Rahgoshay v. Pugh CA4/3

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Filed 4/20/26 Rahgoshay v. Pugh CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MOHAMMAD RAHGOSHAY et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants, G063534

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2018-
00982971)
SAHAR S. PUGH et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Nick A. Dourbetas, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Craig J. Beauchamp and Craig J. Beauchamp for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Milstein Jackson Fairchild & Wade, Mark A. Milstein and Mayo
L. Makarczyk for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
Plaintiffs in this lawsuit are Mohammad Rahgoshay and MRMK,
LLC (MRMK). Rahgoshay and nonparty Fariborz Wosoughkia (Kia)1 were
business partners who made three investments together. Two of these were
made through MRMK, an entity they formed to pursue their investments.
Defendant Sahar S. Pugh is an attorney employed by defendant Milstein
Jackson Fairchild & Wade LLP (Milstein; collectively defendants). Pugh
provided some assistance to Rahgoshay, Kia, and MRMK in making these
investments, but the parties dispute the extent of her involvement. Plaintiffs
claim Pugh orally agreed to represent them, while defendants contend Pugh
was doing Kia a personal favor.
Plaintiffs lost hundreds of thousands of dollars in the three
investments, and Rahgoshay and Kia’s relationship deteriorated. Plaintiffs
then sued defendants for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and
breach of oral contract. Generally, plaintiffs alleged that Pugh had provided
deficient legal services in connection with the three investments. After a
bench trial, the trial court ruled in defendants’ favor. It largely relied on the
testimony of Pugh and Kia, who both testified that defendants never provided
legal representation to Kia or plaintiffs. The court subsequently entered
judgment in defendants’ favor.
Plaintiffs’ contentions on appeal are difficult to parse, and many
of their arguments are not clearly articulated. They appear to primarily
argue that the trial court erred in finding Kia’s and Pugh’s testimony to be
credible. But plaintiffs misconstrue the legal standard for challenging
credibility findings and have failed to show the testimony believed by the

1 Fariborz Wosoughkia is also known as Mike Kia, and he was

referred to as Mr. Kia during trial.

2
court was “‘“unbelievable per se,”’ physically impossible or ‘“wholly
unacceptable to reasonable minds.”’” (Oldham v. Kizer (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d
1046, 1065.)
We also reject plaintiffs’ apparent contention that the trial court
erred in finding no oral contract and no attorney-client or fiduciary
relationship between defendants and plaintiffs. While plaintiffs have cited
evidence from which the lower court could have ruled differently, they have
not shown that its findings are unsupported by substantial evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.2
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
THE INVESTMENTS
Rahgoshay and Kia met in early 2015 and agreed to partner
together to make investments. When they met, Rahgoshay had a real estate
broker’s license and invested in real estate.
Rahgoshay and Kia’s first investment occurred prior to MRMK’s
creation. They invested in ModTech Global, Inc. (ModTech), which had
created a media streaming device that was compared at trial “to a more
advanced [Amazon] Fire Stick.” Kia and one of ModTech’s principals signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) in November 2015. Under the MOU,
Rahgoshay and Kia agreed to purchase 25 percent of ModTech’s stock in
exchange for eight total payments of $1,500,000, with an initial payment of
$100,000. This 25 percent ownership share was supposed to be held by an

2 We grant plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to correct misstatements

and missing citations in their opening brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(e)(2)(A).) We also grant their motion to augment the record. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a).)

