People v. Merida-Diaz CA4/3

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Filed 4/2/26 P. v. Merida-Diaz CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064566

v. (Super. Ct. No. 21ZF0001)

ERIK OYANTAL MERIDA-DIAZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gary S. Paer, Judge. Affirmed.
Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Liz Olukoya, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
* * *
Erik Merida-Diaz was convicted of the second degree murder of
his wife, Elvira Ventura, following a jury trial. On appeal, he argues he killed
Ventura while in the heat of passion and, thus, the evidence was insufficient
to convict him of second degree murder. He contends the evidence established
he was only guilty of voluntary manslaughter. He also argues the trial court
erred in introducing a crime scene photograph of the victim.
We disagree as to both arguments. There was substantial
evidence that Merida-Diaz did not kill Ventura in a heat of passion. The type
of argument that culminated in Ventura’s death was commonplace for their
relationship and Merida-Diaz told police he only killed her “to shut her up.”
We also conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
photograph. Although certainly unpleasant, it was not so inflammatory that
the jury would have used it to punish Merida-Diaz.
We accordingly affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Merida-Diaz and Ventura lived in an apartment with their two
children. In 2016, they rented out a room to C.H. and his wife, B.H. Around
May 2017, C.H. started noticing Merida-Diaz and Ventura having problems.
He often heard them arguing about infidelity issues. Both C.H. and B.H.
were present for one such incident in May 2017 in which Merida-Diaz found
provocative photos on Ventura’s phone that were meant for another man.
Merida-Diaz slammed the phone on the ground and broke it.
B.H. testified that Merida-Diaz was hysterical after looking at
Ventura’s phone. Merida-Diaz called Ventura a “whore” and a “bitch.” He

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then took Ventura’s clothes, cut them with scissors, and said, “she didn’t
deserve anything because she was a whore.” He also smashed or broke all
their wedding photos and grabbed a photo album and tore up all the photos.
Ventura hit Merida-Diaz on the arm. They then started pushing each other.
In another incident later the same month, B.H. heard “hitting on
the walls” of Merida-Diaz and Ventura’s bedroom one night. The next
morning, Ventura was acting “very nervous and crying,” and she had a bruise
on the left side of her face. Merida-Diaz later admitted to C.H. that he had hit
Ventura.
Sometime before Merida-Diaz found the photos, B.H. was sitting
with Merida-Diaz and Ventura. Ventura asked him, “‘if I was unfaithful to
you, what would you do to me?’” Merida-Diaz responded that he would “kill
her.” B.H. testified that Merida-Diaz seemed serious.
On July 5, 2017, C.H. and B.H. left the home and did not return
until 1:00 a.m. on the morning of July 6. When they returned, they saw
Merida-Diaz walking out of his bedroom in an unusual manner; he was
swerving from side to side, and he did not seem okay to them. C.H. said he
did not see Ventura at that time.
Around 9:20 that same morning, Merida-Diaz called 911 and
confessed to choking Ventura to death. He said it happened at about
5:00 a.m. and claimed he did it because she was cheating on him.
The police interviewed Merida-Diaz that day. The prosecution
played an audio recording of the interview for the jury and provided the jury
with a transcript of that recording. Merida-Diaz said Ventura cheated on him
with another man and he found out through her phone a few days prior to
killing her. Ventura and the other man’s relationship was only over the
phone; it was not sexual, although they would talk about sexual things. The

