People v. Berry CA5

CourtListener 10832999Calctapp3 de abr. de 2026

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Filed 4/2/26 P. v. Berry CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, F088801

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 23CM1631)

v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND
CHARRONE SHERRICK BERRY, DENYING REHEARING

Defendant and Appellant. [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.264(c), it is ordered that the opinion
filed herein on March 12, 2026, be modified in the following particulars:

1. On page 4, in the second full paragraph, the last sentence beginning with
“Sarah” and ending with “several days” is deleted, and the following sentence
is inserted in its place:

Sarah and defendant’s communications occurred over a couple of days.

2. On page 5, in the second full paragraph, after the sentence ending “they were
talking about,” add the following sentence:

Defendant denied being the person who sent the messages through the social
media website.

3. On page 16, under the subheading “C. Analysis,” the first full paragraph
beginning with “Defendant’s conviction” and ending with “a commercial sex
act” is deleted and the following paragraph is inserted in its place:
Defendant’s conviction for human trafficking of a minor for a commercial
sex act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)) is supported by substantial evidence. As we stated
above, an attempted inducement of a minor suffices for a conviction under the
statute. (Moses, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 913.) Defendant’s conduct here was
sufficient to constitute an attempt to induce Sarah to engage in a commercial
sex act. (See id. at pp. 908–909, 913; see also People v. Superior Court
(Decker) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 8 [“ ‘[w]henever the design of a person to
commit crime is clearly shown, slight acts in furtherance of the design will
constitute an attempt’ ”].) Defendant’s conduct of using social media to
contact Sarah, of asking her—after learning she was working as a prostitute—
what her “situation was,” of inquiring whether she was looking for a pimp, and
of stating his price as $2,500, were acts that the trier of fact could reasonably
conclude were designed to induce Sarah to engage in a commercial sex act.

There is no change in the judgment.

Appellant’s petition for rehearing filed on March 26, 2026, is denied.

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, J.

HARRELL, J.

2.
Filed 3/12/26 P. v. Berry CA5 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088801
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 23CM1631)
v.

CHARRONE SHERRICK BERRY, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Robert S.
Burns, Judge.
Peggy A. Headley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Galen N. Farris and Robert
Gezi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Following his waiver of the right to a jury trial, defendant Charrone Sherrick Berry
was convicted by the trial court of one count of human trafficking of a minor for a sex
act. On appeal, defendant asserts (1) his jury trial waiver was not made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily, (2) he could only be convicted of attempted human
trafficking, and (3) insufficient evidence supports his conviction. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 14, 2024, the Kings County District Attorney filed a first amended
information, charging defendant with human trafficking of a minor for a sex act (Pen.
Code, § 236.1, subd. (c)(1);1 count 1) and pandering (§ 266i, subd. (a)(2); count 2). As to
both counts, the information alleged defendant had suffered a prior “strike” conviction
within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d)).
On August 1, 2024, at the prosecution’s request, the trial court dismissed count 2.
After defendant waived his right to a jury trial, the court found defendant guilty on
count 1 following a bench trial. The court also found true the prior strike conviction
allegation.
The trial court sentenced defendant on October 8, 2024, to a term of imprisonment
of five years on count 1, which was doubled to 10 years under the Three Strikes law.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 14, 2024.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
FACTS
I. Prosecution evidence
Defendant messages “Sarah” on a social media website
K. Kurtz, a special agent of the California Department of Justice, was assigned to
the human trafficking and sexual predator apprehension team. As part of an
investigation, Kurtz posed as a 17-year-old named “Sarah” on a social media website.2
On May 5, 2023, defendant messaged Sarah on the website, writing: “What’s
happening Sarah.” Kurtz opened defendant’s profile and observed several pictures on the
profile. Using a government database search tool, Kurtz entered the date of birth and
location listed on defendant’s social media profile which produced a person with
defendant’s name. The government database search provided a picture of that person.
Kurtz then compared that picture with the pictures on the social media profile and
determined they were the same person. One of the pictures from the social media profile
was marked as Exhibit 1.
Sarah responded back to defendant’s message, and a conversation followed.
During this conversation, Sarah told defendant that she was “trappin[g].” According to
Kurtz, “trapping” in the “human trafficking culture” means to “actively be making money
working as a prostitute.” Defendant asked about her “situation.” Sarah told defendant
that her “pimp” was in jail for a long time so she no longer had one. Defendant asked
Sarah if she was on bad terms with her pimp and added, “[I]f [you’re] choosing [you] can
just say that too lol.” “Choosing,” Kurtz testified, is short for “choosing up,” a process
by which a prostitute chooses a pimp to work for. Kurtz further testified the “choosing

