Duarte v. Nisson CA2/2

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Filed 3/30/26 Duarte v. Nisson CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

EDITH DUARTE, B342145

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV00585)
v.

PETER L. NISSON et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rupert A. Byrdsong, Judge. Affirmed.

Edith Duarte, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Thaler Law and Jesse J. Thaler for Defendants and
Respondents.

******
Edith Duarte (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered
after the trial court granted respondents Peter L. Nisson and
Consumer Defense Law Group, P.C.’s (collectively respondents)
motion for judgment on the pleadings in this legal malpractice
matter.
Appellant has failed to provide a reporter’s transcript of
proceedings or an adequate record for review and has failed to
support many of her factual assertions with citations to the
record.
Because appellant has failed to show the trial court erred
in granting respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings,
we affirm.

BACKGROUND
We recognize only those facts supported with a citation to
the record on appeal.
On January 9, 2024, appellant filed her verified complaint
against respondents for professional negligence (legal
malpractice) and breach of fiduciary duty.
The underlying lawsuit and respondents’ representation
of appellant
The complaint alleged that on December 17, 2019,
appellant filed a complaint against Milestone, Milestone
Financial LLC, and Mortgage Lender Services, Inc., for the
following causes of action: (1) violation of Civil Code section
2923.5, (2) negligence, (3) slander of credit, (4) cancellation of
instruments, (5) violation of Civil Code section 1671, (6)
accounting, and (7) violation of Business and Professions Code
section 17200 et seq. (underlying lawsuit). The defendants in the
underlying lawsuit filed a motion to compel arbitration. Prior to

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the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration, on February 26,
2020, appellant’s former attorney’s motion to be relieved as
counsel was granted. Appellant was then “forc[ed] to represent
herself in pro per due to financial constraints.”
According to the complaint, appellant was represented by
respondents in the underlying lawsuit at the preliminary hearing
in the arbitration proceedings, which took place on March 5,
2021. Appellant alleged respondents committed acts of
malpractice including filing an inadequate explanation of the
claims she was asserting, failing to timely file a statement of
claims and failing to timely produce an initial exchange of
documents by the deadline of February 26, 2021.
The complaint alleged at the conclusion of a hearing for
sanctions regarding respondents’ failures in the underlying
lawsuit, respondents stated their intention to withdraw as
counsel. The arbitrator advised respondents to file a motion to
withdraw at their earliest convenience so that the case could
move forward with new counsel.1
On March 29, 2021, the defendants in the underlying
matter requested leave to file a dispositive motion in the case.
On April 8, 2021, the arbitrator in the underlying lawsuit
granted the defendants’ request to file a dispositive motion,

1 Respondents assert, without citation to the record,
appellant has failed to set forth all material evidence on this
point as she has failed to reference the fact that respondents were
relieved as counsel on May 26, 2021, in the underlying lawsuit,
which was judicially noticed by the trial court in this matter.
Respondents are correct that appellant has failed to provide a
record of the granting of respondents’ motion to withdraw as
counsel in the underlying lawsuit.

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setting the following briefing schedule: defendants were to file
their motion by May 7, 2021, appellant was to file her opposition
by May 31, 2021, and the defendants’ reply was due by June 15,
2021.
On June 24, 2021, an interim award was issued by the
arbitrator in favor of the defendants in the underlying lawsuit.
On August 17, 2021, the arbitrator issued a final award in the
underlying lawsuit in favor of defendants.
On August 31, 2021, defendants in the underlying lawsuit
filed a petition to conform arbitration award and enter judgment
and for attorney’s fees, interest and costs. On November 1, 2021,
the trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendants in the
underlying lawsuit and against appellant in the amount of
$48,418.53.
The current lawsuit
This lawsuit was filed against respondents on January 9,
2024, over two years after judgment was entered against
appellant in the underlying lawsuit.
On March 29, 2024, respondents filed joint answers to
appellant’s complaint.
On July 16, 2024, respondents filed a motion for judgment
on the pleadings. In the motion, respondents argued the first
cause of action for professional negligence was barred by the one-
year statute of limitations found in Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.6. As to the second cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty, respondents argued it was duplicative of the first
cause of action and should be dismissed for that reason. Further,
respondents argued the second cause of action contained
insufficient allegations to constitute a cause of action for breach
of fiduciary duty.

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On August 28, 2024, following a hearing where the court
heard argument from the parties, the trial court granted
respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.2
On September 25, 2024, the trial court entered judgment
against appellant with prejudice in the present action. On
October 28, 2024, appellant filed her notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii),
permits a defendant to move for judgment on the pleadings if the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendant. “‘“A judgment on the pleadings in
favor of the defendant is appropriate when the complaint fails to
allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action.”’” (Sepanossian v.
National Ready Mixed Concrete Co. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 192,
199.) “‘“A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a
demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of
review.”’” (Ibid.) “‘“All properly pleaded, material facts are
deemed true, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of
fact or law . . . .”’” (Ibid.) The court may also consider judicially
noticed items. (Ibid.) “Our review is de novo because the trial
court’s ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings ‘resolves
a mixed question of law and fact that is predominantly one of
law, viz., whether or not the factual allegations that the plaintiff
makes are sufficient to constitute a cause of action.’” (Ibid.)