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incident culminating in Ventura’s death started when Ventura told Merida-
Diaz she was going to leave him. They argued and she hit and slapped him.
This made him mad. However, he calmed down and suggested they talk more
the next day. But she told him she was going to start working so she could
leave him, and he would not see his kids. She continued yelling at him and
called him an “asshole” and a “motherfucker.” He then choked her to “shut
her up.” He choked her until she stopped breathing. Immediately after killing
her, he felt guilt.
Merida-Diaz was charged with first degree murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a); count 1).1
Before his jury trial, the defense moved to exclude a crime scene
photograph showing Ventura deceased with a bloody foam coming out of her
nose. The photograph depicted Ventura as she appeared in the bedroom when
police found her. The defense argued the photograph had no probative value
because there was no challenge that Ventura was alive before Merida-Diaz
strangled her, nor that she had bloody foam coming out of her nose after her
death; the introduction of the photograph would only play on the emotions of
the jury. The prosecution argued the photograph was probative of the cause
of death because the forensic pathologist was going to testify that the fluid
was either from the victim’s lungs or blood due to the strangulation.
The trial court admitted the photograph ruling that “[u]nder
[section] 352 of the evidence code I’m going to find that the prejudicial effect
is outweighed by the probative value. The D.A is alleging that they will be
seeking first degree murder, which is premediated, willful, and deliberate.
And that would encompass a strong application of force to someone’s neck

1All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.

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over a specific period of time. [¶] I would note that the neck area on this
photo, as well as the upper chest shows some obvious bruising, which
certainly is probative as to what kind of force was applied to the neck, and it
may be indicative how long that pressure was applied.” The photograph is
“relevant to show how the crime occurred, whether there was any malice, and
whether there was any premeditation and deliberation. Which may be
probative if someone is going to suggest this was an accident where someone
is alleging they didn’t apply a lot of force and that this was some sort of
mistake or accident.” The court added, “I really don’t see how this will unduly
inflame the jury. It looks like a woman who is sleeping with some discharge
coming out of the nose.” The court further explained that “on a scale of 1 to 10
in terms of being unduly prejudicial this [photograph] would be on the lower
side. It actually looks as though the victim is sleeping. There are no open
head wounds. There is no blood. There are no bones sticking out. There’s no
organs sticking out.” The court did not think the photo would unduly
prejudice the jury because “[b]asically we have a picture of a woman whose
eyes are closed and her mouth is closed, and there appears to be maybe some
discharge from the nose.”
At trial, a forensic pathologist testified that Ventura died from
asphyxia due to compression of the neck. The pathologist noted that Ventura
had white froth and bloody fluid coming from her mouth, due to increased
fluid in the lungs, which is called pulmonary edema. Pulmonary edema is not
necessarily diagnostic of asphyxia, but it does happen when someone dies of
asphyxia. Merida-Diaz’s attorney did not renew the objection to exclude the
photograph.
The pathologist explained that Merida-Diaz would have needed
to choke Ventura for “more than 2 minutes” for her to become unconscious,

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and that he would have needed to continue applying pressure on her neck
“for 3 [to] 4 minutes more” before she would have died.
The trial court instructed the jury on first and second degree
murder with malice aforethought, as well as the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter as the result of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
The jury found Merida-Diaz not guilty of first degree murder but guilty of
second degree murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced him to
15 years to life in prison.
Merida-Diaz timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE MERIDA-DIAZ DID NOT KILL
VENTURA IN THE HEAT OF PASSION
Merida-Diaz does not challenge the jury’s finding that he killed
Ventura. He argues that the evidence does not support the finding that he
acted with malice when he did so. He contends the evidence only shows he
was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. We disagree.
Murder is the unlawful killing of another with malice
aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Murder is either of the first or second degree.
It is of the first degree if it was committed willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation. (§ 189, subd. (a).) All other murders are of the second degree.
(Id., subd. (b).)
The malice necessary for murder can either be express or implied.
(§ 188, subd. (a).) Express malice requires “a deliberate intention unlawfully
to take away the life of a fellow creature.” (Id., subd. (a)(1).) Malice is implied
“when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).)

