)
iii. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion
The trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion was not irrational or arbitrary.
Defendant has an extensive criminal history predating his current offenses. This record
has kept him in custody or under supervision for much of his adult life. Defendant was
convicted of various theft, burglary, and robbery offenses throughout the 1980’s until he
was incarcerated for two counts of bank robbery in 1989. From 1981 to the commission
of his present offenses, defendant violated probation or parole on multiple occasions.
Then, within a year of his release from a violation of his supervised release related to his
1989 bank robbery convictions, he committed the instant offenses between May and
June 2007. While defendant’s most recent prior strike conviction took place roughly
18 years prior to the case at bar, “[i]n determining whether a prior conviction is remote,

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the trial court should not simply consult the Gregorian calendar with blinders on.”
(People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813; see People v. Solis (2015) 232
Cal.App.4th 1108, 1124 [a prior strike conviction is not properly stricken merely because
it is 30 years old].) “To be sure, a prior conviction may be stricken if it is remote in time.
In criminal law parlance, this is sometimes referred to as ‘washing out.’ [Citations.] The
phrase is apt because it carries the connotation of a crime-free cleansing period of
rehabilitation after a defendant has had the opportunity to reflect upon the error of his or
her ways.” (Humphrey, at p. 813.) Here, defendant did not live a “ ‘legally blameless
life’ ” after his prior strike convictions—he committed the present offenses, a series of
armed robberies. (Ibid.)
Moreover, defendant having committed a series of armed robberies after having
suffered multiple theft, burglary, and robbery convictions “ ‘reveal[ed] that [he] had been
taught, through the application of formal sanction, that [such] criminal conduct was
unacceptable—but had failed or refused to learn his lesson.’ ” (Williams, supra, 17
Cal.4th at p. 163.)
Notwithstanding the trial court’s recognition of defendant’s criminal past and the
seriousness of the offenses for which he is presently incarcerated, the court gave weight
to defendant’s efforts to improve himself while incarcerated and found that he had shown
himself to be a “poster child” for the rehabilitative process that can occur for some people
in custody. The court made clear that it took these facts into account in exercising its
discretion while sentencing defendant.
This careful weighing of defendant’s unique circumstances is apparent in the
sentence imposed by the trial court. Not only did the court dismiss the invalid
one-year prison priors but also dismissed each of the five-year enhancements for
defendant’s prior serious felony convictions. This exercise of discretion in sentencing
reflects a careful weighing of competing facts, which was consistent with the court’s
duty, and was not irrational or arbitrary.

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Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not placing more emphasis and
weight on the postconviction factors identified in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3)—
especially his age, time served, and diminished physical condition—to find that he no
longer represented a risk of further violence such that continued incarceration was no
longer in the interest of justice. But there is nothing in the record showing that the court
ignored this evidence and “[t]he court is presumed to have considered all of the relevant
factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.” (People v. Myers (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310; accord, People v. Edwards (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 523, 529;
People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.) The trial court was not obligated to
explain its reasoning as to every relevant factor, and we do not infer that the court failed
to consider certain factors because it did not mention them on the record.
Defendant argues that the “weight of the record” shows that defendant is no longer
a threat to the community and that continued incarceration does not serve the interest of
justice. We do not discount that this may be a reasonable assessment of the evidence, but
we cannot say that it is the only assessment on which reasonable people can agree. It also
not the role of this court to reweigh the evidence before the trial court. (People v.
Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 352; People v. JTH Tax, Inc., supra, 212
Cal.App.4th at p. 1250.)
Defendant’s efforts to rehabilitate himself in prison through his religious faith and
caring for other inmates are commendable, as recognized by the trial court. That
evidence does not, however, compel a finding that defendant is not a threat to public
safety such that continued incarceration is not in the interest of justice or that he is
outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
Based on the record before this court, we find the trial court’s decision to not
dismiss appellant’s prior strike convictions was not “so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
Accordingly, appellant has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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