People v. Soto CA2/4

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Filed 4/10/26 P. v. Soto CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B338268

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA114218)
v.

MICHAEL ALLEN SOTO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Shezad H. Thakor and Kenneth C. Byrne,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Michael Allen Soto was convicted of ten counts relating to
domestic violence against two different partners, including
attempted murder, kidnapping, and false imprisonment. On
appeal, he argues that his conviction on count 9, false
imprisonment, must be reversed as a lesser included offense of
count 8, kidnapping, because his detention of the victim was a
continuous course of conduct. We agree the false imprisonment
was a lesser included offense of the kidnapping, so the conviction
on count 9 must be reversed.
Soto also contends the trial court erred in sentencing him
to the upper term on count 5, attempted murder, because the
court relied on aggravating facts that were not found by a jury.
The People concede this was error, but assert the error was
harmless. We find the error was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, and therefore vacate the sentence and remand
for further proceedings. As such, Soto’s remaining claims of
sentencing error are moot and we do not address them.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Charges
The People filed an information on June 3, 2020 and an
amended information on September 2, 2020 alleging four counts
involving domestic violence against a former partner, Erica.1
While out on bail, Soto was arrested again for domestic violence
against a different partner, Rosa. The People moved to
consolidate Soto’s two cases, and the trial court granted the
motion.

1 We refer to the victims by first names to protect their

privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)

2
A second amended information filed May 31, 2022 alleged
the following counts: 1. willful infliction of a corporal injury
resulting in a traumatic condition upon Erica, a person in a
dating relationship with Soto (Pen. Code, § 273.52); 2.
misdemeanor contempt of court for knowingly violating a
protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)); 3. criminal threats to Erica
(§ 422, subd. (a)); 4. mayhem against Erica (§ 203); 5. attempted
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Rosa (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 664); 6. willful infliction of a corporal injury resulting in
a traumatic condition upon Rosa, a person in a dating
relationship with Soto (§ 273.5); 7. criminal threats to Rosa
(§ 422, subd. (a)); 8. kidnapping of Rosa (§ 207, subd. (a)); 9. false
imprisonment by violence of Rosa (§ 236); and 11. misdemeanor
contempt of court for knowingly violating a protective order
(§ 166, subd. (c)(1)). Soto’s mother, Geraldina Bonilla, was also
charged in counts 8 and 9, and was charged in count 10 as an
accessory after the fact for the attempted murder. The
information further alleged for counts 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 that Soto
personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances
involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), and for counts
5, 6, 7, and 8 that Soto personally used a deadly weapon in the
commission of the offenses. For counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9,
the following aggravating factors were also alleged: the offenses
involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily
harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)3);
Soto engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to

2 All undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
3 All undesignated rule references are to the California

Rules of Court.

3
society (rule 4.421(b)(1)); Soto’s prior convictions are numerous or
of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)); and Soto was on
probation, mandatory supervision, post-release community
supervision, or parole when the crime was committed (rule
4.421(b)(4)).
Soto pled not guilty. Just before trial, Bonilla pled guilty to
count 8, kidnapping, admitted specific factual grounds for the
plea, and admitted factors in aggravation. The court sentenced
her to three years’ probation. The case against Soto proceeded to
a jury trial, and the following evidence was presented.
B. Trial
1. Crimes against Rosa
Rosa testified that in July 2021, she had been in a romantic
relationship with Soto for about a year. On July 14, she was
staying at a sober living home in Los Angeles, but she had been
out with Soto doing methamphetamine that day. Rosa returned
to the home before her curfew. That evening, Rosa and Soto got
into an argument over the phone and Rosa broke up with Soto.
Rosa then went to sleep. She woke up at about 3:00 a.m. when
another resident saw Soto and said, “Oh my God. He’s here
again.” Rosa testified that Soto told her to come outside, and “he
was serious.” Rosa said no.
Soto entered the house, and “[e]veryone in the room
scattered.” A staff member left to call police. Soto told Rosa that
the staff would also call her probation officer, which worried Rosa
because she had violated probation by spending the day with Soto
and taking methamphetamine. Rosa said her natural inclination
was to run away, and as she ran Soto grabbed her by the arm.
Rosa testified that she did not want to be with Soto, but she also

