In re St.M. CA2/3

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Filed 4/13/26 In re St.M. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re St.M. et al., Persons Coming B346928
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. Nos.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 20CCJP05292E,
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 20CCJP05292F

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Mother challenges a juvenile court order terminating
jurisdiction with a permanent plan of legal guardianship for
her daughter St.M. (born December 2020) and her son A.M.
(born November 2021). She contends the court abused its
discretion by (a) summarily denying her petition to reinstate
reunification services; and (b) imposing unworkable restrictions
on her right to visitation under the legal guardianship. (See
Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 362, subd. (a).)1 We find no error
and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mother has six children who were part of the underlying
dependency proceedings: L.M. (born June 2014), S.M. (born
December 2015), R.L. (born December 2016), K.M. (born
February 2018), St.M. (born December 2020), and A.M. (born
November 2021). This appeal concerns only St.M. and A.M.
Father is the presumed father of L.M. and S.M. and the alleged
father of K.M., St.M., and A.M.
In November 2020, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a
dependency petition on behalf of L.M., S.M., R.L., and K.M.
alleging mother failed to protect them from father’s persistent
physical violence against mother.2 Before the juvenile court
had adjudicated the petition, mother gave birth to St.M.

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 The petition alleged mother allowed father to reside in
the home with the children in violation of a criminal protective
order issued in response to a series of violent assaults by father
against mother in the older children’s presence. Mother had also
had a 2016 dependency case involving the older children, likewise

2
On February 1, 2021, the Department filed a dependency
petition on behalf of St.M., alleging mother had failed to protect
the infant’s siblings from father’s violence. (See § 300, subds. (b),
(j).) The juvenile court detained St.M. from the parents’ custody,
and the Department placed her with the foster parent who would
ultimately become St.M.’s legal guardian.
In advance of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the
Department reported mother’s behavior had been erratic and
counterproductive. She made repeated false accusations against
the children’s caregivers, some of which included doctored text
messages; she participated in counseling and other services, but
denied that domestic violence threatened the children’s safety;
and she claimed not to have had any contact with father, but
one of the older children reported seeing father nearby during
a visit with mother.
On April 27, 2021, the juvenile court sustained the
dependency petition on behalf of St.M., removed her from the
parents’ custody, and granted mother monitored visits with
the infant twice a week. Mother’s reunification services included
a parenting program, individual counseling, and a domestic
violence program.
In November 2021, mother gave birth to A.M., and the
Department opened a new investigation. When questioned
about her contact with father, mother asserted the allegations
against him were untrue and denied there had been domestic

stemming from father’s domestic violence. She successfully
reunified with the children in that case, and the juvenile court
terminated its jurisdiction in August 2017.

3
violence in their relationship. The Department took the newborn
into protective custody.
On December 14, 2021, the Department filed a dependency
petition on behalf of A.M., alleging the infant was in danger
due to mother’s failure to protect the older children from father’s
violence. On February 7, 2022, the juvenile court sustained
the petition based on the findings made in the older children’s
dependency cases. The court removed A.M. from the parents’
custody and granted mother visitation and reunification services.
The Department originally placed A.M. in a medical foster
care placement due to a congenital condition that required the
use of a feeding tube. In June 2022, the Department scheduled
a videoconference with mother and A.M.’s doctor to discuss a
procedure to have a MIC-KEY tube placed in the infant’s stomach
for long-term feeding. Mother refused to turn on her camera or
to provide her consent for the procedure. Sometime later, she
gave her consent, but only after A.M.’s doctor raised concerns
about further delaying the child’s treatment.
St.M. developed a strong bond with her foster parent
and the caregiver’s family. She was progressing with some of
her milestones, but her foster parent had concerns about her
development. St.M.’s doctor recommended she be evaluated for
speech therapy, physical therapy, and behavioral interventions.
Her foster parent had been working with the Department to
obtain training and services to meet St.M.’s needs.
During this period, mother’s visits with the older children
were inconsistent and problematic. The children’s caregivers
refused to monitor visits for mother due to her persistent
harassment and inappropriate behavior, including asking
the children questions that insinuated they were being abused

