CourtListener 10832074•Lora v. Aztec T.D. Service Co. CA2/8
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Filed 4/2/26 Lora v. Aztec T.D. Service Co. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
CANDELARIO LORA et al., B331615
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. 22STCV09458)
AZTEC T.D. SERVICE CO. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Mark C. Kim, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Gomez Law and Susan M. Murphy for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Wood Smith Henning & Berman, Stephen M. Caine,
Frances M. O’Meara, and Holly M. Teel for Defendants and
Respondents West Shores Realty, Amir Al-Khayat, John Denault
III, and Kathleen Healy.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs and appellants Candelario Lora and Maria Del
Sagrario Lora (collectively, the Loras) appeal from the judgment
of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave
to amend the demurrer filed by defendants and respondents West
Shores Realty, Amir Al-Khayat, John Denault III, and Kathleen
Healy (collectively, Respondents) to the Loras’ operative second
amended complaint. In sustaining the demurrer, the trial court
took judicial notice of a tolling agreement entered between the
parties during the pendency of a prior lawsuit, and concluded the
Loras’ complaint was barred as a matter of law by their failure to
comply with the terms of the agreement. We conclude the trial
court erred in taking judicial notice of the tolling agreement and
in sustaining the demurrer because the proper interpretation and
enforceability of the tolling agreement were reasonably subject to
dispute. We accordingly reverse the judgment of dismissal and
remand for the trial court to overrule the demurrer.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The 2019 lawsuit
On October 09, 2019, the Loras filed a civil action against
Respondents and numerous other entities and individuals
(the “2019 Lawsuit”). The gravamen of the claims against
Respondents was that they acted as the Loras’ real estate agents
while participating in a fraudulent scheme to purchase and “flip”
a residential property (the “Shadow Lane Property”) in or about
June 2018. Without the Loras’ knowledge and consent, the
Shadow Lane Property allegedly was purchased with proceeds
from a loan secured by a deed of trust on a separate property
owned by the Loras (the “69th Way Property”), which later went
into foreclosure after the Loras defaulted on the loan.
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2. The tolling agreement
In August 2021, during the pendency of the 2019 Lawsuit,
the Loras and Respondents entered into a “Tolling Agreement.”
In that agreement, the Loras agreed to dismiss, without
prejudice, Respondents from the 2019 Lawsuit so that the parties
can explore the possibility of settlement. At that time, the Loras
had two pending causes of action against Respondents for breach
of fiduciary duty and elder abuse. As relevant here, Paragraphs
2 through 6 of the Tolling Agreement provided as follows:
“2. The LORA PLAINTIFFS will dismiss the WEST
SHORES REALTY DEFENDANTS without prejudice from the
Lawsuit within 24 hours of the receipt by James Judge, Esq.,
counsel for the LORA PLAINTIFFS, of this Tolling Agreement
signed by all WEST SHORES REALTY DEFENDANTS, subject
to re-filing (hereinafter the ‘Refiled Complaint’) against the
WEST SHORES REALTY DEFENDANTS pursuant to
Paragraph 5, below, in the event the parties hereto are unable to
reach and consummate a settlement or other resolution of the
claims contained in the Lawsuit in accordance with this Tolling
Agreement.
“3. Provided the Refiled Complaint is filed before the end of
the Termination Date of this Tolling Agreement as hereinafter
defined in Paragraph 4, below, or within thirty (30) days of the
notice of termination or cancellation of the Tolling Agreement as
provided for in Paragraph 19, below, the Refiled Complaint
against the WEST SHORES REALTY DEFENDANTS shall be
deemed to have been filed on the same date as the Lawsuit,
which was October 9, 2019.
“4. The running time under any and all applicable statute
of limitations, claims of estoppel, laches, laws, rules, regulations,
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or principles of equity of similar effect (collectively referred to as
‘Time-Bar Defenses’) that relate or pertain to the LORA
PLAINTIFFS’ Lawsuit against the WEST SHORES REALTY
DEFENDANTS, and any defenses of the WEST SHORES
REALTY DEFENDANTS to the LORA PLAINTIFFS’ Lawsuit,
are hereby suspended and tolled beginning on the date of
execution of this Tolling Agreement by the LORA PLAINTIFFS
and the WEST SHORES REALTY DEFENDANTS, (the ‘Effective
Date’) and ending six (6) months from the date of the last
signature on this Tolling Agreement (the ‘Termination Date’).