2 No reporter’s transcript of the hearing was included in the
record on appeal.

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A trial court judgment is presumed to be correct, and error
must be affirmatively shown. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “The appellate court is not required to search
the record on its own seeking error. If a party fails to support the
argument with the necessary citations to the record, the
argument will be deemed waived.” (LA Investments, LLC v. Spix
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1061.) To demonstrate error, the
appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent
argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.
(United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th 142, 146.) If a party fails to meet these
requirements, its claims are forfeited. (Ibid.)
Bearing these standards in mind, we review appellant’s
arguments and conclude she has failed to show error in the trial
court judgment.
II. First cause of action for professional negligence
Appellant argues the trial court erred in determining her
first cause of action for professional negligence is barred by the
statute of limitations. Appellant asserts, without citation to the
record, that she appealed the underlying lawsuit. She maintains
the appeal of the matter equitably tolled the running of the
statute of limitations on the alleged professional negligence in
the underlying lawsuit. Without citation to the record, appellant
asserts the judgment in the underlying lawsuit only became final
on November 6, 2023, after the Court of Appeal issued a
remittitur affirming the judgment in the underlying lawsuit.
Appellant cites no law supporting her position that the
pendency of her appeal in the underlying lawsuit tolled the

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statute of limitations on her professional negligence claim.3 A
trial court judgment is presumed to be correct, and error must be
affirmatively shown. (Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d
at p. 564.) To demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record. (United Grand Corp. v.
Malibu Hillbillies, LLC, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 146.)
Appellant has failed to support her argument regarding the
tolling of the statute of limitations with adequate factual
citations, legal authority or analysis. Thus, she has failed to
meet her burden on appeal of showing error.
III. Second cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
Appellant presents two arguments regarding her cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty. First, she argues the claim is
not duplicative of her first cause of action for professional
negligence. Next, she argues her claim for breach of fiduciary
duty is subject to a four-year statute of limitations under Code of
Civil Procedure section 343. Because we find appellant’s cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty is duplicative of her claim for
professional negligence, we decline to address her second
argument.

3 Appellant cites two cases in this section of her opening
brief, neither of which support her position that the pendency of
an appeal in the underlying matter tolls the applicable statute of
limitations. (See Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363,
370–371 [stating general proposition that equitable tolling “is a
judge-made doctrine” that operates independently of the statute
of limitations]; Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger &
Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 751 [cause of action for
professional negligence does not accrue until the plaintiff suffered
actual loss or damage from the allegedly negligent conduct].)

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Appellant’s verified complaint in this matter sets forth the
facts related to the underlying lawsuit in paragraphs 6 through
30. As to her first cause of action for professional negligence,
appellant alleged, “During the course of [respondents’]
representation of [appellant], there were several instances
wherein the conduct of [respondents] fell below the applicable
standard of care as set forth in paragraphs 18 through 30
herein.”
As to her second cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty, appellant alleged, “[Respondents], and each of them,
breached their fiduciary duties and obligations to [appellant] by
failing to fulfill their fiduciary obligations to [appellant] through
actions or inactions as stated in paragraphs 18 through 30
hereof.”
Appellant thus relies on the identical facts alleged in her
complaint to support her cause of action for professional
negligence to support her cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty. Appellant may not merely change the label on identical
allegations to avoid the statute of limitations. “[S]tating them in
two causes of action, as [appellant] has done, is merely
duplicative pleading which adds nothing to the complaint by way
of fact or theory.” (Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991)
228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135.) “‘The gravamen, or essential
nature . . . of a cause of action is determined by the primary right
alleged to have been violated . . . .’” (Slovensky v. Friedman
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1535.) Here, appellant’s allegations
concern respondents’ alleged professional negligence, without
further indication of any breach of trust. As such, they are
duplicative and barred by the one-year statute of limitations set
forth in found in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6.

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Appellant argues a breach of fiduciary duty is a tort claim
entirely distinct from malpractice based on professional
negligence. (Citing Barbara A. v. John G. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d
369, 382–383 [respondent attorney’s representation to client that
he could not get her pregnant did not fall outside claim of breach
of fiduciary duty against attorney].) Appellant cites a Texas
appellate court case for the proposition that the two claims are
distinct. (Murphy v. Gruber (Tex.Ct.App. 2007) 241 S.W. 689.)4
We note that in Murphy, the Texas appellate court determined
the appellants’ allegations asserted claims for professional
negligence, rather than breach of fiduciary duty, and were
therefore barred by the shorter statute of limitations for
professional negligence despite being labeled as breach of
fiduciary duty. The court stated, “these allegations complain
about the quality of the Lawyers’ representation, specifically, the
Lawyers’ failure to properly advise, inform, and communicate
with [the appellants] about the case, which are claims of
professional negligence.” (Id. at p. 698.) Similarly, here,
appellant’s allegations sound in professional negligence despite
being labeled as breach of fiduciary duty.
“The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty are: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the
fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the
breach.” (Stanley v. Richmond (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1070,
1086.) “The scope of an attorney’s fiduciary duty may be
determined as a matter of law based on the Rules of Professional
Conduct which, ‘together with statutes and general principles

4 Appellant provides no authority suggesting Texas state law
is comparable to California state law on this issue.

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relating to other fiduciary relationships, all help define the duty
component of the fiduciary duty which an attorney owes to his [or
her] client.’” (Ibid.) Appellant has set forth no breach of trust,
confidence, or loyalty separate from the allegations of
professional negligence. Thus, the claim was duplicative, and the
trial court did not err in granting the motion for judgment on the
pleadings as to the second cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their
own costs of appeal.

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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