2 We recognize “Sarah” is not a real person as the profile associated with her
identity was operated by Kurtz. For clarity, we refer to the person purportedly
communicating from the profile as “Sarah,” rather than Kurtz. We refer to Kurtz instead
when referencing his actions while not under the guise of Sarah’s identity.

3.
up” process typically involves a payment by the prostitute to the pimp beforehand, called
a “choose-up fee.”
Sarah then told defendant she was 17 years old. Defendant asked when she would
turn 18 years old, and Sarah responded, “Sept[ember] 2.” Defendant noted September
was “around the corner,” and asked Sarah if she was going to be an “asset.” Sarah asked
defendant what his “fee” was. Defendant asked Sarah if she was law enforcement, which
Sarah denied. Defendant asked Sarah how “quickly” she could “come up with” $2,500.
Sarah replied likely by the following weekend. Sarah also informed defendant she was
working in Sacramento at the time.
At another point during their communications, defendant told Sarah he would
move her unless she was already making money. Sarah responded that she was already
making money, so there was no reason for her to leave Sacramento. Sarah and defendant
continued messaging each other through the social media website over the course of
several days.
Custodial interrogation
On May 31, 2023, special agents M. Kutz and J. Robinette contacted defendant at
the parole office in Fresno, California. Robinette read defendant his Miranda3 rights.
Defendant waived those rights and agreed to speak with the agents.
Defendant told the agents he did not remember speaking with someone online.
Robinette asked defendant to hand over his cellphone, which defendant refused to do.
Kutz told defendant he was under arrest and to hand over his cellphone. Defendant took
his cellphone out of his pocket and threw it against the wall before jumping over the
desk, picking up his cellphone, and throwing it against the wall again.

3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

4.
II. Defense evidence
Defendant’s trial testimony
Defendant scheduled a meeting with his parole agent about employment
opportunities. On that day, May 31, 2023, defendant arrived at the parole office and
waited in the lobby. Defendant was approached by two men, the special agents.
Defendant was confused as he expected his parole agent to be there.
When the agents asked him questions, defendant told them he did not know the
person that they were talking about. The “whole situation” made defendant “feel
uncomfortable,” so he broke his phone because he “didn’t clearly understand what they
were . . . there for.” According to defendant, the agents also presented to defendant a
picture of a person that “looked like it could be” him. Defendant admitted he was the
person in Exhibit 1.
DISCUSSION
I. Jury Trial Waiver
A. Additional Background
At a hearing on April 22, 2024, defense counsel informed the trial court: “we
would like to waive our right to a jury trial, and then we would like to adjust the trial
date.” The court stated to defendant he has a “right to have a jury trial,” which means,
“people who live in the county would come to court and listen to the evidence, and they
decide if it shows beyond a reasonable doubt that you’re guilty of the charges.” The
court also stated defendant has “a right to have a court trial.” The court explained:

“It is conducted in exactly the same way. The rules of evidence are
the same, the burden of proof is the same. It is just instead of a jury, it is a
judge that listens to the evidence, and then the judge makes a determination
as to whether or not they think it has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
The court asked defendant if he understood the right to a jury trial. Defendant
responded, “Yes, sir.” The court also asked defendant if he understood the right to a