4
did not want to go to jail for violating probation. They got into
Soto’s car.
In the car, Soto told Rosa he had left her 92 messages; she
did not know that because her phone had died. Rosa testified
that as they were driving, “he starts socking me, just cracking
me” in the head and face. Rosa tried to punch Soto as he turned
a corner, and the car ran into a pole. Rosa hit the windshield
during the crash. Soto then started beating Rosa severely, “[j]ust
beating me like – like I’m nothing. Like I’m nothing. Like a dog.
Just beating me,” and “I’m just being pummeled.” Soto stopped
hitting Rosa and said, “You think you’re going to leave me?” He
also said that if she tried to leave he would kill her.
Soto threatened to chop Rosa into little pieces, so there
would be “[n]o body, no crime.” Rosa testified that Soto poured
carpet cleaner “all over my open wounds,” and he “body shot me .
. . knocked the wind right out of me” so Rosa couldn’t breathe.
Soto took out a Sawzall (a motorized saw), put it to Rosa’s neck,
and turned it on; Rosa thought she was going to die. Soto then
started looking for pliers or wire cutters, saying he was going to
take out Rosa’s teeth so she would “remember” him. Rosa said to
Soto, “No. My eyes are punched shut. I can’t even see you
coming,” and “[J]ust kill me.”
Soto stopped the attack. They “waited a little a bit” then
Soto called his mother, Bonilla. When Bonilla saw Rosa through
the window, she started screaming, “Oh, my God, Michael. Oh,
my God. You’re going to jail. You’re going to jail. Oh, my God.”
Rosa testified that at this point, Rosa was trying to keep Soto
calm until she could get away. The car had “a tire and a battery
issue,” apparently from hitting the pole. Bonilla helped them
with the car issues and gave them money for a hotel.

5
Soto and Rosa went to a Jack-in-the-Box parking lot to wait
until their hotel check-in time; they fell asleep in the car. Rosa
testified that she was “cringing every single moment” she was
with Soto, because she did not want to be with him. Rosa
testified that in the Jack-in-the-Box parking lot, Soto “starts
fucking me. Imagine my face is like a piece of meat and he wants
to have sex.” Rosa testified that she did not want to have sex, but
she did not say anything in an effort to not upset Soto, because
she was “waiting for the moment to escape.”
They checked into the hotel. Rosa then accompanied Soto
while he went out to steal catalytic converters to sell for money to
repay Bonilla. Rosa testified that at one point Soto was outside
the car and Rosa was in the car, and it “was the perfect
opportunity for me to leave.” But she did not try, because she
was in “complete fear” of Soto and afraid he might be able to cut
the tires before she could get away, in which case “of course he is
going to kill me.”
They stayed at the hotel for two or three nights. Soto was
“still having sex with” Rosa, even though she was in pain and did
not want to. Bonilla brought Rosa a bag of ice and salve for her
bruises. Rosa testified that her face made an unusual sound
when she applied the ice, which alarmed her; she thought, “Oh,
my God. My face is broken. There is something in my face
broken.”
Soto and Rosa needed money to stay another night in the
hotel. Rosa told Soto she was in pain and wanted to stay in the
room to rest while Soto went out. Soto replied, “You’re starting to
make me want to beat the shit out of you again.” Rosa testified
that she placated him because “my body can’t take another
beating. It can’t take another beating. If he beats me up again

6
I’m dead. That’s it. I’m dead.” So she told Soto she would go with
him, but first she needed to stop at a store for ibuprofen and
tampons. She “let him think everything [was] cool,” thinking
that she would be able to go inside the store and ask for help.
When they got to the store, Soto went in alone. Rosa got
into the driver’s seat of the car and drove away. Rosa drove
directly to her mother’s house, recklessly fast, because she
assumed Soto would follow her and she was afraid her daughter
would be in danger if Soto got to her house. Rosa’s family
members drove her to the police station. Police arranged for an
ambulance to transport Rosa to the hospital.
Photos of Rosa’s face taken in the hospital were shown to
the jury and Rosa testified about them. Rosa described the
photos as showing her “after three days of being held hostage.”
Rosa said her eyes were “punched shut,” her nose was broken at
“the top and the bottom,” her left orbital eye socket was cracked,
and “[m]y eyeball is hanging. The back of the muscle is hanging
on the crack over the eye socket.” She had extensive bruising on
her upper body; her legs were not photographed. Another
photograph showed marks from the Sawzall blades. Photos of
Soto’s car were also shown to the jury, including pictures of the
wire cutters and Sawzall blades in the car.
Dr. Wayne Dodakian testified about treating Rosa in the
hospital. Rosa had “facial abnormalities” as a “result of fractures
of the face” and “multiple contusions all over her body”; she was
disoriented, in fear, and in severe pain. A CT scan revealed nasal
fractures and “orbital blowout fractures” that were “beyond the
scope of practice at that hospital.” Rosa was transferred to a
trauma center for reconstructive surgery. When asked on cross-