The period from and including the Effective Date until the end of
the Termination Date shall not be considered in any
determination of the timeliness of filing the Refiled Complaint.
“5. If the LORA PLAINTIFFS determine to file the Refiled
Complaint as defined at Paragraph 2, above, against the WEST
SHORES REALTY DEFENDANTS, or any of them, the Refiled
Complaint shall not include a claim for punitive damages or a
cause of action for Elder Abuse, and shall contain only a cause of
action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty. After their filing of the
Refiled Complaint, nothing in this Tolling Agreement shall bar
the LORA PLAINTIFFS from filing a motion for leave to amend
the Refiled Complaint as to the WEST SHORES REALTY
DEFENDANTS. The WEST SHORES DEFENDANTS shall have
the right to oppose any such motion for leave to amend the
Refiled Complaint, but agree not to utilize the time period
encompassed by this Tolling Agreement as a basis for opposing
any such motion as to any claims against the WEST SHORES
REALTY DEFENDANTS. The WEST SHORES REALTY
DEFENDANTS reserve all rights to assert any defenses existing
prior to the Effective Date of the Tolling Agreement.
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“6. Nothing in this Tolling Agreement shall operate to
revive any claim, cause of action, action, lawsuit, arbitration, or
other proceeding that the LORA PLAINTIFFS could have
brought or asserted against the WEST SHORES REALTY
DEFENDANTS, or any of them, arising out of or related to the
Lawsuit or that could have been asserted in the Lawsuit,
arbitration, or any other legal proceeding, which are already
barred, in whole or in part, by any Time-Bar Defense as of the
Effective Date of this Tolling Agreement.”
The Tolling Agreement was signed by the Loras on
August 5, 2021 and by Denault and Healy on August 4, 2021.
It also was signed by Al-Khayat, individually and on behalf of
West Shores Reality, but the date of that signing was not
reflected in the agreement.
In early 2022, the Loras and Respondents entered into an
“Extension of Tolling Agreement” (the “Extension”). Under the
Extension, the parties agreed that “the term (‘Termination Date’)
as defined at Paragraph 4 of the . . . Tolling Agreement shall be
extended to 11:59 p.m. on March 6, 2022,” and that “[a]ll other
terms . . . shall remain in full force and effect.”
3. The 2022 lawsuit
On March 16, 2022, the Loras filed the current action
against Respondents and other entities and individuals for claims
arising out of the Shadow Lane Property transaction (the “2022
Lawsuit”). Like the 2019 Lawsuit, the gravamen of the 2022
Lawsuit was that Respondents and the other named defendants
engaged in a fraudulent scheme to purchase the Shadow Lane
Property through a loan secured by a deed of trust on the Loras’
69th Way Property, and that they did so without the Loras’
knowledge and consent.
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On June 7, 2022, before any party responded to the
March 16, 2022 complaint, the Loras filed a first amended
complaint. Then, on January 5, 2023, the Loras filed a second
amended complaint pursuant to a stipulation between the parties
in which Respondents agreed to permit the Loras to file a second
amended complaint but reserved the right to attack that pleading
on any available grounds.
In the operative second amended complaint, the Loras
asserted causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty against each
of Respondents, and causes of action for breach of written
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing against West Shores Realty only. As alleged in the
complaint, Candelario Lora and the seller of the Shadow Lane
Property signed a document cancelling the sale of the property on
or about June 8, 2018. Despite the cancellation, on or about
June 11, 2018, the Loras were pressured into signing various
documents that were written in English even though their
primary language was Spanish, and they were not provided with
copies of the documents that they signed. Unbeknownst to the
Loras, those documents included a promissory note for $545,000
secured by a deed of trust on the Loras’ 69th Way Property.
Respondents, along with other named defendants, then
fraudulently completed the purchase of the Shadow Lane
Property, using documents with forged signatures and funding
the purchase with proceeds from the 69th Way Property loan.
After the transaction was completed, the Loras did not receive
any invoices or demands for payment regarding the 69th Way
Property loan, and they “did not fully discover and could not have
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the fraud
that had been perpetrated until at least June of 2019,” when a
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notice of default and foreclosure on the 69th Way Property was
recorded.