4
in their placements. Mother’s disruptive behavior continued,
and the caregivers eventually requested the children’s removal
and placement in new foster homes.
In May 2022, the court held a combined six-month
review hearing for A.M. and a 12-month review hearing for St.M.
The court found mother was in compliance with her case plan
but she had “not benefited from the services,” as the caretakers’
reports suggested she was more committed to “sabotag[ing]”
the children’s placements than achieving their best interests.
The court continued mother’s services and ordered her to undergo
a psychological evaluation to “pinpoint what needs to be
addressed in therapy” to facilitate reunification.
Mother’s psychological evaluation identified a “problematic
level of denial,” particularly “surrounding the children’s
developmental delays” and her “false allegations against the
various caretakers.” The evaluator observed that mother did
not “volunteer that she had made any mistakes in the history
of the case,” instead “present[ing] herself as a victim”; and, while
mother “expressed concerns about her children being abused in
foster care, she expressed no concerns about their developmental
issues,” despite reliable reports suggesting that each child needed
developmental support. The evaluator recommended mother’s
visits with the children continue to be monitored, due to the
“likelihood” that father was “still around and in some form of
relationship” with mother.
On September 6, 2022, the juvenile court held an 18-month
review hearing for St.M. and heard the Department’s section 388
petition to terminate mother’s reunification services with A.M.
After receiving testimony from mother and the children’s social
worker, the court found mother was in compliance with her case

5
plan but she “still [had] a level of denial” about the children’s
needs and she had not demonstrated a willingness or capacity to
resolve the issues that endangered her children. Based on these
findings, the court terminated mother’s reunification services
and set a permanency planning hearing for both children.3
During the post-reunification period, mother had consistent
visits with St.M. and A.M. that mostly went well. St.M. was
enrolled in speech therapy, physical therapy, and had been
assessed by an ear, nose, and throat doctor, who believed she
needed a procedure to help with her hearing. Although mother
was generally attentive, she did not seem to grasp St.M.’s
developmental needs and, in the Department’s assessment, she
had not demonstrated an ability to manage and care for St.M.
and her five other children during visits without supervision.
In April 2023, St.M.’s foster parent completed training
for A.M.’s feeding tube, and the Department placed A.M. with
his sister in the same foster home. A.M.’s feeding schedule
required that he receive a prescribed amount of formula three
times per day, and whatever formula he would not take by mouth
had to be administered through his feeding tube. The foster
parent had been attentive to this schedule, and A.M. was gaining
weight in her care. The Department had discussed A.M.’s feeding
schedule with mother, and mother had agreed to feed him his
prescribed formula during her visits. However, mother regularly
failed to feed A.M. when he refused the formula, telling the
monitor she was “not going to force [A.M.] to drink something
he does not like.”

3 The court also terminated mother’s reunification services
with the older children.

6
On June 29, 2023, mother filed a section 388 petition
seeking reinstatement of reunification services or unmonitored
visits with all the children. In a supporting declaration she
catalogued the number of parenting classes, domestic violence
classes, and therapy sessions she had attended, and generally
detailed what she had learned in those classes. She said she
was committed to putting her children “first” and to providing
them a “safe environment” free of domestic violence.
On November 20, 2023, the juvenile court held an
evidentiary hearing on mother’s section 388 petition. After
receiving mother’s testimony, the court denied the petition,
finding mother had not demonstrated a significant change
in circumstances as she still was unable to acknowledge the
danger posed by allowing father to have unmonitored contact
with the children and she was not honest about her ongoing
contact with father.
On May 9, 2024, mother filed another section 388 petition
requesting the children’s return to her custody or, in the
alternative, reinstatement of reunification services and
unmonitored visitation. In a supporting declaration, mother
denied she had had recent contact with father; she acknowledged
domestic violence placed her children at risk; and she said she
was working with her therapist to understand her children’s
special needs. She also reported that she had given birth to a
new daughter—Sp.M.; father was not Sp.M.’s father; she had
maintained custody of Sp.M.; and she had been cooperative
with the social worker assigned to Sp.M.’s case.
On June 28, 2024, the court held an evidentiary hearing
on mother’s section 388 petition. The court denied the petition,
finding that mother’s acknowledgment of the children’s