3
entity to be created called “WR,” which would have signing authority for
ModTech’s bank account.
Around this time, ModTech, Rahgoshay, and Kia began sharing
an office suite in a building in Newport Beach. Their suite was next door to
Pugh’s office. Kia and Pugh met around late 2015, due to the proximity of
their respective offices. According to Pugh, she and Kia “were both kind of
social.” After they met, he was in her office all the time and “constantly . . .
asking [her] for favors” like “us[ing] the copy machine or send[ing] an e-mail
on his behalf.” According to Pugh, Kia started asking for help with
investments in late 2015 or early 2016. She was happy to assist since “[Kia]
was a co-tenant,” “friendly,” and “seemed like he needed some help.” She also
explained that she has “an open door at [her] office, and people pop in and we
help each other.”
Kia introduced Pugh and Rahgoshay. Plaintiffs claim there was a
meeting between Rahgoshay, Kia, and Pugh in December 2015, in which
Pugh orally agreed to provide Rahgoshay and Kia with legal services for their
investments. These services allegedly included forming entities to hold
investments, preparing agreements for stock purchases, providing general
legal counsel to Rahgoshay and Kia and any entities they formed, and
conducting due diligence for potential investments. At trial, Pugh could not
recall this meeting, while Kia denied any such meeting occurred.
Rahgoshay and Kia made their initial $100,000 payment to
ModTech after the alleged meeting between them and Pugh in December
2015. Rahgoshay provided the funds for this investment.
After the ModTech investment, Rahgoshay and Kia incorporated
MRMK in Nevada as their investment vehicle. MRMK’s articles of
organization list Rahgoshay and Kia as MRMK’s only two managers.

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Rahgoshay and Kia made two investments through MRMK.
Shortly after its formation, MRMK invested $100,000 in Peri, Inc. (Peri),
which was developing an “intelligent phone case cover.” Rahgoshay provided
MRMK with this investment capital.
The other investment was in ERA Ventura, LLC (ERA), which
owned a nightclub and restaurant. Plaintiffs assert that MRMK invested
$460,000 in ERA based on Pugh’s recommendation. It invested $120,000 in
February 2016, followed by investments of $240,000 and $100,000 in March
and July 2016, respectively. Rahgoshay again provided the investment
capital.
Plaintiffs assert that Pugh was MRMK’s general counsel. The
record also contains several e-mail exchanges between Pugh and various
representatives of Peri and ERA concerning the investments.
II.
THE LAWSUIT
The above investments all failed, and Rahgoshay and Kia had a
falling out. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in March 2018, alleging that Pugh had
failed to exercise reasonable care in providing legal services for the
investments and had prioritized Kia’s interests over theirs.
As to the ModTech investment, plaintiffs claimed that Pugh was
supposed to form WR to hold Rahgoshay and Kia’s investment in ModTech
but failed to do so. Instead, ModTech allegedly added both Rahgoshay and
Kia as signatories to its bank account in place of WR based on Pugh’s advice.
This purportedly allowed Kia to improperly take $55,000 from ModTech’s
account for his personal use, which harmed ModTech and led to its failure.
Next, plaintiffs asserted that Kia had represented to them that
Pugh had reviewed Peri’s financial information and approved the investment.

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However, plaintiffs claimed they later learned that Pugh had not reviewed
these documents, and they would not have invested in Peri had they known
this.
As for ERA, Pugh allegedly failed to inform plaintiffs of various
issues that arose during due diligence. In particular, they asserted that Pugh
had failed to inform them that ERA was not providing corporate records for
review and that ERA’s manager ceased contact with Pugh. Like the Peri
investment, plaintiffs claimed they would not have invested in ERA had
Pugh informed them of these issues.
Based on the above allegations, plaintiffs asserted claims against
defendants for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of oral
contract.
Defendants denied any oral contract between them and plaintiffs,
and they also denied that there was an attorney-client or fiduciary
relationship between the parties.
III.
THE TRIAL
A. Relevant Testimony
A bench trial was held on plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants called
Kia as a witness. He generally testified that Pugh did not represent either
MRMK or Rahgoshay. He also denied that either he or Rahgoshay had asked
Pugh to do due diligence on any investment deals. Rather, he stated that he
had asked Pugh as a personal favor to send e-mails to Peri and ERA to make
MRMK look like a bigger company. He further clarified that he and
Rahgoshay knew Pugh was only doing them a favor and did not actually
represent MRMK.