5.
court trial, to which defendant again responded, “Yes, sir.” The court then asked: “At
this time you would like to waive your right to a jury trial and . . . exercise the right to a
court trial?” Defendant replied, “Yes, sir.”
The court accepted defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial. The court then
asked defense counsel if he joined in defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial.
Defense counsel replied, “Yes, your Honor.” The court and the parties then discussed
dates for trial.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Under the federal Constitution and our state Constitution, a defendant in a
criminal prosecution has a right to a jury trial.” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th
151, 166 (Sivongxxay).) “However, a ‘jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the
consent of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant’s
counsel.’ ” (Ibid.) A “defendant’s waiver of the right to jury trial may not be accepted
by the court unless it is knowing and intelligent, that is, ‘ “ ‘made with a full awareness
both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it,’ ” ’ as well as voluntary ‘ “ ‘in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 305.)
There is no “specific method for determining whether a defendant has made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial in favor of a bench trial.” (Sivongxxay,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 167.) However, our Supreme Court has offered the following
guidance:

“Going forward, we recommend that trial courts advise a defendant
of the basic mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver colloquy, including but not
necessarily limited to the facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12 members of
the community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may participate
in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously agree in order to
render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, a
judge alone will decide his or her guilt or innocence. We also recommend

6.
that the trial judge take additional steps as appropriate to ensure, on the
record, that the defendant comprehends what the jury trial right entails. A
trial judge may do so in any number of ways—among them, by asking
whether the defendant had an adequate opportunity to discuss the decision
with his or her attorney, by asking whether counsel explained to the
defendant the fundamental differences between a jury trial and a bench
trial, or by asking the defendant directly if he or she understands or has any
questions about the right being waived.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at
pp. 169–170.)
Our Supreme Court made clear in Sivongxxay that this guidance was “advisory”
and “not intended to limit trial courts to a narrow or rigid colloquy.” (Sivongxxay, supra,
3 Cal.5th at p. 170.) The court further stated that a trial court’s “adaptation of or
departure from the recommended colloquy in an individual case will not necessarily
render an ensuing jury waiver invalid.” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “Matters of reality, and not mere
ritual, should be controlling.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
We examine “the totality of the circumstances” in determining whether a
defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial.
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 167.)
C. Analysis
The trial court’s colloquy was not inadequate. The court first stated how a jury
trial operates: “people who live in the county would come to court and listen to the
evidence, and they decide if it shows beyond a reasonable doubt that you’re guilty of the
charges.” Next, the court stated a court trial “is conducted in exactly the same way” and
the “rules of evidence” and the “burden of proof” are “the same.” The court then told
defendant the difference is “just instead of a jury, it is a judge that listens to the evidence,
and then the judge makes a determination as to whether or not they think it has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court confirmed with defendant that he
understood both the right to a jury trial and the right to a court trial. The court then asked
defendant if he would like to waive his right to a jury trial in order to exercise his right to

7.
a court trial, and defendant responded, “Yes, sir.” The court also asked whether defense
counsel joined in defendant’s waiver, which he did.
Defendant had experience in the criminal justice system. The available record
shows defendant had suffered three prior convictions: one conviction occurred in 2020,
and the other two convictions occurred by plea in 2022.4 (Parke v. Raley (1992)
506 U.S. 20, 37 [“evidence of a defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice
system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights”].)
Defendant asserts that his experience with the criminal justice system was “limited”
because the record does not show he had previously been convicted by a jury. But a
defendant’s criminal history is not “limited” merely because his prior convictions did not
result from a jury trial. (See, e.g., People v. Langdon (1959) 52 Cal.2d 425, 432 [noting
the defendant had “been before the criminal courts on at least three previous occasions”
in finding a valid waiver].) A prior conviction by plea agreement is relevant experience
in the criminal justice system. (See People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [“Of
course, before taking the plea, the trial court must admonish the defendant of the
constitutional rights that are being waived, as well as the direct consequences of the
plea.”]; People v. Lytle (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1, 4 [“When a defendant pleads guilty or
nolo contendere, whether or not the plea is pursuant to a plea bargain, he must be advised
of and waive his rights of self-incrimination, confrontation and jury trial [citations], and
must be advised of the direct consequences of the plea, including the maximum possible
penalty.”].) Defendant’s experience in the criminal justice system supports the
conclusion that his waiver was made knowingly and intelligently.
Defendant observes the trial court’s colloquy omitted three out of the four “basic
mechanics of a jury trial” recommended by Sivongxxay. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at
p. 169.) Specifically, defendant notes the trial court failed to inform him: a jury is made