7
examination whether Rosa’s injuries could be consistent with a
car accident, Dr. Dodakian answered, “Absolutely not.”
At the second hospital, a titanium plate was surgically
inserted into Rosa’s face and her broken nose was repaired. Rosa
had a second surgery, and testified that she still needed a third
surgery on her eye.
Rosa also testified about a separate domestic violence
incident with Soto. On September 1, 2020, she was at a hotel
with Soto and they got into an argument. Soto took Rosa’s keys,
and when she tried to get them back, he “pushed me down on the
couch and started strangling me.” Rosa blacked out. When she
returned to consciousness she tried to get away, and Soto said, “I
have to kill you. I have to get rid of you. . . . There is [sic] too
many cases against me. I have to get rid of you.” Rosa said,
“What are you talking about? I have children.” Soto responded,
“I don’t care.” Rosa testified that Soto “tried to snap my neck
three times after that.” Rosa testified that her windpipe was
damaged and it still affects her ability to sing. The jury was
shown a photograph of strangulation marks on Rosa’s neck. Rosa
broke up with Soto for two weeks after that, but she ended up
getting back together with him. The court took judicial notice of
Soto’s December 9, 2020 conviction for injuring a partner under
section 273.5, subdivision (a).
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) detective Michael
Villareal testified that a criminal protective order was issued on
December 9, 2020 requiring Soto to stay away from Rosa.
2. Crimes against Erica
Erica testified that in March 2020 she and Soto had been
dating for about a year. On March 14, 2020, Erica and Soto were
driving together in a car after visiting some tidepools together.

8
Erica received a text on her phone, which upset Soto. Erica
testified that Soto then “took the back of my head and bashed my
head into the dashboard.” Soto repeatedly hit Erica’s face with
his fist, put her into a headlock, and threatened to break her jaw.
Soto then dropped Erica off at a hospital, and said he was a “nice
guy” for doing so. He took Erica’s shoes, because he had bought
them for her.
Photos of Erica’s injuries were shown to the jury. Erica
described the photos as showing that she had stitches in her
forehead and lip, and she was “bruised everywhere, swollen.” Dr.
Douglas McFarland testified about the extent of Erica’s injuries.
Erica suffered blunt force trauma to the face; she needed stitches
to her lip and forehead, and plastic surgery for the scars. The lip
injury was “very complex” because the lip has a lot of small
muscles, and Erica had “non-viable or dead little pieces of tissue
hanging off the wound.” Dr. McFarland “put in some deep
stitches to try to get the muscles back into position” before closing
the skin with more stitches. Police spoke with Erica in the
hospital, and the jury heard a recording of that conversation in
which Erica gave the police Soto’s name.
Erica also testified that on August 7, 2019, she was with
Soto and her sister. Soto hit Erica, then Erica’s sister got
involved, and Soto hit her too. Erica’s lip was injured and she
needed stitches. A Hawthorne Police Department detective
testified about arriving on the scene, finding Erica injured, and
having her transported to a hospital. LAPD detective Villareal
testified that a criminal protective order was issued on November
20, 2019 requiring Soto to stay away from Erica.
The defense did not present any evidence.