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Pugh echoed Kia’s testimony. She testified that she had sent e-
mails on MRMK’s behalf to potential investment targets as a favor to Kia.
She also stated that Kia prepared and reviewed the relevant investment
documents and that she only “transferr[ed] documents back and forth via e-
mail.”
Rahgoshay stated that prior to meeting Kia he had a real estate
broker’s license that he used for individual real estate investment. He also
traded public stocks. He also testified that a meeting occurred in December
2015 between Kia, Pugh, and himself. Kia arranged the meeting, and it
occurred in a small conference room in their office suite. According to
Rahgoshay, at the meeting, Pugh agreed to represent him, Kia, and any
investment entity they formed. However, he admitted that no one took any
notes at this meeting, nor did Pugh state what she would charge for any
services.
B. Statement of Decision
Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court ruled in
defendants’ favor and provided an oral statement of decision. The court
prefaced its ruling by explaining, “this is a credibility determination . . . case.
We have different witnesses saying different things.” It then found the
accounts of defendants’ witnesses more credible than plaintiffs’ witnesses.
The trial court relied heavily on Kia’s testimony. It explained,
“Mr. Kia had the most to lose by testifying in the way he did because he
testified that, if [plaintiffs] were to be successful in this lawsuit and get
money, that would benefit him. So he is really here testifying against his own
interest, and I can’t ignore that. Mr. Kia testified that he did the due
diligence.”

7
Further, Rahgoshay and Kia were “experienced business people”
that relied on each other in making investments. Rahgoshay provided capital,
while Kia “was the sweat equity partner of MRMK.” The trial court believed
Kia’s testimony that he was the point person on all the investments and he
and Rahgoshay just “used Ms. Pugh . . . . to make their company seem bigger
and stronger.”
As the trial court explained, “Mr. Kia was the quote/unquote
lawyer here. He put together the . . . due diligence list. He was the point
person for MRMK and Mr. Rahgoshay. He wrote the MOU for ModTech.
Again, Mr. Kia and Mr. Rahgoshay are experienced business people. These
are not two gentlemen who are in distress business wise and needed Ms.
Pugh to advise them on a single thing.” “Mr. Kia was MRMK’s mouthpiece.
He was the communicator. He was the guy who was bringing in the business.
Mr. Rahgoshay did not appear to want to communicate with anyone directly,
but rather through Mr. Kia. And it sounded like that was their
understanding for MRMK and the relationship between Mr. Rahgoshay and
Mr. Kia. And that’s fine. [¶] Somebody communicates with everyone, brings
in the businesses. Mr. Rahgoshay is the money guy.”
The trial court acknowledged the e-mails sent by Pugh to
investment targets. While those e-mails were ‘“a mistake and probably not
prudent,” the court found they did not “rise to any sort of legal duty or
representation, and that is because of Mr. Kia’s testimony.”
Finally, the trial court concluded, “defendants were not negligent.
There was no breach of fiduciary duty. There was no [oral] contract here.
There was not an attorney-client [relationship].” Thus, “Mr. Rahgoshay is not
entitled to recover any damages against the defendants because . . . the court
does not find that there . . . is any sort of liability on the defendant’s part.”

8
The trial court later entered judgment in defendants’ favor,
which plaintiffs appeal.
DISCUSSION
“The most fundamental principle of appellate review is that ‘“A
judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it . . . .”’” (Universal Home
Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 116, 125–126.) “[T]he
appellant must frame the issues for us, show us where the superior court
erred, and provide us with the proper citations to the record and case law.”
(Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892, 913.) “‘“‘As
with an appeal from any judgment, it is the appellant’s responsibility to
affirmatively demonstrate error . . . by citation to the record and any
supporting authority.’”’” (Ibid.)
I.
PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs’ opening brief is difficult to follow. An appellant must
“‘[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the
point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of
authority.’ [Citations.] Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that
may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading.”
(Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.)
Here, the “Legal Argument” section in plaintiffs’ opening brief
contains four main headings, each of which we assume contains a single
primary argument. (See Pizarro v. Reynoso, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.)
Plaintiffs four main headings are as follows:
• “A. The Very Difficult ‘Substantial Evidence Standard,”
• “B. Generally Reasonable Rules of Thumb for Judging Credibility . . . ,”