4 As defendant notes, the record does not show how he was convicted in 2020.

8.
up of 12 members of the community, all 12 jurors must unanimously agree in order to
render a verdict, and that he could participate in jury selection through his counsel. But
Sivongxxay declined to prescribe any specific set of advisements as prerequisites for a
waiver’s validity. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 170 [“[W]e emphasize that our
guidance is not intended to limit trial courts to a narrow or rigid colloquy.”].) Sivongxxay
made clear those four “basic mechanics of a jury trial” were only “general guidance” for
a trial court’s waiver colloquy. (Id. at p. 169.) The court’s omission of three of the four
general mechanics is not determinative of the waiver’s validity. (Id. at p. 170 [“a trial
court’s adaptation of or departure from the recommended colloquy in an individual case
will not necessarily render an ensuing jury waiver invalid”].)
While the trial court’s advisements here departed from those recommended by
Sivongxxay, the extent of the difference does not render the colloquy legally insufficient.
The court informed defendant that a jury is made up of “people who live in the county”
and that “they decide if it shows beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant is] guilty of
the charges.” We observe that these advisements did not precisely inform defendant that
“a jury is made up of 12 members of the community” or “all 12 jurors must unanimously
agree in order to render a verdict.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169, italics
added.) But the court’s colloquy partially covered those two mechanics. Compared to
the advisements recommended in Sivongxxay, these statements only fall short because
they failed to specifically mention that a jury is composed of “12” members, and that
those 12 jurors must “unanimously” agree. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.)
However, neither shortcoming compels a conclusion that the waiver was invalid. (See id.
at p. 168 [“the presence or absence of a reference in a colloquy to [the requirement of
unanimity among the 12 jurors], or to the impartiality requirement, is not necessarily
determinative of whether a waiver meets constitutional standards”]; People v. Tijerina
(1969) 1 Cal.3d 41, 45–46 [finding a jury waiver knowing and intelligent even though the
defendant was not advised of the unanimity requirement].) Similarly, though the court

9.
failed to advise defendant that he could participate in jury selection, this is not
determinative. (See People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1072–1074 [finding a jury
waiver knowing and intelligent even though the defendant was not advised of his right to
participate in jury selection].) These deficiencies do not outweigh other circumstances
relevant to the inquiry, including the extent of the court’s questioning coupled with
defendant’s experience in the criminal justice system.
Defendant further notes the record does not show whether defense counsel
discussed the jury trial waiver with defendant. Relying on People v. McCray (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 260 (McCray), defendant appears to argue that this aspect should be
afforded significant weight in the totality of the circumstances analysis.
In McCray, the trial court accepted the defendant’s waiver of his right to have a
jury determine whether he needed to be recommitted to a state hospital. (McCray, supra,
98 Cal.App.5th at p. 270.) During the colloquy on waiver, the court allowed the
defendant’s counsel to question the defendant on the issue. (Id. at p. 269.) Defense
counsel asked if the defendant remembered that the two had “talked about [the defendant
having] the right to have a jury listen to the evidence in this case and make the decision
on whether or not you need more treatment at the hospital.” (Ibid.) After the defendant
responded affirmatively, defense counsel then asked him if he “decided that [he] wanted
to have the judge listen to the evidence and make the decision, to waive your right to a
jury, correct?” (Ibid.) The defendant replied, “Yeah, yeah.” (Id. at p. 270.) Defense
counsel then stated: “Okay. So the judge is supposed to make sure that you understand
that you have a right to have a jury but that you are waiving that right in order to have the
judge make the decision.” (Ibid.) Defense counsel asked if he understood that, to which
defendant stated, “I waive that right.” (Ibid.) Neither defense counsel nor the court
asked any further questions or gave any further advisements. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal in McCray determined the record failed to show a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury trial. (McCray, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at