In their cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, the
Loras alleged that Respondents owed them a fiduciary duty as
their real estate agents, and that Respondents breached that
duty “by misrepresenting facts, lying, suborning perjury, forging
documents, suppressing the truth, placing their own interests
above that of [the Loras], and other, similar breaches.” The
Loras further alleged that they “did not discover the breach . . .
until at least June of 2019, and could not have discovered it by
any exercise of due diligence before that time.” In their cause of
action for breach of written contract against West Shores Realty,
the Loras alleged that, within the last four years, they entered
into a written contract with West Shores Realty for a real estate
transaction involving the Shadow Lane Property, and that West
Shores Realty breached the contract by “failing, refusing, and
neglecting to cancel the sale of the Shadow Lane [P]roperty and
by other acts alleged herein.” In their cause of action for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against
West Shores Realty, the Loras alleged that a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract entered in
California, and that West Shores Realty breached the covenant
“by doing the acts herein alleged.”
4. Respondents’ demurrer and motion to strike
On March 30, 2023, Respondents filed a demurrer and
motion to strike the Loras’ second amended complaint.
Respondents argued that the entire action was time-barred
because the Tolling Agreement and Extension required the Loras
to refile their complaint by March 6, 2022, and the Loras did not
do so until March 16, 2022. Respondents further asserted that
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the causes of action for breach of written contract and breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were barred
because the Tolling Agreement required the Loras to limit their
refiled complaint to a single cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty. In support of their demurrer and motion to strike,
Respondents also filed a request for judicial notice of (1) the
original complaint in the 2019 Lawsuit; (2) the requests for
dismissal of Respondents from the 2019 Lawsuit; and (3) the
Tolling Agreement and Extension.
The Loras opposed Respondents’ demurrer, motion to
strike, and request for judicial notice. The Loras contended that
the Tolling Agreement and Extension were not judicially
noticeable for purposes of a demurrer and motion to strike
because the proper interpretation of the agreement was in
dispute. The Loras further argued that, even if subject to judicial
notice, the Tolling Agreement and Extension did not bar any of
their claims because the complaint was timely refiled, and the
terms of the agreement did not prohibit amended versions of the
complaint from adding claims beyond breach of a fiduciary duty.
In support of their timeliness argument, the Loras asserted that
their counsel electronically filed the complaint on March 3, 2022,
but that filing was rejected by the court clerk, and that after
several additional attempts, their counsel successfully refiled the
complaint on March 16, 2022. In addition, the Loras contended
that the Tolling Agreement and Extension did not preclude them
from refiling the complaint after March 6, 2022, but rather
provided that if filed after that date, then the refiled complaint
would not relate back to the original complaint in the 2019
Lawsuit. The Loras also sought leave to amend the complaint in
the event that the court sustained the demurrer.
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5. The ruling on the demurrer and motion to strike
On June 1, 2023, the trial court sustained the demurrer to
the Loras’ second amended complaint without leave to amend on
the ground that the entire action was barred by the terms of the
Tolling Agreement and Extension. In sustaining the demurrer,
the court also granted Respondents’ request for judicial notice.
The court concluded that judicial notice of the parties’ Tolling
Agreement and Extension was proper because the terms of the
contract were not ambiguous, and thus, “interpretation of the
contract is not necessary.” The court then concluded that each
cause of action in the second amended complaint was barred
because the Loras “failed to comply with their obligations under
the parties’ [T]olling [A]greement.” In particular, the court found
that the terms of the Tolling Agreement and Extension required
that the complaint be filed by March 6, 2022, and that the Loras
did not file their complaint until March 16, 2022. The court
reasoned that the term “ ‘filed’ ” as used in the Tolling Agreement
“means filed,” not “attempted to file,” and as a result, the Loras’
unsuccessful attempts to file the complaint before March 6, 2022
did not satisfy the Tolling Agreement. Based on its conclusion
that the complaint was not timely filed, the court determined
that any additional issues raised by the demurrer and motion to
strike were moot.
On June 13, 2023, the trial court dismissed the Loras’
second amended complaint against Respondents with prejudice
and entered a judgment in favor of Respondents.
6. The Loras’ motion for reconsideration
On June 12, 2023, prior to the entry of judgment, the Loras
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order sustaining the
demurrer. In their motion, the Loras asserted that they had
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additional facts to support granting leave to further amend the
complaint, including that they signed the Tolling Agreement
under pressure from their attorney at the time, and that they did
not knowingly and voluntarily waive any rights by signing the
agreement. The Loras also argued that each cause of action
alleged against Respondents in their complaint was timely under
the applicable statute of limitations and the doctrine of equitable
tolling. The motion was supported by a declaration from
Candelario Lora in which he asserted that the Loras’ former
attorney in the case did not explain the terms of the Tolling
Agreement or provide the Loras with a copy in Spanish, but
rather threatened to quit if they did not immediately sign the
agreement.