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• “C. The Objection to the Trial Court’s Statement of Decision,” and
• “D. Defendants are Liable for Negligent Conductor Malpractice.”
(Boldface omitted.)
The first heading only contains two subheadings, which both discuss the
applicable standard of review in this appeal. The fourth heading does not
contain any subheadings.
However, the second heading contains nine subheadings, and the
third heading contains five subheadings. The points made under each of
these subheadings should presumably support the primary argument
advanced in the main heading. (Dictionary.com (2026), at
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/subheading [as of Mar. 27, 2026],
archived at: https://perma.cc/U23Y-Y7KJ [defining “subheading” as “a
division subordinate to a main heading or title”].) But for many of these
points, it is unclear whether they support the argument advanced in the
main heading, or whether they are intended to be new arguments that are
detached from it. Further, many of the arguments advanced under these
subheadings are not clearly articulated, making it difficult for us to analyze
them.
“It is not our responsibility to act as counsel for [plaintiffs] and
attempt to arrange [their] arguments coherently.” (Pizarro v. Reynoso, supra,
10 Cal.App.5th at p. 181; Perry v. City of San Diego (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th
172, 188, fn. 8 [“It is not this court’s role to connect the dots”].) Plaintiffs’
“failure to present complete and coherent headings and legal arguments is
significant because, as the appellant[s], it is [their] burden to overcome the
presumption on appeal that the underlying order is correct.” (Pizarro, at p.
181.)

10
Given the lack of clarity in plaintiffs’ opening brief, we construe
the points set forth in the subheadings as supporting the argument under the
main heading. To the extent plaintiffs intended to raise new arguments in
the subheadings distinct from the argument in the main heading, those
arguments are forfeited. Their “failure to provide coherent organization to
[their] arguments forfeits consideration of those arguments on appeal.”
(Pizarro v. Reynoso, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 181.)
II.
WITNESS CREDIBILITY
Plaintiffs’ arguments under the first and second main headings
address the same issue: witness credibility. The analysis under the first
heading discusses the appropriate standard of review. The argument under
the second heading appears to apply that standard of review to the trial
court’s credibility findings on Kia’s and Pugh’s testimony. This argument is
divided into nine subparts (under nine different subheadings) that ostensibly
explain the errors in these credibility findings. However, plaintiffs’ argument
is based on a misunderstanding of the applicable standard of review. As such,
they have not met their burden of showing error.
Plaintiffs’ argument begins by quoting case law explaining the
substantial evidence standard: “Under the deferential substantial evidence
standard of review, we ‘liberally construe[]’ findings of fact ‘to support the
judgment and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the
findings.’ [Citation.] ‘We may not reweigh the evidence and are bound by the
trial court’s credibility determinations.’ [Citation.] Testimony believed by the
trial court ‘may be rejected only when it is inherently improbable or
incredible, i.e., “‘unbelievable per se,”’ physically impossible or ‘“wholly

11
unacceptable to reasonable minds.’”’ [Citation.] ‘“The ultimate determination
is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found for the respondent
based on the whole record.”’” (Quoting McPherson v. EF Intercultural
Foundation, Inc. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 243, 257 (McPherson).)
Plaintiffs then attempt to define what it means for testimony to
be “incredible” or “inherently improbable.” (McPherson, supra, 47
Cal.App.5th at p. 257.) To ascertain this definition, they quote a passage from
Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633
(Kuhn), which they believe contains the standard for “incredible” or
“inherently improbable” testimony: “While substantial evidence may consist
of inferences, such inferences must be ‘a product of logic and reason’ and
‘must rest on the evidence’ [citation]; inferences that are the result of mere
speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding.” (Quoting Kuhn, supra, 22
Cal.App.4th at p. 1633.)
Plaintiffs appear to tie the standard in Kuhn to the standard for
witness credibility. Their specific argument is difficult to parse. But they
appear to believe that a trial court’s credibility findings can be reversed if
they are not based on logical inferences or otherwise supported by the record.
In the nine subdivisions under the second main heading (Section IV.B.1
through B.9.), plaintiffs appear to argue that the trial court’s credibility
findings were based on unreasonable inferences or failed to account for
evidence favoring plaintiffs.
We need not consider their specific arguments because plaintiffs
misstate the standard for determining witness credibility. Kuhn does not
support their argument. The passage of Kuhn that plaintiffs quote was not
discussing the standard for evaluating whether testimony was “incredible” or
“inherently improbable” as plaintiffs suggest. It had nothing to do with

