CourtListener 10829927•People v. Seals CA2/8
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Filed 3/30/26 P. v. Seals CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B336917
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA474960)
v.
TOI SEALS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.
Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blake Armstrong,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Toi Seals of assault with a
firearm, and it found true great bodily injury and firearm
enhancements. On appeal, Seals argues his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to request a “no duty to retreat”
pinpoint instruction to support his claim of self-defense. As we
explain, any omission by counsel did not prejudice Seals because
the evidence did not support a no duty to retreat instruction.
Accordingly, we affirm Seals’s conviction.
BACKGROUND
One early morning in February 2019, Carlos Guerrero,
Robert Jojola, Arlando Martinez, and Carlos Valencia were inside
a tent on a sidewalk in Hollywood. Dillion Mahoney and his
girlfriend slept in another tent nearby.
Around 5:00 a.m., Seals stopped his car near the tents and
began “honking aggressively.” Guerrero confronted Seals and
asked him to stop honking his car’s horn. Seals pulled his car to
the curb, with his driver’s side window facing the sidewalk. Seals
and Guerrero started arguing.
After Mahoney heard Seals say “I’ll fuck you up” or “I’ll
beat your ass” to Guerrero, Mahoney approached Seals and asked
him to “take it somewhere else.” Seals told Mahoney that he
would “fuck [Mahoney] up.” Mahoney then slammed his hand on
Seals’s driver’s side window several times trying “to seem
intimidating.” Seals told Mahoney, “I got something for you,”
before driving away.
Seals drove to the next intersection, made a U-turn, and
stopped his car across the street from the tents. Seals then got
out of his car, opened the back door, and retrieved something
from the back passenger area of the car before returning to the
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driver’s seat. Mahoney thought “something bad [was] about to
happen,” so he grabbed a pair of bolt cutters and stood in front of
his tent.
Seals then pulled his car within about a foot from where
Mahoney and Guerrero were standing and rolled down the front
passenger side window. Before anyone approached his car, Seals
raised his right arm and pointed a gun at Guerrero. Mahoney
testified that he swung his bolt cutters at the passenger side
mirror of Seals’s car, knocking part of the mirror off, after Seals
pointed his gun at Guerrero but before Seals fired any shots.
Another witness testified that Mahoney did not swing his bolt
cutters until after Seals fired at, and missed, Guerrero.
Immediately after shooting at Guerrero, Seals fired a shot at
Mahoney, striking him near his pelvis. Seals then drove away.
He was arrested a couple of days later.
The People charged Seals with two counts of attempted
premeditated murder (counts 1 and 2) and two counts of assault
with a firearm (counts 3 and 4). As to count 3, the People alleged
that Seals personally inflicted great bodily injury on Mahoney
under Penal Code1 section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and that he
personally used a handgun under section 12022.5,
subdivision (a). The People further alleged that Seals suffered a
prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of
the “Three Strikes” law.
A jury convicted Seals of assault with a firearm on count 3,
and it found true the great bodily injury and firearm
enhancements for that count. The jury did not reach a verdict on
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
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counts 1, 2, or 4. After Seals admitted the prior strike conviction,
the trial court sentenced him to 19 years in prison.
DISCUSSION
“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was
prejudicial.” (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1211 (Scott);
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) We defer to
counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a
presumption counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986,
1009.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for
ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or
omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide
one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.”
(Ibid.) Typically, if “the record does not shed light on why
counsel acted or failed to act in the challenged manner, we must
reject the claim on appeal unless counsel was asked for and failed
to provide a satisfactory explanation, or there simply can be no
satisfactory explanation.” (Scott, at p. 1212.)
Prejudice is shown when there is a reasonable probability
that but for counsel’s error the result of the proceeding would
have been different. “ ‘A reasonable probability is [one] sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (Scott, supra,
15 Cal.4th at pp. 1211–1212.) “It is not sufficient to show the
alleged errors may have had some conceivable effect on the trial’s
outcome; the defendant must demonstrate a ‘reasonable
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probability’ that absent the errors the result would have been
different.” (People v. Mesa (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1008.)
A defendant is not guilty of assault if he acts in self-
defense. (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064.)