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““Generally, the intent to unlawfully kill constitutes malice.
[Citations.]”” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549.) But the Legislature
has determined that a defendant who kills, even intentionally so, while in the
“heat of passion” lacks malice. (§ 192, subd. (a).) Thus, even if the defendant
has formed an intent to kill, there is no malice if the intent was formed while
in a “heat of passion.” (People v. Peau (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 823, 829
(Peau).) In that case, the defendant is only guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
(Ibid.)
A person acts in the heat of passion when they act ‘“without
reflection in response to adequate provocation.’” (Peau, supra,
236 Cal.App.4th at p. 829.) The provocation must be caused by the victim and
“must be sufficiently provocative that it would cause an ordinary person of
average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection.”
(People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583–584 (Manriquez).)
Heat of passion has both a subjective and an objective
component. (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 584.) The circumstances
which caused the defendant to subjectively act in the heat of passion must
also have caused an ordinarily reasonable person to have acted similarly
under those circumstances. (Ibid.)
In reviewing Merida-Diaz’s claim, our inquiry ‘“is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th
1015, 1055.) ‘“[I]t is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced
of the defendant’s guilt . . . .’” (Id. at pp. 1055–1056.) We resolve neither
credibility issues nor conflicts in the evidence; that is solely the province of
the jury. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)

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Here, there was substantial evidence Merida-Diaz did not
subjectively act in the heat of passion. The evidence showed he previously
reflected on the precise circumstances of the crime. B.H. testified that
Ventura had asked Merida-Diaz what he would do to her if she were ever
unfaithful to him. In a serious tone, he stated he would kill her. Thus, in July
2017, when Merida-Diaz found out Ventura had been cheating on him, it was
not a situation he had never contemplated before—to the contrary, he had a
preconceived response in mind and acted consistently with it. (People v.
Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 828 [heat of passion requires “an unconsidered
reaction to provocation”].)
Moreover, the argument leading to the crime was similar to
arguments Merida-Diaz and Ventura had before. C.H. testified he often
heard them arguing about issues of infidelity, and the evidence showed these
arguments often got heated and physical. From this, the jury could
reasonably conclude that the July 2017 argument was “the norm” and not a
unique situation Merida-Diaz had never encountered before. (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1216 [no heat of passion where “conduct that
evening . . . was no different than on the many other occasions on which they
had argued”].)
On the night of the murder, although Ventura told him she was
going to leave him and she hit him in the mouth, Merida-Diaz admitted to
police that he was able to “calm down.” He suggested to Ventura that they
talk more the following day. (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 585 [no heat
of passion where the defendant was “attempting to exert a calming influence
on the victim”].) However, Ventura continued to verbally insult him, so he
choked her “to shut her up.” The evidence does not establish Ventura’s
actions were “sufficiently provocative that [they] would cause an ordinary

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person of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and
reflection” (Manriquez, at pp. 583–584), nor do they support a finding
Merida-Diaz acted ‘“without reflection in response to adequate provocation’”
(Peau, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 829).
As to the objective component, there was substantial evidence
that these circumstances would not have aroused a heat of passion in an
objectively reasonable person. A reasonable person would not stop an
argument by choking the other person involved. (Manriquez, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 586 [victim’s insults and repeated assertions that the
defendant should take out and use weapon was insufficient to cause a
reasonable person to lose sight of reason and judgment].)
Accordingly, there was substantial evidence Merida-Diaz
committed second degree murder in the killing of Ventura; the evidence did
not support a finding Merida-Diaz killed Ventura while in the heat of
passion.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING THE CRIME SCENE
PHOTOGRAPH OF THE VICTIM
Merida-Diaz argues the crime scene photograph depicting
Ventura was not relevant and that its admission was a violation of state and
federal due process. He contends that, although the prosecution told the court
that the bloody foam was due to the strangulation, the pathologist testified
the substance was not diagnostic of strangulation. We conclude the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photograph.
Trial courts are often tasked with ruling on the admission of
gruesome photographs at homicide trials. (People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th