12
witness credibility. Rather, it was explaining the proper inferences that
appellate courts can make from the record. Further, McPherson already
explains that for testimony to be “incredible” or “inherently improbable,” it
must be “‘“‘unbelievable per se,’” physically impossible or “‘wholly
unacceptable to reasonable minds.”’’”3 (McPherson, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
p. 257.)
Other appellate courts have set forth the same standard as
McPherson. “‘“[I]t is the exclusive province of the [trier of fact] to determine
the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends.”’ [Citations.] Testimony may be rejected only when it
is inherently improbable or incredible, i.e., ‘“unbelievable per se,”’ physically
impossible or ‘“wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds.”’” (Oldham v. Kizer,
supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1065.) There must be a showing of “physical
impossibility, apparent falsity or extreme outlandishness. [I]nconsistencies
and conflicts in the evidence go to credibility of witnesses and weight of the
evidence, which are matters for the trial court.” (In re S.A. (2010) 182
Cal.App.4th 1128, 1149.)
In sum, to challenge the trial court’s credibility findings,
plaintiffs had the burden of showing relevant testimony believed by the court
was “inherently improbable or incredible,” i.e., “‘“unbelievable per se,”’
physically impossible or ‘“wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds.”’”
(Oldham v. Kizer, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1065.) Since plaintiffs’

3 Plaintiffs also cite case law that explains substantial evidence

“is evidence . . . ‘of ponderable legal significance, . . . reasonable in nature,
credible, and of solid value.’” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870,
873.) This portion of Bowers is also discussing the substantial evidence
standard generally. It is not providing a standard for witness credibility.

13
argument is based on the wrong legal standard, they have not met that
burden of showing error.
While we need not do so, we will address what appears to be
plaintiffs’ primary contention regarding Kia’s credibility. The trial court
found his testimony credible in part because he was testifying against his
own interest. Plaintiffs contend this was untrue because Kia had no financial
interest in MRMK. They argue that Kia’s distribution rights under Nevada
law were dependent on a “unanimously approved operating agreement.”
Plaintiffs claim that MRMK never had an operating agreement, so Kia had
no distribution rights. Thus, he had no personal interest in whether MRMK
recovered money in this lawsuit. This argument is unpersuasive for several
reasons.
First, the relevant inquiry is not whether Kia actually had a
financial interest in MRMK. Rather, the question is whether Kia believed he
had an interest in MRMK. If he did, his testimony against MRMK would still
be contrary to that expected financial interest. Plaintiffs cite no evidence that
Kia knew he had no financial interest in MRMK.
Second, plaintiffs have not cited any evidence that MRMK had no
operating agreement. In its statement of decision, the trial court explained
that it “never heard anything about an operating agreement for [MRMK], so
I am not sure if there is one.” Thus, it is unclear whether MRMK had an
operating agreement that set forth Kia’s distribution rights.
Third, plaintiffs misinterpret the applicable law. Their argument
is based on Nevada Revised Statute section 86.279, which states,
“‘distribution’ means a direct or indirect transfer of money or property . . . by
a limited-liability company to or for the benefit of all holders of any one or
more classes or series of its members’ interests with respect to such interests