The defendant must have a reasonable belief that he is in
imminent danger of suffering great bodily injury or death and
that immediate use of force is necessary to defend against that
danger. (Id. at pp. 1064–1065.) The defendant must not use
more force than is reasonably necessary to defend against the
perceived danger. (Id. at p. 1065.) A defendant acting in self-
defense has no duty to retreat. (People v. Hatchett (1942)
56 Cal.App.2d 20, 22.) Instead, the defendant may stand his
ground and defend himself when attacked, and he may pursue
the attacker until the danger has passed. (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the principles of
self-defense using CALCRIM Nos. 3470 (right to self-defense for
non-homicide offenses), 3471 (right to self-defense where there is
mutual combat or defendant is the initial aggressor), 3472 (right
to self-defense may not be contrived), and 3476 (right to defend
real or personal property). Seals’s counsel did not request, and
the trial court did not provide, optional language included in
CALCRIM No. 3470 addressing a defendant’s right to stand his
ground: “A defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is
entitled to stand his or her ground and defend himself or herself
and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue an assailant until the
danger of (death/bodily injury/[or other crime]) has passed. This
is so even if safety could have been achieved by retreating.”
Seals argues that his counsel should have requested the
optional language from CALCRIM No. 3470 describing his right
to stand his ground. Seals claims that language was necessary to
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explain to the jury that once he confronted Mahoney and
Guerrero the second time, he had no duty to retreat before he
fired his gun at the two men. As we explain, counsel’s failure to
request a no duty to retreat instruction was not deficient because
the evidence did not support that instruction.
Seals initiated both confrontations with Mahoney and was
the first to engage in threatening behavior during each
confrontation. During the first confrontation, Seals stopped his
car next to where Mahoney, Guerrero, and several other
individuals slept in tents. Seals began aggressively honking his
horn, causing Guerrero and some of the other individuals to ask
Seals to stop. After Seals threatened to assault those individuals,
Mahoney asked Seals to be quiet. Seals told Mahoney that he
would “fuck [Mahoney] up.” Mahoney slammed his fist on Seals’s
window to intimidate Seals. Seals then drove away. At that
point, any potential threat from Mahoney was gone.
Seals voluntarily confronted Mahoney again, when he
drove his car back to where Mahoney and Guerrero were
standing. Although Mahoney was now holding a pair of bolt
cutters, there is no evidence that he immediately approached
Seals or immediately engaged in threatening or aggressive
behavior toward Seals. Rather, the evidence shows that Seals
was the first to act in an aggressive or threatening manner by
stopping his car next to where Mahoney and Guerrero were
standing and pointing his gun at Guerrero. It was not until after
Seals raised his gun that Mahoney swung his bolt cutters at
Seals’s car.
Seals argues his counsel’s failure to request a no duty to
retreat instruction was unreasonable because counsel questioned
prospective jurors about that instruction during voir dire. But, as
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we just explained, the evidence that was presented at trial did
not support a no duty to retreat instruction. While counsel may
have believed before trial that the instruction would be pertinent
to Seals’s defense, counsel could have realized after the evidence
phase of trial that the instruction was not supported by the
evidence. Counsel’s failure to request that instruction, therefore,
was not deficient.
Seals also argues that the instruction was warranted
because the prosecutor argued during closing argument that
Seals could have driven away from the scene to avoid further
confrontation with Mahoney. Specifically, Seals points to the
following portion of the prosecutor’s argument, “The defendant
had choices. He could have driven off. He could have left. He
could have done a U-turn and gone the opposite direction. He
could have decided to put the gun away and keep the gun away.
There’s so many things he could have done.” Seals does not cite
or discuss, however, what the prosecutor said next: “[Seals] put
himself in that situation. Why? Because he had already made
up his decision that he was going to shoot at the victims. He
made that decision back when he first threatened them and said,
I’ve got something for you. I’ve got something for you.”
Considered in context, it is clear that the prosecutor’s argument
that Seals cites was referring to when Seals first drove away from
the scene, before he returned to confront Mahoney and Guerrero
with a gun. Indeed, this argument is consistent with the People’s
theory that Seals instigated both encounters.
In short, the evidence did not support a no duty to retreat
instruction. Accordingly, Seals could not have been prejudiced by
any omission on his counsel’s part to request such an instruction.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
SCHERB, J.
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