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116, 173 (Suarez).) Like any other evidence, the trial court has broad
discretion in determining the relevance of a crime scene photograph. (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court has held that crime scene
photographs of a deceased victim are relevant to show that the murder
occurred, how the murder occurred, and where the murder occurred. (See
Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 173.) Such photographs “clarify testimony
regarding the [victim’s] injuries and causes of death.” (Ibid.) Further,
prosecutors ‘““are not obliged to prove their case with evidence solely from
live witnesses; the jury is entitled to see details of the [victim’s body] to
determine if the evidence supports the prosecution’s theory of the case.
[Citations.]”’” (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 164.)
Here, the trial court did not err in finding the photograph was
relevant. It tended to prove that Ventura’s death was the result of murder,
not voluntary manslaughter, and that Merida-Diaz strangled Ventura.
Although the bloody foam did not conclusively establish that the death
occurred by strangulation, it was consistent with such a cause. The
photograph was relevant to support the prosecution’s theory that Merida-
Diaz murdered Ventura. That Merida-Diaz “did not contest the testimony of
the medical examiner . . . did not render the photograph[] irrelevant; rather,
the [photo] served to clarify that testimony.” (People v. Crittenden (1994)
9 Cal.4th 83, 132 (Crittenden).)
Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs its probative value. (Evid. Code, § 352.) This
determination is also within the trial court’s discretion. (Suarez, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 173.) Evidence is prejudicial if it is substantially likely that
the evidence would inflame the passions of the jury such that they would use

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it to punish the defendant, as opposed to using it for a lawful evidentiary
purpose. (People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 286.)
In evaluating prejudice in a homicide case, the California
Supreme Court has explained that “victim photographs and other graphic
items of evidence . . . always are disturbing.” (Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
p. 134.) The photograph of the victim in this case is disturbing. However, it is
not so unduly shocking or inflammatory that the jury would use it to punish
the defendant. The trial court provided a reasoned explanation for why it
exercised its discretion in the way it did, and we take no issue with it.
Even if the trial court did abuse its discretion, there was no
prejudice. Merida-Diaz contends we should review such an error under the
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 beyond a reasonable doubt
standard because the error deprived him of a fair trial. (See Chapman, at
p. 24.) His lone statement on the point is that the “error affected the sole
disputed issue—whether [he] acted with malice or in the heat of passion.” He
does not cite to anywhere in the record to support this contention. In any
event, we are not persuaded. Merida-Diaz cannot ‘“inflate garden-variety
evidentiary questions into constitutional ones.’” (People v. Bacon (2010)
50 Cal.4th 1082, 1104, fn. 4.) “[O]nly evidentiary error amounting to a
complete preclusion of a defense violates a defendant’s federal constitutional
right[s].” (Ibid.) Merida-Diaz does not claim the admission of the photograph
precluded him from presenting a defense, and we would not reach such a
conclusion.
Instead, we review evidentiary errors to determine if it is
“reasonably probable [that the] defendant would have achieved a more
favorable result absent the exclusion of [the evidence].” (People v. McNeal
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1203.)

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As explained ante, there was more than enough evidence of
Merida-Diaz’s guilt of the crime of murder, rather than voluntary
manslaughter. The record amply demonstrates Merida-Diaz strangled
Ventura to death for a period of at least five minutes because he wanted “to
shut her up.” It was not reasonably probable that the exclusion of a
photograph depicting the deceased victim would have resulted in a more
favorable outcome for Merida-Diaz.2

2 In passing, Merida-Diaz contends his counsel should have
renewed the objection after the forensic pathologist testified that the bloody
foam was not diagnostic of asphyxia. This argument was not properly raised
under its own heading. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Even if we
were to address the argument, it would not affect our conclusion. Assuming
Merida-Diaz’s counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the objection, it
would not have prejudiced him. Prejudice under this standard means “there
[was] a reasonable probability that [Merida-Diaz] would have obtained a
more favorable result absent counsel’s shortcomings.” (People v. Cunningham
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1003.) As explained ante, there was ample evidence,
aside from the photograph, demonstrating Merida-Diaz’s guilt.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

BANCROFT, J.*

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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