7
developmental needs at most suggested “changing”—not changed
—circumstances, and mother had failed to demonstrate the
requested modification would be in the children’s best interests.
The court took special issue with mother’s refusal to follow
A.M.’s prescribed feeding schedule and her apparent inability
to recognize that his dietary demands required diligent attention.
On August 23, 2024, mother filed another section 388
petition, again requesting the children’s return to her custody
or, in the alternative, reinstatement of reunification services
and unmonitored visitation. This time she included documents
confirming her enrollment in a parenting class for families
with special needs children. The Department responded to the
petition with a report detailing mother’s visits with St.M. and
A.M. over the past three months. The report described the visits
as consistent and “fair,” but noted mother regularly experienced
“challenges with the children’s behaviors.” In many cases,
mother was unable to redirect the children when they threw
tantrums, often leaving the monitor with the task of calming
the children. Mother also seemed unwilling or unable to handle
basic parenting responsibilities like changing the children’s
diapers during their visits. And the Department reported she
had made another false allegation to the child abuse hotline
claiming St.M. had bruises on her legs and arms.
On September 26, 2024, the court denied mother’s
petition for modification with respect to St.M. and A.M after
an evidentiary hearing.4 While the court recognized mother had

4 The court granted mother’s petition with respect to L.M.
and R.L., finding these older children were “differently situated”
than St.M. and A.M. in that their developmental needs presented
more modest challenges for mother. Thus, the court modified its

8
made an effort to change by enrolling in a new class directed
at parenting special needs children, it found St.M.’s and A.M.’s
needs presented “more profound challenges for mother” than she
seemed capable of addressing. Mother appeared unable to handle
“[b]asic things,” the court noted, “such as changing a diaper,” and
the reports on her visits demonstrated “the programs that she
would [have to] engage in [would] require so much more time
and effort” than she had exhibited thus far. The court also
recognized that both children had developed a close bond to
the foster parent, with whom they had spent most of their
lives, while they “[did not] seem to have a bond with mother.”
Emphasizing that the foster parent had remained a “consistent
presence” and “committed to permanency,” notwithstanding
mother’s recent attempts to sabotage the placement, the court
found it would not serve the children’s best interests to delay
a permanent placement by granting mother further reunification
services.
On January 2, 2025, the Department filed a report on its
recommendation for the children’s permanent plan. Although
mother consistently visited with the children, she still was
unable to address their behavioral issues; she frequently relied
on the monitor to calm them down; and she often neglected to
change the children’s soiled diapers. St.M. had been placed
with her foster parent since she was two months old, and A.M.
was removed from mother’s care when he was a newborn. The
children did not look to mother when they were upset and they

previous order terminating reunification services and granted
mother an additional six months to reunify with the older
children.

9
often hit mother when they were frustrated during visits. St.M.
sometimes referred to mother as “teacher,” while both children
referred to the foster parent as “mommy.” Both children were
receiving developmental care and behavioral services. St.M.
had been diagnosed with autism, and A.M.’s service providers
had observed early signs of autism. The Department
recommended a permanent plan of adoption.
On February 20, 2025, the court held a hearing in advance
of the scheduled permanency planning hearing. Mother notified
the court that she intended to pursue the parental bond exception
to adoption, and requested the court order a bonding study,
given her frequent visits with the children.5 The court granted
the request.
On April 15, 2025, Dr. Chuck Leeb completed his bonding
study, after observing a one-hour visit between mother and the
children at a park five days earlier.6 He found a “very positive
bond” between the children and mother, noting mother’s
“interaction with the children was positive and showed good
guidance and parenting skills.” He also observed both children

5 Under the parental bond exception (also referred to as
the beneficial parent-child relationship exception), the juvenile
court may decline to implement the generally preferred plan
of adoption if the court finds terminating parental rights would
be detrimental to the child because the parent has “maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would
benefit from continuing the [parental] relationship.” (§ 336.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); see In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630–
634.)
6 Dr. Leeb is a licensed psychologist and a forensic and
clinical specialist.