9
C. Verdict and sentence
The jury found Soto guilty on all counts. On counts 1, 5, 6,
and 8 the jury found true that Soto personally inflicted great
bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence.
On counts 5, 6, 7, and 8 the jury found true that Soto personally
used a deadly weapon. On count 6, corporal injury of a person in
a dating relationship, the jury found true that Soto had a prior
conviction. On count 5, the jury found not true that the
attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
The court sentenced Soto to a combined prison and county
jail term of 24 years and four months, calculated as follows. On
count 5 (attempted murder of Rosa) the upper term of nine years,
plus five years for the great bodily injury enhancement, plus one
year for the weapon enhancement; on count 1 (corporal injury of
Erica) a consecutive term of one year plus four months on the
great bodily injury enhancement; on count 3 (criminal threats
against Erica) a consecutive term of eight months; on count 4
(mayhem against Erica) four years stayed under section 654; on
count 6 (corporal injury of Rosa) four years, plus four years for
the great bodily injury enhancement, plus one year for the
weapon enhancement, stayed under section 654; on count 7
(criminal threats against Rosa) two years, stayed under section
654; on count 8 (kidnapping of Rosa) a consecutive term of one
year and eight months, plus one year and four months for the
great bodily injury enhancement, plus four months for the
weapon enhancement; on count 9 (false imprisonment of Rosa)
two years, stayed under section 654; on misdemeanor counts 2
and 11, consecutive terms of one year each to be served in county
jail at the conclusion of his prison terms; plus a consecutive term
of one year for his probation violation.

10
Soto timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Soto challenges his conviction on count 9, false
imprisonment, on the grounds that it is a lesser included offense
of count 8, kidnapping. We agree that count 9 must be reversed.
Soto also asserts several sentencing errors. We agree with Soto
that the trial court erred in sentencing him on count 5, attempted
murder, by relying on aggravating factors that were not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that as a result, the matter must
be remanded for further sentencing proceedings. That conclusion
renders moot Soto’s remaining contentions of sentencing error, so
we do not address his remaining arguments.
A. False imprisonment (count 9) as a lesser included
offense of kidnapping (count 8)
Soto contends his conviction on count 9, false imprisonment
of Rosa, is a lesser included offense of kidnapping, count 8. He
asserts that because these crimes arose from a single course of
conduct he cannot be convicted of both, so the conviction for false
imprisonment must be reversed.4 “The issue of whether multiple

4 Soto’s argument includes several inaccurate statements

about the evidence. He contends, for example, that “there was
one course of conduct on one day” and “Rosa was held for one
day.” However, Rosa testified that they spent multiple nights in
the hotel, and the hospital photos showed her “after three days of
being held hostage.” Soto also asserts that Rosa left Soto and the
hotel to steal things, but then she came back. This is also
incorrect; Rosa’s statement about stealing things was a comment
about their past relationship, not what occurred in the days Soto
was detaining her. These factual inaccuracies do not affect the
outcome of this issue.

11
convictions are proper is . . . reviewed de novo.” (People v.
Villegas (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 642, 646.)
1. Additional background
In closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury that the
kidnapping in count 8 occurred when Soto took Rosa to the hotel
from the place where the car hit the pole. She argued that by
then, Soto had severely beaten Rosa and compelled her to submit
to going with him. The prosecutor argued that the false
imprisonment in count 9 began with the stay in the hotel room,
when Rosa felt she could not leave and was biding her time as
she waited to escape. The jury convicted Soto on both counts.
The court stayed the sentence on count 9.
2. Analysis
“In California, a single act or course of conduct by a
defendant can lead to convictions ‘of any number of the offenses
charged.’” (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034,
quoting § 954 [italics in Montoya].) “But a judicially created
exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on
necessarily included offenses.” (Ibid.) “When a defendant is
found guilty of both a greater and a necessarily lesser included
offense arising out of the same act or course of conduct, and the
evidence supports the verdict on the greater offense, that
conviction is controlling, and the conviction of the lesser offense
must be reversed.” (People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731,
736.) False imprisonment by violence is a lesser included offense
of kidnapping. (See People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 420.)
The evidence shows that Soto’s kidnapping of Rosa was
continuous from the time he kidnapped her until she escaped;
there was no break in the course of conduct upon their arrival at
the hotel. “‘[F]orcible detention of a victim is an element of

