CourtListener 10845592•In re R.S. CA1/1
Texto completo
Filed 4/20/26 In re R.S. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re R.S., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
LAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A174814
v.
(Lake County
A.S.,
Super. Ct. No. JV320688)
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
A.S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her
parental rights as to R.S. following a Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.26 hearing.2 Mother contends the Lake County Department of Social
Services (the Department) failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it raises no
substantial issue of fact or law. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) On our own
motion, we take judicial notice of the record filed in the dismissed appeal no.
A173755 (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a)), portions of which the
parties cite in their briefing in this appeal.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
1
of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related state law (§ 224 et seq.)
by not questioning extended family members as to whether R.S. might be of
Native American descent. The Department concedes that a conditional
reversal and remand for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with
ICWA is warranted here. We agree and conditionally reverse and remand
the matter to the juvenile court for compliance with ICWA’s inquiry and
notice requirements.
In August 2024, after R.S. sustained serious physical injuries, the
Department detained R.S. and filed a petition alleging he came within section
300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j) (petition).
In its jurisdiction report, the Department stated ICWA may apply, as
the paternal grandmother reported Native American ancestry. R.S.’s parents
reported they do not have Native American ancestry. The report does not
indicate whether the Department contacted other relatives about R.S.’s
potential Native American ancestry, even though the notice for the
jurisdiction hearing listed several living relatives, including a paternal
grandfather and a paternal great-grandmother.
In January 2025, R.S.’s presumed father died. Shortly thereafter, the
juvenile court sustained the petition as to Mother.
In its disposition report, the Department stated ICWA did not apply,
noting that R.S.’s parents reported that they did not have Native American
ancestry. Attached to the report was Mother’s signed Judicial Council ICWA-
020 form, indicating no Native American ancestry. The report made no
mention of any efforts to ask other relatives whether R.S. had any Native
American ancestry.
The juvenile court bypassed reunification services to Mother, found
R.S.’s current out-of-home placement was appropriate, and set a selection
2
and implementation hearing under section 366.26. In doing so, the court
found ICWA did not apply.
Prior to the section 366.26 hearing, the Department filed an ICWA
compliance report recommending a finding that ICWA did not apply.
According to the report, the Department either contacted or attempted to
contact R.S.’s parents, paternal grandmother, and several maternal relatives
regarding potential Native American ancestry. R.S.’s father reported
potential Native American ancestry, and R.S.’s paternal grandmother
“indicated that she is a descendant of the Choctaw people.” The report
further stated that the Department mailed ICWA-030 forms to the
“pertinent” tribes. Two tribes responded by letter that the family members
identified in the ICWA-030 form were not enrolled members and were not
eligible for enrollment. The third tribe provided no response.
At the ICWA compliance hearing, the juvenile court found the
Department exercised due diligence to inquire whether R.S. had Native
American heritage, R.S. was not an Indian child, and ICWA did not apply.
At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s
parental rights and ordered a permanent plan of adoption. Mother timely
appealed.
Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the Department failed to
comply with its duty of inquiry under ICWA because it did not attempt to
locate or interview several paternal family members about R.S.’s potential
Native American ancestry. The Department asserts, and the record shows,
that three of the paternal family members identified by Mother are deceased
or likely deceased, but it agrees that a conditional remand is appropriate
because the record is “not clear on the inquiries that were made” of R.S.’s
paternal grandfather and one of his paternal great-grandmothers. We agree.
3
Under ICWA, the juvenile court and the Department have an
“affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” whether R.S. is or may be an
Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) Because this duty is a continuing one, a
juvenile court has a present duty of inquiry even if it previously found a child
was not an Indian child and that order has become final. (See In re Isaiah
W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 10; In re Michael V. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 225, 233–
234.) The duty of inquiry includes making “a meaningful effort to locate and
interview extended family members to obtain whatever information they may
have as to the child’s possible Indian status.” (In re K.R. (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709.) This duty of inquiry “continues throughout the
dependency proceedings.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1132.)
As the Department concedes, the record does not indicate whether the
Department attempted to contact and interview R.S.’s paternal grandfather
and paternal great-grandmother regarding whether R.S. may be an Indian
child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) In accepting the Department’s concession and
remanding for ICWA compliance, we do not mean to suggest the Department
will necessarily fulfill its duty merely by consulting the two identified family
members.
The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed. The
matter is remanded to the juvenile court for compliance with ICWA’s inquiry
and notice requirements. If the juvenile court finds there has been adequate
further inquiry and concludes ICWA does not apply, the court shall reinstate
its order terminating parental rights. If the juvenile court concludes ICWA
applies, it shall proceed in accordance with ICWA and California’s
implementing provisions.3 (See In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152.)
3 Although the Department has requested immediate issuance of a
remittitur, neither Mother nor her counsel has stipulated to the immediate
4
_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
HUMES, P. J.
_________________________
SMILEY, J.
Lake County Department of Social Services v. A.S. / A174814
issuance of the remittitur. We “may direct immediate issuance of a
remittitur only on the parties’ stipulation or on dismissal of the appeal under
rule 8.244(c)(2).” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(1), italics added.) If the
parties file a joint application and stipulation to the immediate issuance of a
remittitur, the court anticipates it will be granted.
5
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