10
“were verbal” and at “no time did the children display any
behaviors indicative of Autism Spectrum Disorder.” Dr. Leeb
recommended that all future visits take place at a park, as
mother had told him the children “didn’t like being” at the
Department’s office for visits and she “could not believe how
happy and positive the children were behaving.” He also noted
that mother’s behaviors and interactions with the Department
might be due to her “history of verbal, physical, and sexual abuse
while growing up,” and recommended she receive therapy to
address possible Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Battered
Woman Syndrome.
On May 8, 2025, the juvenile court held a contested
permanency planning hearing to consider the parental bond
exception. Mother requested that, if the children were not
returned to her custody, then the court order legal guardianship
as the permanent plan. The children’s counsel agreed the
bonding study supported application of the parental bond
exception and requested the court continue the hearing to
allow guardianship papers to be prepared.
The court found the bonding study was “compelling”
evidence that mother had established a “significant bond” with
St.M. and A.M. In view of that bond and mother’s regular visits
with the children, the court found “the termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the children” and the children
would “receive benefits from continuing [their] relationship”
with mother, which outweighed the benefits of adoption. The
court also found “it would be detrimental to the children to be
returned to [mother’s] physical custody” and it was “in the best
interest[s] of the children to proceed through guardianship.”
After consulting with counsel, the court continued the

11
permanency hearing to June 3, 2025 to give the parties time
to prepare the guardianship papers and to identify a monitor
for mother’s future visits.
On June 2, 2025, mother filed another section 388 petition,
again requesting the children’s return to her custody or, in the
alternative, reinstatement of reunification services. She asserted
the bonding study represented the “most significant positive
change[ ],” as it showed she and the children “were both
extremely well bonded to each other.” (Boldface and underlining
omitted.) She emphasized she had remained in compliance
with her case plan; had participated in a special needs parenting
course and individual counseling; had cut off contact with father
for “almost 4 years”; and had maintained custody of her new baby
“with no concerns.” With respect to the children’s special needs,
mother asserted the Department had made false claims that
the children were “non-verbal,” while Dr. Leeb had found they
were “quite capable of speaking.” She claimed the Department
“conflate[d] small things such as a child making a mess in his
pants” with an inability to care for the children, and she argued
the agency used incidents that could “be corrected very quickly”
as a pretext to refuse to liberalize her visits. She also alleged
the Department had “threatened” to file a dependency petition
for her new baby and suggested the “entire” agency was “biased
against her and trying to take her children.”
On June 3, 2025, the juvenile court resumed the
permanency hearing for St.M. and A.M.7 After reiterating
that it had sided with mother on the parental bond exception

7 The court held the continued hearing on the same day it
held a hearing on a permanent plan for L.M. and R.L. At that
hearing, the court also addressed a section 388 petition that

12
—granting her request for “legal guardianship as opposed to
adoption”—the court addressed her new section 388 petition.
The court summarily denied the petition without prejudice,
finding it “essentially asks for a different outcome” than what
mother requested in arguing for the parental bond exception,
and the petition failed to present new evidence sufficient to
show that the requested relief would better serve the children’s
interests than the guardianship.
The juvenile court declared the children’s foster parent
their legal guardian and granted mother monitored visits at
a mutually agreed upon location with a mutually agreed upon
monitor. If mother and the guardian could not agree on a
monitor, mother would be responsible for hiring a professional
monitor to supervise her visits.
Mother’s counsel objected to the visitation conditions,
arguing mother would be unable to afford a professional monitor.
The court invited mother and the Department to meet and confer
on the visitation issue in advance of a final hearing on the
guardianship.
On June 6, 2025, the court entered the guardianship
documents and terminated jurisdiction. Mother asked to
make up a missed visit with the children, but there was no
further discussion of visitation. This timely appeal followed.

mother had filed to regain custody of the older children. The
court denied the petition with respect to L.M. and R.L. as “not
ripe,” because the court had granted mother’s earlier request to
reinstate reunification services and there was, as yet, no order
that “need[ed] to be changed.” (See fn. 4, ante.) To the extent
mother contends this ruling applied to her petition regarding
St.M. and A.M., we reject her argument.