10.
p. 273.) The McCray court noted the trial court “did not take any steps itself to determine
if [the defendant] understood what a jury trial entailed or how it differed from a bench
trial.” (Ibid.) McCray observed “[t]here was no discussion between the court and [the
defendant] about how a jury trial works or the difference between a bench trial and a trial
by jury.” (Ibid.) Further, McCray observed “[t]he court did not even ask [defense
counsel] if he concurred with [the defendant’s] waiver decision.” (Ibid.)
McCray is distinguishable from this record. Here, the court led the questioning
and advisement of defendant. The court explained to defendant what a jury trial consists
of, and what a court trial consists of. The court also explained some of the ways in which
the two differ. Moreover, defendant stated he understood each advisement given to him
by the trial court. The court also asked defense counsel if he concurred with defendant’s
waiver, to which defense counsel responded affirmatively. The steps taken by the trial
court here go well beyond those in McCray.
In addition to the comments not made by the trial court, defendant also takes issue
with the comments the court did make. Specifically, defendant suggests that the trial
court “minimized” his right to a jury trial by stating a court trial “is conducted in exactly
the same way.” We disagree. First, the court was not obligated to fully explain the
differences between a court trial and jury trial. (See People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th
1088, 1105 [“There is no constitutional requirement that appellant understand ‘all the ins
and outs’ of a jury trial in order to waive his right to one.”].) But the court further
explained: “The rules of evidence are the same, the burden of proof is the same. It is just
instead of a jury, it is a judge that listens to the evidence, and then the judge makes a
determination as to whether or not they think it has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” We cannot conclude that these advisements were misleading or minimized his
right to a jury trial.
In sum, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates defendant’s jury trial waiver
was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

11.
II. Attempted Human Trafficking of a Minor
Defendant contends his conviction for human trafficking of a minor for a sex act
(§ 236.1, subd. (c)) must be reversed because the conviction is impermissible as a matter
of law. Specifically, he argues he could only be convicted of the “attempt prong” of
section 236.1, subdivision (c), because there was not an “actual minor victim.” The
People ask us to affirm the judgment because the statute proscribes an attempt to induce a
minor even when no actual minor is involved. We agree with the People.
Section 236.1, subdivision (c), provides, in relevant part: “A person who causes,
induces, or persuades, or attempts to cause, induce, or persuade, a person who is a minor
at the time of commission of the offense to engage in a commercial sex act, with the
intent to effect or maintain a violation of Section 266, 266h, 266i, 266j, 267, 311.1,
311.2, 311.3, 311.4, 311.5, 311.6, or 518 is guilty of human trafficking.”
Under the statute, “the word ‘attempts’ operates to modify all of the elements of
the statute, making it unnecessary to prove that the defendant targeted an actual minor
victim.” (People v. Moses (2020) 10 Cal.5th 893, 907 (Moses).) “Subdivision (c)
specifically targets trafficking minors.” (Id. at p. 908.) “A completed violation of
subdivision (c) will, obviously, involve the inducement of a particular person, and that
person must be a minor.” (Ibid.) “By contrast, to violate subdivision (c) as an attempt,
the defendant must intend to induce a minor, but the target of that inducement need not
be an actual minor.” (Ibid.) “This understanding of the statute supports a conclusion
that, as long as the defendant has attempted to induce a person and intends that the object
of his inducement be a minor, the elements of the attempt provision are satisfied.” (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court in Moses summarized the two different ways a defendant can
violate section 236.1, subdivision (c):

“In sum, [section 236.1, subdivision (c)] operates as follows: To be
convicted of the completed crime of inducing a minor to engage in a
commercial sex act, the person induced must be a minor. To commit the
crime of attempting to induce a minor, the defendant must act with the