On July 27, 2023, the trial court issued a tentative ruling
denying the Loras’ motion for reconsideration. However, on that
same date, the court vacated the hearing on the reconsideration
motion and stayed the case in its entirety because the Loras had
filed a notice of removal of the action to federal bankruptcy court.
On August 29, 2023, following the remand of the action to
state court, the Loras filed an appeal from the judgment of
dismissal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the Loras challenge the trial court’s order
sustaining the demurrer to their second amended complaint
without leave to amend. Among other arguments, the Loras
assert that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the
Tolling Agreement in ruling on the demurrer because the proper
interpretation of the agreement, including whether it barred any
complaint filed after March 6, 2022, was subject to dispute.
The Loras also argue that they should have been granted leave to
10
amend the complaint to add factual allegations regarding the
unenforceability of the Tolling Agreement, including that they
signed the agreement under duress and did not knowingly and
voluntarily release any claims. Respondents contend that the
trial court properly took judicial notice of the existence of the
Tolling Agreement and its legal effect because there was no
dispute about the authenticity of the document. Respondents
further assert that the trial court did not err in sustaining the
demurrer without leave to amend because the complaint was
barred by the plain language of the Tolling Agreement.
We conclude that the trial court erred in taking judicial
notice of the Tolling Agreement and Extension in ruling on the
demurrer because the proper interpretation and enforceability of
the agreement were reasonably subject to dispute. Because the
Tolling Agreement and Extension were not properly subject to
judicial notice at the demurrer stage, the trial court erred in
sustaining Respondents’ demurrer on the ground that the
complaint was barred by the Loras’ failure to comply with the
terms of that agreement.
1. Standard of review
“In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine
the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.”
(T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145,
162.) “[W]e accept the truth of material facts properly pleaded in
the operative complaint, but not contentions, deductions, or
conclusions of fact or law.” (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage
Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924.) “ ‘We give the complaint a
reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in
their context.’ ” (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2023)
11
14 Cal.5th 1034, 1041.) “We also consider matters that are
subject to judicial notice.” (Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 520, 523.) “If the demurrer was
sustained without leave to amend, we consider whether there is a
‘reasonable possibility’ that the defect in the complaint could be
cured by amendment.” (King v. CompPartners, Inc. (2018)
5 Cal.5th 1039, 1050.)
2. The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the
Tolling Agreement and sustaining the demurrer
“Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the
complaint, it can refer to matters outside the pleading only if
those matters are subject to judicial notice.” (Tenet Healthsystem
Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
821, 834.) Under Evidence Code section 452, a trial court may
take judicial notice of “[f]acts . . . that are not reasonably subject
to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate
determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable
accuracy.” (Id., subd. (h).) Generally, “[i]n ruling on a demurrer,
a court may consider facts of which it has taken judicial notice.
[Citation.] This includes the existence of a document. When
judicial notice is taken of a document, however, the truthfulness
and proper interpretation of the document are disputable.”
(StorMedia Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 456,
fn. 9.) Accordingly, at the demurrer stage, “[a]lthough the
existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of
statements contained in the document and its proper
interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters
are reasonably disputable.” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont
General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113 (Fremont); accord,
Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corp. (2015)
12
242 Cal.App.4th 651, 660; see C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.
(2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1103–1104.)
Where the document at issue is a contract between the
parties, “[t]he proper interpretation of a contract is disputable if
the contract is susceptible of more than one reasonable
interpretation, that is, if the contract is ambiguous. An
ambiguity may appear on the face of a contract, or extrinsic
evidence may reveal a latent ambiguity.” (Fremont, supra,
148 Cal.App.4th at p. 114.) “For a court to take judicial notice of
the meaning of a document submitted by a demurring party
based on the document alone, without allowing the parties an
opportunity to present extrinsic evidence of the meaning of the
document, would be improper. A court ruling on a demurrer
therefore cannot take judicial notice of the proper interpretation
of a document submitted in support of the demurrer.” (Id. at
pp. 114–115.) Furthermore, “[t]his rule applies not only with
respect to the interpretation of a contract, but also with respect to
its enforceability. A court ruling on a demurrer cannot take
judicial notice that a contract submitted in support of the
demurrer is binding and enforceable if the plaintiff claims the
contract is unenforceable due to fraud or duress.” (Id. at p. 115.)