13
DISCUSSION
1. The Juvenile Court Reasonably Exercised
Its Discretion to Deny the Section 388 Petition
Without an Evidentiary Hearing
Mother contends the order establishing the legal
guardianship and terminating dependency jurisdiction must
be set aside to allow an evidentiary hearing on her section 388
petition to reinstate reunification services with St.M. and A.M.8
She argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it
summarily denied the petition after finding her bond with the
children was sufficient to preserve the parent-child relationship
under a legal guardianship. We find no error on the record
presented.
“A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or
set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed
circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote
the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A parent need only
make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right
to a hearing on a section 388 petition and the petition should be
liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the

8 Mother argues the juvenile court also erred by failing to
consider whether the existing visitation order should be modified
to allow unmonitored visits with the children. However, her
section 388 petition did not request this relief—it requested
only to “reinstate [family reunification services], and/or return
[the child] to my custody.” Even if the petition could be construed
to include a request to modify visitation, the juvenile court
reasonably exercised its discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing
for the reasons discussed above.

14
parent’s request.” (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799,
806 (Zachary G.); accord In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,
316–317 (Stephanie M.); In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295,
309–310 (Marilyn H.).)
“However, if the liberally construed allegations of
the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed
circumstances and that the proposed change would promote
the best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing
on the petition.” (Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806,
citing In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 592–594
(Edward H.).) “The prima facie requirement is not met unless
the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the
hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.”
(Zachary G., at p. 806.) “In determining whether the petition
makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire
factual and procedural history of the case.” (In re Jackson W.
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258 (Jackson W.); accord In re
Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 (Justice P.).)
The reviewing court will not disturb the decision to
deny a petition for modification without an evidentiary hearing
unless the juvenile court “ ‘ “has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.” ’ ” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
184, 205; accord In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415
(Jasmon O.).)
Mother maintains the bonding study performed by Dr. Leeb
constitutes the sort of “new evidence” that warrants a full
hearing to consider whether an order terminating reunification
services should be modified. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1); see In re H.S.
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 103, 105 [“the term ‘new evidence’ in

15
section 388 means material evidence that, with due diligence,
the party could not have presented at the dependency proceeding
at which the order, sought to be modified or set aside, was
entered”].) The juvenile court appears to have accepted this
premise (at least implicitly), and we are inclined to do the same
for purposes of this appeal. The critical issue was whether this
new evidence was sufficient to prove the proposed modification
would promote St.M.’s and A.M.’s best interests. We agree
with the juvenile court—it was not.
Section 388 provides: “Any parent . . . may, upon
grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition . . .
for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court
previously made . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] If it appears that the best
interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change
of order . . . , the court shall order that a hearing be held.” (§ 388,
subds. (a), (d), italics added.) “The conditional language of
section 388 makes clear that the hearing is only to be held if
it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted
by the proposed change of order, which necessarily contemplates
that a court need not order a hearing if this element is absent
from the showing made by the petition.” (Zachary G., supra,
77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 806–807.) The operative “ ‘if it appears’ ”
language “refers to the initial, prehearing judicial determination
of probable cause to set the section 388 petition for hearing”—
not to the ultimate determination of whether to grant the petition
on its merits. (Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
477, 490; accord In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424,
432–433.)
“After the termination of reunification services, the
parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship

16
of the child are no longer paramount.” (Stephanie M., supra,
7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) “Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to
the needs of the child for permanency and stability’ [citation],
and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued
foster care is in the best interests of the child.” (Ibid., quoting
Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309; accord Jasmon O.,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 419–420.) Although section 388 is
meant to provide an “ ‘escape mechanism’ . . . to allow the court
to consider new information,” even “after the focus has shifted
from reunification” (Marilyn H., at p. 309), a court considering
a petition for modification “at this stage of the proceedings must
recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question
before it, that is, the best interests of the child.” (Stephanie M.,
at p. 317; accord Marilyn H., at pp. 308–309; see also § 352,
subd. (a) [“In considering the minor’s interests” with respect
to a continuance, “the court shall give substantial weight to a
minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status,
the need to provide children with stable environments, and
the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.”].)
When mother filed her section 388 petition, both children
had been in foster care for over three years (St.M. had been in
her foster placement for over four years); mother’s reunification
services had been terminated for over two and a half years; and
the court had determined the permanent plan for the children
should be a legal guardianship with their long-time foster parent
and monitored visitation for mother. Accordingly, to meet
her prima facie burden for modification, mother was required
to show there was new evidence that, if credited, would prove
the children’s best interests would be promoted by postponing
the guardianship to allow mother more time to attempt to

17
reunify with the children, notwithstanding her past failures
to do so. (See Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 309–310
[after reunification services are terminated, sections 366.26
and 388 rationally shift “the burden to the parent” to rebut the
presumption that “continued care [with a prospective guardian
or adopted parent] is in the best interest of the child” by “showing
that circumstances have changed that would warrant further
consideration of reunification”].)
Mother contends the bonding study, coupled with past
evidence of her consistent visitation with the children and her
progress in court-ordered programs, was sufficient to satisfy her
prima facie burden. She argues this evidence proved reinstating
reunification services would promote the children’s best interests
because it showed “the children were significantly bonded to
[m]other, the children did not evidence significant special needs
that [m]other was unable to handle, [m]other maintained her
youngest child in her custody without concern, and [m]other
effectively parented the children during visits.” The argument
overstates what the bonding study was sufficient to prove,
particularly when considered in context with “the entire factual
and procedural history of the case.” (Jackson W., supra, 184
Cal.App.4th at p. 258.)
At most, the bonding study proved a beneficial bond
existed between mother and the children. As Dr. Leeb recounted
at the beginning of his report, he had been commissioned only
to perform a “bonding study as to the parent-child relationship
between mother and the minors,” and his findings were limited
to the determination that there was “a very positive bond
between the minors and the mother” and between the
two siblings. The juvenile court credited these findings

18
in determining the beneficial parent-child relationship exception
applied, while reasonably rejecting mother’s later contention
that further delaying the guardianship to allow her more
time to try to reunify with the children would be in their best
interests. As the court recognized in Jackson W., the mere
showing that more time “would further strengthen the parent-
child bond” is an insufficient basis to prolong dependency
proceedings after reunification services have been terminated,
because “ ‘[t]he presumption favoring natural parents by itself
does not satisfy the best interests prong of section 388.’ ”
(Jackson W., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 260, quoting Justice
P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 192.) Moreover, because
the juvenile court had selected a legal guardianship as the
permanent plan, any interest the children had in continuing
to foster this bond with mother would be preserved without
prolonging their temporary placement. (See, e.g., Justice P.,
at p. 192 [sibling bond was not at risk and did not establish
probable cause for evidentiary hearing where permanent plan
provided for continued contact among siblings].)
The bonding study was insufficient to prove any other
matter that could reasonably support a finding that the
children’s best interests would be promoted by postponing
the guardianship. To be sure, in assessing the bond mother
had with the children, Dr. Leeb observed them during a one-hour
visit at a park and noted that mother “interacted with both
children in a positive manner”; the children “were verbal” and
did not “display any behaviors indicative of Autism Spectrum
Disorder”; and mother “showed good guidance and parenting
skills.” However, his report also summarized an interview with
mother during which she denied responsibility for allowing father