12.
‘ “specific intent to commit the [completed] crime” ’ [citation], i.e., the
intent to cause, induce, or persuade a minor to engage in a commercial sex
act, at least when no actual minor victim is involved [citation]. The
defendant must act with the additional intent to effect or maintain a
violation of one of the offenses enumerated in the statute. If these elements
are met, the fact that the particular target of his efforts is not actually a
minor is not a defense. Under both theories the defendant is guilty of
‘human trafficking’ (§ 236.1[, subd. ](c)) and subject to the same
punishment.” (Moses, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 912–913.)
Relying on Moses, defendant asserts he could not be convicted under the statute
because a “completed violation” of section 236.1 requires an actual minor victim. Moses
does not support defendant’s reading of the statute. Moses recognized that an attempt can
be the basis for a conviction under section 236.1, subdivision (c). (Moses, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 908 [“[Section 236.1, subdivision (c)] conveys the voters’ intent that
human trafficking of a minor, whether successfully completed or merely attempted, is to
be punished in a uniform way.”].) Moses held that section 236.1, subdivision (c)
proscribes both the completed act of inducing an actual minor, and the attempt to induce
a person believed to be a minor. (Moses, at p. 913.) Put differently, a violation of
section 236.1 is completed, in colloquial terms, when a person attempts to induce a minor
to engage in a commercial sex act. (See Moses, at p. 913.) Moreover, Moses made clear
that an attempt to induce a minor does not require an actual minor. (Id. at p. 913 [“If
[the] elements [of section 236.1, subdivision (c)] are met, the fact that the particular
target of his efforts is not actually a minor is not a defense.”].)
As discussed in further detail in part III. of the discussion below, defendant
discussed with Sarah the prospect of her working for him as a prostitute, even after she
represented to him she was 17 years old. Defendant discussed with Sarah his “fee” of
$2,500 and asked how soon she could get him the money. Although defendant did not
successfully induce Sarah to engage in a commercial sex act, as Sarah was not a real
person, the crime was committed when defendant attempted to induce Sarah with the
intent to cause, induce, or persuade her to engage in a commercial sex act. (See Moses,

13.
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 913.) While Moses separates the two different ways a defendant
can violate section 236.1, subdivision (c), the court made clear that both may constitute a
violation of that section. (Moses, at p. 913 [“Under both theories the defendant is guilty
of ‘human trafficking’ (§ 236.1[, subd. ](c)) and subject to the same punishment.”].) For
that reason, we reject defendant’s contention that his conviction for human trafficking of
a minor for a sex act must be reversed as a matter of law.
Alternatively, defendant urges us to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect that
his conviction under section 236.1 occurred as result of the attempt prong, specifically,
“Attempted Human Trafficking of a Minor for a Sex Act.” We decline to do so. Again,
a violation of section 236.1 already encompasses an attempt. (See Moses, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 913; id. at p. 902 [“[Section 236.1, subdivision (c)] codifies the crime of
attempted human trafficking of a minor and punishes actual inducement and attempted
inducement in the same way.”].) Defendant also does not provide any authority
supporting his request. We see no need to amend the abstract of judgment.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of
human trafficking of a minor for a sex act. The People disagree, as do we.
A. Applicable Law
“To commit the crime of attempting to induce a minor, the defendant must act
with the ‘ “specific intent to commit the [completed] crime” ’ [citation], i.e., the intent to
cause, induce, or persuade a minor to engage in a commercial sex act, at least when no
actual minor victim is involved [citation].” (Moses, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 912–913.)
In addition, “[t]he defendant must act with the additional intent to effect or maintain a
violation of one of the offenses enumerated in the statute.” (Id. at p. 913.) Sections 266h
and 266i are among those enumerated offenses. (§ 236.1, subd. (c).)
Section 266i has six subparts defining the various ways the crime of pandering
may be committed. (See People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 485; see also

14.
People v. Dixon (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159–1160 [defining pandering as “the
business of recruiting a prostitute, finding a place of business for a prostitute, or soliciting
customers for a prostitute”].) “The statutory subparts or alternatives are not mutually
exclusive, i.e., the subparts can be violated at the same time.” (Campbell, at p. 485.)
Section 266i, subdivision (a)(1) states that a person is guilty of pandering if he
“[p]rocures another person for the purpose of prostitution.” In this context, the term
“procures” means “ ‘assisting, inducing, persuading or encouraging’ [another] to engage
in prostitution.” (Campbell, at p. 485.) Subdivision (a)(2) of section 266i proscribes:
“By promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, persuades,
or encourages another person to become a prostitute.” The proscribed activity of
encouraging someone to become a prostitute “includes encouragement of someone who
is already an active prostitute, or an undercover police officer.” (People v. Zambia
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 981 (Zambia).)
The act of pimping is proscribed by section 266h, subdivision (a). (See § 266h,
subd. (a); People v. Scally (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 285, 292.) Subdivision (b) of that
section states, in pertinent part: “Any person who, knowing another person is a
prostitute, lives or derives support or maintenance in whole or in part from the earnings
or proceeds of the person’s prostitution, . . . or who solicits or receives compensation for
soliciting for the person, when the prostitute is a minor, is guilty of pimping a minor, a
felony[.]” (§ 266h, subd. (b).)
B. Standard of Review
For a claim of insufficient evidence, we assess “the whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—
that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Snow
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66 (Snow).) We view “the trial evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution and presum[e] every fact the [trier of fact] could reasonably deduce