In Fremont, for instance, the plaintiff filed suit against the
defendants for an alleged misappropriation of the net operating
losses of the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest. (Fremont, supra,
148 Cal.App.4th 97 at p. 103.) In sustaining the demurrer to the
plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend, the trial court
granted the defendants’ request for judicial notice of a letter
agreement between the parties that purportedly released the
defendants from any liability for their use of the net operating
losses. (Id. at p. 113.) In reversing the judgment of dismissal,
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the Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by taking
judicial notice of the agreement in ruling on the demurrer. (Id. at
pp. 115–116.) As the court explained: “[The plaintiff] does not
allege in the complaint either that the . . . letter agreement
released the defendants from liability [to the plaintiff] for their
use of [the predecessor’s] net operating losses or that the letter
agreement is an enforceable contract. Because the parties
disputed and continue to dispute the proper interpretation of the
letter agreement, we conclude that the trial court erred by
interpreting the document in ruling on the demurrer.” (Id. at
p. 115.) The Court of Appeal further concluded that, because the
plaintiff disputed the enforceability of the agreement based on
the defendants’ alleged fraudulent concealment of certain
material information, “[t]he trial court erred by determining in
ruling on the demurrer that the letter agreement is binding and
enforceable. The [trial] court could not properly foreclose the
introduction of extrinsic evidence bearing on the proper
interpretation of the letter agreement and its enforceability by
deciding those questions based on only the pleadings and matters
judicially noticeable.” (Id. at p. 116.)
Similarly, in Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc.
(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137 (Gould), the Court of Appeal held
that the trial court could not properly take judicial notice of a
written agreement between the parties in ruling on a demurrer
where the existence and enforceability of that agreement were in
dispute. (Id. at pp. 1144–1146.) The plaintiff in Gould sued his
former employer based on allegations that he was employed
under an oral contract governed by California law. (Id. at p.
1144.) In its demurrer, the employer asked the trial court to take
judicial notice of a written at-will contract between the parties
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governed by Maryland law. (Ibid.) In concluding that the
written agreement was not subject to judicial notice at the
demurrer stage, the Court of Appeal held that “the existence of a
contract between private parties cannot be established by judicial
notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h).” (Gould,
at p. 1145.) As the court observed, “we have a dispute between
two parties one of whom claims he was employed under an oral
contract and one of whom claims the employment was pursuant
to a written contract. Clearly, this dispute cannot be resolved by
resorting to ‘facts and propositions that are not reasonably
subject to dispute.’ ” (Ibid.) Moreover, “[w]hile most matters
subject to judicial notice can be established by reference to a
statute, court file, treatise or other document, a court cannot
simply look at a piece of paper and conclude as a matter of law it
is a contract between the parties. Here, . . . [the plaintiff] claims
the document [the employer] contends is a contract is merely an
offer by him to enter into a contract . . . which [the employer]
never accepted. He further contends he is not bound by the terms
of the document because he signed it under duress. These
contentions raise questions of fact which cannot be resolved at
the pleading stage of the case.” (Id. at p. 1146.)
In this case, the trial court granted Respondents’ request
for judicial notice of the Tolling Agreement and Extension in
sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. In its ruling,
the court found that “[b]ecause interpretation of the contract is
not necessary, judicial notice is proper.” The court then found
that the Loras “failed to comply with their obligations under the
parties’ [T]olling [A]greement” and Extension because the terms
of the agreement required them to file their complaint by
March 6, 2022, but the Loras did not successfully file their
15
complaint until March 16, 2022. Therefore, despite asserting
that “interpretation of the contract is not necessary,” the trial
court went on to interpret the language of the Tolling Agreement
to mean that any complaint filed by the Loras after March 6,
2022 was untimely. However, because the parties disputed, and
continue to dispute, the proper interpretation of the Tolling
Agreement and Extension, the trial court erred in interpreting
those documents in sustaining the demurrer.
Although the trial court construed the Tolling Agreement
and Extension as providing a deadline of March 6, 2022 for the
filing of the complaint, neither document expressly stated that
a complaint filed after a certain period or date would be time-
barred. Paragraph 3 of the Tolling Agreement provided that if
the Loras filed the complaint “before the end of the Termination
Date,” then the complaint “shall be deemed to have been filed on
the same date as the [2019] Lawsuit, which was October 9, 2019.”