12
kidnapping and as long as the detention continues, the crime
continues.” (People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 60
(Chacon); see also People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1159
[“the crime of kidnapping continues until such time as the
kidnapper releases or otherwise disposes of the victim”].)
In Chacon, for example, the defendant and a companion
took a librarian hostage during an attempt to escape a youth
authority facility. They put the librarian in a truck and tried to
drive away, but a security officer sprayed them with mace. The
youths crashed the truck and were apprehended. (Chacon, supra,
37 Cal.App.4th at p. 58.) The defendant was convicted of
kidnapping and several other crimes. On appeal, the defendant
challenged whether the kidnapping involved bodily harm,
arguing that some of the victim’s injuries did not occur during the
kidnapping, which was complete once the victim was put into the
truck. The court disagreed, holding that as long as the victim
was forcibly detained, the kidnapping continued. (Id. at p. 60.)
Similarly, in People v. Thomas (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1328,
1331 (Thomas) the court held that “a defendant may be convicted
of only one kidnapping offense where there is but one abduction
and detention of a solitary victim.” There, the defendant
apprehended the victim in a mall parking lot, kidnapped her at
gunpoint in her car, took her money and wallet, parked and
sexually assaulted her, then drove her to her apartment to get
her ATM card. The victim escaped and called police; the
defendant fled but was later apprehended. (Id. at pp. 1331-1332.)
The defendant was convicted of two counts of kidnapping based
on the prosecution’s theory that the first offense, kidnapping for
robbery, ended when the defendant parked the car to rape the

13
victim, and the second kidnapping began when he drove the
victim to her apartment. (Id. at p. 1334.)
The Court of Appeal held that the second kidnapping
conviction must be vacated. It stated that although the
defendant’s “plan for obtaining money from [the victim] may have
changed in approach during the course of the kidnapping, the
initial kidnapping did not end with the commission of the sexual
offenses, and there was only one continuous kidnapping.”
(Thomas, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334.) After discussing
other kidnapping cases, the court stated, “In the present case,
there was a single abduction, followed by a continuous period of
detention. Not until she reached her apartment was [the victim]
released from that detention and the danger it presented. That
[the defendant] may have changed his approach or focus as to the
robbery, uttered a variety of threats to the victim, and engaged in
other crimes after the initial abduction did not transform the
offense into two kidnappings.” (Id. at p. 1335.)
On the other hand, the court in People v. Wiley (1994) 25
Cal.App.4th 159 held that “it was proper to convict Wiley of both
kidnapping for robbery and kidnapping for ransom in a
transaction involving a single victim.” (Id. at pp. 161-162.) In
that case, the defendant attempted to rob a victim at an ATM,
but the ATM would not dispense money. Wiley then “forced [the
victim] into [the victim’s] vehicle and drove forward
approximately 100 feet. He then forced [the victim] at gun point
to drive through the drive up ATM again. When he did so, the
ATM refused to dispense any money or to disgorge [the victim’s]
ATM card. In fear that Wiley would carry out his threat to shoot
him, [the victim] agreed to call his wife so she could bring [cash.]”
(Id. at p. 162.) The wife arrived but reported that she was having

14
trouble getting the cash. “She departed and [the victim] and
Wiley then drove from El Cajon to Alpine to meet her and make
the exchange. [The victim] was rescued by sheriff’s deputies who
had been alerted.” (Ibid.) Wiley was convicted of kidnapping for
robbery for his activities relating to the attempts to get money
from the ATM, and kidnapping for ransom for detaining the
victim at gunpoint while attempting to extort money for his
release. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal rejected Wiley’s argument that the two
convictions constituted “an impermissible division of a single
crime into multiple offenses.” (People v. Wiley, supra, 25
Cal.App.4th at p. 162.) The court stated that kidnapping for
robbery under section 209, subdivision (b) and kidnapping for
ransom under section 209, subdivision (a) “involve different
elements and different statutes. . . . Here, the kidnapping for
robbery terminated before the detention for extortion began.” (Id.
at pp. 162-163.)
None of these cases is directly on point, because they do not
involve lesser included offenses. However, they demonstrate that
a kidnapping continues as long as the victim remains detained.
Here, Rosa testified that once she was under Soto’s control, she
was continuously detained and had no opportunity to leave. That
continuous detention, and therefore the kidnapping, did not end
because the place of detention changed from the car to the hotel.
Soto relies on People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340
(Jandres). There, the defendant grabbed a woman as she walked
down the street, carried her to a dark area between two houses,
raped her, and ran away when a police officer arrived. (Id. at p.
347.) The defendant was convicted of both kidnapping to commit
rape and false imprisonment. On appeal, the court stated