19
to have unmonitored contact with the older children; disputed
the juvenile court’s findings that her conduct had endangered
the children; claimed the Department had misrepresented St.M.’s
and A.M.’s developmental needs while denying her access to
regional center services; and largely blamed the Department
for her failure to reunify with the children. Dr. Leeb’s report
recounted mother’s troubled upbringing and suggested that
it, combined with mother’s “history of physical abuse by the
children’s father,” could be responsible for mother’s inability
to “balance emotions and impulses” and her “general inability
to cope with life’s demands.” Critically, these observations
were consistent with recent and ongoing reports about mother’s
inability to respond to the children’s behavioral outbursts during
visits and her failure to follow directives for feeding and toileting
the children that had been prescribed for their health and
welfare. And perhaps most significantly, these observations
also fit with a long pattern of mother failing to appreciate the
harm posed by father’s domestic violence, notwithstanding years
of services and counseling to address this crucial safety concern.
(See Edward H., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 593 [“Although
a juvenile court will order a hearing if a section 388 petition
presents any evidence supportive of a conclusion that a hearing
would promote the child’s best interests [citation], it need not
ignore an allegation which shows a hearing will not promote
such interests.”].)
In sum, Dr. Leeb’s only specific finding concerned the
parental bond, and his report otherwise painted (at best) a
mixed picture about mother’s understanding of the children’s
special needs and her capacity to meet those needs in a reliably
safe manner, particularly with respect to the domestic violence

20
issues that brought the family within the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. The “most basic” consideration in assessing whether
to deny a section 388 petition is “the gravity of the problem
leading to the dependency, and the reason that problem was
not overcome by the final review.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 519, 530–531.) Thus, establishing probable cause
for a modification will “necessarily involve” some showing that
the parent can “eliminat[e] the specific factors that required
placement outside the parent’s home.” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 454, 463–464.) The bonding study did not furnish
this necessary proof, nor did it suggest that mother was likely
to overcome these risk factors were she given more time (on top
of the three to four years the children had already been in their
temporary placements) to engage in reunification services.
Even crediting Dr. Leeb’s observations during a one-hour visit,
mother’s petition was still insufficient to prove the children’s
best interests would be promoted by postponing the guardianship
any longer. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
summarily denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing.
(See, e.g., In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1160 [where
“evaluation report upon which mother herself relied stated that
mother continued to deny any parental role in [child’s] serious
injuries,” section 388 petition was insufficient to establish
prima facie case for modification]; Edward H., supra,
43 Cal.App.4th at p. 594 [“on the eve of the section 366.26
permanency planning hearing,” “the children’s interest in
stability was the court’s foremost concern and outweighed any
interest in reunification”]; cf. Kimberly F., at pp. 532–533 [where
“the facts uniformly favor[ed] the parent,” and “dirty house” that
was basis for jurisdiction did not pose an “intractable” problem

21
for the children’s best interests, it was an abuse of discretion
to deny an evidentiary hearing, notwithstanding the children’s
interest in stability].)
2. The Juvenile Court Reasonably Exercised Its
Discretion to Place Conditions on Visitation under
the Legal Guardianship
The juvenile court’s exit order granted mother supervised
visitation with the children, provided that mother either (a) find
a monitor who was agreeable to the guardian, or (b) hire a
professional monitor at her expense. Mother contends this
condition rendered the visitation order “illusory” because the
guardian would “not allow” mother to visit the children “without
a professional monitor,” and mother “cannot afford” to pay a
monitor. More specifically, she argues the order improperly
“ ‘delegate[s]’ ” the decision to allow visitation to the guardian,
while failing to acknowledge mother’s financial condition.
The record does not support her claim of error.
When the juvenile court orders a permanent plan of legal
guardianship, it must also make an order for visitation with the
parents, unless the court finds visitation would be detrimental
to the child’s physical or emotional well-being. (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(4)(C).) The juvenile court has “great discretion” in setting
conditions for visitation, and we will not disturb the court’s order
unless it has exceeded the bounds of reason in exercising this
discretion. (In re S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557–1558
(S.H.), citing Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.)
“The court may delegate authority to the legal guardian
to decide the time, place, and manner in which visitation
will take place.” (In re M.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 269, 274.)
However, the court cannot delegate authority to the legal