14
or as otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating
agreement.” (Italics added.) To the extent this statute governs here, the
italicized portion explains that an operating agreement is not necessary to
determine distribution rights. Rather, it appears an operating agreement can
be used to alter the general rule that distributions are made with respect to a
member’s interest in the entity. Thus, even if MRMK has no operating
agreement, Kia would presumably be entitled to distributions based on his
interest in the entity.
III.
MERITS
The arguments under the third and fourth heading in plaintiffs’
opening brief appear to challenge the trial court’s factual findings that no
oral contract existed and that the parties were not in an attorney-client or
fiduciary relationship.
We review the trial court’s factual findings under the substantial
evidence standard. (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570,
581.) “This traditional standard of review is highly deferential. It has three
pillars. First, we accept all evidence supporting the trial court’s order.
Second, we completely disregard contrary evidence. Third, we draw all
reasonable inferences to affirm the trial court. These three pillars support the
lintel: we do not reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Under this standard of
review, parties challenging a trial court’s factfinding bear an ‘“enormous
burden.”’” (Id. at pp. 581–582.)
Plaintiffs’ argument consists of citations to evidence from which
the trial court could have found the existence of an oral contract, attorney-
client relationship, or fiduciary relationship. They contend (1) various e-mails
show that Pugh agreed to do due diligence on some of the investments,

15
(2) there was expert witness testimony that some of the favors Pugh did for
MRMK included legal services, and (3) Rahgoshay testified that Pugh offered
to provide legal services in exchange for compensation.
This argument is unpersuasive. When performing substantial
evidence review, we disregard evidence contrary to the trial court’s findings.
(Schmidt v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 581–582.) “Our job
is only to see if substantial evidence exists to support the verdict in favor of
the prevailing party, not to determine whether substantial evidence might
support the losing party’s version of events.” (Id. at p. 582.) Plaintiffs have
not met their burden of showing that the above findings are unsupported by
substantial evidence.
Further, as the trial court noted, there was testimony that (1) Kia
was the point person on all the deals, (2) Kia and Rahgoshay only used
Pugh’s name to make MRMK appear bigger, (3) Rahgoshay had a real estate
broker’s license and both he and Kia were experienced business people, and
(4) Pugh was not paid for any of the alleged services provided to MRMK, Kia,
or Rahgoshay. This evidence sufficiently supports the court’s factual findings
that there was no oral contract and that no attorney-client or fiduciary
relationship existed between the parties.
Plaintiffs also claim that Rahgoshay provided the only testimony
regarding the terms of the alleged oral contract, and they suggest the trial
court erred by failing to credit his testimony. But “‘[t]he trier of fact is free to
reject any witness’ uncontradicted testimony; and the court of appeal will
affirm so long as the rejection was not arbitrary.’” (Goehring v. Chapman

16
University (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 353, 368.) Rahgoshay has not made this
showing.4
IV.
SANCTIONS
We deny defendants’ request for sanctions under Code of Civil
Procedure section 907, which authorizes sanctions for frivolous appeals.
“[A]n appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is
prosecuted for an improper motive—to harass the respondent or delay the
effect of an adverse judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit—when
any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and
completely without merit.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637,
650.) “Counsel and their clients have a right to present issues that are
arguably correct, even if it is extremely unlikely that they will win on appeal.
An appeal that is simply without merit is not by definition frivolous and
should not incur sanctions. Counsel should not be deterred from filing such
appeals out of a fear of reprisals.” (Ibid.)
Due to this high standard, we are not persuaded that this appeal
was frivolous. Defendants cite briefing delays that occurred during the
pendency of this appeal, such as plaintiffs’ requests for continuances, but it is
not clear that such requests were improper. (See In re Marriage of Flaherty,
supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 650.) And while plaintiffs’ contentions were unclear at
times, their comprehensible arguments were not indisputably without merit.
(Ibid.)

4 Plaintiffs also appear to include an argument about proximate

cause, but this argument would only apply if an attorney-client relationship
existed. (McClintock v. West (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 540, 554–555.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to their costs
on appeal.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

SCOTT, J.

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