15.
from that evidence.” (People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 319.) “ ‘ “We do not
reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022)
13 Cal.5th 997, 1118.) “ ‘Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is
the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is
physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient
to support a conviction.’ ” (Ibid.)
“A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon
no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the [trier of
fact]’s verdict.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 (Zamudio).)
C. Analysis
Defendant’s conviction for human trafficking of a minor for a sex act (§ 236.1,
subd. (c)) is supported by substantial evidence. As we stated above, an attempted
inducement of a minor suffices for a conviction under the statute. (Moses, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 913.) Defendant used a social media website to contact Sarah, who told
him she was “trappin[g],” meaning, actively working as a prostitute. Defendant asked
what her “situation” was. When Sarah told him she no longer had a “pimp,” defendant
asked her if she was “choosing,” meaning, looking for another pimp. When Sarah told
defendant she was 17 years old, he asked her when she would turn 18 years old. Sarah
asked defendant about his “fee,” and, after he asked her if she was law enforcement,
defendant asked Sarah how quickly she could pay him $2,500. From this, the trier of fact
could have reasonably concluded defendant intended to induce Sarah to engage in a
commercial sex act.
Defendant asserts the evidence does not support a reasonable inference that he
specifically intended to induce a minor to engage in a sex act. He also notes the evidence
reasonably supports contrary inferences regarding defendant’s intent, i.e., that defendant
was “merely playing along” for a brief period of time with an “unknown texter by the
name of Sarah,” since he was the one who stopped texting her. Defendant notes he stated

16.
“lol” after his reference to “choosing.” But even if contrary inferences could be
reasonably drawn from the evidence, reversal is not warranted unless defendant could not
be convicted under any hypothesis. (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 639 [“If
the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the
judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be
reconciled with a contrary finding.”]; Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.) Substantial
evidence supported the trier of fact’s findings.
Defendant further argues the evidence was insufficient to prove his intent to
violate sections 266i and 266h. We disagree. As stated above, defendant’s conversation
with Sarah showed he intended for her to work for him as a prostitute. He discussed with
Sarah the fee she would have to pay in order to work for him. (§ 266i.) For purposes of
section 266i, it did not matter that Sarah was actually an undercover police officer.
(Zambia, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 977, 981.) Similarly, defendant’s conversation showed
he intended to derive financial gain from Sarah’s prostitution. (§ 266h.) For the same
reasons stated above, the trier of fact could reasonably have concluded defendant
possessed the requisite additional intent of violating sections 266i and 266h.
Defendant observes the prosecution did not mention section 266i or 266h in
closing arguments. It appears the prosecution instead referenced section 647, which is
not among the enumerated offenses in section 236.1. (§ 236.1, subd. (c).) Based on this,
defendant argues a claim of substantial evidence as it relates to sections 266i and 266h
should be treated as forfeited or, alternatively, as implied concessions of these issues.
However, “[i]t is elementary . . . that the prosecutor’s argument is not evidence and the
theories suggested are not the exclusive theories that may be considered by the
[factfinder].” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1126.) Under the applicable
standard of review, we are not limited to the theory presented by the prosecution. (See
ibid.) We instead may assess “the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence[.]” (Snow, supra,

17.
30 Cal.4th at p. 66.) There was substantial evidence defendant possessed the additional
intent to violate sections 266i and 266h.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

DETJEN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, J.

HARRELL, J.

18.

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