22
guardian to decide “whether visitation [will] occur,” and,
therefore, a visitation order must provide not only that the
parent “has a right to visit,” but “must also specify the frequency
and duration of those visits.” (Ibid.) Here, there is no dispute
that the order specified these matters—visitation under the order
is to occur once a week for two hours. Nevertheless, mother
argues the requirement that she mutually agree upon a monitor
with the guardian, or else pay for a professional guardian herself,
effectively gives the guardian veto power over whether a visit
will take place because, mother says, the guardian “is not willing”
to monitor mother’s visits, and mother “does not have anyone else
available to monitor visits without payment, which she cannot
financially afford.” There are at least two problems with this
argument.
The principal problem is that mother’s contention rests
on the speculative and dubious premise that the “guardian will
not allow [m]other to visit the children without a professional
monitor.” The record does not support this charge. On the
contrary, it shows the guardian had diligently brought the
children to supervised visits with mother throughout the
four-year dependency proceeding; in the early months, the
guardian had monitored mother’s visits herself, until mother’s
“inappropriate behavior” made that unworkable; and mother’s
relatives had also monitored mother’s visits, again until mother’s
behavior made it untenable for them to do so. Mother’s past
belligerent behavior supports the juvenile court’s decision
to condition visitation on a mutually agreed upon monitor—
her history of alienating willing monitors does not prove that
the guardian will refuse to agree to a new monitor when mother
finds one. In view of the guardian’s consistent cooperation with

23
mother’s supervised visitation, any contention that the guardian
would use the mutual-agreement condition as a de facto veto
power is (at most) speculative. (See Friends of Lagoon Valley v.
City of Vacaville (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 807, 834, fn. 13 (Friends)
[“speculation does not establish an abuse of discretion”].)
The second problem is mother has not furnished an
adequate record to show she would be unable to pay for a
professional monitor, if one were required. A juvenile court is
authorized to place conditions on visitation that have financial
consequences for the parent. (See In re Chantal S. (1996) 13
Cal.4th 196, 202–204 [juvenile court had authority to require
child’s therapist facilitate father’s visits and to make father
“ ‘financially responsible for these visits’ ”].) Although mother’s
counsel claimed that monitors charge around $75 per hour and
that mother could not afford this rate, he offered no evidence to
support either assertion. Again, absent this evidence, mother’s
contention is speculative and insufficient to establish an abuse
of discretion.9 (Friends, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 834, fn. 13.)

9 Mother’s reliance on section 362.8 is misplaced. That
statute governs a parent’s compliance with “the court-ordered
case plan” during the period of “reunification” and seeks to
protect a very different interest than the parent’s right to
visitation after efforts to reunify have failed. (§ 362.8, subd. (a);
see, e.g., S.H., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1558–1559
[statutory objectives related to visitation and reunification
“are no longer valid” where “reunification services have been
bypassed and a permanent plan of guardianship has been
ordered”].) Even in the reunification context, the statute does
not shield a parent from a finding of noncompliance if the child
welfare agency has provided “a comparable free service that
was accessible and available to the parent” to comply with the
case plan. (§ 362.8, subd. (a).) There is a free option available

24
Our review of the record confirms mother was able to visit
consistently with the children and there were no issues with the
guardian accommodating visits during the four years that she
served as a foster parent. In any event, even after a dependency
is terminated, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the
children as wards of the court and may modify the guardianship
order if problems arise with a parent’s visitation. (See In re K.D.
(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1019, citing §§ 366.3, 366.4; see also
In re Kenneth S., Jr. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1358 [when
a legal guardianship is established, “if a problem develops, the
parent has access to the juvenile court”]; see, e.g., S.H., supra,
197 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1557–1559 [juvenile court reasonably
modified visitation upon appointment of successor guardian].)
Mother has not established prejudicial error on the record
presented. The juvenile court reasonably exercised its discretion
to set conditions on mother’s visitation under the guardianship.

to mother here—she simply needs to identify someone (a friend,
family, community member, etc.) who is willing to monitor her
visits and who is mutually acceptable to the children’s guardian.

25
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

HANASONO, J.

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