CourtListener 10840452•J.E. v. A.C. CA2/7
Texto completo
Filed 4/9/26 J.E. v. A.C. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
J.E., B343796
Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BQ053107)
v.
A.C.,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Anne Kiley, Judge. Affirmed.
J.E., in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
__________________________
J.E.1 filed a request for a domestic violence restraining
order against his former girlfriend A.C., and the trial court
subsequently dismissed the petition without prejudice for lack of
prosecution. More than eight years later, J.E. asked the court to
“seal or destroy” the case records. The court denied the request,
and we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2016 J.E. filed a petition for a domestic violence
restraining order against his then-ex-girlfriend, A.C., and a
temporary restraining order was granted pending the hearing on
a permanent restraining order. J.E. did not appear at the
hearing, and the court dissolved the temporary restraining order
and dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution.2
More than eight years after filing the petition, in November
2024, J.E. filed a motion to “seal or destroy” the record of the
restraining order proceeding. He cited the “sensitive nature of
this matter and the parties’ current relationship” and argued
“[p]ublic dissemination of this motion and the underlying records
1 We refer to the protected party by his initials. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1) [names of “protected persons in
domestic violence-prevention proceedings” may be abbreviated to
protect their privacy interests].) We also refer to the restrained
party by her initials to protect J.E.’s privacy interests.
2 J.E. contends the trial court never issued a temporary
restraining order, but the court’s May 3, 2016 minute order
dismissing the case states the court dissolved a temporary
restraining order. On our own motion, we augment the record to
include that minute order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.155(a)(1)(A).)
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could cause irreparable harm to the parties’ reputations and
privacy,” as well as “professional challenges[] and emotional
distress.” J.E. argued the court had authority to seal records
under California Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d)3 and to seal or
destroy the records under Code of Civil Procedure section 128,
subdivision (a). J.E. asked the court to destroy or seal all records
associated with the case, including petitions, filings, the
temporary restraining order, and hearing minutes or transcripts.
J.E. supported his motion with a declaration stating he and
A.C. had reconciled and were now life partners. He explained he
requested the restraining order when the parties “were
navigating a complex and emotionally charged dynamic, which
led to misunderstandings and impulsive actions on my part.”
J.E. stated A.C.’s attempts to contact him were “not motivated by
malice or harm but rather by her deep affection and immaturity
at the time.” He stated the continued existence of the records
had drawn “unwanted scrutiny” in his personal and professional
life and undermined the couple’s efforts to “build a positive future
together.” He concluded, “I deeply regret filing the restraining
order petition in 2016 and have since come to understand the
situation in its proper context. [A.C.] had no harmful intentions,
and my actions were a reaction to misunderstanding and
emotional distress. Destroying these records would bring closure
and allow us to continue building our lives together.”
In January 2025 the court denied the motion. It concluded
there was “no basis to seal the pleadings” and “the court ha[d] no
authority to destroy the pleadings.” At the hearing, the court
explained there was “a public policy in the state of California to
courts being open,” which was “a very strong and important
3 Citations to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
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policy.” It described that sealing records requires “a very tailored
request” and a “reason to do so” under the Rules of Court, which
J.E. had not established. The court stated, “On what you’ve
shown me, there’s no basis to seal these records anymore than
anybody else’s domestic violence prevention act records would be
sealed.” The court concluded “there’s no basis on what you filed
to seal these records. I have no authority to do so. . . . There’s no
basis . . . to destroy court records at all.”
J.E. timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
“Courts in California have long recognized a common law
right of access to public documents, including court records.”
(In re Marriage of Tamir (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1078;
accord, Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 471, 483 (Overstock).) Under the common law,
“court records are presumed to be ‘ “open to the public unless
they are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute or are
protected by the court itself due to the necessity of
confidentiality.” ’ ” (Tamir, at p. 1078; accord, Overstock, at
p. 483; see NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1213-1214 (NBC Subsidiary) [“[W]e agree
with numerous other courts . . . that history does suggest such a
general right of access to civil trials and related proceedings.”].)
Rules 2.550 and 2.551, which govern requests to seal court
records, “expressly implement the First Amendment principles
espoused in NBC Subsidiary and establish a presumption that
‘court records . . . be open’ unless the law requires
confidentiality.” (Overstock, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 486; see
rule 2.550(c).) Under rule 2.550(d), a court may order a record
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filed under seal “only if it expressly finds facts that establish:
(1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of
public access to the record; (2) The overriding interest supports
sealing the record; (3) A substantial probability exists that the
overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed;
(4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) No less
restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.”