Paragraph 4 of the Tolling Agreement defined the “Termination
Date” as “six (6) months from the date of the last signature” on
the agreement, and the Extension later entered into by the
parties extended the “Termination Date” to “March 6, 2022.”
Paragraph 4 also provided that “[t]he running time under any
and all applicable statute of limitations . . . that relate or pertain
to the [2019] Lawsuit . . . are hereby suspended and tolled”
between the Effective Date (which was August 5, 2021) and the
Termination Date (which was March 6, 2022 under the
Extension), and that this period “shall not be considered in any
determination of the timeliness of filing the Refiled Complaint.”
Yet neither the Tolling Agreement nor the Extension
specifically addressed what it would mean if the Loras filed their
complaint after March 6, 2022, but before the applicable statute
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of limitations on their claims had run. Under Respondents’
interpretation of the Tolling Agreement, which the trial court
adopted, any claim alleged in the complaint would be time-barred
regardless of whether the statute of limitations on that claim had
run because the complaint was filed after the Termination Date.
Under the Loras’ interpretation, the complaint would not relate
back to the October 9, 2019 filing of the 2019 Lawsuit, and
instead, the applicable statute of limitations, plus the seven-
month tolling period, would determine whether each claim
alleged in the complaint was timely. The parties also disputed
whether the Loras complied with Paragraph 3 of the Tolling
Agreement when they electronically submitted the complaint for
filing with the court prior to March 6, 2022, even though the
court clerk rejected the filing due to a formatting error. In ruling
on the demurrer, the trial court agreed with Respondents that
the term “file” as used in the Tolling Agreement meant that the
Loras had to successfully file the complaint by March 6, 2022,
and that their prior unsuccessful attempts at filing were not
sufficient to satisfy their obligations under the agreement.
However, “ ‘[o]n a demurrer a court’s function is limited to testing
the legal sufficiency of the complaint. [Citation.] “A demurrer is
simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of
disputed facts,” ’ ” including disputes over the meaning of a
contract. (Fremont, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 113–114.)
Because the proper interpretation of the Tolling Agreement and
Extension is a matter of dispute between the parties, it was not
the proper subject of judicial notice on demurrer.
In arguing that the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrer without leave to amend, the Loras also dispute the
enforceability of the Tolling Agreement. In particular, in both
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their motion for reconsideration before the trial court and their
briefing on appeal, the Loras assert that they signed the Tolling
Agreement under duress, and that they did not knowingly and
voluntarily release any of their claims because their limited
proficiency in English precluded them from understanding the
terms of the agreement. Respondents argue that none of these
alleged facts are sufficient to overcome a demurrer because the
Tolling Agreement included a clause stating that each party to
the agreement represented that they read and understood the
agreement, that they obtained the advice of counsel in agreeing
to enter into it, and that they did so voluntarily. However, as the
appellate courts in Fremont and Gould recognized, a court ruling
on a demurrer cannot take judicial notice that a contract between
the parties is binding and enforceable if the plaintiff disputes the
enforceability of the contract based on alleged fraud or duress.
(Fremont, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 115; Gould, supra,
31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146.) Here, the Loras contend the Tolling
Agreement is unenforceable as a release of any claims against
Respondents because they did not knowingly and voluntarily
enter into the agreement, but rather signed it under duress. Like
the parties’ dispute over the proper interpretation of the Tolling
Agreement, the Loras’ claim regarding the enforceability of the
agreement raises a factual issue that cannot be resolved on
demurrer.
In conclusion, the trial court erred in taking judicial notice
of the proper interpretation and enforceability of the parties’
Tolling Agreement and Extension in ruling on the demurrer.
Because the meaning and enforceability of these documents were
reasonably subject to dispute, the trial court could not consider
their contents in deciding whether the Loras’ complaint was
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timely filed and whether it properly included causes of action
other than breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court accordingly
erred in sustaining Respondents’ demurrer on the ground that
the Loras’ complaint was barred as a matter of law under the
terms of the Tolling Agreement and Extension.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the order
sustaining Respondents’ demurrer to the second amended
complaint without leave to amend and to enter a new order
overruling the demurrer. The Loras shall recover their costs on
appeal.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
19
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