15
without further analysis: “The People concede that defendant’s
conviction for false imprisonment must be vacated for the
additional reason that ‘false imprisonment is a lesser included
offense of kidnapping for rape,’ of which defendant also was
convicted. Citation.] We agree, as a defendant cannot be
convicted of both an offense and a lesser offense necessarily
included within that offense, based upon his or her commission of
the identical act.” (Id. at p. 362.)
The People argue that this case is not like Jandres, because
Soto’s false imprisonment of Rosa in the hotel was not based on
the “identical act” as the kidnapping. They argue that the hotel
is the place where “asportation ceased,” so the kidnapping was
complete and the false imprisonment began. However, the
People cite no authority in support of this argument, and we have
found none. Thus, because false imprisonment is a lesser
included offense of kidnapping, and the kidnapping of Rosa
continued until she escaped, the false imprisonment conviction on
count 9 must be reversed. (See People v. Sanders, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 736.)
B. Upper term on count 5, attempted murder
Soto contends the trial court erred when it relied on
aggravating facts that were not found by a jury to support the
high term on count 5. The People agree this was error, but
contend the error was harmless. We find the error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore remand is
warranted.
1. Additional background
While the jury was deliberating, the court asked the
prosecutor whether she would be “proceeding with any of the

16
aggravating factors that require a jury to make a determination.”
The prosecutor said no, she would “proceed on the court ones.”
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) states that when a statute
allows for a low, middle, and high term, the court shall impose
the middle term unless “there are circumstances in aggravation
of the crime that justify the imposition of” the upper term. Rule
4.421(b) sets out several aggravating factors relating to a
defendant: “(1) The defendant has engaged in violent conduct
that indicates a serious danger to society; (2) The defendant’s
prior convictions . . . are numerous or of increasing seriousness; . .
. . (4) The defendant was on probation, mandatory supervision,
postrelease community supervision, or parole when the crime was
committed; and (5) The defendant’s prior performance on
probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community
supervision, or parole was unsatisfactory.”
At the sentencing hearing, the court took judicial notice of
Soto’s record of arrests and prosecutions, or “rap sheet.” The
court noted that Soto had been on probation for section 273.5
domestic violence incidents at the times he committed these
crimes. The court also observed that in 2017 Soto sustained
convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and contempt of
court relating to domestic violence, and he sustained additional
convictions in 2019 and 2020. The court stated that it found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Soto showed an increasing and
violent criminal history, he posed a danger to society, and he does
not perform well in probation or on parole. The court said it was
“[u]sing one of the aggravating factors” to choose the high term
on count 5, and “using an aggravating factor” to choose the high
term on the great bodily injury enhancement.

17
2. Analysis
At the time of sentencing, in early 2024, controlling case
law held that “‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th
1069, 1079-1080 (Wiley), quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)
530 U.S. 466, 490 [emphasis in Wiley].) In June 2024, the United
States Supreme Court decided Erlinger v. United States (2024)
602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger), holding that “[v]irtually ‘any fact’ that
‘“increase[s] the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed”’”—including certain details relating to
prior convictions—“must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond
a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea).” (602
U.S. at p. 834.) Thus, in sentencing “a judge may ‘do no more,
consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what
crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.’” (Id.
at p. 838.)
While this appeal was pending, our Supreme Court
followed Erlinger in Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1069, holding that
under the reasoning of Erlinger, “a defendant is entitled to a jury
trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior
conviction and its elements,[ ] that expose the defendant to
imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily
provided midterm.” (Id. at p. 1086.) The court further held that
when a defendant “is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts
used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the
reviewing court must apply the Chapman[5] standard of review.
[Citations.] Under that standard, ‘a sentence imposed under ...