We “review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial
evidence, and ‘review de novo questions of law raised by the trial
court’s order.’ ” (Marino v. Rayant (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 846,
863; see In re M.T. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 322, 336.)
J.E. first contends the court had to make “specific findings
on the record under rule 2.550(d)(2)-(3).” He cites no authority
requiring the court to make explicit findings on the record in
support of a decision denying a motion to seal. Rule 2.550
requires a court to make express findings only if it orders records
filed under seal. (See rule 2.550(d), (e).)
Second, J.E. asserts the court failed to balance the public’s
right of access against his confidentiality interests. However, we
presume the trial court knew and followed the law unless the
record shows otherwise. (In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487,
499; Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 719–720
[“ ‘Absent an indication to the contrary, we are required to
presume a court was aware of, and followed, the applicable law
and considered all the relevant facts and arguments.’ ”].)
Moreover, the record shows the court applied the correct
framework. The court recognized California’s “very strong and
important” policy favoring open courts and explained that sealing
required a “specific reason” sufficient to overcome that policy.
(See rule 2.550(d)(1) [a court may order record filed under seal
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“only if . . . [t]here exists an overriding interest that overcomes
the right of public access to the record”].) In his motion, J.E.
asserted that the records caused “unwarranted scrutiny in both
[his] personal and professional life” and hampered his and A.C.’s
efforts to “build a positive future together.” But the court
properly concluded those generalized concerns did not constitute
an overriding interest sufficient to overcome the public right of
access, concluding, “On what you’ve shown me, there’s no basis to
seal these records anymore than anybody else’s domestic violence
prevention act records would be sealed.” (See rule 2.550(d); In re
Marriage of Tamir, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088 [rejecting
the request to seal financial records because the parties “do not
identify any specific prejudice or privacy concerns regarding
disclosure of these materials that would override the right of
access” and their “reasoning, if adopted by this court, would
essentially mandate the sealing of all financial records filed in a
court proceeding”].)
J.E. then informed the court he was “a public figure now
after . . . doing a documentary” and people were using the
restraining order filing against him and A.C. in other courts. The
court responded by noting that a federal public defender had
sought access to the case file in connection with another case, and
stated, “[I]f there are other cases and a federal public defender is
looking into this file, that’s a whole other reason why public
access to court records is important.” The court appropriately
determined that J.E.’s assertion that he had become a public
figure did not establish that he had an interest supporting
sealing the record that overrode the public right of access.
On appeal J.E. asserts he is facing extraordinary
circumstances that distinguish his filing from others because he
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“has become a public figure as the documented target of a federal
murder-for-hire plot that received widespread media attention,”
and the court records involving his request for a restraining order
have created an “enduring stigma” for him. He asserts the
records have “been used to mischaracterize [him] in online
searches and background checks, thereby impeding his
employment, professional credibility, and personal safety.”
However, J.E. did not include this information in his motion filed
in the trial court or raise these points at the hearing. Therefore,
we may not consider these additional alleged facts in determining
whether the court properly denied the motion to seal. (See San
Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, fn. 6
[“ ‘In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we must consider the facts
before the court at the time of its ruling. . . .’ ”].)
Third, J.E. argues the court mistakenly believed it lacked
authority to seal the records, relying on the court’s statement, “I
have no authority to destroy court records.” However, the court
addressed that comment to J.E.’s alternative request to destroy
the court records, not to seal them. The court plainly understood
it had the authority to order records filed under seal; it just found
J.E. had not demonstrated that such an order was appropriate in
his case.
Fourth, to the extent J.E. argues the court erred in not
granting his request to destroy the files, he cites no authority,
and we are aware of none, that would permit the court to order
family court files be destroyed. Code of Civil Procedure
section 128, subdivision (a)(8), on which J.E. relies, gives courts
the power to control their proceedings and enforce their orders,
but not to order court records destroyed.
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Finally, J.E. also asserts the court should have considered
“partial or tailored sealing—such as removing the case from
online docket systems or restricting access through in-person
review.” But he did not ask the trial court for that relief, so he
has forfeited that argument. (See Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 489 [“It is well settled that the failure
to raise an issue in the trial court typically forfeits on appeal any
claim of error based on that issue.”].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
GIZA, J.*
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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