5 See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.

18
section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the
reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury,
applying that same standard, would have found true all of the
aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the
upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise
proved true in compliance with the current statute.’” (Id. at p.
1087, quoting People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 743
(Lynch).)
The People concede that under the reasoning of Wiley, the
trial court erred by relying on aggravating facts that were not
found by a jury. However, they argue the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Wiley is instructive, because it has similar facts. In that
case, to justify the imposition of an upper term, the trial court
cited Wiley’s “‘prior convictions, [his] poor performance on
probation, and the fact that the charges are becoming more
serious.’” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1077.) The Supreme
Court rejected this conclusion, noting that whether Wiley’s
crimes showed “‘increasing seriousness’” (rule 4.421(b)(2))
required “a comparison and evaluation of the relationship among
a defendant’s prior convictions, and a determination as to their
relative seriousness.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1082.)
Those factors must be assessed by a jury; such a finding “involves
something more than a narrow factual finding that the
convictions were sustained and what elements were required to
prove them,” which is the limitation on a court’s power under the
reasoning of Erlinger. (Ibid.) The same was true for the finding
that Wiley’s performance on probation had been “unsatisfactory”
(rule 4.421(b)(5)), because “even where a finding of unsatisfactory
probation performance is based on conviction of a new offense, it

19
is not strictly limited to that fact. Rather, it must be proven that
the defendant was ordered to serve a term of probation and
remained on probation at the time he or she committed the new
offense. These facts, too, go beyond the mere existence of a prior
conviction and its elements.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p.
1083.)
Wiley found these errors prejudicial because “a rational
juror could conclude that the People had not proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Wiley’s convictions were of increasing
seriousness.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1089.) The court
acknowledged that “the evidence may have been sufficient” to
support such a finding, but “that is not the proper inquiry when
assessing prejudice under Chapman. [Citation.] Instead, we
must ask ‘whether any rational fact finder could have come to the
opposite conclusion.’ [Citation.] A rational juror could have
reached the opposite conclusion here based on the totality of
Wiley’s criminal conduct and the applicable sentences for those
transgressions.” (Id. at p. 1090.)
The court held that the same was true for Wiley’s
performance on probation. The People argued that no rational
juror could conclude that being arrested while on probation
constituted satisfactory performance. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
pp. 1090-1091.) The court disagreed, noting that because the
record showed a mixed performance on probation the court could
not “discount the possibility that either counsel in a contested
jury trial might have presented live testimony on this factor that
would have affected the jury’s determination. [Citation.] Nor can
we discount the possibility that a rational jury could have
disagreed as to whether the People had proved that Wiley’s

20
overall performance on probation was unsatisfactory.” (Id. at p.
1091.)
Following the reasoning of Wiley, we also cannot determine
beyond a reasonable doubt what a jury might have concluded
regarding the aggravating facts the court cited in support of its
imposition of the high term on count 5. Soto argues, for example,
that a jury might not have concluded that Soto’s violent conduct
“indicates a serious danger to society” (rule 4.421(b)(1)), because
his violent conduct was directed toward his romantic partners
rather than society in general. There is also no evidence in the
record about Soto’s performance on probation, other than the
evidence of the crimes herein. We “‘cannot assume that the
record reflects all of the evidence that would have been presented
to the jury, or that the defendant had the same incentive and
opportunity at a sentencing hearing to contest the aggravating
circumstance.’” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 775.) Thus, we
are unable to find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
When aggravating facts were not tried to the jury and the
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the proper
remedy is to remand to give the People an opportunity to retry
the aggravating facts. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.) “On
remand, the parties remain free to introduce at trial all relevant
evidence to support or contest the factual support for the
aggravating circumstances set out in the California Rules of
Court. The court may rely on any properly proven aggravating
facts, including prior convictions or facts necessarily found by the
jury to support a verdict on underlying counts and
enhancements. The court retains its discretion to impose an
upper term sentence if it concludes that one or more properly
proved circumstances justify such a sentence. (§ 1170(b)(2).) If it

21
cannot so conclude, it may impose no more than a middle term for
each of the counts on which [Soto] stands convicted. (Id., subd.
(b)(1).)” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 777-778.)
C. Soto’s remaining sentencing claims are moot
Because we remand for further proceedings and
resentencing on count 5, we need not address Soto’s remaining
claims of sentencing error. “[W]hen part of a sentence is stricken
on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to
all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its
sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’”
(People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) As such, Soto’s
remaining claims of error relating to his sentencing are moot.
DISPOSITION
Soto’s conviction for false imprisonment of Rosa, count 9, is
reversed. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. The sentence on
attempted murder, count 5, is vacated. The matter is remanded
for further sentencing proceedings as discussed herein.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

MORI, J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

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